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The interpretive work of analytic philosophers in the Thomist tradition, such as 
Anthony Kenny and Robert Pasnau, has been significant not only for historical accounts 
of medieval thought, but also for contemporary philosophy. It is remarkable that in all of 
this literature, the great opponent of Aquinas in philosophy and theology, John Pecham 
(d. 1292), is largely omitted. In this dissertation I will examine two Pecham texts that 
have not been properly studied to date, and that deal with the issues of the life and mind 
of the human person. The first text is the Tractatus De Anima. The Tractatus is from the 
latter part of Pecham’s career, and so stated positions in this work can be treated as his 
mature views. The second work is the fifth of Pecham’s disputed Quaestiones De Anima 
!v
 David C. Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” John Pecham and the Science of Optics, ed. 1
Lindberg (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), 5-6; Decima Douie, 
Archbishop Pecham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 11.
(probably 1269-1271 ), which situates him in the context of debates with Aquinas and 1
Latin Averroism.  2
I will show how these two texts support the following thesis: John Pecham’s 
philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of Neoplatonic 
metaphysics, and is a significant alternative to Aquinas’s anthropology.  
Proving this thesis to be correct will involve showing that, in his controversy with 
Aquinas, Pecham was neither insisting on a minor point nor obviously misguided (as has 
been alleged in contemporary literature), but was rather working to defend and preserve 
what he considered to be broadly important truth. By providing an interpretation of 
central texts and showing Pecham’s distinctiveness, I hope to open the question of his 
significance.  
I will first describe who Pecham was and what he did. To place Pecham in his 
historical context, I will discuss a movement, Neo-Augustinianism, in which he was a 
!vi
 Modern usage, following Fernand van Steenberghen, suggests the use of “heterodox 2
Aristotelianism” or “radical Aristotelianism” instead of “Latin Averroism” (Thomas 
Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism [Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 
1980]; Aristotle in the West: The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism [Louvain: E. 
Nauwelaerts, 1955], 204-208; John F. Wippel, Mediaeval Reactions to the Encounter 
Between Faith and Reason [Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995], 14; cf. John 
Marenbon, Late Medieval Philosophy [New York: Routledge, 1987], 73-74). However, I 
think “Latin Averroism” denotes the movement more clearly. Marenbon writes that Van 
Steenberghen is “right to stress that the so-called Averroists wished to be Aristotelians, 
and that they were in many respects distant from Ibn Rushd’s real thought; but the link 
with Averroes—Ibn Rushd as seen through Latin eyes—is essential to their 
approach” (“Dante’s Averroism,” Poetry and Philosophy in the Middle Ages: A 
Festschrift for Peter Dronke, ed. Marenbon [Leiden: Brill, 2001], 353). 
leader. While it is difficult to determine precisely the positions that constituted Neo-
Augustinian philosophy, it is possible to understand generally what the movement was 
and how Pecham’s views relate to it. As I explicate Pecham’s philosophical psychology, it 
will become obvious that he cannot be construed as being simply an “Augustinian,” but 
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John Pecham was a Franciscan theologian who took both a strongly anti-Thomist 
position and a strongly anti-Averroist position in late-13th-century debates in philosophy 
of mind. Following a successful career as a theologian, Pecham was Archbishop of 
Canterbury from 1279 until his death in 1292. Despite the facts that (1) he represented a 
viable theological and philosophical perspective in his day, (2) he was involved directly 
in major debates with Aquinas and other masters at the university of Paris, and (3) a 
number of his philosophical writings are extant, Pecham has been studied far less than 
other medieval thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Bonaventure, and the 
Latin Averroists.   
My thesis is this: John Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, 
original synthesis of Neoplatonic metaphysics, and is a significant alternative to 
Aquinas’s anthropology.  
Arguing for this thesis will involve supporting a number of sub-theses, which will be 
largely based on my exegesis of Pecham’s texts (primarily in chapters two and three of 
the present study), especially his Tractatus De Anima  and quaestio five of his 1
!1
 Ed. P. Gaudentis Melani (Florence: Stabilimenti Grafici Vallecchi, 1948). All references 1
to the Pecham’s Tractatus are to the Tractatus De Anima, unless otherwise noted.
Quaestiones De Anima.  I will also refer to relevant passages in others of Pecham’s 2
works: Quaestiones De Beatitudine Corporis et Animae,  Quaestiones Selectae ex 3
Commentario Super I. Sententiarum,  other portions of Pecham’s commentary on the first 4
book of Peter Lombard’s Sentences,  the Summa de Esse et Essentia,  and Pecham’s 5 6
Quodlibeta Quatuor.   7
It is particularly important to give an exposé of the Tractatus and quaestio five in 
detail. Both texts are replete with Pecham’s citation of his philosophical and theological 
sources, and a consideration of how Pecham organizes and uses these sources to advance 
his agenda is the subject of the fifth chapter of the present study. Both texts contain 
arguments throughout that will serve as evidence to support claims I make about 
Pecham’s position in comparison with Aquinas’ position. This is the subject of the sixth 
chapter. Furthermore, with the exception of Girard Etzkorn’s and Hieronymus 
Spettmann’s work, the Pecham texts have not been studied in-depth in the scholarship 
(usually study of Pecham has been done briefly and only to aid in understanding Aquinas’ 
work). The present study is an effort to begin to correct this oversight. Though the 
!2
 Quaestiones Disputatae, ed. Girard Etzkorn, Franciscana Scholastica 28 (Grottaferrata: 2
College of St. Bonaventure Press, 2002). Unless otherwise noted, all references to 
Pecham’s Quaestiones refers to the Quaestiones De Anima.
 This text is also included in Etzkorn’s Quaestiones Disputatae. 3
 Johannis Pechami Quaestiones: Tractantes De Anima, ed. Hieronymus Spettmann 4
(Munster: Monasterii Guestfalorum, 1918), 183-221. 
 Included as an appendix in Melani’s edition of the Tractatus (129-138).5
 Ferdinand Delorme, “La Summa de Esse et Essentia de Jean Peckham, Archevêque de 6
Cantorbéry,” ed. Delorme, Studi Francescani 14 (1928): 56-71.
 Ed. Etzkorn and Delorme, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica 25 (Grottaferrata: 7
College of St. Bonaventure Press, 1989), 171-295. The fourth Quodlibet was edited by 
Delorme and revised by Etzkorn.
detailed exegesis of the primary Pecham texts serves to support my thesis, the exegesis 
will also enhance future Pecham scholarship. 
In order to facilitate my comparison between Pecham and Aquinas, I must also give 
an exposé of relevant Aquinas material. I will focus on Aquinas’s arguments against 
Averroism from the following texts: Questions on the Soul (ca. 1269),  The Treatise on 8
Human Nature: Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89,  and Against the Averroists On There Being 9
Only One Intellect (ca. 1269).  The reader may wonder why so much space is given to 10
the study of Aquinas in a dissertation that is focused on Pecham. There are four reasons 
why I give so much attention to Aquinas in chapters four and six of the present study:  
(1) Aquinas’s work represents an important response to a major view of psychology 
in the 13th century, namely Latin Averroism. Pecham also criticizes Latin Averroism 
during the same period, thus a careful study of Pecham’s psychology should naturally 
include some discussion of Aquinas.  A comparison reveals stark differences between 11
Pecham’s response and Aquinas’s response. These differences are rooted in basic 
principles of their understanding of the human person, and so it is unsurprising that a 
!3
 On the date of the writing of the Quaestiones, see Quaestiones, 2-3.  8
 The Summa Theologiae was “probably begun in 1265, and remained unfinished at 9
Aquinas’ death” (Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh, “Thomas Aquinas,” in Philosophy 
in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed., ed. Hyman and Walsh [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1973], 506); 
cf. Jean-Pierre Torrell, Aquinas’s Summa: Background, Structure, & Reception 
(Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 9-10. 
 Cf. Ralph McInerny and John O’Callaghan, “Saint Thomas Aquinas,” Stanford 10
University, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/ (2009). 
 In fact, a thorough discussion of many aspects of Pecham’s philosophy would include a 11
discussion of Aquinas (see Etzkorn, “Franciscan Quodlibeta 1270-1285: John Pecham. 
Matthew of Aquasparta, and Roger Marston,” Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle 
Ages, ed. Christopher David Schabel [Leiden: Brill, 2006], 136-139).
close study of Aquinas’s texts relevant to Latin Averroism is also helpful in understanding 
Aquinas’ anthropology overall. With a broad understanding of Aquinas’s anthropology, 
one is in a position to compare Pecham and Aquinas.  
(2) While Pecham’s differences from Aquinas on the topic of the eternity of the world 
have been studied in some depth, the differences between the two thinkers on the topic of 
the soul and the nature of the human person have been less studied. Pecham has been 
dismissed as being obviously misguided or as failing to see that the philosophical 
controversy with Aquinas (especially on the matter of the unity of form) did not amount 
to much. However, Pecham treats the differences between Aquinas and himself as being 
very serious. A detailed study of Aquinas’s views on the matter can help us in evaluating 
whether Pecham or the contemporary scholarship is correct on this point.  
(3) Given that the differences between Pecham and Aquinas have been little studied, 
modern scholarship has failed to consider the possibility that Pecham’s anthropology is 
comparable to Aquinas’s in consistency and explanatory power. The occasion of this 
dissertation seemed a good opportunity to begin to correct this oversight.  
(4) Purely in the interest of fairness toward Aquinas, I wanted to focus extensively on 
his own texts just as I have focused on Pecham’s texts. I did not want to rely merely on 
secondary sources in order to understand Aquinas’s psychology. 
I hope that, given these four reasons, the reader will appreciate the necessity of the 
excursion into Aquinas’s thought in chapters four and six of the present study.  
!4
My thesis, as stated above, is supported by various strands of evidence from diverse 
sources.  Therefore, in the rest of this introduction I will summarize the dissertation’s six 12
chapters, showing how the evidence presented throughout each chapter supports my 
thesis. Here is a broad overview:  
• Chapter one is an introduction to Pecham and his work, and a contextualization 
of his work in the history of philosophy and theology.  
• Chapters two, three, and four are expositions of the relevant Pecham and 
Aquinas texts.  
• Chapters five and six are interpretations of the data explicated in chapters two 
through four. Chapter five will prove the first part of my thesis (i.e., that 
Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original 
synthesis of Neoplatonic metaphysics). Chapter six will prove the second part of 
my thesis (i.e., that Pecham’s anthropology is a significant alternative to that of 
Aquinas). 
Chapter One 
Three logical conditions for Pecham meriting scholarly attention at all, even in a 
dissertation, are: (1) The study has not already been done. (2) We already know 
something about who he is. (3) We have some idea of his philosophical work. Therefore 
in this chapter I will begin by briefly reviewing the secondary literature that describes 
Pecham’s life and work, arguing that there are lacunae in scholarship, where it would 
have been beneficial to investigate debates between Pecham and Aquinas (the present 
study will begin to correct these oversights). Second, I will give an overview of Pecham’s 
life and career, as presented in the secondary literature, in order to contextualize his work. 
This section will show something of the kind of man Pecham was and that he had 
!5
 For brevity, I am using few footnotes in this introduction; many of the introduction’s 12
claims will be supported in the chapters to follow. 
basically the same agenda throughout his career—to preserve what he considered to be 
orthodox Christianity in a world greatly affected by philosophers from the Islamic world 
and the new Aristotelianism. 
Pecham’s work cannot be placed in its historical context unless consideration is given 
to his role in a movement that developed among the Franciscans in Paris in the 1270s and 
has come to be known as “Neo-Augustinianism.” Pecham’s conception of orthodoxy, in a 
European world surrounded by and influenced by an intellectually powerful Islam, 
centered on positions taken to be representative of Augustine but which were, in fact, 
conditioned by a number of Neoplatonic, Jewish, and Arabic sources. It has been 
suggested that Pecham was in some sense a “founder” of Neo-Augustinianism and that 
Bonaventure and Pecham were seminal figures in the movement. While this appears to be 
roughly correct, there has been great debate about the philosophical contours of the 
movement and therefore at this time it is impossible to precisely state Pecham’s role in 
the movement’s development. Still, evidence from our Pecham texts suggests that he was 
promoting a particular kind of “Augustinianism.” Pecham refers to Augustinian doctrines 
in a framework that results largely from his reading of four authors in particular: 
Avicenna, Avicebron,  Dominicus Gundissalinus, and Pseudo-Dionysius. Our works 13
place Pecham in a Neoplatonic tradition that gives special credence to what is taken to be 
Augustine’s position; using a wide array of authors, Pecham endorses emanationist 
!6
 While contemporary usage would dictate I use ‘Ibn Gabirol’ rather than ‘Avicebron,’ I 13
will respect medieval usage and refer to the author of the Fons Vitae as Avicebron.
metaphysics, universal hylomorphism, spiritual matter, seminal reasons, and divine 
illumination.  
Finally, I will discuss Pecham’s argumentative approach. The new reader of the 
Tractatus De Anima and quaestio five may be put off because Pecham often does not 
spend much time on each point, but rather presents a series of brief arguments to support 
his claims. In support of Pecham, I suggest two things: (1) There are plausible ways of 
reading Pecham that vindicate him of the charge of using an unphilosophical approach. 
(2) Pecham exhibits (especially in the Quaestiones) the ability to write in-depth 
philosophical criticism that is much deeper than recitation of stock arguments.  
Chapter Two 
This chapter begins a basic task that has yet to be done, i.e., the exposition of 
Pecham’s psychological texts. In this chapter I will first introduce the literary form of the 
disputed question, saying something about how it developed and how it was carried out 
in the philosophical context of the medieval university. I will then give an exposé of 
Pecham’s psychology as presented in the fifth of his Quaestiones De Anima, which has 
been edited by Girard Etzkorn on the basis of a previous edition by Hieronymus 
Spettmann.  This quaestio contains many of Pecham’s arguments against the Latin 14
Averroists.  
!7
 Etzkorn says that his edition generally agrees with the former edition by Spettmann (in 14
the Tractantes De Anima, 1-104); the main new contribution is the updating of the notes 
to conform with modern critical editions (Quaestiones, introduction, xviii).
Averroes  was not unusual in positing a separate agent intellect, but he was unique in 15
positing a separate material (or passive) intellect. The Averroes translator and editor 
Richard C. Taylor writes: 
Following Aristotle’s suggestions in De Anima 3.5 and the explicit accounts of the 
Greek commentators Alexander and Themistius, and also Avicenna, Alfarabi, and 
others of the Arabic tradition, Averroes asserts that a separate and transcendent 
Agent Intellect is needed to bring about the actuality of knowledge experienced 
by human beings. The “light” of this Agent Intellect fully distills the form from 
the purified yet still individual intention and actualizes the form as an actual 
intelligible in the separate Material Intellect. In this process ... individual human 
beings provide intentions which the separate Material and Agent Intellects process 
into intelligibles in act. This is a conjunction or conjoining ... which brings about 
the acquired intellect ... in the individual human being. As a result of this, the 
individual attains the intellect in a positive disposition of knowledge ... which 
connects the individual human being in an abiding way with the Material Intellect 
where the intelligibles in act exist.  16
The view that there is one common intellect for all human beings is also called 
monopsychism. Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia are the most notable exponents 
of Latin Averroism, and by the late 1260s and 1270s there was already considerable 
opposition to their views.  Dominicans and Franciscans were not unified in their shared 17
opposition to Averroist doctrines. Yet, Franciscans viewed the Dominicans Aquinas and 
Albert the Great with almost as much suspicion as they viewed the Averroists, because 
both groups were integrating Aristotle in what the Franciscans considered to be an 
unacceptable fashion.   18
!8
 For ease of use, I will use the Latinized Averroes instead of Ibn Rushd, throughout (see 15
Richard C. Taylor, “Averroes,” A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge 
J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone [Hoboken: Wiley and Sons, 2008], 182). 
 “Averroes,” 191.16
 See Wippel, “The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris,” Journal of Medieval and 17
Renaissance Studies 7, no. 1 (1977): 177. 
 See Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 15.18
Here then, is a brief summarization of the arguments found in quaestio five:  
Pecham begins his responsio by saying that the Catholic faith supports the view that 
there is one rational soul for each individual, and that this position has never been 
doubted by the saints (the sancti, or learned doctors of the church). Yet, Pecham says that 
the Averroist error concerning the common intellect still needs to be destroyed “in its 
foundations.” Thus, Pecham will argue against what he takes to be the three fundamental 
erroneous propositions advanced by monopsychism:  
(1) The possible [material] intellect is substantially free from matter. This radical 
dissociation of the intellect from corporeality has the unfortunate consequences that 
individuals can no longer be said to have their own proper intellect, and that the intellect 
is no longer a perfection of each individual human corporeal being. Here, Pecham 
presents his own view on the connection between the possible intellect and matter: The 
intellect (active and possible) perfects corporeal matter without being dependent on it for 
its own very being and without being an epiphenomenon to matter. This leads Pecham to 
explain not only how the soul perfects the body, but also how the body perfects the soul. 
Thus, there may be a sense in which Pecham is not a radical dualist with regard to the 
body/soul unity.  
(2) There is only one active intellect for all men. Pecham objects not only to the 
doctrine that the possible intellect is singular, but also to the doctrine that the active 
intellect is singular. For Pecham, each particular human being has his own proper 
intellect, including his own active intellect. For Averroes to say that a common intellect 
receives phantasms from individual people, he must deny even that the soul is inclined to 
!9
a particular body. Furthermore, since understanding occurs at various times and only 
temporarily, a single intellect cannot perfect many individuals, and a single act of 
understanding cannot be alike in all people.  
(3) The individual human being uses the single, separate intellect. This position 
actually works against monopsychism because it allows that the individual human being 
thinks to himself about his own faith and justice, and these are objects that he could not 
consider by looking outside of his own, particularized experience. Thus, Pecham appeals 
to phenomenological experience, and looks to Augustine for support. Furthermore, 
Pecham points to what he believes are inconsistencies in Averroes’ account: Averroes 
says that the individual human being is defined by universal reason and that universal, 
common reason perfects the individual, yet monopsychism conflicts with this. If the 
individual human being is not defined by reason, then he cannot make a rational choice 
and cannot be held accountable for what he does.  
In the contra section of the quaestio, Pecham cites 15 additional arguments against 
the Averroist position. Some arguments are based squarely on scriptural authority, 
philosophical authority (Aristotle), or theological authority (Augustine, Gennadius). 
Some arguments deal with problems that Pecham perceives to be inherent in Averroes’ 
writing. Still others are based on Pecham’s own presuppositions about the soul. Perhaps 
the most important arguments from a philosophical perspective are the sixth and seventh, 
which deal with the suitability of the possible intellect to do what the Averroist position 
requires it to do. Here, Pecham provides his most detailed understanding of Averroism, 
and argues that if the possible intellect is united to individuals through the phantasms that 
!10
individual corporeal beings supply (as Averroes says), then knowledge cannot be 
common to all humans. In the seventh argument, Pecham goes further to argue that there 
is no plausible way for phantasms to serve as the connection between a single possible 
intellect and multiple psycho-biological individuals. Pecham continues this attack on 
Averroes’ account of phantasms in the 12th argument.  
In the ostenditur quod sic section, and in the corresponding ad argumenta principalia 
section, Pecham brings up 25 possible arguments in favor of monopsychism, and 
responds to almost all of them (perhaps to all of them by implication). Again, some 
arguments are based on philosophical or theological authority. Some are based on 
epistemological principles. Still others are based on ontological concerns about plurality, 
singularity, and individuation, or concerns about generation and corruption. Then, there 
are problems related to the simplicity of the soul, and to the possibility that there would 
be an infinity of souls if there were more than one intellect. Of particular interest is the 
first argument, which states that truth is unified and cannot be numbered, therefore truth 
can reside only in one mind. Pecham answers by explaining that propositions are known 
to be true in three ways, each of which must be included in an account of the status of 
truth in the mind of a knower. The fourth argument in favor of monopsychism is related: 
If two people understand the same thing, then they must have the same intelligible 
species in their mind; if there is more than one mind, then the species must be different in 
some respect, and therefore two people could not both understand exactly the same thing. 
Pecham responds by saying that intelligible species can be numerically diverse yet 
!11
substantially alike. To illustrate this, Pecham compares intelligible species and rays from 
the sun. 
Chapter Three 
In the third chapter I will explicate Pecham’s psychology as presented in his Tractatus 
De Anima, which has been edited by P. Gaudentis Melani. We may take the Tractatus as 
Pecham’s mature statement about the nature of the soul. In the Tractatus Pecham clearly 
presents his final synthesis, providing some of his most notable positions and evidence 
that he is working within a particular framework. The Tractatus is divided into three parts 
with multiple chapters in each part. The first part is on the operation of the soul, the 
second part on the powers of the soul, and the third part on the substance of the soul, but 
it is not always clear how the divisions govern the content. Thankfully the chapter titles 
provide clearer structure. Chapter three below contains the exposition of the Tractatus, so 
in this introduction I will merely mention some major themes that animate the Tractatus 
and that are particularly helpful in forming basis for my interpretive arguments. 
In the Tractatus Pecham presents his doctrine of “life,” wherein the fundamental act 
of the soul (or “form”) is life. Here, life refers basically to an operation that is prior to the 
operation of the nutritive and sensitive aspects of the soul. Life is a drive toward 
completion. The life of the ensouled being comes about as a result of an emanation and 
an impression whereby the life of the soul “overflows” into the life of the body. The body 
is disposed (evidently by its vegetative and sensitive aspects) to receive the rational soul. 
Pecham insists that the rational soul can be united only to the human body, because only 
the human body has a mediating disposition that is specified by its animal spirits.  
!12
On Pecham’s view, a living thing’s fundamental form is life itself, and this principle is 
irreducible to any other form. The tripartite soul of the human being is responsible for the 
fulfillment of the potencies of life in the individual. Having equated life with form, 
Pecham mentions other vital forms, thus making clear his view that there exists a 
plurality of substantial forms in the person.  In addition to the form that is the driving 19
force of life, there is a form of corporeity (forma corporeitatis) in matter, and the 
!13
 Franciscans, perhaps inspired by Pecham, adjusted the plurality view and spoke instead 19
of grades of a single form (e.g., Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, ed. Girard J. 
Etzkorn and Ignatius Brady [Florence: Quaracchi, 1968], 2:22; cf. Etzkorn, “John 
Pecham,” A Companion, 385; Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 280). This can be read as an 
attempt to reconcile with Aristotle. Unfortunately, Pecham’s major treatment of this issue 
has been lost (see Etzkorn, “John Pecham, O.F.M.: A Career of Controversy,” Monks, 
Nuns, and Friars in Mediaeval Society, ed. E.B. King, et al. [Sewanee, TN: The Press of 
the University of the South, 1989], 79). In the Tractatus Pecham speaks explicitly about a 
plurality of forms and does not discuss the “grades” theory, and so I will primarily focus 
on the more general plurality view without the “grades” refinement. However, Pecham 
does endorse the grades view in his Quodlibeta Quatuor (ed. Etzkorn and Delorme 
[Grottaferrata: College of St. Bonaventure], 198-199, 230-231): “Dicendum igitur quod 
sicut coniunctio principiorum—materiae et formae—dat esse, eorumdem indivisio dat 
unum esse: ‘unum enim est ens quod non dividitur’. Ex prima autem coniunctione formae 
cum materia causatur unitas, scilicet ex coniunctione formae primae substantialis cum 
materia prima, quia ‘simul est substantia et haec substantia’. Et ideo superveniens mutatio 
formarum naturalium in esse physico circa substantiam non mutat identitatem numeralem 
substantiae vel corporis per se, quia vivum et mortuum nihil faciunt ad essentiam 
corporeitatis, quamvis mutent esse specificum generis naturalis infimi et quorumdam 
subalternorum. Sub transmutatione enim simul manent materia, potentia et forma prima 
substantialis, quia sola materia non est subiectum. . . . Dicendum igitur quod anima 
rationalis non est forma corporis, secundum quod corpus est, immo praesupponit 
corporeitatem, cuius forma non corrumpitur per adventum animae, quia nullam habet 
cum ipsa corporeitatem. Praeterea, corporeitas supponitur in definitione animae, quae est 
‘actus corporis organici physici potentia vitam habentis’ ... [D]icendum quod in corpore 
hominis, secundum quod corpus est, omnes formae quattuor elementorum reductae sunt 
in unam formam mixti; non cuiuscumque mixtionis, sed illius quae est propria 
complexionis humanae. Unde nulla est ibi forma elementaris quantum ad formarum 
simplicitatem. Unde sunt in homine formae plures gradatim ordinatae ad unam ultimam 
perfectionem, et ideo formatum est unum.” 
vegetative, sensitive, and intellective forms. Each form has its own perfection. The 
rational soul is unique among these forms because, while other forms receive the 
foundation of their existence from natural generation in matter, the pure, rational intellect 
does not need matter in order to exist. Although the intellect requires the body in order to 
accomplish some of its purposes, its primary role is not to be involved in particular bodily 
events but rather to empower any human activity whatsoever, and to contemplate the 
divine. On the other extreme of Pecham’s Neoplatonic hierarchy of organisms are the 
plants, which have “the farthest resonance of life.”  
Pecham endorses universal hylomophism, the view that “all substances except God 
were composed of matter and form, whereas God is immaterial.”  According to universal 20
hylomorphism, everything other than God (including angels and the rational souls of 
human beings) is composed of both spiritual matter and spiritual form. Pecham takes 
matter to be the principle of changeability, so matter may or may not involve corporeality. 
An angel, for example, has spiritual matter, which allows it to change or sin. 
The rational soul is marked by the image of God and ordered to intellectual 
illumination and has matter, but does not have corporeal matter as part of its essence. 
Pecham does not spell out a detailed illuminationist epistemology here, but does imply 
that divine light is involved at all levels of life and is required for any knowledge. The 
sensitive soul receives corporeal forms incorporeally, whereas the intellective soul 
receives its forms from above. Yet, the intellect has a managerial role over the body such 
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that numerous potencies are all involved in a single human function. The body allows for 
the intellect to be “perfected, sanctified, and cleansed.”  
As the Tractatus is a treatment of every aspect of the soul and not just of the 
intellectual soul, Pecham gives attention not only to the intellect but also to the sensitive 
soul. Visual perception of particular objects occurs through a combination of intromission 
and extramission, and Pecham is evidently operating with a corporeal species model 
similar to that of Roger Bacon’s Perspectiva and De Multiplicatione Specierum.  For 21
any apprehended thing to be known intellectually, a mental similitude of it must be 
assimilated to an eternal exemplar. The soul is totally assimilable, yet it is structured in 
the sense that it is partially responsible for its own transformation into various similitudes 
or species, just as the wax is potentially in the shape of the seal.  
This obviously raises the question of what God contributes to intellection and what is 
left for man and the objects of intellection to contribute. There are several aspects to 
Pecham’s answer in the Tractatus. (1) Angelic intermediaries assist in human knowledge 
by providing illuminations. Angels do not impart their own knowledge, but rather remove 
impediments between the human and knowledge. (2) Human knowledge is never 
produced from the complete absence of previous knowledge. New knowledge is always  
based either on some memory or upon some illumination. (3) Divine light cooperates in 
some sense in the production of intelligible species from corporeal species and in the 
production of understanding based on the species. Pecham explains by comparing 
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intellectual “vision” to corporeal vision. The light of the sun is required for corporeal 
vision, and divine light is required for intellectual vision; the intellect has an active power 
that produces similitudes, but this production is only by virtue of the superior light from 
God in whom everything is known. In particular, genuine knowledge occurs when the 
knower comprehends things in light of their “ultimate forms,” which are available only in 
God. Pecham goes into some detail and illustration about how the intellect is completed 
through divine light. 
Pecham says that there is both a created and an uncreated agent intellect. The 
uncreated agent intellect is God (or the divine light) and provides the illuminations 
discussed above, and the human agent intellect is the active power that abstracts species 
from the phantasms. The individual human being’s active intellect also unites with the 
individual’s possible intellect, which is the principle of openness/possibility in the 
intellect whereby it is assimilable to objects. There is also an active and passive aspect of 
the human memory.  
At this point Pecham takes a bit of an excursion—albeit an important one—to explain 
how love is the appetite which is the basis for all teleology. A creature has a desire 
(appetitus) for vital movement, and desire gives rise to love, which is the main 
motivating factor in free choice.  In fact, Pecham portrays love as the principle by which 22
all of the passions are defined. Human love is imperfect because of embodiment (similar 
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to how the intellect is troubled by the ineptitude of the body), and so love must be 
purified by the rule of the Holy Spirit in order to function as “divine love.” The passions 
are functions of both the sensitive and the intellective soul; thus Pecham endorses a 
doctrine of rational will. Pecham argues that the soul’s conjoining with God (portrayed as 
a mystical ascent) is accomplished through the will, which must be purified by grace. 
Therefore the same “father of lights” who makes intellectual illumination and knowledge 
possible also makes rectitude of will possible.  
Pecham now provides a sort of map of the soul, by discussing the soul’s powers. He 
first shows how the soul is divided into virtual parts. The soul is not a mass, but it can 
nevertheless be divided according to its various principles. The soul is essentially present 
in every part of the body; e.g., the sensitive soul perfects the various sense organs by 
providing the potencies with which they are associated. The intellectual powers, however, 
are “streamed in by no organ” (nulli organo influuntur). In breaking down the soul’s 
powers and in mapping the intellect’s connection to the various parts of brain, Pecham 
follows Avicenna, but takes opportunities to show how his explanation accords with 
Aristotle. Of particular interest is Pecham’s view that no medium falls between the 
intellect and itself; nonetheless, because of the instability of corporeal embodiment, the 
soul cannot have complete, self-identical understanding.  
At the end of the Tractatus, Pecham presents a series of 10 arguments for the rational 
soul’s survival of the body’s death. A number of these arguments are reflective of 
Augustine’s arguments in On the Immortality of the Soul and of Gundissalinus’ work on 
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the same subject.  There are five arguments that consist of negative responses to 23
arguments in favor of the soul’s annihilation. There are then five arguments that can be 
read as positive arguments for the soul’s immortality.  
Chapter Four 
In the fourth chapter I will explicate Aquinas’s arguments against the Averroists as 
presented in a number of his writings: Questions on the Soul,  The Treatise on Human 24
Nature: Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89,  and Against the Averroists On There Being Only 25
One Intellect.  As with Pecham’s Tractatus, I will not attempt to summarize all of these 26
passages in this introduction, but will merely give a broad overview to make easier the 
reading of the exposition. There is some repetition among the three works. 
In the Against the Averroists, Aquinas insists that he is making philosophical 
arguments against Averroism instead of basing his objections on theological 
presuppositions. The first set of arguments deals with Aquinas’s interpretation of 
Aristotle. At issue is the Averroists’ failure to understand Aristotle, who says that the soul 
is the first act of a physical, organic body. Thus at least some part of the soul must be 
inseparable from the body, but Aquinas maintains that Averroes’ position disallows 
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inseparability. Aquinas admits that it is possible to argue for a single agent intellect 
(although Aquinas thinks that Aristotle did not argue for this), but not for the single 
possible intellect.  
A repeated theme in Against the Averroists (and in Aquinas’s Quaestiones) is the 
difference between Aristotle’s view of the soul, whereby the soul is united to the body as 
form, and Plato’s view of the soul, whereby the soul is united to the body as mover (or a 
sailor is united to a ship). Aquinas insists that Aristotle never implies that the intellect is 
external to the individual human soul. In reality, Aquinas says, the soul is on the border 
between material and separated forms. Furthermore, Aquinas says that Plato erred in 
thinking that the soul is a complete species and only accidentally united to the body. For 
himself, Aquinas maintains that the soul can be the form of the body and yet there can be 
some power of the soul that is not a power of the body. (The broader principle at work 
here is that a power might belong to a form not in virtue of its relationship to some 
matter.) Even though the soul is the form of the body, it retains is being after the death of 
the body, because intellectual activity is not exercised by a bodily organ. In addressing 
the passage from Aristotle’s Generation of Animals that says that the intellect enters from 
outside,  Aquinas says that every act must correlate to a potency, and so the human must 27
possess intellection potentially before he possesses it actually.  
Aquinas provides a series of arguments to prove that the Averroists cannot account for 
individualized knowledge. Especially, the Averroists’ view of the conjunction between the 
proposed single mind and the imagination in the individual knower is faulty, because the 
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individual must know by his own power of knowing and not merely because he has 
contributed some images to an external mind that does the knowing. Phantasms are only 
“preambles” to actions of the mind, and so phantasms as such cannot differentiate 
between simultaneous intellectual acts. More generally, Averroists cannot explain the 
relationship between the species, phantasms, and the intellect. Even if it were allowed 
that a single intellect for all humans moves the individual man, the Averroists’ problem 
would not be solved, because the connection between the intellect and man does not 
explain how the individual man knows anything himself/herself. 
Aquinas responds to a number of objections to his view that there are a plurality of 
possible intellects. Particularly important is his response to the objection that if two 
people understand the same thing, then there can be only one understanding. Aquinas 
responds by saying that the object of the mind determines whether there is one 
understanding, and does not determine the number of intellects. Also, understanding 
occurs according to the mode of the one who is doing the understanding.  
In Aquinas’s response to the first of his Quaestiones De Anima, he argues for two 
important claims: (1) The human soul is both an entity and a form. In fact, the soul is a 
substance and has being, but apart from the body the soul has an incomplete nature and 
does not have existence. Both the body and the soul exist when they are together, and 
they go out of existence when they are separated (although the intellect does not go out of 
being when the body dies). The rational soul does not have a complete specific nature 
when separated from the body, however the rational soul has an operation that it carries 
out when separate from the body. (2) The soul is the form of a living body. One argument 
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that Aquinas gives for this claim is this: The soul gives being to a body. But to confer 
being is a characteristic of a form. Therefore, a human soul is the form of the body. 
Aquinas argues specifically against substance dualism on the basis that such a dualism 
makes the soul-body relationship accidental so that the separation between soul and body 
would not be a substantial corruption. Yet death does represent such a corruption, and so 
the soul completes human nature rather than representing a distinct nature in itself.  
Aquinas endorses a plurality of accidental forms, but maintains that there can be only 
one substantial form for a given organism at a time. Each new form takes the place of a 
previous form, which is corrupted. Thus Aquinas says that the intellective soul has the 
powers that the vegetative and sensitive souls had, just as a pentagon has in itself the 
triangle and the square.  
In the second quaestio, Aquinas maintains that humans must have a principle of 
intellectual potency, i.e., a principle that is unspecified with respect to intelligible forms. 
This indetermination is why the possible intellect can have no bodily organ; if it had an 
organ, it would be determined to a particular sensible nature. Still, Aquinas insists that the 
possible intellect is not so unmixed with matter that it is a substance separate from the 
body. This leads Aquinas to offer a number of criticisms of the Averroist positions about 
the possible intellect. These arguments are based on the inseparability between form and 
matter, and the instrumentality of the intellect in bringing about human understanding. 
The fact that the intellect abstracts universal forms from individuating material principles 
does not require that the intellect be universal, as the Averroists say it is, but only that that 
the intellect be immaterial.  
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In the third quaestio, Aquinas adds that species become intelligible only after they 
have been abstracted from the phantasms and exist in the possible intellect, and so 
phantasms as such cannot explain for the individuality of knowers. Aquinas also argues 
that there is no way to account for the multiplication of the operation of understanding if 
there is only one possible intellect. He insists that Averroism is open to the same 
objections to which a Platonic doctrine of Ideas is subject; if intellect is what determines 
human nature, and there is only one intellect (as in a Platonic Ideal realm), then a human 
intellect exists and is defined through its participation in a single, separate substance.  
There are two main sections of Aquinas’s Treatise of Human Nature that pertain to 
Latin Averroism and thus indirectly to the conflict with Pecham. Quaestio 76 deals with 
“The Soul’s Union with the Body,” and quaestio 84 asks “What Does the Soul Cognize 
Bodies Through?”. In quaestio 76 Aquinas argues for the following claims (among 
others, some of which I have already mentioned in connection with the other Aquinas 
texts): (1) The intellect is the principle of rationality, which is the differentia of the human 
being. (2) If someone says that the soul is composed of matter and form, then he could 
not say that the soul is the body’s form, because form is actuality and matter is 
potentiality. (3) There can be no more than one soul for each individual body. (4) The 
sensitive soul is made incorruptible through its association with the intellectual soul. (5) 
There can be but one substantial form for a body, because Aristotle says that the soul is 
the actuality of a physical body potentially having life. (6) Matter is the way it is because 
of form; matter is for the sake of form. (7) There is no innate knowledge, and so 
knowledge must arise from what the senses provide. (8) The soul has multiple powers, 
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even though it is one essence. (9) There is no mediating form or matter between a given 
matter and its substantial form, or between body and soul. (10) The soul is whole in each 
part of the body.  
In quaestio 84, the propositions for which Aquinas argues include the following: (1) 
The intellect cognizes bodies through intelligible species that are drawn from phantasms; 
therefore, human cognition is not a merely corporeal process. (2) Species do not emanate 
from separate, immaterial forms, into the soul. (3) Cognition requires both the intelligible 
species and the light in which the eternal natures are contained. (4) The agent intellect is 
in some sense separate from the possible intellect, but there is an operation of the human 
soul in a human being that forms the various images by dividing and composing. (5) The 
human soul needs recourse to the phantasms in order to actually understand anything 
(God and incorporeal substances are cognized by comparing them to sensible things).  
Chapter Five 
Pecham’s texts often present themselves as collections of rapid-fire claims and 
citations with scarce explanation of concepts or support for presuppositions. (Pecham 
addressed an audience of highly trained philosophers and theologians who knew the 
various traditions.) Thus, in order to understand Pecham’s psychology one must show 
that some objective structures his wide-ranging use of arguments and sources. Thus, in 
the fifth chapter I will seek to address how Pecham organizes his sources, and how he 
marshals these sources to advance his own agenda. The answers to these questions reveal 
that Pecham had a definite agenda and that he organized his material strategically.  
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While a number of sources animate Pecham’s work, one plausible way of reading our 
texts suggests that, while Pecham was clearly drawing from Augustine and Avicenna, he 
was inspired also by Avicebron’s Fons Vitae, an 11th-century work of Neoplatonic 
metaphysics that was preserved in the translation of Dominicus Gundissalinus. 
Avicebron’s doctrines were also expanded in Gundissalinus’ own works, to which 
Pecham makes frequent reference.  The scholarship is practically unanimous in the view 28
that Avicebron was considered to be the main source of the doctrines of the plurality of 
forms and universal hylomorphism in 13th century and the later Middle Ages.  There are 29
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a number of places in Pecham’s work where he seems to be thinking of the Fons Vitae.  30
In fact, a reading of the Tractatus in comparison with the Fons Vitae yields a number of 
examples of striking similarities in the arguments the authors make.  
I will explain Avicebron’s position and how it relates to Pecham’s position in greater 
detail in the fifth chapter, but to briefly introduce it: Avicebron believes that the initial 
emanation from the First Author resulted in two substances, universal form and universal 
matter, and the rest of the development of the universe is the result of the emanative 
interplay between these two, with the result that both are progressively specified. Pecham 
does not discuss universal form and universal matter as such in our texts, but does 
endorse the forma corporeitatis and the corresponding doctrine that all substances have 
both matter and form, as did Bonaventure before him.)  
Avicebron endorses a causal hierarchy whereby forms impress themselves on one 
another. The motions of the soul are due to impressions of form, and the rational soul is 
the source of the rest of the forms in the human being. In this way form itself is diffused 
among all things that exist. The First Author is characterized by no form, but every 
intermediary between the First Author and the human being does have a form, and the 
human being has a plurality of forms. Each form is simple. Both Pecham and Avicebron 
use sunlight as a metaphor for emanation, to illustrate how a whole substance confers its 
form to another substance which is in the mode of receiving form. In discussing the mode 
of the human body’s receptivity in particular, both Pecham and Avicebron say that the 
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body’s configuration, and especially its blood, constitute a disposition toward the 
impression of the rational soul. Pecham and Avicebron also ground knowledge in the 
impression of purely intellectual emanations. 
Pecham is willing to call matter, form, and their combination “substance.” This is not 
unexpected given Avicebron’s insistence that spiritual substance permeates all being. In 
both Pecham and Avicebron, substances are differentiated based on their subtlety and 
density, two opposites. The more dense a being is, the more perceptible it is to the senses. 
However, density hides the perceptibility of being itself, whereas subtlety reveals being. 
Pecham illustrates subtlety with the example of fire. Further examples of similarities 
between Pecham’s thought and Avicebron’s thought, and areas in which the two 
complement or expand on one another, include the following:  
• There is immaterial addition such that adding immaterial conceptual parts has no 
effect on a substance’s simplicity.  
• Animal spirits are the vehicles of animal powers and are intermediaries between 
soul and body.  
• Love is a central metaphor for metaphysics and natural philosophy.  
• Individuation of particular human beings is based on distinct contributions from 
form and matter. (Here Pecham also shows his debt to Bacon and Bonaventure, but 
also independence of thought.) 
• Emanation functions in the human being’s intellection, being, and existence.  
• The soul is “everywhere in the body.”  
• Human knowledge is the result of a conjoining to God, rather than to the 10th and 
lowest of separate intellects (as in Avicenna). Perfect human knowledge involves a 
mystical ascent. 
It may be impossible to determine to what degree these ideas (or approximations) were 
available to Pecham in texts other than the Fons Vitae; it is certainly impractical for the 
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present study to attempt such a judgment. Nonetheless, this high number of connections 
between Pecham and his Neoplatonic forbearer shows that reading Pecham as part of a 
tradition that was heavily influenced by the Fons Vitae is a promising interpretive 
strategy. 
Nonetheless, I will have to provide plausible reasons why Pecham seldom cites 
Avicebron directly, because Pecham cites the Fons Vitae directly only once.  Actually, at 31
one point Pecham seems to attribute the doctrine of spiritual matter to Augustine rather 
than to Avicebron.  Yet as Dales explains, Pecham had in mind a doctrine that Avicebron 32
taught: 
When Pecham says the soul is ‘immaterial,’ however, he means only that it is not 
involved in corporeal matter, for, like Bonaventure and William of Baglione, he 
bases his position on Avicebron’s teaching that the soul is composed of matter and 
form, both spiritual, a view he attributes to Augustine and even Averroes. The 
rational soul does indeed contain matter, though spiritual rather than corporeal. 
Therefore it is free of transmutable matter, “but has something similar to matter 
itself through which it is a ‘this,’ through which there is a natural distinction in 
separated substances.” (It is this that confirms his true source to be Avicebron, not 
Augustine, for Augustine’s reason for positing something like spiritual matter was 
specifically to guarantee the mutability of spiritual substances.)  33
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Quaestiones, 379. It is curious that Aquinas, who does not believe in spiritual matter, 
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Dales’ conclusion that Pecham’s sources for the spiritual matter excluded Augustine is 
inconclusive since Pecham also motivates the doctrine of spiritual matter with the 
principle of mutability.  
I will offer four reasons why the scarcity of direct Pechamian citations of the Fons 
Vitae does not mean that Pecham was not influenced heavily by the Fons Vitae: (1) There 
are plausible explanations for why Pecham would have infrequently cited the Fons Vitae 
explicitly, even though the text influenced him. (2) The scholarship on the subject of the 
philosophical background of the 13th century is practically unanimous in the traditional 
conviction that Avicebron inspired two central doctrines that Pecham adopts in his 
anthropology, i.e., universal hylomorphism and the plurality of forms. (I will respond to 
two writers who object to the traditional view.) (3) There are obvious philosophical 
commonalities between Pecham and other Franciscan writers who advocated for 
Avicebron’s ideas. Thus, in Pecham we find not only the direct influence of Avicebron/
Gundissalinus, but also the indirect influence of the Fons Vitae tradition through prior 
Franciscan philosophers. (4) Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas recognized 
Avicebron as a primary source of the doctrines of hylomorphism and plurality of forms, 
and treated Avicebron’s philosophy as a serious problem.  
Next we must ask what such an interpretive strategy would yield as an answer to the 
question: “What is Pecham’s project?” Here, I reflect on the data gathered to this point 
and attempt to say with more precision what Pecham’s project is. I suggest that Pecham’s 
project is to design an answer to the following question: “Given that Avicebron and 
Avicenna are right about metaphysics, what kind of natural philosophy and epistemology 
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account best for how things are?” Then, I suggest that in addition to his own original 
thinking on the subject, Pecham uses three tools at hand to answer the question. The first 
is Avicenna’s account of the human person and cognition. The second is a set of 
Aristotelian principles that he takes to be valid limitations on any anthropology of 
epistemology. The third is a divine illumination theory, which goes back at least to 
Augustine. This is probably why Pecham has been called an exponent of “Avicennized 
Augustinianism.” 
In the conclusion to chapter five I acknowledge that, to show in detail how Pecham 
differs from every philosopher who espoused doctrines such as universal hylomorphism 
would require a separate study. Yet I point to the possibility that in every case of 
comparison with Pecham, his distinctiveness could be amply illustrated in the existing 
scholarship. These conclusions about Pecham’s project support the claim in my thesis 
that Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of 
Neoplatonic metaphysics 
Chapter Six 
The aspect of my thesis that will not have been supported by the end of the fifth 
chapter is the claim that Pecham’s anthropology is a significant alternative to that of 
Aquinas. Thus, in the sixth chapter I will compare and contrast Pecham’s views (as 
presented in chapters two, three, and five) with Aquinas’s views (as presented in chapter 
four), showing (1) that Pecham’s view is not obviously subject to some objections that 
are problematic for Aquinas; (2) that Pecham and Aquinas are both dualists in some 
sense; and (3) that Pecham has philosophical arguments in the controversy with 
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Averroism that are interesting independent of their value to theology. I will also discuss 
Pecham’s philosophical motivation for taking the plurality of forms position, showing 
how Pecham’s metaphysical starting point leads him to theological and philosophical 
conclusions which he sees as far superior to the consequences of Aquinas’s position. 
First, I will notice areas in which Pecham’s and Aquinas’s views are similar due to 
their shared religious commitments. For example, they agree that God creates individual 
rational souls ex nihilo and infuses them into particular bodies. Aquinas and Pecham both 
agree that the soul is the form of the body in some sense. They both think that the 
individual human has, in some sense, his/her own agent intellect. Aquinas agrees with 
Pecham that humans cognize things truly in the illumination of divine light, i.e., in their 
eternal natures, exemplars, or reasons. Finally, Aquinas and Pecham both think that 
monopsychism is opposed to central tenets of both philosophy and Christianity. 
Undoubtedly this list of similarities could be expanded. 
Second, I will show that there are at least two significant differences between 
Aquinas’s view and Pecham’s view: 
(1) Pecham orients his discussion of the soul around the concept of life in a way that 
Aquinas does not. Of course, both Pecham and Aquinas associate the soul with life, but 
whereas Aristotle and Aquinas more or less say that the nutritive power is fundamental to 
life, Pecham wants to find a principle that is ontologically prior—a result of emanation 
that is present before nutrition.  Furthermore, the concept of life is also central to 34
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Pecham’s account of how the various forms in the human being cooperate. And, of 
course, (2) Pecham believes in the plurality of substantial forms, whereas Aquinas does 
not. The debate concerning the plurality of forms was the precise point of issue between 
Pecham and Aquinas, and Pecham condemns the unity of form in 1286 (although a 
number of decisive events precede the 1286 condemnation).  
While Aquinas denies that there is a plurality of substantial forms in the human being, 
it is not at all clear that Aquinas avoids dualism given his presuppositions. Recent work in 
Aquinas’s psychology, reflecting on the Aquinas texts I have studied, has shown that 
Aquinas thinks of the human body as precisely the kind of body that is suited for the 
human soul. That is, the body that befits the soul is one that is composed of contrary 
elements and is corruptible. But this presents problems for Aquinas’s position that the 
soul is naturally incorruptible. Aquinas is free, of course, to ground the soul’s immortality 
in theology, but it is not obvious that he can use Aristotle to support this strategy. Aquinas 
scholarship has also presented two additional roadblocks between Aquinas and a purely 
theological solution to the problem of immortality: (1) Aquinas has argued that soul and 
body are both naturally immortal. (2) Aquinas has affirmed that the soul and body are two 
different kinds of things, thus it would be difficult to develop an account that would be 
consistent with Aquinas’s theological principles and yet maintain the soul’s necessary 
connection to a naturally mortal body. In response to problems like these, Aquinas 
scholarship has suggested that while Aquinas’s Aristotelian psychology is consistent and 
plausible as an account of human nature, Aquinas simply fails to show how immortality 
is consistent with Aristotelian psychology. This would have been unsatisfactory to 
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Aquinas and remains so for interpreters who would like an Aristotelian psychology that 
allows for immortality. So, Aquinas scholarship has also suggested the possibility that 
Aquinas solves the immortality problem by actually endorsing dualism himself in some 
way. Perhaps this is the correct strategy, but then Aquinas is lost as the pioneer of non-
dualism in the Middle Ages, and modern Thomists have also lost a major reason for 
considering Aquinas’s psychology to be principally distinct from and superior to that of 
Pecham. 
Pecham’s dualism is explicit right from the start of our texts. He calls the human 
being an aggregate. This does not prohibit Pecham from considering the human being as 
one thing or a “third nature.” It is the aggregate or the third nature that is dissolved at 
death. It is interesting that Aquinas scholarship has admitted that universal hylomorphism 
may apply very well to the human soul, and that the addition of some kind of “spiritual 
matter” would solve a difficulty for Aquinas even though it would also place him in the 
camp of those who subscribe to the plurality of forms.  
In addition to Pecham’s conviction that the human being is an aggregate, he also 
introduces a way in which the soul itself can be thought of as being simple. The soul’s 
simplicity results from the addition of forms, but is not the result of a combination of 
contraries. Pecham feels justified in taking this position for at least two reasons: (1) Just 
because one must have a number of concepts in mind prior to having a full understanding 
of the pluralist soul does not mean that the pluralist soul cannot be simple when 
considered from another perspective. (2) There is a sense in which the intellect is the 
substantial form for the human being. This becomes evident in Pecham’s account of how 
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the various forms relate to one another. Some are ordered to nutrition, some to sensible 
perception, some to intellection, and some to all three acts. All are united by their 
involvement in life. Each form strives for its perfection in order to further the cause of the 
human being’s life and highest function, intellection. Pecham illustrates this principle 
with regard to the human eye. The eye is necessary for apprehension, but the question of 
apprehension is properly about the soul and not about the eye, because a psychological 
process is at work: The intellect transforms itself by receiving forms that have been 
abstracted from perceptions that the eye has helped to produce. The rational soul is the 
form that allows the previous form (the sensitive soul) to complete its function. Pecham 
uses the word substantia in various ways in our texts, but does not insist that the 
vegetative and sensitive forms are themselves substantiae. Rather, diverse potencies can 
be present in a single substance.  
In contemporary Thomism, there have been at least two basic responses to the 
controversy between Pecham and Aquinas. (1) Pecham is wrong because he implies that 
the introduction of the rational soul is the introduction of an accidental change. But, from 
the perspective of the “third nature” (the human being), it does not follow that the 
introduction of the intellect is accidental. In fact, if the intellect were not infused, the 
substance we know as the human being never would exist at all. (2) The problem is 
philosophically uninteresting, because Pecham’s position merely involves the choice of 
calling various aspects of the soul “forms” instead of “potencies.” This response is 
remarkable given that Pecham and many others were greatly concerned that the pluralist 
position prevail. If a mere shift of grammar could have solved the problem, would not 
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someone in the 13th century have noticed? Furthermore, there are a number of significant 
philosophical consequences that hinge on the debate between Pecham and Aquinas, and 
these consequences have evidently gone unnoticed in contemporary Thomism:  
(1) Pecham’s plurality of forms view is part and parcel of a Neoplatonic metaphysics 
that includes particular views of matter and form, so what is at stake is not a minor 
grammatical distinction, but rather an entire philosophical system that accounts for all of 
physical and spiritual reality in its own way.  
(2) Pecham thinks the perfection of man is neither nutritive nor sensitive, but 
intellectual. So, the nutritive and sensitive aspects must have their own distinct, 
subservient perfections. If we take it that Pecham thinks of substantial form as specifying 
a perfection or completion, then Pecham is simply saying that the intellect is the highest 
of the substantial forms and has the highest degree of perfection. To say otherwise 
requires not just a grammatical shift, but a shift in the overall understanding of the human 
being, for if the perfection of one man is exclusively a function of his highest aspect, the 
intellect, then the vegetative and sensitive aspects simply cannot be man’s highest 
perfection. 
(3) The plurality position allows the body to retain its corporeal form after death, and 
thus its identity as belonging to an particular corporeal individual. A clear implication of 
the plurality view is that the dead body of Christ in the tomb retains its identity as the 
body of Christ for the three days until the resurrection, not taking on any other substantial 
form. (The plurality view provides similar answers to questions about dead bodies of 
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saints, the Incarnation, and the Eucharist; theological issues surrounding the debate over 
plural forms made the controversy intense.) 
(4) The plurality position avoids whatever problems may be associated with positing 
that previous forms are corrupted or displaced during the development of the embryo, as 
Aquinas taught. 
Pecham takes the plurality of forms position not only because of his allegiance to a 
particular tradition but also and primarily because he believes his positions are more 
reasonable than the opposing views taken by Aquinas. The plurality view, according to 
Pecham, has greater explanatory power than Aquinas’s unitarian view. In fact, Pecham 
thinks that Aquinas’s metaphysical starting point, which involves certain definitions of 
matter, form, and substance, leads to unacceptable consequences of theological and 
philosophical significance. These consequences concern the relationship between the soul 
and the body in general, including the problem of the identity of the dead body of Christ 
in the tomb, the Eucharist, the creation of the first man (Adam), the development of the 
embryo, and the inheritance of sin.  
The overarching reason for which Pecham sees himself as opposed to Aquinas, even 
though they agree that Averroism should be opposed, is that Pecham’s immediate focus is 
on the defense of theological convictions which he believes can be defended 
philosophically, whereas he believes Aquinas’s focus is on the defense of naturally 
revealed truth and only secondarily on the defense of theological truth. Pecham believes 
this is particularly problematic because the philosophical positions that result from 
Aquinas’s approach endanger certain centrally important theological convictions. Yet 
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Pecham’s purely philosophical arguments deserve consideration independent of any 
disagreement with Aquinas for at least the reason that Pecham’s texts contain interesting, 
non-theological arguments against Averroism which Aquinas does not make in the texts I 
have studied, and which are interesting independent of debates with Averroism. These 
include arguments about the assimilation of the intellect to intelligible species, the 
perfection of human beings, purely abstract thought, inherent diversity in intellects, and 
the sensation of lesions in the body. Some of these arguments also would have been 








PECHAM AND NEO-AUGUSTINIANISM 
Introduction 
Three logical conditions for Pecham meriting scholarly attention at all, even in a 
dissertation, are: (1) The study has not already been done. (2) We already know 
something about who he is. (3) We have some idea of his philosophical work. In the 
present chapter I will briefly review the small amount of secondary literature on Pecham, 
showing that (1) is the case. Then I will summarize Pecham’s life and career as 
documented in that literature, to fulfill (2). Next I will explain what Neo-Augustinianism 
is and how Pecham figures into it, to fulfill (3). In doing so, I will draw on the secondary 
literature and the Pecham texts that are the focus of the present study to show how 
Pecham promoted the ideals of the Neo-Augustinian movement. Finally I will suggest 
that readers of Pecham should bear in mind that he has a certain argumentative style. As a 
historical survey of Pecham’s work and the philosophical movement in which he was 
involved, this chapter serves to facilitate an appreciation for the intensive exposition that 
occupies the following two chapters. 
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Secondary Literature on Pecham 
In 1942 M.D. Knowles provided an overview of the progress of the scholarship 
concerning Franciscans in general, and John Pecham in particular.  Franciscan authors 1
have been published from presses at Quaracchi, Assisi, and Rome.  Philosophers and 2
historians who shed light on Pecham’s work prior to Knowles included A. Teetaert,  3
Hieronymus Spettman,  A.G. Little,  D.E. Sharp  and Charles Lethbridge Kinsgford.  4 5 6 7
Teetaert’s article includes a complete list of Pecham manuscripts, and Victorin Doucet 
attempted a complete list of Pecham’s works in 1933,  but a more current list was made 8
in 2006 by Etzkorn.  And, since Knowles wrote his summary, there have been a number 9
of developments, especially the well-researched Pecham biography by Decima Douie.  10
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 “Pecham, Jean,” Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholoique, 12:100-114.3
 “Die Psychologie des Johannes Pecham,” Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und 4
Theologie des Mitelalters 20, no. 6 (1919): 1-102. 
 “Illuminated Manuscripts,” Franciscan History and Legend in English Mediaeval Art, 5
Volume 19, ed. A.G. Little, British Society of Franciscan Studies (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1937), 35ff.
 Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century (London: Oxford University 6
Press, 1930).
 “John Peckham,” Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900, first series, 63 vols. 7
(London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1896), 44:190-197.
 “Notulae Bibliographicae de Quibusdam Operibus Fr. Ioannis Pecham, O.F.M.,” 8
Antonianum 8 (1933): 307-28, 425-59; cf. Etzkorn, “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 71. 
 “Franciscan Quodlibeta,” 136-139.9
 Archbishop Pecham.10
Among others, Etzkorn,  Ignatius Brady,  Roland J. Teske,  Gordon Wilson,  and 11 12 13 14
Benjamin Thompson  have written articles about Pecham’s ecclesiastical work, theology, 15
and philosophy. Richard C. Dales’ book on the problem of the rational soul in the 13th 
century includes a brief section on Pecham’s psychology and is particularly helpful 
because it describes in some detail the genealogy of the views of those predecessors that 
Pecham would adopt and modify.  According to David C. Lindberg, the editor of 16
Pecham’s work on optics,  the richest source of biographical information on Pecham is 17
Douie’s biography.  Indeed, while a number of brief summaries of Pecham’s life and/or 18
work are available, Douie’s remains the only extensive overview; however it is not 
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Controversy,” 71-82; “John Pecham,” Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy 
between 500 and 1500, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (New York: Springer, 2011), 1:640-642. 
“Pecham, John,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig, 10 vols. 
(New York: Routledge, 1998), 7:268-269.
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Commemorative Studies, ed. Étienne Gilson et. al. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Medieval Studies, 1974), 2:11-71.
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Patrick W. Carey and Joseph T. Leinhard (Westport: Greenwood, 2000), 410-411.
 “The Critique of Thomas Aquinas’s Unicity Theory of Forms in John Pecham’s 14
Quodlibet IV (Romanum),” Franciscan Studies 56 (1998): 423-431; ibid., “Henry of 
Ghent and John Peckham’s Condemnation of 1286,” Henry of Ghent and the 
Transformation of Scholastic Thought: Studies in Memory of Jos Decorte, ed. Guy 
Guldentops, et al. (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), 261-276.
 “John Pecham,” Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H.C.G. Matthew and Brian 15
Harrison, new series, 60 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 43:362-368.
 The Problem of the Rational Soul. For further information on this subject, see the fifth 16
chapter of the present study. 
 Cf. Lindberg, “Bacon, Witelo, and Pecham, the Problem of Influence,” XII Congrès 17
Internationale d’Histoire des Sciences 1968, 111-A:103-7; “Lines of Influence in 
Thirteenth-Century Optics: Bacon, Witelo, and Pecham,” Speculum 46:66-83.
 Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 3. 18
primarily a philosophical biography. In this book  and in Lindberg’s sketch of Pecham’s 19
life,  we find much insight as to who Pecham was and what kind of work he was doing.  20
Here is one example of the relative lack of attention paid to Pecham in scholarship in 
the history of philosophy and theology where it would have been relevant to discuss his 
philosophy or publish his writing: In 1965, Marquette University Press published the 
second edition of a translation of three medieval authors’ writings on the issue of the 
world’s eternity.  Pecham’s text on the same issue was left out of the compilation, even 21
though Aquinas’s text was probably directed against Pecham.  (Pecham’s text was edited 22
by Ignatius Brady in 1974 but was not published in translation until 1993.  Etkorn 23
updated the Latin text as part of his edition of Pecham’s Quaestiones Disputatae in 
2002. ) Furthermore, Pecham’s response to Averroism in quaestio five of the 24
Quaestiones De Anima, while contemporary with Aquinas’s Against the Averroists on the 
Unity of the Intellect, has never been systematically compared to it (chapters four and six 
of the present study are designed to correct this oversight).  
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Perspectiva, ed. Lindberg (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1972), 1-21.
 Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, Bonaventure, On the Eternity of the World, 2nd ed., 21
Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 16 (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1965). 
 Ignatius Brady, “John Pecham and the Background,” 11-71.22
 Quaestio Disputata de Aeternitate Mundi, ed. Brady, St. Thomas Aquinas (1274-1974), 23
2:141-178; cf. ibid., Questions Concerning the Eternity of the World, trans. Vincent G. 
Potter (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993). 
 See Etzkorn, introduction, xix-xx. 24
Twentieth- and 21st-century Aquinas scholars have paid little attention to Pecham’s 
work. Consider some prominent examples: In 1934 Anton C. Pegis wrote St. Thomas and 
the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century.  As helpful as Pegis’ book is in 25
devoting 50 pages to Bonaventure’s psychology,  Pegis mentions Pecham only once in 26
the text—in a list with other Franciscans—and in two footnotes.  (Pegis does not 27
mention Neo-Augustinianism by name, as the term was probably yet to be coined.)  
In his 1992 book, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Brian Davies suggest that 
Aquinas’s Aristotelianism makes him the leading medieval proponent of non-dualism, or 
that Aquinas’s position is “midway between the extremes of Dualism and 
Physicalism.” Although Anthony Kenny’s 1993 book Aquinas On Mind attaches some 28
plausibility to the plurality of forms position, he quickly sides with Aquinas’s position 
and does not mention Pecham.  Furthermore, Kenny does not show how Pecham’s 29
pluralism might seriously enter a controversy with Aquinas’s position. In a 1995 article 
on Aquinas’s psychology, Eleonore Stump mentions briefly the controversy over 
substantial forms.  She casts Aquinas as the foil of later substance dualists such as 30
Descartes, but largely overlooks that there were respected dualist positions during 
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 (New York: Routledge, 1993), 149-154.29
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Aquinas’s own time.  In Robert Pasnau’s 2002 book, Thomas Aquinas on Human 31
Nature, we again find that Aquinas has explained the problem of the soul well, and 
Pasnau adds that there was a merely grammatical difference between Pecham and 
Aquinas.  Finally, in 2013, Denys Turner praises Aquinas for his balanced view of 32
matter and form, and for opposing those “Platonist-Augustinians” who go almost entirely 
nameless in Turner’s chapter on the soul.   33
As chapter six of the present study highlights, in Aquinas scholarship generally, 
Pecham’s views are only briefly mentioned alongside those of Aquinas, but Pecham as a 
philosopher and theologian is either unmentioned, dismissed, or the significance of the 
controversies themselves is called into question, while Aquinas is hailed as having 
produced a “balanced” synthesis.  34
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(ad 1, 4, 5). Second, the soul can be united to the body without itself becoming material 
(ad 2, 3). Third, the soul’s immortality does not stand in the way of soul and body’s being 
unum simpliciter (ad 6). Even though the soul can exist without the body, the body 
remains inseparable from the soul, in that it cannot exist without the soul. So despite 
being part of a unified material substance, the soul preserves the autonomy necessary for 
immortality and abstract thought” (ibid., 94-95, parenthetical items in orig.).
 Thomas Aquinas: A Portrait. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.33
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Overview of Pecham’s Life and Career 
David Burr, writing about late-13th-century Franciscans, says that Pecham “was an 
extremely influential figure whose teaching career extended from Paris to Oxford and to 
the papal court, and whose later activities as Archbishop of Canterbury form a major 
chapter in the history of English Aristotelianism and its critics.”  Similarly, Knowles 35
says that Pecham is a “great figure in the intellectual life of Europe” due to his 
“significance at Paris, at the papal court, and wherever friars or theologians met”.  Even 36
if none of Pecham’s letters or literary works had survived, his record as the teacher of a 
number of important Franciscan thinkers and leaders at Paris would be suggestive of his 
wide influence: Matthew of Aquasparta,  Peter John Olivi, John of Murrovalle (all three 37
his students ), Richard of Middleton, Bartholomew of Bologna,  and Vital du Four.  38 39 40
Pecham also taught Roger Marston, who borrowed material from him,  and Marston’s 41
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Etzkorn, “John Pecham,” A Companion, 384; Wilson, “Roger Marston,” A Companion, 
627.
work provides a kind of link between Pecham and Duns Scotus.  To what degree this 42
large influence was due to philosophical skill rather than effective exposition and 
presentation of traditional material is a question in the literature.  Knowles says that the 43
scientific works of Pecham show him to be  
in the full tradition of Oxford as begun by Grosseteste and continued by the 
Franciscans; he shows traces of the influence of Roger Bacon. . . . His 
metaphysical and psychological views, also, show many affinities with earlier 
Franciscan thought at Oxford, though here the exact limits of dependence are not 
easy to assign, since before the rise of the Averroists and Christian Aristotelians 
there was little division between the schools of Paris and Oxford, or between the 
masters of the Preachers and the Minors. In general, he stood in the full stream of 
tradition, and in his latest years gloried in this. His works show him to have had a 
capacious and versatile mind and great industry, but he was not a speculative 
theologian, nor was he a great metaphysician, like his predecessor at Oxford, 
Thomas of York. His high reputation among contemporaries would seem to have 
been due to his gifts of exposition, and perhaps also to his very lack of profundity 
and the eminently ‘safe’ character of his teaching.  44
Knowles is correct about Pecham’s “capacious and versatile mind,” particularly 
considering that Pecham added to scientific knowledge in the West.  And, although 45
Pecham had what Lindberg calls a “conservative attitude toward philosophy and the 
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 See Agostine Paravicini-Bagliani, The Pope’s Body, trans. David S. Peterson (Chicago: 45
University of Chicago Press, 2000), xiii, 196-197. 
philosophical novelties that were appearing in the latter half of the thirteenth century,”  46
this study will show that Pecham’s anthropology represents an original synthesis. I am 
not the first to notice originality in Pecham’s philosophy; in fact, Gordon Wilson has 
observed:  
Although discussions between Franciscans and Dominicans on [the issue of the 
unicity of form ] are known to be quite acrimonious after the condemnations of 47
1277 and charges of theological heterodoxy would be exchanged, Pecham was a 
sharp critic of Thomas’s unicity theory in Thomas’s lifetime.   48
This assessment indicates that Pecham was not so completely indebted to his forbearers 
and contemporaries that we should ascribe to him as little originality as Knowles and 
others have done. Even if Knowles is correct in saying that Pecham’s reputation at Paris 
and Oxford was built upon his (as yet unedited) scriptural commentaries and less 
technical literary work,  to which Douie would add his scientific work in Oxford,  the 49 50
present study will demonstrate why Pecham was a far more original thinker than his or 
our contemporary scholars believed.  
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for the human being.  
 “The Critique,” 423-431, emp. and bracketed item added.48
 “Some Aspects. I,” 5.49
 Archbishop Pecham, 35.50
The date of Pecham’s birth is uncertain.  He received early education with the 51
Benedictines at the priory of Lewes, for which he always maintained affection.  He 52
probably departed to study at Paris at a young age.  Bacon may have been influential 53
(along with Adam Marsh, surely) in Pecham’s decision to join the Franciscan order, 
probably in the 1250s.  At any rate, Bacon and Pecham were both among the group of 54
English friars in Paris.  Pecham seems to have been a dedicated Franciscan for the rest 55
of his life.  In 1258 he was sent back to Paris to complete his theological studies.  Until 56 57
he became Archbishop, in 1279, Pecham studied and taught at Paris, Oxford, and the 
Papal Curia.  Pecham is of particular interest because of the diversity of his intellectual 58
history alone. Furthermore, the scientific and mathematical emphases at Oxford and Paris 
would have given scope for Pecham’s interests.   59
Here is how Pecham’s career unfolded, according to Lindberg’s chronology:  60
• 1260s: Pecham matriculates in the faculty of theology at Paris, receiving the 
magister in theology (equivalent to our doctorate) in 1269. 
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 Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 1, 3; cf. Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 3-4. 51
 Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 3-4; cf. Hughes, introduction, 78:5.52
 Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 4-5.53
 Ibid., 4-5, 6. This is not to suggest that Pecham had no strictly philosophical or 54
theological motivations for joining the Franciscans. Quite the contrary (see ibid., 5-6).
 Ibid., 9.55
 See, e.g., R.W. Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages, The 56
Pelican History of the Church 2 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), 236-237.
 Hughes, introduction, 78:6.57
 Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 4.58
 See Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 7; cf. Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 35; A.G. 59
Little, The Grey Friars in Oxford, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), 1.29ff.; 
Etzkorn, “Franciscan Quodlibeta,” 135-136. 
 Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 5-8.60
• 1269(70)- 1271:  Pecham serves as University Regent Master in theology at 61
Paris and as lector to the Franciscan friary. 
• 1271(ca.)-1274(5):  Pecham serves as 11th lecturer in the Franciscan school at 62
Oxford.  
• 1275-1277: Pecham serves as ninth provincial minister of the Franciscan order 
in England. 
• 1277-1279: Pecham serves as lecturer in theology at the papal university 
(studium) in Viterbo. 
• 1279: Pecham is consecrated as Archbishop of Canterbury, succeeding the 
Dominican Robert Kilwardby in this position. 
Etzkorn thinks that Pecham was probably chosen to succeed Eustachius of Arras as 
regent master, and that before Eustachius could complete his tenure, he was called to 
accompany Louis IX in the crusades.  During Pecham’s years as regent master 63
(1269-1271), he reached his intellectual maturity and completed many of his works, 
including biblical commentaries, the commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, and 
perhaps the Quaestiones De Anima (among other disputed questions).  Also while at 64
Paris, Pecham defended the mendicant orders against the secular clergy; the poverty of  
the evangelists was often at issue during Pecham’s career.  Pecham also defended the 65
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 See Etzkorn, “John Pecham,” A Companion, 384; Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 5. 61
 See Etzkorn, “John Pecham,” A Companion, 384; Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 7. 62
 “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 71.63
 Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 5-6; Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 11. Dales thinks 64
that Pecham composed the Tractatus during his years at the papal university, 1277-1279 
(The Problem of the Rational Soul, 127). For more information on the Paris period, see 
Etzkorn, introduction, ix-x.
 Etzkorn, “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 73ff.; cf. William A. Hinnebusch, The Early English 65
Friars Preachers (Rome: Ad S. Sabinae, 1951), 238-239, 245-246, 315-316; Virpi 
Mäkinen, Property Rights in the Late Medieval Discussion on Franciscan Poverty, 
Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales: Bibliotheca 3 [Leuven: Peeters, 
2001], 34ff.)
orders against claims, made by the diocesan cleric and University Master Gerard of 
Abbeville and others, that the friars were inducing naive youths to join their orders.   66
Pecham was in Paris when the controversies over Averroism and the unity of form 
were intense. Franciscans (and the majority of masters in theology) opposed Aquinas on 
the issue of the unity of form as early as 1270 (and William of Baglione may have 
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 Etzkorn, “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 73; cf. Pecham, Quaestio De Pueris Oblatis, in 66
Quaestiones Disputatae; Leff, Paris and Oxford, 265, 267. Roger Bacon had made an 
accusation of this kind: “I will here expound at least some of those things which are done 
publicly and are known to all men, though few turn their hearts to regard either this or 
other profitable considerations, by reason of those causes of error which I here set forth, 
and whereby almost all men are basely blinded. These are boys who are inexperienced in 
the knowledge of themselves and of the world and of the learned languages, Greek and 
Hebrew, which (as I will prove later on) are necessary to study; they are ignorant also of 
all parts and sciences of the world's philosophy and of wisdom, when they so 
presumptuously enter upon the study of theology, which requires all human wisdom, as 
the saints teach and as all wise men know. For, if truth be anywhere, here is she found: 
here, if anywhere, is falsehood condemned, as Augustine says in his book Of Christian 
Doctrine. These are boys of the two Student-Orders, as Albert and Thomas and others, 
who in many cases enter those Orders at or below the age of twenty years. This is the 
common course, from the English sea to the furthest confines of Christendom, and more 
especially beyond the realm of France; so that in Aquitaine, Provence, Spain, Italy, 
Germany, Hungary, Denmark, and everywhere, boys are promiscuously received into the 
Orders from their tenth to their twentieth year; boys too young to be able to know 
anything worth knowing, even though they were not already possessed with the aforesaid 
causes of human error; wherefore, at their entrance into the Orders, they know nothing 
that profits to theology” (Compendium Studii Philosophiae, in Opera quaedam hactenus 
inedita, ed. J.S. Brewer [London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1959], 
425-426, bracketed item in orig.; translated in “Roger Bacon: Despair over Thirteenth 
Century Learning,” Fordham University, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/
bacon1.asp [1996]).
expressed concern as early as 1266),  probably during the Easter Disputation.  M.-D. 67 68
Chenu writes about this incident: 
In the course of the solemn assemblies of Advent and Lent in which the 
current problems of the times were reviewed, Thomas defended the consubstantial 
unity of human body and soul with all the psychological and epistemological 
consequences that follow, in contrast to the idealist position of the Augustinians. It 
was doubtless at one of these gatherings that Thomas in 1270 suffered the severe 
attack leveled by John Peckham, a Master of the rival school, fiercely accusing 
him of contaminating philosophy with naturalism. This event took place before 
the whole university in the presence of Master Stephen Tempier who had become 
the bishop of Paris (who later oversaw the condemnation of 1277).  69
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 Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 19; cf. Dales, Problem of the Rational Soul, 120ff.; 67
Brady, “Background of the Condemnation of 1270: Master William of Baglione, O.F.M.,” 
Franciscan Studies 30:5-48; Wippel, “The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 and 1277,” A 
Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 66. M.F.W. Stone writes, “By 1269 it was 
clear that the views of magisteri like Siger were causing a great deal of disquiet, 
particularly in the theology faculty. For instance, it had long been known that 
Bonaventure ... attacked some of the views held by Siger’s group in his Lenten 
Conferences of 1267-1268. Other Franciscan Masters of theology, most notably William 
of Baglione (fl. 1260) and John Peccham [sic] also put forward strong criticisms of the 
unicity of the intellect. William’s discussion of this issue, for instance, indicates that he 
already had first-hand knowledge of Averroes’ Commentary on the De anima” (“The 
Soul’s Relation to the Body: Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant and the Parisian Debate 
on Monopsychism,” History of the Mind-Body Problem, ed. Tim Crane and Sarah 
Patterson [New York: Routledge, 2012], 45, parenthetical item in orig.). 
 For a record of the evidence for this chronology, see Quinn, The Historical 68
Constitution, 889.
 Aquinas and His Role in Theology (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2002), 82-83, 69
parenthetical item added. 
In Pecham’s first Quodlibet, he made a public attack on Aquinas, and some thought that 
Aquinas recanted his theory of the unity of form.  And Pecham’s condemnations of 1284 70
and 1286 were directed partially at the unicity view of Aquinas and his English 
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 See Etzkorn, “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 73; cf. Pecham, Quodlibeta Quatuor, 1-73. The 70
degree to which Aquinas changed his position is unclear. Pecham reports that he defended 
Aquinas because Aquinas abandoned his position: “Quin potius ei, de quo loquitur, cum 
pro hac opinione ab episcopo Parisiensi et magistris theologiae, etiam a fratribus propriis 
argueretur argute; nos soli eidem astitimus ipsum prout salva veritate potuimus 
defensando, donec ipse omnes positiones suas, quibus possit imminere correctio, sicut 
doctor humilis subjecit moderamini Parisiensium magistrorum” (Registrum, 3:899; cf. 
Knowles, “Some Aspects. I,” 12). However, Douie says that Pecham’s account “differs 
from the one given fifty years later at the canonization process, where the meekness and 
humility of Aquinas are contrasted with his adversary’s violence. . . . [A] formal 
expression of deference for the opinions of an assembly of distinguished theologians 
could easily have given rise” to the view that Aquinas recanted (Archbishop Pecham, 
15-16). Testimony to this effect was given by the Dominican Bartholomew of Capua, 
who “represented the saint as violently attacked by Pecham, and replying with serene 
good temper” (Knowles, ibid.). “Item dixit dictus testis se audivisse a pluribus fratribus 
Predicatoribus, fide dignis, quod quando idem frater Thomas, una vice, disputabat 
Parisius ubi erat frater Iohannes de Pizano, ordinis fratrum Minorum, qui fuit postea 
archiepiscopus Cantuariensis, quantumcumque dictus frater Iohannes exasperaret eundem 
fratrem Thomam verbis ampullosis et tumidis nunquam tamen ipse frater Thomas 
restrinxit verbum humilitatis set semper cum dulcedine et humanitate respondit” (Corpus 
Thomisticum: Liber de inquisitione super vita et conversatione et miraculis fratris 
Thomae de Aquino, ed. M.H. Laurent, http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/bprcneap.html 
[2011]). 
representatives.  Pecham’s 1284 renewal of Robert Kilwardby’s condemnation became a 71
“dead letter” by the end of the 13th century.  72
Just as Pecham defended what he considered to be orthodoxy against Averroism and 
Thomism at Paris, it is also clear that he was at Oxford during a critical period of its 
intellectual history, wanting to defend what he considered to be orthodoxy against both 
Averroism and Thomism.  Pecham succeeded Thomas Bungay as the Franciscan 73
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 Wippel writes: “Pecham completed his theological studies and officially incepted as a 71
Master in the Theology Faculty at Paris during Thomas’ second teaching period there, in 
1270, and would prove to be one of the staunchest opponents of Thomas’ doctrine of the 
unity of substantial form. Moreover, the theory that defends the unity of substantial form 
in human beings would be included in a condemnation of 30 propositions ranging over 
the fields of grammar, logic and natural philosophy at Oxford on March 18, 1277 by the 
then Archbishop of Canterbury, the Dominican Robert Kilwardby. Pecham succeeded 
Kilwardby as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1279, and in 1284 he repeated Kilwardby’s 
prohibition at a meeting with Oxford Masters in Theology. Subsequently, in April 1286, 
at a meeting in London of Bishops and Abbots, Pecham himself condemned the unity of 
substantial form repeatedly and in much stronger terms, directing in in particular against 
a young Dominican at Oxford, Richard Knapwell” (“Thomas Aquinas and the Unity of 
Substantial Form,” Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to 
Stephen F. Brown, ed. Kent Emery, Jr., et al. [Leiden: Brill, 2011], 137). For Kilwardby’s 
1277 condemnation, see Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. Heinrich Denifle 
(Paris: 1889), 1:558-561. For information about Knapwell’s 1286 encounter with 
Pecham, see Francis E. Kelley, introduction to Richard Knapwell, Quaestio Disputata De 
Unitate Formae, ed. Kelley (New York: State University of New York at Binghamton, 
1982), 9-44. For the text of Pecham’s 1286 condemnation, see Pecham, Registrum, 
3:921-923. There is debate in the scholarship about whether there was a separate process 
against Thomas Aquinas in 1277, with Robert Wielockx suggesting that the process 
occurred, and Wippel and Hans Thijssen questioning it (Thijssen, “Condemnation of 
1277,” Stanford University, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/condemnation/ [2003]; cf. 
Robert Wielockx, “Autor du procés de Thomas d’Aqnin,” Thomas von Aquin. Werk und 
Wirkung im Licht neurerer Forschungen, ed. Albert Zimmerman [Berlin: De Gruyter, 
1987], 413-438; Wippel, “Bishop Stephen Tempier and Thomas Aquinas: A Separate 
Process Against Aquinas?,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 44 
(1997): 117-136.  
 See P. Osmund Lewry, “Robert Kilwardby,” Dictionary of Literary Biography 115: 72
Medieval Philosophers, ed. Jeremiah Hackett (Detroit: Gale, 1992), 261. 
 Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 36.73
provincial minister of England, and very little record of Pecham’s work survives from the 
Oxford period.  Knowles observes that Pecham, at Oxford, argued against Kilwardby’s 74
position on poverty.  This debate had to do with the divergent conceptions of religious 75
poverty held by the Dominicans and Franciscans. Douie says that, when one compares 
his selection of authorities with the selections of Thomas of York and Richard Rufus, it 
seems clear that Pecham’s positions were influenced by the masters at Oxford.  76
Furthermore, there was the competition between Dominicans and Franciscans for recruits 
from among the masters, bachelors, and students.   77
We may assume that Pecham’s reputation continued to grow during his time in 
England, for Pope Nicholas III summoned Pecham to be the Lector sacri palatii.  78
Pecham’s work at the papal university probably included lecturing, but he would also 
“prepare young men in theology for priesthood and give the occasional lecture to groups 
of ecclesiastics.”  Douie discusses the significance of Pecham’s work during this period:  79
The two years which he spent at the Curia as lector in theology at the papal 
university were ... valuable, since they ensured that he was acquainted with the 
four popes under whom he worked as archbishop, and that many of the cardinals 
were his personal friends. First-hand knowledge of the machinery of papal 
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 Knowles, “Some Aspects. I,” 17. Still, Etzkorn writes: “At what time was Pecham’s 74
Quodlibet III debated? The present state of research seems to give us no clues in this 
regard. It could have been debated at Paris in 1271 or at Oxford during Pecham’s tenure 
there between 1272-1275” (introduction to Pecham, Quodlibeta, 25). 
 “Some Aspects. I,” 16; cf. Tractatus Tres De Paupertate Fratris Iohannis De Peckham, 75
ed. C.L. Kingsford, et al. (Aberdeen: Academic Press 1910), 91-147.
 Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 7.76
 Ibid., 39.77
 Knowles, “Some Aspects. I,” 17.78
 Hughes, introduction, 6.79
administration was also a useful preliminary to the government of one particular 
province in the great medieval Church-State.  80
As documented by Agostino Paravicini-Bagliani, Pecham accomplished much during his 
time at the papal court: 
Peckham had been called ... to teach theology at the Studia curiae. The great 
scholar  and future archbishop of Canterbury appears to have used his time 
there ... to complete the revision of his Perspectiva minor (Lesser Optics). A 
decade before Peckham’s arrival in Viterbo another leading English scientist, the 
famous Franciscan Roger Bacon, had sent Pope Clement VII [sic] a treatise on 
optics, his On Rays (De radiis). In the decade 1267-77, the papal court at Viterbo 
was therefore the principal European center for the production and transmission 
of works devoted to optics. The ruling pope himself, John XXI (1276-77), was a 
specialist in problems of vision. Peter of Spain [John XXI] was in fact the author 
of one of the most important medieval treatises on ophthalmology, On the Eye 
(De oculo). It is probable, moreover, that he finished the work during the long 
period at the curia before ascending to the pontificate.   81
It was also during the period just before Pecham was archbishop that Pope John XXI (the 
philosopher Peter of Spain) ordered Bishop Étienne (Stephen) Tempier to make a 
doctrinal enquiry into the university of Paris, and it is generally accepted that this papal 
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 Archbishop Pecham, 35. Pecham was also not a stranger to serving the interests of the 80
authorities: “In May, 1275, at the King’s appointment, Oliver d’Eyncourt, Prior of 
Oxford, and John Pecham decided a suit at the University which had long been pending 
in the Chancellor’s court” (Hinnebusch, Early English Friars, 470). Yet, Pecham’s ideal 
was for the Franciscans to remain focused on preaching rather than the execution of royal 
affairs: “Archbishop Pecham’s Register frequently testifies to the activity of the Welsh 
Dominicans in political and ecclesiastical affairs which demanded great tact and 
discrimination. Pecham noted that they and the Franciscans had almost alone remained 
faithful to their true vocation of teaching the word of God to the faithful” (Hinnebusch, 
Early English Friars, 473; cf. Pecham, Registrum, 1:367-368, 2:403-404, 488, 742-743). 
 The Pope’s Body, 197, parenthetical items in orig., bracketed item added. It was 81
actually Pope Clement IV, Guy le Gros de Foulque, to whom Bacon sent the treatise (see 
Hackett, “Roger Bacon”).
order was the basis for Tempier’s condemnation of 219 philosophical and theological 
propositions (1277).   82
Pecham was known for his austere and orthodox personal habits, but by the time he 
was nominated to be archbishop, he was dubious about the appointment due to his ill 
health.  The controversy over the unicity of form “haunted him during the years of his 83
episcopacy at Canterbury when he came into conflict with the Dominicans [at Oxford] 
who … espoused the views of St. Thomas.”  Another significant event from Pecham’s 84
archbishopric occurred in 1281, when Pecham’s Council of Lambeth drafted the Lambeth 
Constitutions, or the Ignorantia Sacerdotum, which has been edited with various other 
works in the Lay Folks’ Catechism.   85
Thompson describes Pecham’s work as archbishop: 
Pecham was thorough in including monasteries in his visitations, and he issues 
many sets of injunctions for correction, aimed at religious [sic] who neglected 
their offices and adopted secular lifestyles, so blurring the boundary between the 
cloister and the world through their frequent presence outside the convent, and the 
systematic intrusion of the laity within. As ever, he urged religious to keep their 
calling of worship at the centre of the picture, and to devote their resources as 
effectively as possible to that end: hence his opposition to the Benedictines’ 
decision in 1277-9 to pare down accretions to the divine office, and his restoration 
of the full traditional opus dei at monasteries he visited: hence also his attempts to 
replace or supplement the rule of ineffective superiors, and especially to 
encourage financial stability, the latter no doubt informed by his personal 
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 Thijssen, “Condemnation of 1277.”82
 Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 7-8.83
 Etzkorn, “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 79, bracketed item added. Not all Dominicans 84
espoused Aquinas’s views. Robert Kilwardby, for example, who objected to the doctrine 
of the unity of form, is not included among those with whom Pecham contended (Sharp, 
Franciscan Philosophy, 175-176; Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West, 144-146). 
 John Thoresby, et al., The Lay Folks’ Catechism (Charleston: Nabu: 2012); cf. David 85
Wallace, The Cambridge History of Medieval English Literature, illustrated ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 396-397.
experience of the deleterious effects of debt on the performance of duties. His 
own monastery at Christ Church, Canterbury, with its centralized treasury, 
provided the model that he successfully encouraged others to adopt.  
Pecham’s opposition to the foundation of a monastic house of study at Oxford 
was based on a deep suspicion of Thomism there. The Dominicans, led in Oxford 
by Richard Knapwell, had responded to the Franciscan corrections to Aquinas 
with their own correctoria, and were capturing the minds of the university: the 
reiteration of much of Pecham’s old material by his pupil Roger Marston, 
Knapwell’s Franciscan opponent, was hardly likely to stem the popularity of 
Thomism. Unity of form was once more the central issue, and Pecham highlighted 
the danger of its theological implications when he renewed Kilwardby’s 
condemnations of 1277 on 29 October 1284. . . .   86
Kingsford thinks that Pecham’s ecclesiastical policy was “marred by blundering zeal and 
an inclination to lay undue stress on the rights and duties of his office.”  In addition to 87
his controversies with those in his own order, Pecham was also involved in conflicts with 
the king.  Pecham died on December 8, 1292, from causes that are unclear.   88 89
A statement from one of Pecham’s letters, from 1285, provides insight into his 
orientation toward the debates in which he was involved: 
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 “John Pecham,” 367. 86
 “John Peckham,” 192.87
 See Southern, Western Society, 195-198; cf. 211. “Peckham’s letters are full of 88
examples of what this meant in practice. The king forbade the archbishop’s council to 
discuss matters touching his Crown, his person, his dignity, or the business of the royal 
council. The king summoned bishops to appear in his court in cases concerning 
ecclesiastical patronage. The king forbade the archbishop’s court to hear cases alleged to 
belong to the field of royal jurisdiction. Wherever he turned Peckham found himself 
confined within a jurisdictional system which limited his freedom in unexpected ways. 
He would have needed to be either very wise or very lax to keep his sense of direction in 
this maze. He was neither of these things, so he failed. He could neither acquiesce in, nor 
see his way through, the tangle; and the issues were too complicated to be solved by 
heroic measures in the manner of Thomas Becket. Peckham was driven to the safer but 
even more annoying course of perpetual complains, which achieved nothing except a 
general nervous exhaustion” (ibid., 195). 
 Christopher Cullen, Bonaventure (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 20; cf. 89
Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 9; Potter, introduction to Pecham, Questions 
Concerning the Eternity of the World, x.
I do not in any way disapprove of philosophical studies, insofar as they serve 
theological mysteries, but I do disapprove of irreverent innovations in language, 
introduced within the last twenty years into the depths of theology against 
philosophical truth, and to the detriment of the Fathers, whose positions are 
disdained and openly held in contempt. Which doctrine is more solid and more 
sound, the doctrine of the sons of St. Francis. . . . or that very recent and almost 
entirely contrary doctrine, which fills the entire world with wordy quarrels, 
weakening and destroying with all its strength what Augustine teaches concerning 
the eternal rules and the unchangeable light, the faculties of the soul, the seminal 
reasons included in matter and innumerable questions of the same kind; let the 
Ancients be the judges, since in them is wisdom; let the God of heaven be judge, 
and may he remedy it.  90
Pecham saw the doctrines of both the Averroists and Thomas Aquinas as threats to a 
theological orthodoxy that was oriented around interpretations of the work of Augustine
—interpretations both selective in their use of sources and conditioned by various 
philosophical views.  This nuance in Pecham’s work has led scholars to associate him 91
not simply with “Augustinianism,” but with “Neo-Augustinianism.” 
Pecham as a Neo-Augustinian 
In this section I will address two questions: (1) To what movement do scholars refer 
when they use the term “Neo-Augustinianism”? (2) What was Pecham’s role in the 
development of Neo-Augustinianism? In answering these questions I will consult briefly 
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 The translation is from Potter, introduction, ix-x; cf. Pecham, Registrum: “Praeterea 90
noverit ipse quod philosophorum studia minime reprobamus, quatenus misteriis 
theologicis famulantur; sed prophanas vocum novitates, quae contra philosophicam 
veritatem sunt in sanctorum injuriam citra viginti annos in altitudines theologicas 
introductae, abjectis et vilipensis sanctorum assertionibus evidenter. Quae sit ergo 
solidior et sanior doctrina, vel filiorum Beati Francisci. . . . vel illa novella quasi tota 
contraria, quae quicquid docet Augustinus de regulis aeternis et luce incommutabili, de 
potentiis animae, de rationibus seminalibus inditis materiae et consimilibus innumeris, 
destruat pro viribus et enervat pugnas verborum inferens toti mundo? Videant antiqui in 
quibus est sapientia, videat et corrigat Deus coeli” (3:901-902).
 On Aquinas as an innovator, see Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 72-73. 91
the secondary literature and the Pecham texts that are under consideration in the present 
study.  
A number of scholars have described a movement called Neo-Augustinianism among 
the Franciscans in Paris in the 1270s. The movement has also been called simply, 
“Augustinianism.”  Yet this nomenclature/terminology is misleading for, as Stephen P. 92
Marrone has noted in his work on Augustinian divine illumination theory in the 13th 
century, all scholastics were in a sense Augustinians.  In 1966 Fernand Van 93
Steenberghen, seeing this difficulty in classification as arising from the theological rather 
than philosophical commonalities amongst 13th-century philosophers, was the first to use 
the name “Neo-Augustinianism”; he refers to Bonaventure as the inspiration for the 
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 Mourant, “Augustinianism,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New 92
York: Macmillan, 1967), 1:207: “Augustinianism may be described as that complex of 
philosophical ideas which reflected to a greater or lesser degree the philosophy of 
Augustine. Many of the philosophers who came after Augustine not only restated his 
leading ideas but also frequently modified them with their own interpretations. Such 
interpretations were often the result of the impact of other schools of thought, notably the 
Avicennian and the Aristotelian. Occasionally doctrines that were only implicit in 
Augustine—for instance, the plurality of forms and universal hylomorphism—were made 
explicit and assumed considerable importance. Thus there originated in the medieval 
period what has been termed the Augustinian tradition, which in the later years of its 
development was closely identified with the Franciscan order. . . . After Aquinas it 
gradually disintegrated owing to the impact of Thomism and a resurgent Aristotelianism, 
and no longer represented a distinctive school or tradition. However, it continued to be 
influential to the extent that it inspired or characterized in varying degrees later medieval 
and modern philosophers.” Cf. Stone, “Augustine and Medieval Philosophy,” The 
Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 256. For an overview of Augustine’s 
doctrines, see Gareth Matthews, Augustine (Malden: Blackwell, 2005). 
 The Light of Thy Countenance. Volume One: A Doctrine of Divine Illumination, Studies 93
in the History of Christian Thought 98 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 18. 
movement and Pecham as its founder.  Marrone prefers to refer to the movement 94
differently: 
The focus here is on the conservative party, thinkers not just carried along on 
the Aristotelianizing wave but also partially engaged in reaction against it. Van 
Steenberghen chose for them the name “Neo-Augustinians,” but they are perhaps 
better identified simply as a particular instantiation of the longer-term … current 
of thought labeled … the “Augustinian school.” Not immune to Aristotelian ideas
—the very impulse towards philosophical clarity and consistency being an effect 
of the attraction to Aristotle—they were engaged in an effort to build a system of 
thought cleaving as close to Augustine as could be contrived. Ambivalence thus 
lay at the heart of their endeavor, and the reality of their achievement was as 
much a matter of polemics as substance. They constituted a corps of thinkers 
aiming to create a collective identity under the aegis of Augustine’s name; it was 
in this modest sense that they were Augustinian, not that they represented pure 
Augustine or that Augustine’s influence was not pervasive in other circles as 
well.  95
As Marrone indicates, the Neo-Augustinians have a complex relationship to Aristotle. As 
will become obvious, they were not opposed to citing the authority of Aristotle when they 
felt that this authority was on their side.  
It has been argued that  
neo-Augustinianism is a broadly confused complex of heterogeneous theses often 
erroneously accepted on the authority of Augustine, which actually derived from 
Neoplatonic, Jewish, and Arabic sources, though generally considered to be in 
accord with Catholic belief.   96
It is not surprising that a heterogenous movement arose, given the heavy influence of 
Neoplatonism upon the Latin psychology through Arabic sources (especially Avicenna) 
!58
 La Philosophie Au XIIIe Siécle (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1966), 187-188, 94
470; cf. Marrone, The Light. Volume One, 18. Quinn follows Van Steenberghen in using 
the term “Neo-Augustinianism” (The Historical Constitution, 83). 
 The Light. Volume One, 113; cf. ibid., 7; Georg Wieland, “Plato or Aristotle—A Real 95
Alternative in Medieval Philosophy?,” Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. Wippel 
(Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1987), 81-82. 
 Spruit, Species Intelligibilis, 202.96
and other authors, including Avicebron,  Pseudo-Dionysius and the author of The Book 97
of Causes  (and thus, indirectly, The Theology of Aristotle ).  98 99
[I]n the first half of the 13th century, the reception of Aristotle’s De Anima was in 
fact more of a reception of Avicenna’s De anima and Averroes’ Long Commentary 
on the De anima (than of Aristotle’s De Anima). . . . Evidence for the predominant 
presence of Arabic thought in the 13th century accounts of the soul, perception 
and intellect is abundant.   100
While the scholarship makes it clear that Neo-Augustinians were drawing on a variety of 
sources in the philosophical tradition, the scholarship has not revealed that the use of any 
set of sources or profession of any single set of doctrines was consistent across the 
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 See Weisheipl, “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism.”97
 The critical edition of the Book of Causes is Adriaan Pattin, Le Liber de Causis. Edition 98
établie a l'aide de 90 manuscrits avec introduction et notes (Louvain: Tijdschrift voor 
Filosofie, 1966), 28:90-203. There is also an English translation: The Book of Causes, 
trans. Dennis J. Brand, rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1984). There is 
a forthcoming edition of the Arabic text, Liber de Causis (Kalâm fî mahd al-khair), by 
Richard C. Taylor, et al.
 See Peter Adamson, “The Theology of Aristotle,” Stanford University, http://99
plato.stanford.edu/entries/theology-aristotle/ (2012).
 Luis Xavier López-Farjeat and Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp, introduction to Philosophical 100
Psychology in Arabic Thought and the Latin Aristotelianism of the 13th Century, ed. 
López-Farjeat and Tellkamp (Paris: Vrin, 2013), 11, 12, parenthetical item added. Dales 
comments on this general phenomenon: “It was the acquisition of a number of Muslim, 
Jewish, and Greek works during the twelfth century that cast the subject in a new light 
and made evident a large number of problems that had not been considered before. By the 
time Aristotle’s De Anima became generally known in the early thirteenth century, much 
of its teaching was already familiar to Latin scholars ... but it had acquired a good deal of 
Neoplatonic baggage in the process of transmission” (The Problem of the Rational Soul, 
5).
movement.  Thus I cannot state precisely the necessary or sufficient conditions for a 101
philosopher to meet in order to be considered a Neo-Augustinian. However, there is 
enough data to give a rough idea of the movement.  
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 Wippel writes of the beginnings of Neo-Augustinianism: “By 1270 ... another 101
movement was also coming into being. Owing much of its inspiration to St. Bonaventure, 
its leader around 1270 seems to have been John Pecham. Later in that same decade it 
would find a powerful spokesman in the person of Henry of Ghent (master from 1276 
until 1292)” (“The Condemnations,” 174, parenthetical item in orig.). Wippel and Allan 
B. Wolter discuss the achievement of Neo-Augustinianism as follows: “The 
condemnation of 1270 did not halt this movement of radical Aristotelianism at Paris 
[Latin Averroism, which will be the topic of sections of the present study]. In 1277 Pope 
John XXI asked the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, to investigate the situation. 
Apparently going beyond his mandate, Stephen assembled a commission of sixteen 
theologians who hastily drew up a haphazard list of 219 propositions. These were 
condemned on March 7, 1277. Directed in large measure against Siger [of Brabant], 
Boetius [of Dacia], and their party, they also extend to Aristotelianism in other forms and 
include some perfectly orthodox Thomistic theses. The prohibition was a local reaction 
on the part of certain churchmen and theologians against the autonomous concept of 
philosophizing fostered by Siger and his group and also marked the triumph of a Neo-
Augustinian movement inspired by Bonaventure and founded by John Peckham (d.1292). 
Although primarily directed against heterodox Aristotelianism, it also symbolizes a 
growing opposition to the balanced synthesis so recently worked out by Thomas Aquinas. 
Thomistic theses were also included in prohibitions at Oxford in 1277, 1284, and 
1286” (introduction to Medieval Philosophy, 23-24, parenthetical item in orig., bracketed 
items added); cf. Kelley, introduction, 11. 
Clearly, Bonaventure, William of Baglione,  Roger Bacon,  Alexander of Hales,  102 103 104
Eustachius of Arras,  Walter of Bruges,  and Pecham are seminal figures in the 105 106
movement. Bonaventure was, in 1267 and 1268, among the first to express concerns 
about Latin Averroism.  In the introduction to his study of Bonaventure’s philosophy, 107
John F. Quinn provides a summary of the late-19th- and 20th-century literature 
concerning the development of philosophy in the 13th century.  This summary is 108
especially valuable because it illustrates how one’s philosophical perspective of the 
relationship among various movements at Paris, Oxford, and elsewhere can dictate how 
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 William “reveals himself as one of the more prolific and philosophic Franciscan 102
Masters between Bonaventure and Matthew of Aquasparta,” and William does directly 
address the controversy with Averroism (Brady, “Background,” 7ff.). 
 See Hackett, “Roger Bacon.”103
 Alexander of Hales established a Franciscan presence in the theology faculty at Paris 104
(see Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 27). “Undoubtedly a traditionalist whose 
prime sources are Augustine, John of Damascus, and Pseudo-Dionysius, and whose 
thought is close to the scholastic traditions of his predecessors, Alexander nonetheless 
surpasses his contemporaries in the breadth and profundity of his questions and in the 
new problems and tracts he introduced into theology. To this extent he was an innovator 
who helped open the way for the scholastic renaissance of the mid-thirteenth century. In 
particular, as head of the friars’ studium at Paris, he initiated a certain approach that came 
to characterize such representatives of the Franciscan school as Odo Rigaldus, 
Bonaventure, and Matthew of Aquasparta” (Brady, “Alexander of Hales,” The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1:74). 
 Eustachius was a disciple of Bonaventure (See Maurice De Wulf, History of Medieval 105
Philosophy, trans. P. Coffey, 3rd ed. [London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1909], 293); cf. 
Timothy B. Noone, “The Problem of the Knowability of Substance: The Discussion from 
Eustachius of Arras to Vital Du Four,” Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle 
Ages, 66ff.
 See Kent, Virtues of the Will, 95; Russell L. Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the 106
Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology 
Among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250-1350 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 101. 
 Wippel, “The Condemnations,” 177. For Pecham’s response to Latin Averroism, see 107
the second chapter of the present study.
 The Historical Constitution, 17-99. 108
one views Neo-Augustinianism. There are at least two major issues that bear on how one 
views Neo-Augustinianism: (1) How one takes philosophy to have related to theology in 
the 13th century, and (2) the kind of significance that one attaches to a variety of 
historical events.  For example, there is a long-term dispute about what kind of 109
“Christian philosophy” existed in the 13th century.  One might partially summarize the 110
relevant history by saying the following: 
• In 1942 Van Steenberghen said that Augustinian philosophy was not present in the 
theology faculty at Paris in the mid-13th century, but rather a Neoplatonizing 
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 Consider the following samples: “In 1932, [Maurice] De Wulf delineated four 109
movements of philosophy in the thirteenth century. The first movement was 
Augustinianism, which endured from 1220 until 1260, when Thomism came to the fore. 
Having a conservative spirit and a love of tradition, Augustinianism contained authentic 
doctrines of Augustine; however, it compromised them by blending them with the new 
Aristotelianism. As a consequence, the doctrines of Aristotle were used to explain St. 
Augustine’s teaching on such questions as the creation of the world, seminal reasons, the 
human soul and human knowledge. . . . Speaking of the thirteenth-century Augustinians, 
[Étienne] Gilson said that they all subscribed to three doctrines. The first doctrine 
concerned the human soul, which they defined as a spiritual substance; but none of them 
upheld “the view that the very essence of this substance was to be the form of a body,” 
Their [sic] position went back to St. Augustine. . . . The second doctrine was a corollary 
of the first and had to do with the divine illumination. . . . The third doctrine dealt with 
the nature of matter. . . . In his account of the principal events leading to the 
condemnation of 1277, Van Steenberghen said that St. Thomas had understood better than 
any other theologian that philosophy necessarily formed the central framework of the 
sciences. . . . Because his new system departed on many points from the traditional 
teaching of theology, the conservative theologians saw it as an ally, and then as an 
accomplice, of radical Aristotelianism. Thus, in 1270, the innovations of St. Thomas 
provoked the attack on him by those theologians, particularly by John Peckham. Inspired 
by St. Bonaventure, who apparently encouraged Peckham’s opposition to Thomism, he 
founded the philosophical school of Neo-Augustinianism: this was new from an adoption 
of Aristotelian, Arabian and Jewish doctrines; it was an Augustinianism because of a 
deliberate attachment to Augustinian doctrines in the traditional theology” (Quinn, The 
Historical Constitution, 36, 68-69, 72-73, bracketed items added; emp. in orig.).
 See Cullen, Bonaventure, 32-35. 110
Aristotelianism was there. Thus the conflict between Aquinas and the Franciscans 
did not represent a conflict between Aristotelian and Augustinian philosophies.   111
• Also in 1942, Étienne Gilson responded to Van Steenberghen and said that 
Augustine had developed a Christian philosophy as did Aquinas. Because medieval 
theologians and philosophers were creative in their theological function, their 
philosophy cannot be separated from their theology. Thus the movement in which 
Pecham is involved can be properly called Augustinianism.  112
• Also in 1942, Patrice Robert contended that Bonaventure developed medieval 
Augustinianism. Bonaventure respected Aristotle and his authority, which motivated 
him to complete his Augustinian Platonism with Aristotelianism, complementing 
Augustinianism with Aristotle’s scientific precision.  113
This is merely a brief account of what occurred during one representative year in 
scholarship that bears on the issue. It is not the purpose of the present study to adjudicate 
these matters, but it is worth noting that the interpretive story goes on: In 1959 Joseph 
Ratzinger proposed that Bonaventure never intended to be an Augustinian but rather 
sought exclusively to acknowledge the historical positions of Augustine and Aristotle in 
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 Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 90-91; cf. Van Steenberghen, Siger de Brabant 111
d’apres ses oeuvres inédites, Les Philosophes Belges 12-13 (Louvain: Institut supérieur 
de philosophie, texts issued in 1931 and studies issued in 1942); ibid., Aristotle in the 
West, 130ff. 
 Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 92; cf. ibid., 44; Gilson, Bulletin Thomiste (Le 112
Saulchoir: La Société Thomste), 6:23-29; ibid., Le Thomisme: Introduction á La 
Philosophie De Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1986). Cullen writes on this point: 
“Gilson argued consistently that there was authentic philosophical thought to be found in 
the Middle Ages, but that its approach during that time was distinctive, because it was in 
the context of Christian faith. He called this ‘Christian philosophy,’ a term he borrowed 
from Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879). . . . Gilson found a particularly clear 
example of Christian philosophy in the thought of Bonaventure” (Bonaventure, 32, 33, 
parenthetical item in orig.). 
 Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 92; Robert, “St. Bonaventure, Defender of 113
Christian Wisdom,” Franciscan Studies 3 (1943): 159-179.
the development of human thought.  And, Philotheus Boehner has argued that 114
Franciscans in the 13th century were more Augustinian than Aristotelian.  Marrone 115
maintains that, while it was not the Franciscans’ primary goal to provide an accurate 
interpretation of Augustine’s text, they were committed to preserving what they believed 
to be threats against orthodoxy; they did so “under the aegis of Augustine’s name”.   116
Secondary Literature on Pecham’s Role 
Quinn says that Pecham “inspired” the school of Neo-Augustinianism, thus echoing 
the position taken by Van Steenberghen.  On what basis is Pecham called the inspiration 117
of the movement? Just as the secondary literature does not facilitate a precise definition 
of the Neo-Augustinian movement, it also fails to show that Pecham founded the 
movement. One wonders whether the literature could possibly show that Pecham was the 
founder, given that Pecham and others like him did not label themselves as Neo-
Augustinians.   
Nonetheless, one feature of the history is particularly supportive of the idea that 
Pecham played a decisive role. While Van Steenberghen does not say that Pecham 
founded the movement (in fact, Van Steenberghen calls Pecham [and Bonaventure, 
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 Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 96; Ratzinger, Die Geschichtstheologie des 114
Heiligen Bonaventura (München und Zürich: Schnell & Steiner, 1959); ibid., The 
Theology of History in St. Bonaventure (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1989); Cullen 
says that “Ratzinger’s study does not make a sharp distinction between Aristotelianism 
and Averrosim” (Bonaventure, 194; cf. ibid., 113-117).
 “The Spirit of Franciscan Philosophy,” Franciscan Studies 2 (1942): 217-237; cf. 115
Marrone, The Light. Volume One, 19. 
 The Light. Volume One, 111ff. 116
 The Historical Constitution, 68; cf. ibid., 73. 117
tacitly] representatives of “eclectic Aristotelianism” ), he nonetheless brings up several 118
points that can be marshaled in support of such a claim.  Pecham was regent master of 119
the Franciscan school in Paris from 1269-1271, and there is no official record of 
philosophical or theological dispute between the Dominicans and Franciscans before that 
date.  Aquinas’s “innovations” prompted Pecham to oppose him on the issues of the 120
unicity of form and the eternity of the world in 1270, and no one is known to have done 
so prior to Pecham. Roberto Zavalloni therefore places Pecham at the origins of the 
controversy over the plurality of forms.  121
Evidence from Pecham’s Texts, concerning His Role  
Pecham’s texts also yield evidence that he was promoting a particular kind of 
“Augustinianism.” Here, I will consider select passages from Pecham’s work where he 
makes clear what his sources are, and then I will consider examples of Pecham’s 
doctrines which have roots in Augustinine’s works but have been modified by other, 
especially Greek, Arabic, and Jewish, Neoplatonic, influences. It will become clear that 
Pecham refers to Augustinian doctrine in a framework that results largely from his 
reading of three authors in particular: Avicebron, Avicenna, and Pseudo-Dionysius.  
Due to the scholarship of Ignatius Brady, it is widely accepted that Aquinas wrote his 
De Aeternitate Mundi against a presentation that Pecham made at his inceptio (i.e., when 
!65
 Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West, 146-162.118
 Ibid., 234-235. 119
 Ibid., 233-234.120
 Richard De Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes. Textes inédits et 121
études critique (Louvain: Ed. de l’Institut superieur de philosophie), 213-215.
he received the doctorate) around 1270.  The position that Pecham takes in his own 122
Questions Concerning the Eternity of the World is directly traceable to Augustine:  
During Thomas’ second regency at Paris, Pecham seems to have been the 
spokesman for a group that claimed that their view of creation was continuous 
with a tradition of orthodoxy going back to Augustine, particularly in the De 
civitate Dei XII and in Super Genesim VIII.   123
However, while Pecham cites Augustine often in the text of the Questions Concerning the 
Eternity of the World,  he also expresses what he takes to be Augustine’s doctrine in the 124
context of other philosophers and interpreters. Consider the following examples: 
• Pecham cites Avicenna’s point that “the metaphysical philosophers do not mean 
by ‘agent’ only the principle of motion, as the naturalists mean, but the principle 
and giver of existence, as in the case of God with respect to the world. . . . [t]hat 
which bestows existence is a principle of motion.”   125
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 Brady, “John Pecham and the Background”; cf. Potter, introduction, xv-xvi; Turner, 122
Thomas Aquinas, 190-191; Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), 11-12
 Potter, introduction, xv; cf. Augustine, City of God, trans. Marcus Dods, Nicene and 123
Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series 2, 12.10-14; The Literal Meaning of Genesis, On 
Genesis, trans. Matthew O’Connell, ed. John E. Rotelle, Works of St. Augustine 13 (New 
York: New City Press, 2002), Book 8, especially 8.21.40-8.22.43.
 E.g., 11, 13, 14, 16, etc.124
 Pecham, Questions, 7; cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics, 6.1. Unless otherwise noted, all 125
citations from Avicenna’s Metaphysics are from The Metaphysics of the Healing, trans. 
Michael E. Marmura (Provo: Brigham Young, 2005). 
• Pecham cites Pseudo-Dionysius to argue that the divine being is more 
fundamental than every other perfection, and Pecham says that this is 
Avicenna’s opinion as well.   126
• Pecham cites Avicenna’s position that “When a thing has non-esse of itself, then 
it follows that its esse is after non-esse and it comes to be after it had not 
been.”  Pecham is here arguing against the view that the world could be 127
eternal. 
• Pecham cites various theological authorities to make points that are (to my 
knowledge) not stated in exactly the same way in Augustine.  128
Pecham’s debt to Neoplatonic sources is even more evident in the Tractatus, where he 
takes a foundational principle of his psychology from the De Motu Cordis by Alfred of 
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 Pecham, Questions, 11; cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, 820B. Unless 126
otherwise noted, all citations of Pseudo-Dionysius are from The Complete Works, trans. 
Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist, 1987); Avicenna, Metaphysics, 9.4: “It is impossible 
that there should, in any manner whatsoever, be for Him a principle and a cause—neither 
[the cause] from which [something] comes to be, [nor the cause] either in which or by 
which [something] comes to be, nor [the cause] for [the purpose] for which [a thing] is, 
whereby He would be for the sake of something. For this reason it is impossible for the 
existence of all things [proceeding] from Him to be by way of intention—like our 
intention— for forming the whole and for the existence of the whole, so that He would be 
intending for the sake of something other than Himself (bracketed items in orig.); cf. 
ibid., 6.2.
 Questions, 25; cf. ibid., 18; Avicenna, Metaphysics, 6.1: “To this [latter] thing there 127
would [occur] existence, and to that [same] thing [also] belongs [the fact] that it did not 
exist. It does not derive from the agent [the fact that] it did not exist, nor that it came to 
be after nonexistence, but from the agent it derives only its existence” (bracketed items in 
orig.). 
 Pecham cites Richard of St. Victor on the point that every nature must come from 128
God, since there is nothing prior to God (Questions, 9). Pecham again cites Richard to 
show that “what exists of itself is necessarily eternal” (ibid., 28). Similarly, Pecham cites 
Hugh of St. Victor to support the view that nothing could be coeternal with an omnipotent 
being for purposes of aiding in creation (ibid., 10). Pecham cites Hugh again in arguing 
that there had to be a moment when the world began to be, since the world does not 
produce infinitely (ibid., 33). Pecham cites John Damascene and Anselm as he argues that 
anything that is brought from non-being to being cannot be naturally co-eternal with one 
who is without beginning (ibid., 33). 
Sareshel (calling it the Fons Vitae) : “The first act of life occurs earlier or more 129
generally than the others, because just as it is said in the book The Fount of Life: “Life is 
the first and equal act.”  This is not to say, however, that Pecham was unfamiliar with 130
Avicebron’s text itself. In fact, as I will show in the fifth chapter of the present study, 
Pecham appears to have been carrying out the project of adapting and extending the 
tradition inspired by the Fons Vitae.  The De Motu Cordis was used as a philosophy text 131
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 Tractatus, 4-6; See Alfred of Sareshel, Shrift De Motu Cordis [Münster: Verlag Der 129
Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1923]. For a summary of the life Alfred of 
Sareshel and a report on the scholarship related to him, see James K. Otte, “The Life and 
Writings of Alfredus Anglicus,” Viator 3 (1972): 275-292. Callus writes: “Still more 
important in introducing the new Aristotle into England is Alfred of Sareshel, called the 
Englishman, Alexander Nequam’s friend, to whom he dedicated his De Motu Cordis, 
written not later than 1217 (the date of Alexander’s death). Besides this he translated 
from the Arabic the Pseudo-Aristotelian (Nicholas of Damascus’s) De Vegetabilus, or De 
Plantis, and the last three chapters of the Meteorology of Avicenna, which he added to 
Book IV. But above all Alfred was the pioneer in the long list of medieval commentators 
on the libri naturales. . . . The most solid foundation of Alfred’s reputation was, however, 
the De Motu Cordis. About the middle of the thirteenth century, it was introduced into the 
curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Paris as a textbook for the last part of the ‘scientia 
naturalis inferior’. . . . Moreover, Alfred’s definition of the soul soon gained general 
acceptance, and was quoted among the current definitions by Philip the Chancellor, John 
de la Rochelle, St. Albert the Great, Bartholomew the Englishman, and others. This wide 
reputation earned for Alfred in the pages of the Summa Philosophiae (generally but 
wrongly ascribed to Robert Grosseteste) a distinguished place among the 
philosophers” (“Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford,” Proceedings of the 
British Academy 19:11, 12, parenthetical items in orig.). 
 Pecham, Tractatus, 4, 6: “Vita est actus primus et aequalis. . . . vita est primus actus 130
formae.” Pecham says that this point comes from a Fons Vitae, however the phrase is 
really in Alfred of Sareshel’s De Motu Cordis (7, 8): “Vitam actus omibus aequaliter 
inesse necesse est, ceteras neutiquam [sic]. . . . Primae ergo et aequalis et continua est 
vita. Primus enim formae actus est. Est enim primus motus ex quieto sempiterno fluens”; 
cf. Sarah Pessin, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol [Avicebron],” Stanford University, http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-gabirol/ (2013).
 See Avicebron, Fountain of Life, trans. Wedeck. Wedeck’s abridged translation is 131
based on the Latin text of the Fons Vitae, ed. Clemens Baeumker (Münster: Aschendorff, 
1995).
by the arts faculty at Paris by 1250, and is now known for the view that what moves the 
heart is not nature, but the soul.  Pecham again cites the De Motu Cordis (as the Fons 132
Vitae) in making the point that nutrition and sensation cannot be the first act of life, 
because old men whose powers of sensation are diminishing have life just as a young 
man does.  The De Motu Cordis comes up again when Pecham says that the soul is 133
“incorporeal substance, intellective, and of the illuminations which are from the First, in 
the last relation are perceptive.”  It is interesting that in his Quaestiones Pecham 134
essentially repeats this statement, but locates it this time in the Fons Vitae itself.  135
I have already noted Avicenna’s influence in the Latin west.  References to 136
Avicenna abound in the Tractatus. Dag Nikolaus Hasse has written what is now the 
standard account of the reception of Avicenna’ De Anima in the Latin west.  Michael E. 137
Marmura has pointed out that for Avicenna, 
The human soul is an emanation from the active intellect [the last celestial 
intelligence in the series of intelligences emanating from God]. It is an immaterial 
substance that is individuated only when it joins the body. This individuality, 
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 Otte, introduction to Alfred of Sareshel, Alred of Sareshel’s Commentary on the 132
Metheora of Aristotle, ed. Otte (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 6; Roger French, Medicine Before 
Science: The Business of Medicine from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 68.
 Pecham, Tractatus, 5; Alfred of Sareshel, De Motu Cordis, chapter 1. 133
 Pecham, Tractatus, 8; Alfred of Sareshel, De Motu Cordis, prologue.134
 Quaestiones, 451; cf. Avicebron, Fons Vitae, 4.10. 135
 For further details, see Jon McGinnis, Avicenna (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 136
2010), 251ff.
 Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of 137
the Soul, Warburg Institute Studies and Texts (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000). 
Avicenna was himself the recipient of a long commentary tradition that focused on 
harmonizing Plato with Aristotle (Robert Wiznovsky, “Avicenna and the Avicennian 
Tradition,” The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Peter Adamson and 
Richard C. Taylor [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005], 92-136).
however, is retained, so that with the death of the body the human soul survives as 
an individual. The task of the soul in this life is to control and manage bodily 
appetites, ideally through the acquisition of theoretical and practical 
knowledge. . . .  138
Avicenna said that the agent intellect was not part of the human substance but rather a 
single, cosmic entity.  He identified it with the 10th and lowest celestial sphere, and 139
said that the agent intellect completes abstraction in order to bring about 
understanding.  Then, Gundissalinus, the interpreter of both Avicebron and Avicenna, 140
identified Avicenna’s agent intellect with God.  141
Hasse describes Pecham’s Tractatus as both exceptional in its time as a work that 
takes Avicenna’s De Anima as its model, and illustrative of the failure of Avicenna’s 
faculty psychology to take hold in Western philosophy more broadly: 
This work, written between 1270 and 1279, contains a section on the soul’s 
powers which presents the full range of Avicennian faculties. Pecham tries to 
establish a concordance between Aristotle and Avicenna, for instance by saying 
that both philosophers attribute three faculties to the vegetative soul (which is 
correct only for Avicenna) and that Aristotle calls Avicenna’s ‘intellectus 
accomodatus’ the active intellect (which is not correct either, since for Avicenna 
the acquired intellect is a status of the human intellect, whereas the active intellect 
is separate). One can see that this is not a convincing strategy: Pecham is not 
writing a commentary on Aristotle, but neither does he develop Albertus’s diligent 
account of Peripatetic philosophy into a post-Avicennian direction. In contrast to 
what happened in the Arabic East, where Avicenna’s philosophy eclipsed that of 
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 “Avicenna (Abu ‘Ali al-Husayn ibn ‘Abd-Allah ibn Sina) (980-1037),” Dictionary of 138
Literary Biography 115, 87-88, bracketed item added and adapted from ibid., 87. 
 The Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 42ff.; cf. Nadja Germann, “Avicenna and Afterwards,” 139
The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy, ed. John Marenbon (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 86; Marcia Colish, Medieval Foundations of the Western 
Intellectual Tradition, 400-1400 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 143-144.
 Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 8.140
 Ibid., 13; cf. Dominicus Gundissalinus, “The Treatise De Anima of Dominicus 141
Gundissalinus,” ed. J.T. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies 2:23-102.
Aristotle and dominated Islamic philosophical thought for many centuries, it did 
not determine the direction of Western philosophical writing after 1250.  142
As will become obvious in this chapter and in the third chapter of the present study, 
Hasse is correct that Pecham sought to utilize the authority of Augustine, Aristotle, and 
Avicenna in the Tractatus. However, Hasse is too quick to assume that Pecham is wrong 
in comparing Aristotle and Avicenna. We can find in Aristotle’s description of the 
nutritive soul principles that correspond to Pecham’s nutrivam, augmentativam, and 
generativam powers.  Pecham would have been clearly wrong about the intellectus 143
accommodatus only if it is clear that Aristotle believed the agent intellect to be a principle 
separate from the human intellect ; for Pecham to have taken a position in a notoriously 144
difficult controversy of Aristotelian interpretation is hardly reason to say that Pecham’s 
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 Avicenna’s De Anima, 74-75, parenthetical items in orig. Hasse says that further 142
evidence of the subordination of interest in Avicennian psychology to Averroist 
psychology and other concerns is that very few psychological theses of Avicenna are 
included in the condemnation of 1277 (ibid., 76). But see Arthur Hyman and James 
Walsh, “The Condemnation of 1277,” Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, 
Islamic, and Jewish Traditions, 2nd ed., ed. Hyman and Walsh (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1973), 589, where one condemned proposition reads: “That the agent intellect is a certain 
separated substance superior to the possible intellect and that it is separated from the 
body according to its substance, power, and operation and is not the form of the human 
body.” Hasse presents two major reasons why Avicenna did not determine the direction of 
Western philosophical writing after 1250: (1) The growing influence of Averroes 
(Avicenna’s De Anima, 75); (2) A shift in intellectual interest toward disputes over 
doctrines about the intellect (e.g., the unicity of the possible intellect, universal 
hylomorphism, plurality of forms, the theory of intellection, etc.) and away from 
physiology and faculty psychology in general (ibid., 76). 
 Pecham, Tractatus, 31; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 416a.19-416b.31. Unless otherwise 143
noted, all citations of Aristotle are from The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan 
Barnes. 2 vols. Bollingen Series (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
 In support of the position that Aristotle did think this, see Myles F. Burnyeat, 144
Aristotle’s Divine Intellect (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2008), especially 
37-43.
project of finding correspondence between Avicenna and Aristotle is unpromising.  145
Even if Hasse is correct to criticize Pecham for misunderstanding his sources, it does not 
follow that Pecham’s approach to psychology is itself unpromising or would have been 
looked upon as being so among his contemporaries. Furthermore, Hasse observes in the 
late-13th-century writers a turn away from faculty psychology and toward debates over 
doctrines of the intellect, but does not also criticize this turn for representing an 
unconvincing strategy.  One might read Pecham’s Tractatus alongside his Quaestiones 146
as being a perfect representation of the very turn that Hasse notes. If so, then we require a 
more substantial explanation as to why Pecham’s approach is unpromising and not a 
nuanced procedure for dealing with philosophical and theological problems that were 
pressing in Paris at the time.  
Consider in further detail how Avicenna’s influence on Pecham makes itself clear in 
the Tractatus. As Hasse observes, Pecham’s breakdown of the souls’ various potencies 
reflects directly his reading of Avicenna.  Pecham claims the authority of Avicenna for 147
the view that the conjoining of the soul with the body is for the purpose of the 
contemplative intellect’s perfection, sanctification, and cleansing.  Similarly, Pecham 148
cites Avicenna for support for the position that the soul is united to the body by a desire to 
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 See Pecham, Tractatus, 39. 145
 Avicenna’s De Anima, 76-77. 146
 Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima, 74-75; cf. Pecham, Tractatus, 31-39; Avicenna, Liber De 147
Anima (Leiden: Brill, 1968), 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 4.1, 4.2. 
 Pecham, Tractatus, 8: “Obligatio animae cum corpore est propter hoc ut perficiatur 148
intellectus contemplativus et sanctificetur et mundetur.” Melani did not find the quotation 
that Pecham uses here; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.6. 
govern it.  Avicenna “carefully says” that the conjoining of soul and body is facilitated 149
by both cognition and motion.  Pecham agrees with Avicenna’s view that the intellect 150
needs bodily organs only for acquiring knowledge, just as a sailor needs a ship only when 
he wants to be brought to port.  Pecham also cites Avicenna for the view that the 151
rational soul’s perfection occurs when it makes the world intelligible.  On Pecham’s 152
view, Avicenna is correct to say that the understanding occurring in humans is a function 
of the radiation of intelligible forms onto human intellects from the agent intellect.  153
Thus, Pecham says, we should apply our own intellects to the separate agent intellect.  154
(However, as I will discuss later, Pecham thinks that there is both a human agent intellect 
and a divine agent intellect.) Augustine does not speak of the agent intellect per se, but 
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 Pecham, Tractatus, 13: “[S]ed corpori compatitur, cui intime est unita affectu et 149
desiderio regendi ipsum, sicut dicit Avicenna”; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 1.3. 
 Pecham, Tractatus, 13: “Sic igitur et cognoscendo et movendo est corporis et animae 150
colligatio et confirmatio modo supradicto. Unde caute dicit Avicenna”; cf. Avicenna, De 
Anima, 2.3.
 Pecham, Tractatus, 25; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 2.1. 151
 Pecham, Tractatus, 9: “[P]erfectio animae rationalis est ut fiat saeculum intelligibile et 152
describatur in ea forma totius”; cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics, 7.2. 
 Pecham, Tractatus, 20; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.5. “Avicenna’s epistemology is 153
emanative. Theoretical knowledge involves the reception from the active intellect of two 
types of intelligibles, primary and secondary. The primary consists of primitive concepts, 
such as that of ‘the existents’ and of self-evident logical truths. These primary 
intelligibles are received ‘directly,’ in the sense that they are received without the need of 
any preparatory activities of the soul such as perception, imagination, or cogitation. The 
secondary intelligibles consist of complex concepts and inferences and normally requires 
these preparatory activities for their acquisition” (Marmura, “Avicenna,” 88). 
 Tractatus, 20. Pecham says that Avicenna rightly teaches that in the collection of 154
human powers, one power can impede another (Tractatus, 25; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 
5.4). This can distract us from the agent intellect. Pecham also cites Avicenna for the 
view that animal spirits are vehicles for animal powers, which trouble the soul (Tractatus, 
26-27; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.8).
the Franciscans clearly associated a kind of Augustinian divine illumination with the role 
of the agent intellect.  
Twice in the Tractatus, Pecham evidently refers to the fifth-/sixth-century 
Neoplatonist theologian Pseudo-Dionysius  for reinforcement: (1) Pseudo-Dionysius 155
says that the plants have the “farthest resonance of life” (ultimam resonantiam vitae).  156
Pecham presents this point as part of his explanation of a scale of illumination that ranges 
from the “Principal” on one extreme, to the plants on the other.  (2) Pecham finds in 157
Pseudo-Dionysius support for his definition of love: “life and life coming together” (vita 
et vita copulans).  158
Twice in the Tractatus, Pecham references the Book of Causes,  
one of the principal sources of the eclectic tendency of Arabic and Jewish 
metaphysics. . . . Its official ratification as a fundamental source for philosophical 
studies ... took place on March 19, 1255, when it became, according to new 
statutes, a text for required reading at the Faculty of Arts at Paris. . . . [I]t was St. 
Thomas who signaled the true origin of the opuscule: he recognized in it theses 
extracted from Proclus’ Elements of Theology. Three quarters of a century of 
confusion was thus ended. But the fact that it was no longer reckoned among the 
writings of Aristotle did not diminish the authority or the importance of the Liber 
de causis. It continued to be, along with Avicenna, Ibn Gabirol, Pseudo-
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 See J.C. Marler, “Pseudo-Dionyisius the Areopagite,” Dictionary of Literary 155
Biography 115, 325-334.
 Pecham, Tractatus, 7; cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names: “All life and living 156
movement comes from a Life which is above every life and is beyond the source of life. 
From this Life souls have their indestructibility, and every living being and plant, down to 
the last echo of life, has life” (856B).
 Tractatus, 7-8. 157
 Tractatus, 22: cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, 712Cff., 721C-724B. “Even the 158
person who desires the lowest form of life still desires life and a life that seems good to 
him; thus he participates in the Good to the extent that he feels a desire for life and for 
what—to him at least—seems a worthwhile life. Abolish the Good and you will abolish 
being, life, desire, movement, everything” (ibid., 720C). 
Dionysius, and St. Augustine, one of the principal sources of the Neo-
Platonism. . . .   159
Pecham cites the Book of Causes to make the point that “Life is proceeding out of the 
first being, quiet and eternal and the first motion. . . .”  For a connected point, Pecham 160
cites what he takes to be Plato’s doctrine: “the soul moves itself and that movement is 
!75
 Bazán, Carlos B., foreword to The Book of Causes, 1, 2. The Book of Causes has been 159
called “an epitome of pagan Neoplatonism. The work covers many topics, but especially 
the Neoplatonic doctrine of causality and participation, the nature of the triads, the 
plenitude of being, the sovereignty of good, the superessentiality of the first cause ... and 
the nature of intelligence” (Hackett, “Roger Bacon,” Dictionary of Literary Biography 
115, 93. 
 Tractatus, 6; cf. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, trans. Vincent 160
A. Guagliardo, et al. (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 111.
continuous.”  Pecham cites the Book of Causes again in his discussion of the soul’s self-161
reflection: “Everything knowing its essence is returning above it by complete bringing 
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 Tractatus, 6; cf. Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, 161
245c-246a; unless otherwise noted, all citations of Plato are from Complete Works, ed. 
John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). However, Pecham must have taken this 
principle not from Plato’s text directly, since it was almost certainly unavailable to him, 
but rather from a source such as Cicero. See Tractatus, 6, footnote 5; Cicero, On Old Age, 
chapter 21 (unless otherwise noted, all citations from Cicero are from The Basic Works of 
Cicero, ed. Moses Hadas, trans. various [New York: Modern Library, 1951]); cf. Spade: 
“In the case of Plato, the Middle Ages for all practical purposes had only the first part of 
the Timaeus (to 53c), hardly a typical Platonic dialogue, in a translation and commentary 
by a certain Calcidius (or Chalcidius). . . .” (“Medieval Philosophy,” Stanford University, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-philosophy/ [2009], parenthetical items in 
orig.). For a list of Plato’s texts and commentaries available during the Middle Ages, see 
Raymond Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages 
(London: Warburg Institute, 1950), 52-58. The Meno and Phaedo were available in 
translations by Henricus Aristippus (cf. Bernard G. Dod, “Aristoteles Latinus,” The 
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, et al. 
[Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982], 56; cf. Marenbon, Late 
Medieval Philosophy, 194-197). See also Stephen Gersh, “The Medieval Legacy From 
Ancient Platonism,” The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographic 
Approach, ed. Stephen Gersh and Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
2002), 3-30, especially the following remark: “Macrobius’ Commentarius in Somnium 
Scipionis represents an interpretation of the final section of Cicero’s treatise on the ideal 
commonwealth in terms of the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Porphyry. During the 
execution of this project, the fifth-century Latin writer has plenty of opportunity to cite 
Plato, although it is impossible to determine with any certainty whether the citations have 
been made directly from the original text. The Phaedo is cited for the notion that 
philosophy is a meditation upon death, the depiction of the soul’s confusion upon 
entering the body, and the notion of our varying rewards and punishments in the afterlife. 
Macrobius cites the Phaedrus for the teaching that soul is a self-moving principle, and 
the Gorgias for the notion of man’s varying rewards and punishments in the 
afterlife” (10); see Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, trans. William Harris 
Stahl (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 225-226. Pecham also cites 
Macrobius in quaestio four of his Tractatus De Sphaera, but the statement that Pecham 
cites is not found in Macrobius’ Commentary (personal email communication from 
Etzkorn, editor of the forthcoming critical edition of Pecham’s Tractatus De Sphaera). 
back.”  Furthermore, it is likely that Pecham’s view of the agent intellect is partially a 162
result of his reading of the following principle from the Book of Causes: “And indeed, 
Intelligence is an intellectual substance; therefore, after the mode of its own substance it 
knows the things it acquires from above and the things of which it is the cause.”  163
Pecham does not think that the human intellect is the cause of the external objects that the 
sensory soul knows (i.e., it is not the case that “the knower and the known are one 
thing” ), but he does think that the individual human being’s mind is productive, as I 164
will discuss below.  
In Pecham’s Quaestiones, we again find him citing Augustine often and discussing 
doctrines which have roots in Augustine’s writings but have now been re-interpreted. For 
example, Pecham advocates universal hylomorphism, another doctrine that cannot 
obviously be taken from the writings of Augustine but that was adapted from Avicebron 
and his Latin interpreters and grafted onto Augustine’s doctrine in the 13th century.  165
James Weisheipl has argued that the universal hylomorphism that Pecham defends 
actually is derived from Avicebron, and I will corroborate Weisheipl’s position in the fifth 
chapter of the present study.  (It is interesting to note that, while Pecham claims to be 166
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 Tractatus De Anima, 43; Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, 98. The Latin 162
text, which Pecham approximates, is: “Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam est rediens 
ad essentiam suam reditione completa” (Liber de Causis, 14.5-6).
 Liber de Causis, 7.1-5: “[I]ntelligentia quidem est substantia intelligibilis: ergo 163
secundum modum suae substantiae scit res quas acquirit desuper et res quibus est causa. . 
. .”; cf. Book of Causes, 26; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, 60.  
 Liber de Causis, 14.126: “[E]t hoc non est ita nisi quoniam sciens et scitum sunt res 164
una. . . .”; cf. Book of Causes, 32; Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, 98.
 Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 3.165
 “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 239-260. 166
supporting doctrines that are traditional, the doctrines of universal hylomorphism and the 
plurality of forms had a limited history at the time when Pecham discussed them. ) 167
Sarah Pessin has a helpful discussion of the universal hylomorphism of the Fons Vitae: 
Matter and form ... are, along with the doctrine of Divine Will, cornerstones of the 
Fons Vitae. In particular, the Fons Vitae teaches (rather unusually within the 
history of ideas) that all things—including spiritual simples such as soul and 
intellect (but not God)—are comprised of matter and form. . . . This doctrine of 
Universal Hylomorphism emerges as a central theological and philosophical point 
of contention between Augustinian Franciscans (who embrace it) and Aristotelian 
Dominicans (who reject it).  168
Yet even though universal hylomorphism finds a full articulation in Avicebron, it has 
been suggested that the underlying concept of spiritual matter is already found in 
Augustine.  This idea is based on passages in Augustine’s Confessions and On Genesis, 169
where Augustine seems to use “formlessness” to describe matter with a kind of obscure 
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 See Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West, 140; cf. D.A. Callus, “The Oxford Career 167
of Robert Grosseteste,” Oxoniensia 10 (1945): 42-72. Lewry notes that the source of the 
plurality view is the Fons Vitae by the 11th-century Jewish Neoplatonist Solomon Ibn 
Gabirol, or Avicebron (“Robert Kilwardby,” 260). I will discuss this point further in the 
fifth chapter of the present study
 “Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” parenthetical items in orig.168
 Roland Teske, “William of Auvergne’s Debt to Avicenna,” Avicenna and His 169
Heritage: Acts of the International Colloquium, Leuven, September 8-11, 1999, ed. Jules 
Janssens and Daniel De Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001), 163; Michael B. 
Sullivan, “The Debate over Spiritual Matter in the Late Thirteenth Century: Gonsalvus 
Hispanus and the Franciscan Tradition from Bonaventure to Scotus,” Doctoral Thesis 
(Catholic University of America. 2010), 15-21. James J. O’Donnell says that Augustine 
actually discusses matter with reference to eight different items or senses: (1) caelum: the 
spiritual, celestial creature; (2) caelum et terram: together the confusion of unformed 
matter; (3-8) terra invisibilis et incomposita: the unformed matter of corporeal things; the 
unformed matter of corporeal heaven and earth; unformed matter from which would 
come intelligible heaven and corporeal heaven and earth; unformed matter from which 
would come heaven (spiritual creature) and earth (corporeal creature); pre-existent 
informity that would be the matter out of which corporeal heaven and earth would be 
drawn (Augustine Confessions, Volume 3: Commentary, Books 8-13, [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press], 317). 
form.  (I will discuss the issue of universal hylomorphism in Augustine further in the 170
fifth chapter of the present study.) Universal hylomorphism also involves the Aristotelian 
idea that matter is the principle of continuity in change;  Bonaventure and Pecham will 171
thus argue that any mutable substance must have a material component, even if this 
matter is spiritual rather than corporeal, as in the case of the separated substances.  And, 172
Pecham’s discussion of the soul’s simplicity expands upon what we find in the Fons 
Vitae.   173
From the Stoics and Augustine, Bonaventure and Pecham derive the doctrine of 
seminal reasons (rationes seminales) or principles embedded in matter which account for 
changes in nature.  This doctrine is clearly found in Augustine: 174
Augustine’s account of seminal reasons was derived, in part, from Stoic 
natural philosophy. Many of his Franciscan supporters were unaware of this 
genealogy, and thus construed the doctrine as affirming the superiority of the 
completeness of divine creation over the Aristotelian conception of the pure 
potency of matter. They understood Augustine to teach that God had infused into 
matter, at the moment of creation, intelligible patterns that could be actualized 
over time. Bonaventure, for example, held that the souls of non-rational animals 
and of plants were created not ex nihilo and not simply out of pre-existing matter, 
but rather in the manner of a seed. In other words, these souls were created by 
actualizing an active potency in matter. After the moment of creation, animal 
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 See Sullivan, “The Debate,” 16ff. O’Donnell writes on the concept of informem 170
materiam in Augustine’s Confessions: “He will insist (at 13.33.48) that though matter was 
without form, form was created simultaneously with matter, and that the order here is 
logical but not temporal. . . . The subject first appears in [On Genesis Against the 
Manichees] when Augustine comes to handle Genesis 1:2. . . . (Confessions, Volume 3, 
305, parenthetical item in orig., bracketed item added).
 See Aristotle, e.g., Metaphysics, 1028b.33-1029b.13.171
 See Cullen, Bonaventure, 44-45. 172
 Quaestiones, 387. 173
 Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 vols., Studies in 174
the History of Christian Thought 34, 35 (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 2:205-206. For Pecham’s 
doctrine of the seminal reasons, see Delorme, “La Summa,” 66.
souls were reproduced without divine intervention by the natural actualization of 
these “seminal reasons.”  175
In On the Trinity, Augustine provides a theological background for this view: “Because 
therefore the Word of God is One, by which all things were made ... all things are 
simultaneously therein, potentially and unchangeably; not only those things which are 
now in this whole creation, but also those which have been and those which shall be.”  176
Augustine’s doctrine of matter as being more than a pure potency was motivated by his 
debate with the Manicheans, who taught that evil was material substance, co-eternal with 
God.  Seminal reasons account for how God guides his creation, and Augustine refers 177
to them as the condition of physical growth over time.  While it is unclear whether 178
Augustine thinks that each rational soul is created ex nihilo, existed prior to embodiment, 
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 Stone, “Augustine and Medieval Philosophy,” 257-258; cf. R.A. Markus, “Augustine, 175
St.,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1:204-205; Simo Knuuttila, “Time and Creation in 
Augustine,” Cambridge Companion to Augustine, 103-105; Augustine, Literal Meaning 
of Genesis, 6.10.17-6.11.19; On the Trinity, trans. A.W. Haddan, Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, First Series 3, ed. Philip Schaff (Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1887), 
3.8.13-9.16.
 4.1.3; cf. Gerard P. O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University of 176
California Press, 1987), 195.
 Frederick Van Fleteren, “Matter,” Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. 177
Allan Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 548: “Although matter is not 
mentioned as such in Confessiones 7.9.13-7.21.27, it forms part of the philosophical 
framework which Augustine uses in his polemic against the Manichees, who rejected 
Genesis along with the rest of the Old Testament. They also ridiculed the apparent 
contradictions within the creation account itself. Augustine uses the concept of matter as 
almost nothing (prope nihil) to help refute the Manichean notion of evil as a material 
substance. . . .” (parenthetical item in orig.).
 O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy, 24; cf. Delorme, “La Summa,” 66. 178
or is contained in the seminal reasons,  it is clear that Pecham believes in the rational 179
soul’s creation ex nihilo and seems to think that Augustine believed it too.  180
For Pecham, as well as for Bonaventure and Bacon, every part of the person except 
for the rational soul arose ultimately from seminal reasons.  Corporeal matter itself is 181
therefore is not a “nothing” or a mere lack, but rather has its own essence consisting of 
the forma corporeitatis and the seminal reasons, which are substantial forms in a 
potential state, awaiting an external force to educe them.  Matter is thus a principium 182
for substance and not merely the potency for a particular form’s act, but an active 
potency.   183
For some thinkers who believe in seminal reasons, light is the first form that is united 
with matter, and this view evidently influenced Pecham. Bonaventure’s position is an 
example, as Christopher Cullen explains: 
[A]ll of being is luminous, reflecting its source. Light is then an active principle in 
bodies shining forth in the activities of corporeal things, which flow from the 
basic operation of light, including sensible and intellectual cognition. . . . the 
celestial bodies participate in the form of light, even though each one has its own 
form. Earthly bodies participate in an embodied light, which is not a substantial 
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 Simo Knuuttila, “Time and Creation in Augustine,” 104; Augustine, On the Free 179
Choice of the Will, in On the Free Choice of the Will. . . ., ed. and trans. Peter King 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1.12.24.80-81; cf. O’Daly, Augustine’s 
Philosophy, 199. 
 Quaestiones, 378.180
 Cullen, Bonaventure, 48; Colish, The Stoic Tradition, 2:206; Pecham, Registrum, 181
3:901.
 Crowley, Roger Bacon, 103-106; Pecham, Tractantes, 143-144; Quaestiones, 182
186-187; Quodlibeta, 175-176; Bonaventure does not explicitly mention the forma 
corporeitatis, but it would fit well in his conception of corporeal matter as having the 
seminal reasons (see Cullen, Bonaventure, 53).
 See Pereira, “Materia naturalis”.183
form, but is a virtual disposition to become colored under the influence of external 
light.  184
This approach has been called a metaphysics of light, because it holds that light is part of 
every structure, and could have been derived from Alfarabi, Averroes, Avicenna, and the 
Book of Causes.  Lindberg has shown the pervasive usage of light metaphors in early 185
Greek literature and philosophy, late antique writers and early church fathers, and in 
Islamic philosophy.  186
Consider the case of Avicenna on light and intellectual vision in particular. Jon 
McGinnis has recently argued for two theses about Avicenna’s interpretation of 
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 Ibid.184
 See Patrick J. Aspell, Medieval Western Philosophy: The European Emergence 185
(Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1999), 120-121; Aquinas, 
Commentary on the Book of Causes, 45ff.; Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, & 
Averroes, on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, & Theories of 
Human Intellect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), introduction. 
 Lindberg emphasizes Avicebron’s influence (introduction to Roger Bacon, Roger 186
Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature, trans. and ed. Lindberg [New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1983], xxxv-liii; cf. Lindberg, introduction to Bacon, Roger Bacon and the 
Origins, xxv-xxxvii). “Given the limited knowledge of optical phenomena, it is perhaps 
clear (but the point is worth stressing) that there existed no ‘discipline’ of perspectiva or 
optics during the early Middle Ages. This is not to deny that scholars of the early 
medieval period had opinions about the nature of light and the act of vision, but simply to 
insist that these opinions did not constitute a school subject, a discipline, or a ‘science’ to 
which a name was attached and to which a scholarly career might be devoted. If these 
opinions were affiliated with any specific subject-matter, it would most generally have 
been with cosmology, meteorology, psychology or metaphysics: cosmology because the 
principal sources of light were celestial bodies; meteorology because of the presence of 
striking luminous phenomena such as the rainbow and halo in the atmosphere; 
psychology because of the pre-eminence of sight among the five external senses; and 
metaphysics because of the ubiquity of light as an analogue and metaphor in the works of 
Neoplatonic metaphysicians. Light also figured in theological discussions, owing to its 
prominence in the creation account in Genesis, the biblical use of light metaphors, and 
the close connection between theology and metaphysics” (ibid., xxv-xxvi, parenthetical 
item in orig.).
Aristotle’s De Anima, 3.5 (410a.10-17): (1) Avicenna’s interpretation provided a new 
theoretical model for vision, differing widely from Aristotle’s account. (2) Avicenna’s 
theory of vision has interesting parallels to his theory of intellection.  McGinnis finds 187
five such parallels: 
• The active intellect is like the Sun: it is both intelligible substance in itself and a 
source of intelligibility in the sub-lunar world.   188
• Just as light radiates from the Sun and combines with potential color, there 
radiates from the active intellect “intellectualizing forms” which mix with 
potential intelligibles to produce actual intelligibles in the potential intellect.  189
• A preparatory motion is needed for both cognition and vision; locomotion must 
occur for light to reach the potentially colored object, and the rational intellect 
must take control of the imagination.  190
• The intellect’s focus on the essential qualities of the thing that is perceived is 
like a perceiver turning to face the actually colored object in order that the 
object may project a sensible image of itself onto the eye.   191
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 “New Light on Avicenna: Optics and its Role in Avicennan Theories of Vision, 187
Cognition and Emanation,” Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought, 41-57. 
McGinnis says that, according to Avicenna, “Light is of two types. There is luminous 
light, which belongs to certain bodies like the Sun and fire, and by which these bodies are 
visible in themselves. Additionally, there is radiant light, which radiates from luminous 
bodies and mixes with the potential colors of certain other types of bodies. What is 
potentially colored but not actually colored only becomes actually colored through a 
certain motion or alteration; however, the alteration or motion does not take place in the 
transparent medium, which is always actually transparent for Avicenna, but by some 
motion that brings the potentially colored object into the presence of a radiant light. 
Thereafter the mixture of radiant light and potential color form a ray, which when it is 
connected with a perceiver that is facing the visible object, that visible object projects a 
sensible image of itself that is seen as actual color” (ibid., 51-52). 
 Ibid., 53. 188
 Ibid., 54.189
 Ibid., 54-55.190
 Ibid., 55. 191
• Just as when radiant light mixes with potential color to make it actual color and 
to form rays, emanating intellectualizing forms radiate and mix with the 
potentially intelligible object to make it actually intelligible.   192
For Avicenna, knowledge acquisition involves two kinds of reception from the active 
intellect, one of which requires preparatory activities on the part of the individual human 
knower, including perception, imagination, and cogitation.  193
Because Pecham inherits Avicenna’s faculty psychology and also has a theory of 
illumination, it is to be expected that similar Pechamian analogues between vision and 
intellectual knowledge would result from a comparative study between Pecham’s 
statements about light and vision (particularly in his Perspectiva ) and his statements 194
about intellectual activity. While a detailed comparison is beyond the scope of the present 
study, we do find Pecham utilizing Avicenna’s method in our texts and citing Avicenna in 
support of the view that the relationship between intelligence and the human mind is like 
the relationship between the sun and vision.  The fifth chapter of Pecham’s Tractatus 195
makes the same general kind of analogy that McGinnis finds in Avicenna’s De Anima. In 
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 Ibid., 55-56. 192
 Marmura, “Avicenna,” 88.193
 John Pecham and the Science of Optics.194
 Quaestiones, 395; Tractatus, 12; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.5, 5.6. Jacques Derrida 195
discusses the metaphor of the sun (“heliotrope”) to illustrate the complexity of metaphor 
even in philosophical texts (“White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” 
New Literary History 6, no. 1 (1974): 5-74). Derrida suggests the appropriateness of the 
medieval metaphor: “We have long known that value, gold, the eye, the sun and so on, 
belong to the development of the same trope. Their interchange is dominant in the field of 
rhetoric and of philosophy. . . . It reminds us that an object which is the most natural, the 
most universal, the most real, the most clear, a referent which is apparently the most 
external, the sun—that this object, as soon as it plays a role in the process of axiological 
and semantic exchange (and it always does), does not completely escape the general law 
of metaphorical value: ‘The value of just any term is accordingly determined by its 
environment. . . .’” (ibid., 17, parenthetical item and emp. in orig.). 
fact, a number of statements in Pecham’s texts suggest that his aims were similar to 
Avicenna’s in comparing light and vision to intellectual activity:  
• In the second quaestio Pecham endorses a kind of emanationism when he does 
not disagree with the following basis of an objection: A bright light gets more 
corrupted the further it is from its source, and by the same token, the further a 
human is from its source (of being, presumably), by so much it is corruptible.    196
• In the Tractatus Pecham says that the visive power is the perfection of the eye 
just as the soul is the perfection of the whole body.  197
• In the fifth quaestio Pecham bases an argument on the idea that there is a 
singular, uncreated light manifested by every created thing.   198
• In the sixth quaestio Pecham cites Ephesians 5:9 in support of the view that 
there is one light of truth that is common to all.   199
• Also in the sixth quaestio Pecham says that the truth of a proposition is “like the 
formal, namely the truth of the proposition, and that seized from eternal 
light.”  This is part of the view that in a true cognition the operation of the 200
intellect is like something material and the proposition itself is like something 
formal (taken from eternal light).  Pecham cites Avicenna in support of this 201
point.   202
• In the Tractatus’ discussion concerning how human understanding occurs 
Pecham says that, properly speaking, the cause of understanding is eternal 
light.  Like Avicenna, Pecham says that the intelligible is not light, but is 203
capable of being enlightened.  204
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 Quaestiones, 334.196
 Tractatus, 12. 197
 Quaestiones, 383.198
 Ibid., 392; Ephesians 5:9: “(for the fruit of light is found in all that is good and right 199
and true),” (parenthetical item in orig.); all quotations of the English Bible are from the 
English Standard Version (Wheaton: Crossway, 2001).
 Quaestiones, 409.200
 Ibid., 409. 201
 Ibid., 409. 202
 Tractatus, 10; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.6.203
 Tractatus, 11. 204
• Pecham says that an angel is related to cognition as the person who opens a 
window to let in sunshine is related to the illumination of the room.    205
Pecham expands this analogy in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences.  Here, 206
he says that there are three things that allow the eye to see: moving species, light that is 
connatural to the eye, and the light of the sun. And, there are three corresponding things 
required for intellectual vision: intelligible species to move the intellect in its possibility, 
the light of the intellect of the creative agent, and the divine light shining on the 
intellect.  Pecham explains this process somewhat in the Tractatus.  207
Pecham adapts this Avicennian epistemological perspective to suit his own 
theological views. Pecham says that we see principles of knowledge in the eternal light, 
thus reflecting Bonaventure.  Pecham also cites Avicenna in his discussion of the 208
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 Ibid., 12. 205
 An excerpt from Pecham’s commentary is included as an appendix in the Tractatus 206
(131-138). From that appendix: “Dicendum igitur, quod sicut in corporali visu tria sunt, 
per quae videtur aliquid ab oculo, videlicet species movens, lux oculi connaturalis 
splendens, dicente Philosopho, De Anima: ‘Visus non tantum patitur, sed agit 
quemadmodum splendida’, et lux solaris, irradians super utrumque; ita in intellectu est 
species intelligibilis movens intellectum in sua possibilitate, sicut species visibilis oculum 
in sua perspicacitate, et lux intellectus creati agenti [sic], quo forte est vis formativa 
specierum, vel vis transformativa animae in omnium similitudinem, et lux divina 
irradians super intellectum, sicut superius tactum est in quaestione: An sit Deus. Unde 
intelligens istam: omne est majus sua parte, habet species intelligibiles totius et partis ut 
determinatas rationes cognoscendi; attingit etiam rationes aeternas ex parte et obscure, 
oculo lippienti in quibus cernit harum habitudinem incommutabilem et propositionis 
veritatem” (135).
 Cf. Hackett, “Roger Bacon and the Moralization of Science: From Perspectiva 207
through Scientia Experimentalis to Moralis Philosophia,” I Francescani E Le Scienze 
(Spoleto: Italiano di Studi sull’Alto Medioevo, 2012), 369-392.
 Ibid., 17. “Et adhuc restat in cognitione intellectuali quod sit amplius admittendum. 208
Sicut enim sciunt qui in libris eximii Doctoris Augustini sunt experti, omnia, quae 
intelligimus per lucem aeternam et in illa cognoscimus, in ipsa cognoscimus scientialia 
principia, in ipsa videmus quae sunt post principia ex principiis deducta.”
intelligible forms: intelligible forms shine from God and we then apply ourselves to the 
agent intellect.  Perhaps the most helpful thing Pecham does for the readers of his 209
Tractatus in connection with this question is to direct them to his commentary on Peter 
Lombard’s Sentences.  In this text Pecham explains one way in which divine light 210
mediates between God and the human intellect:  Just as the eye uses species to see color 211
yet does not see the species themselves, the intellective soul is informed by divine light 
and yet does not have divine light for its object; rather, it is by attaining the propositiones 
incommutabiles that the mind attains the eternal light.  Also in the Sentences 212
commentary, Pecham presents various arguments against the view that divine light is the 
immediate cause of cognition:  213
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 Ibid., 20: “Et hic est de quo Avicenna dicit quod intelligere sit in nobis, per hoc quod 209
formae intelligibiles irradiant super intellectum nostrum ab intelligentia agente, hoc est 
esse ingeniosum hanc aptitudinem applicandi intelligentiam suam intelligentiae agenti”; 
cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.5.
 Tractatus, 131-138.  210
 Ibid., 134, 135: “Sunt qui dicunt quod lumen eternum non est informans intellectum, 211
sed efficiens tantum cognitionem intellectualem non in quantum informans vel formaliter 
ostendens, sed mediante aliqua luce creata. . . . ipsi in dicta auctoritate pervertunt mentem 
Augustini, sicut patet in capitulo praecedenti, ubi patet ex praedictis expresse quod 
loquitur de luce incommutabili, quae est supra mentem. Quidquid autem est supra 
mentem est Deus.”
 Ibid., 135-136: “Sed sicut species sensibilis ostendit rem, cuius est, et non ostendit se 212
ipsam, nisi in quantum ducit ad alteram, cuius est species,—unde video colorem per 
species suam et speciem non video, quoniam penitus sit, ignoro—sic intelligendo 
propositiones incommutabiles attingo lucem aeternam ut rationem cognoscendi; nec hoc 
adverto nisi quantum ratione colligo et super eas reflector; et non attingo eam lucem ut 
obiectum; hoc enim est praenium [sic] Beatorum. Et hoc sentit Augustinus dicens, De 
libero arbitrio II. . . .”
 These arguments are presented as representing Pecham’s own position. There is no 213
responsio in Melani’s edition.
• Infidels can have knowledge even though they cannot have such in divine 
light.   214
• Insofar as the divine light pertains to cognition, it does not shine all around us, 
but merely through the mirror of the creature (per speculum tantummodo 
creaturae).   215
• If everything true is seen in eternal light, then natural cognition would not differ 
from prophetic cognition. Similarly, if we were to know something about the 
future in the context of eternal reasons, then we would know the future 
certainly.  216
• If cognition always occurs through something greater that is known, then it 
would not be possible to doubt that God is. Yet it seems that it is less doubtable 
that every whole is greater than its part than that God exists.  217
Beyond Pecham’s adaptation of the Avicenna’s light and vision metophors, there are 
differences between Pecham and Avicenna. Pecham differs from Avicenna about whether 
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 Ibid., 133: “Augustinus, loquens de rationibus aeternis, De Trinitate, XII, c. 14, dicit: 214
‘Ad quas pervenire paucorum est’. Sed certudinaliter cognoscere omnium est. Ergo 
rationes aeternae non sunt communes rationes cognoscendi. Item, I De Trinitate, c. 8: 
Mentis humanae acies invalida in tam excellenti luce non figitur nisi per iustitiam fidei 
mundata vegetetur. Sed certum est quod mens infidelis defigitur in lumine; quod est ratio 
cognoscendi. Ergo, etc.”
 Ibid., 133: “Item, Dionysius dicit in Angelica Hierarchia: ‘Impossibile est nobis aliter 215
splendere thearchicum radium nisi varietate velaminum circumvelatum’. Ergo per se non 
splendet nobis, sed per speculum tantummodo creaturae.”
 Ibid., 133: “Item, si omne verum videretur in luce aeterna, tunc cognitio naturalis non 216
differret a prophetica. . . . Item, rationes aeternae certae sunt repsectu futurorum 
contingentium, sicut respectu necessariorum. Ergo si mens nostra vera, quae videt, videt 
in rationibus aeternis, eque [sic] certudinaliter cognoscit futura contingentia sicut 
necessaria.” Pecham may be distinguishing between cognizing a truth and cognizing truth 
in light of the eternal reasons. The former would lead to purely natural knowledge. The 
latter, representing a deeper way of knowing truth, would be available only to one 
thinking as a Christian. Bonaventure has a similar distinction, related to the difference 
between the illumination of science and the illumination of wisdom (see Quinn, The 
Historical Constitution, 547). 
 Tractatus, 133: “Item, omnis ratio cognoscendi est cognitio per magis nota, sicut 217
principium est notius quam conclusio. Ergo si lux aeterna esset ratio cognoscendi alia, 
ipsa inter omnia esset magis cognita, igitur non videretur per speculum et nullus posset 
dubitare de ista: Deus est; sicut nec potest de ista: omne totum est majus sua parte.” 
there is just one, created, agent intellect. Pecham sides with what he takes to be 
Aristotle’s and Augustine’s position, that there is a “created light,” or an agent intellect 
that is part of each individual’s soul.   218
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 Quaestiones, 401-402, 403: “Alii fuerunt, sicut Avicenna et sui, ponentes pluralitatem 218
intellectuum materialium, sed intellectum agentem esse unum et creatum. Iuxta quod 
ponit Avicenna animam mundi influere super omnes animas humanas, docens VI 
Naturalium: ‘Addiscere non est nisi inquirere perfectam aptitudinem coniungendi se 
intelligentiae agenti quousque fiat ex ea intellectus’. Sed quia substantiae separatae nihil 
agunt nisi per intentionem, impossibile est eas cognitione naturali simul pluribus 
intendere. Impossibile est aliquam substantiam separatam vel coniunctam, si esset, super 
omnes—immo nec super duos diversos—cadere.—Item, angelus adest ubi operatur, et ita 
si esset agens, non posset simul esse agens respectu alterius. . . . Est ... in anima 
intellectus hic agens sicut motivum in moto, cum tamen ipsa anima habeat aliquid 
activum, sed non aliud de quo vere sunt praedictae proprietates. . . . Cum enim intelligere 
sit coniuncti ex anima et corpore, multo magis nullum erit intelligere animae secundum 
unam partem quod non sit ei scire secundum aliam. [Secus] impossibile est lucem 
aliquam naturalem posse intellectum humanum constituere in actu intelligendi. . . . Ideo 
est quarta positio dicentium quod Deus perficit omnem intellectum et in actu constituit 
intelligendi, non per se, sed per aliquod lumen creatum. Quod etiam probare se credunt 
per verbum Augustini dicentis, De Trinitate XII cap. 15” (bracketed item in orig.); cf. 
Tractatus, 20: “Sed adhuc dicam apertius qualiter per lucem illam intellectus compleatur. 
V.g. anima intelligit et invisibiliter videt quod omne totum majus est sua parte et hoc 
videt opitulante imagine veritatis huius enuntiabilis: in toto enim enuntiabili et in nulla 
eius parte certum est quod, cum anima habet rationem totius effigiatam, non habet simul 
effigiatam partis rationem, quia non potest diversis simul configurari. Igitur, anima in se 
nunquam habet simul rationem totius et partis in actu, et tamen simul videt horum 
habitudines et veram esse istam: ‘omne totum’; ergo ubi sunt simul videt et attingit. 
Anima igitur, per species efficiatas discurrens secundum apicem sui, rationes earaundum 
partium in luce aeterna attingit et ibi veritatem enuntiabilis immobilem cernit et inde 
veritatem haurit, sicut dicit Augustinus, De Trinitate, XII, c. ultimo, et De libero arbitrio 
in pluribus locis et De vera religione, et hic est intellectus agens, quem dicit Aristoteles 
simul omnia intelligere, et hic est de quo Avicenna dicit quod intellegere sit in nobis, per 
hoc quod formae intelligibiles irradiant super intellectum nostrum ab intelligentia agente, 
hoc est esse ingeniosum hanc aptitudinem applicandi intelligentiam suam intelligentiae 
agenti. Duplicem enim pono intelligentiam agentem, increatam et creatam, ut iam patet, 
et hoc est intellectum agentem species a phantasmate abstrahere et intellectui possibili 
unire. . . .”; Avicenna, De Anima, 5.6; Augustine, On the Trinity, 12.15.24. 
In the Quaestiones Pecham draws from some of the same authors who were 
influential in the Tractatus. Pecham cites Avicenna in reference to a variety of topics, e.g., 
in support of the view that the single soul can be virtually divided according to its 
potencies.  Also, Pecham reports that Avicenna proved the immortality of the soul and 219
took the position that the soul cannot be perfect unless separated from the body.  220
Avicenna’s proof the immortality of the soul was “from the dignity of its substance” (ex 
dignitate suae substantiae) and “from the reason of the perfecting of virtue” (ex ratione 
virtutis perficientis).  In the Quaestiones Pecham indicates that his view of abstraction 221
will be inspired by Avicenna: “[T]he soul has two operations, as Avicenna 
distinguishes ... One is through comparing to the body in abstracting from phantasms; 
another has the nearer role by understanding of abstract things.”   222
It is striking that Pecham often cites Cicero’s On Old Age and Tusculan Disputations 
often in the second quaestio, which deals with whether the rational soul is immortal. 
Cicero would have been a helpful philosopher to cite on this topic, due to his emphasis on 
immortality: 
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 Pecham, Quaestiones, 327; Tractatus, 29; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 1.2. 219
 Pecham, Quaestiones, 339; cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics, 9.7. Pecham cites Avicenna’s 220
text only in connection with the “perfecting of virtue”.  
 Pecham, Quaestiones, 341, 343; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.2: “Assiduitas difficilium 221
intelligibilium acquirit virtutem efficacius apprehendendi.”
 Quaestiones, 348: “[D]uplex est animae operatio, ut distinguit Avicenna ... una est per 222
comparationem ad corpus in abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; aliam habet interiorem 
intelligendo res abstractas”; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 4.2. 
• Pecham cites Cicero in support of the point that the soul is not made up of 
contraries, and so it cannot be broken apart.   223
• Pecham cites Cicero’s statement to the effect that the immortal gods provide the 
human heart the capability to care for the earth.  224
• Pecham cites Cicero and other Stoici in support of a view about the soul’s 
memory, which Pecham also attributes to Plato.  225
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 Pecham, Quaestiones, 344-345; cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, trans. Robert 223
Black, 1.29: “Now, as to knowledge of the soul, we cannot doubt, unless we be dullards 
in the study of natural philosophy, that in souls there is nothing composite, concrete, 
conglomerate, joint, or duplex. And if that be so, it certainly cannot be separated, divided, 
dismembered, sundered; and, therefore, it cannot perish. For perishing is, as it were, a 
separation, division, sundering of what before the perishing was held together by some 
sort of junction.”; cf. ibid., chapter 27). 
 Pecham, Quaestiones, 339; cf. Cicero, On Old Age, trans. Moses Hadas, chapter 21. 224
 Pecham, Quaestiones, 340, 342; cf. Cicero, On Old Age, chapter 21: “I believe that the 225
immortal gods implanted souls in human bodies to provide overseers for the earth who 
would contemplate the heavenly order and imitate it in the moderation and constancy of 
their lives. To this belief I have been impelled not by reason and arguments alone, but by 
the distinguished authority of the greatest philosophers. I learned that Pythagoras and the 
Pythagoreans, virtually our countrymen and sometimes called Italian philosophers, never 
doubted that our souls were emanations of the universal divine intelligence. I was 
impressed also by the discourse on the immortality of the soul delivered on the last day of 
his life by Socrates, whom the oracle of Apollo had pronounced the wisest of men. I need 
say no more. This is my conviction, this my belief: Such is the rapid movement of souls, 
such their memory of the past and foresight of the future, so many are the arts, so 
profound the sciences, so numerous the inventions, that the nature which embraces these 
things cannot be mortal; and since the soul is always active and has no source of motion 
because it is self-moving, it can have no end of motion, for it will never abandon itself, it 
is indivisible and hence cannot perish. Furthermore, it is a strong proof of men knowing 
many things before birth that boys studying difficult subjects grasp innumerable points so 
quickly that they seem not to be receiving them for the first time but to be recalling and 
remembering them. This, in substance, is Plato’s argument.” 
• Pecham cites Cicero’s view that the soul is self-moving.  226
• Pecham cites Cicero’s point that sometimes a body of poor disposition coincides 
with a mind that is genius.  227
Pecham also cites Cicero in the Tractatus. Cicero presents the argument that if there were 
no meritorious retribution after death, then the unjust life would be more “free” (liberius) 
than the just life.  This collection of citations is illustrative of stoicism’s influence on 228
Pecham. A number of authors have dealt with the prominence of Stoic ideas in the 
medieval period, notably Gérard Verbeke  and Marcia L. Colish.   229 230
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 Pecham, Quaestiones, 343; cf. Cicero, On Old Age, chapter 21; ibid., Tusculan 226
Disputations, chapter 23: “But if it be beyond even soul itself to know the nature and 
quality of soul, may it not know, pray, so much as that it is, that it moves? This is the 
question out of which arose that argument which is set forth by Socrates in Plato’s 
Phaedrus, and is cited by me in the sixth book of my Republic. The substance of it is on 
this wise: ‘That which is ever moving is immortal. . . . So, then, the first principle of 
motion resided in that which is self-moved. . . . It being evident, then, that that is 
immortal which is self-moved, who would deny that this is the natural attribute of souls? 
For soul-less (inanimate) is all that is moved from without; soul-ful (animate), all that is 
moved from within: for that is the peculiarity and innate property of soul. And if it is the 
only thing in the world which is self-moved continually, it certainly is not generated, and 
certainly is immortal’” (parenthetical items in orig.); cf. ibid., On Old Age, chapter 21. At 
the end of Cicero’s Republic, as part of Scipio’s dream, there is a similar argument (trans. 
Cyrus R. Edmonds and Moses Hadas). 
 Pecham, Quaestiones, 348; cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.33: “For many things 227
appertaining to the body contribute to sharpen the intelligence, many to blunt it. Aristotle 
says that all men of genius are melancholic; so that, for my part, I am not sorry to be of 
rather a dull temperament.”
 Pecham, Tractatus, 50; cf. Cicero, On Old Age, chapters 21-23. “Nothing in our 228
experience so resembles death as sleep; and it is in sleep that souls manifest their divine 
nature, for being free and unfettered they foresee the future. This indicates what souls 
will be when they are entirely liberated from the shackles of the flesh. . . . Were it not that 
souls are immortal, men’s souls would not strive for undying fame in proportion to their 
transcending merit” (ibid., chapter 22, 23). 
 The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought (Washington: Catholic University of 229
America Press, 1983). 
 The Stoic Tradition, volume 2. 230
In this section, I have provided evidence from secondary literature and from 
Pecham’s own texts to show that Pecham played an important role in the Neo-
Augustinian movement. In giving examples of how Pecham utilized his sources, I 
provided further content to the the idea of Neo-Augustinianism, i.e., I showed how 
Pecham and his movement were indebted to a Neoplatonic tradition (I will say more 
about this in the fifth chapter). Now, as a final preparation for the exposition of Pecham’s 
texts, I will say something about Pecham’s argumentative approach. 
Pecham’s argumentative approach 
Pecham’s Tractatus suggests that he was using a polemical style in order to defend 
positions associated with the Neo-Augustinian movement. Typically, in the Tractatus, 
Pecham elaborates little on each point, but rather presents a series of brief arguments and 
authorities to support his claims. A charitable reading of Pecham would bear in mind 
three points: (1) Pecham is citing arguments and passages with which his readers would 
have been familiar, and so it was unnecessary for him to develop the details of the 
discussions. After all, Pecham was writing to trained theologians. (2) Standard medieval 
literary forms, and the “disputed question” format in particular, lent themselves to 
Pecham’s style (I will discuss this point further at the beginning of the next chapter).  231
(3) Pecham’s use of various sources to promote his own agenda is itself an original 
contribution, particularly when one considers that Pecham’s positions are not altogether 
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 See Eileen Sweeney, “Literary Forms of Medieval Philosophy,” Stanford University, 231
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-literary/ (2013).
the same as any of those thinkers who influenced him (I will discuss this point further in 
the fifth chapter). 
Pecham’s style is no less polemical in the Quaestiones, and again we find Pecham 
making lists of arguments in support of his position. For example, in the second quaestio, 
Pecham produces seven proofs for the immortality of the soul from the Bible and other 
sources, including Anselm, Avicenna, and Augustine.  Pecham discusses each of these 232
arguments only briefly. Yet in Pecham’s responsio in the fifth quaestio (the subject of 
chapters three and five of the present study) we find an in-depth philosophical criticism 
of the Latin Averroists’ position.  Pecham’s discussion is far from a mere recitation of 233
stock arguments. Rather, he discusses three fundamental errors involved in 
monopsychism,  and argues that in the case of each foundation, Averroes has failed to 234
give a consistent account of how knowledge could result if the possible intellect were 
separate from individual knowers. The first has to do with Averroes’ misunderstanding of 
spiritual matter (he has failed to differentiate spiritual matter from matter considered 
more broadly, and thus has gotten wrong the soul/body relationship generally). The 
second has to do with Averroes’ misunderstanding of the power of the possible intellect 
(he wants to account for the particularization of knowledge to individual humans, but his 
presuppositions disallow this). The third has to do with the operation of the active 
intellect (he equivocates on the view that rational soul is the perfection of “man”). In this 
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 Quaestiones, 339-346. 232
 Quaestiones, 378-383.233
 Pecham takes Averroes as the main representative of monopsychism and evidently 234
writes the arguments as if they are directed at Averroes.
section, Pecham occasionally references Aristotle and Augustine, but is clearly laying out 
what he personally sees as the main philosophical and theological problems with 
Averroism. Furthermore, the three foundations of Averroes’ error are connected in their 
philosophical content. Only at the very end of the quaestio, in the discussion of the third 
foundation of Averroes’ error, does Pecham develop the theological objection concerning 
personal moral responsibility. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I first introduced John Pecham by surveying his life and work. I then 
contextualized his work by placing him in the Neo-Augustinian movement. This involved 
saying something about how Pecham utilizes his sources. (I will return to this subject in 
detail in the fifth chapter of the present study, where I make a case for a particular way of 
understanding Pecham’s project.) Finally, I suggested that when one reads Pecham it is 
helpful to bear in mind that Pecham is writing with a certain argumentative style. In this 
way I have facilitated an appreciation for the intensive exposition that occupies the 











EXPOSITION OF QUAESTIO FIVE IN PECHAM’S QUAESTIONES DE ANIMA 
This chapter is an exposition of Pecham’s fifth quaestio, which is “whether there is 
one possible intellect in all men.” By way of introducing this text and those of which give 
an exposé in chapters three and four, I will do three things: First, I will discuss the 
various medieval literary methods to which I will refer throughout the present study. 
Second, I will discuss the broader context of the medieval tradition of writing de anima. 
Third, I will discuss the specific historical occasion for Pecham’s fifth quaestio.  
The Quaestiones De Anima represents one set of John Pecham’s Disputed Questions 
(Quaestiones Disputatae). M.-D. Chenu provides a helpful summary of how the quaestio 
method developed as a “procedure of exposition” of texts in the Middle Ages.  I will now 1
follow Chenu’s overview of the three medieval forms of expression which followed 
progressively upon one another: the lectio, the quaestio (eventually with its 
accompanying disputatio and quodlibet), and finally the summa. I will also consider the 
basic unit of the quaestio, the articulus (article).   2
The lectio, or reading, was the institutionalized foundation of medieval pedagogy, 
which centered around the reading of texts. The professor “read” his text, gave a course 
called a lectio, and was himself called the lector. The method including not only reading, 
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but emendatio (similar to our textual criticism and criticism of style), enarratio 
(exposition), and judicium (general review and final aesthetic judgment of the work).  3
The lectio method of instruction is a testament to the medievals’ desire to recover the 
literary treasures of antiquity. Texts and a growing number of commentaries were made 
available by booksellers, and gradually the number of available texts began to multiply. 
Thinking developed around auctoritates, or texts held to be authoritative expressions of 
their topics. It has been said that, in the long term, the intellectual effect of the medieval 
attachment to auctoritates stifled speculation.  4
 When in the course of pursuing a lectio the reader encountered a difficult question, 
he had an occasion for active research and elaboration. Thus the lectio gave rise to 
quaestiones that went beyond exposition of a text, although the text still functioned as the 
substance with which the question dealt.  The 13th century, in particular, is characterized 5
by increased inquisitiveness in theological matters and in philosophical questions raised 
by the entrance of Aristotle’s full corpus. With the quaestiones method for dealing with 
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became a source of intellectual “stagnation”: “Instead of being the means to open the 
mind to a knowledge of objects, of realities, the tendency was to consider them 
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actual living speech of men but Priscian. Philosophical knowledge meant to learn 
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the causes that explain all being. . . . The commentator allowed himself to be taken in by 
his own game. Having lost little by little his power of discovery, he condemned in 
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these problems, scholasticism reached the peak of its philosophical and theological 
development; ideas were analyzed in themselves and were not regarded merely as the 
fruit of textual exegesis.  
Kenny describes the literary formalization used for a quaestio of Aquinas’s (the same 
formalization also generally applies to disputed questions such as Pecham’s): 
First, reasons are given for taking the view which is opposed to that which 
Aquinas is going to defend. Sometimes … the reason will be an authoritative text 
which takes the contrary view. More commonly … it will be a philosophical 
argument which makes no appeal to authority but which is derived from an 
analysis of the concepts involved in the proposition which is up for question. . . .  
Second, there follows the sed contra, a reason for taking the view which 
Aquinas thinks correct. In those works which are records of live disputations, the 
initial arguments are followed by a set of arguments of prima facie equal weight 
in the contrary sense. . . . 
Third, there is the body of the article, introduced by the phrase Respondeo 
dicendum [in the case of Pecham’s Quaestiones Disputatae, the body is titled 
Responsio]. Here, commonly, the main reasons for Aquinas’ position are stated in 
detail. . . . 
Finally come the answers to the objections initially stated. Quite frequently 
the answers to objections offer a crucial clarification of issues which have 
remained ambiguous or undecided in the body of the article. Often, too, they go a 
long way to accommodate the opposite view which has been stated initially in the 
objections.   6
The sed contra section (called simply contra in Pecham’s Quaestiones), as Chenu notes, 
is not necessarily a statement of the author’s opinion or of reasons that support the 
author’s own position.  It is rather the presentation of the position alternative to the one 7
advanced in the first part of the quaestio. The part of the article that is the author’s own 
response to the first part of the article is the responsiones ad obiecta section, or what is 
called in Pecham’s Quaestiones the Responsio auctoris ad argumenta principalia. Very 
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often the author’s responsio to the question, where he states and defends (at least in some 
measure) his own position, does not altogether dismiss the position that was taken at the 
beginning of the article. Rather, at some point in the article (for Pecham, it is usually 
during the responsio ad argumenta principalia) the author will show what aspects of that 
first viewpoint accord with his own.  
As the quaestio method urged discussion of new philosophical problems, settled 
convictions were philosophically analyzed for deeper understanding: “Does God exist?” 
“Should a person honor his parents?” Etc.  The quaestio method also revised the role of 8
the professor or master; beyond exegesis he now had the task of “determining” or 
resolving a question not just by appeal to authority, but by the giving of reasons and the 
evaluation of them.   
Discussions of questions were eventually isolated from the lectio format and given 
their own period for special exercise and wider audience within the university. The 
disputatio thus represents a final break with the authoritative text as the substance for the 
discussion.  Two or more masters, whether in agreement on the question or not, would 9
participate in positing and resolving the questions, perhaps delegating some responsibility 
to an appointed student.  A lively disputation would be held, followed one or more days 10
later by the presentation of the master’s determination in a second oral session.  11
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Often the discussion of the quaestio was recorded in a collection of quaestiones 
disputatae  (beginning with Robert of Melun around 1145). Eileen Sweeney provides 12
further details about the disputed question as a medieval literary form:  
Disputations took place both privately between a master and his students, and 
publicly or “solemnly” at an event that replaced regular classes at the university 
and was attended by the larger university community. The latter practice was 
eventually codified by university statute, which prescribed that masters would 
hold a certain number of disputations at various times of the year, sometimes as 
frequently as once a week. Most scholars agree that the process came to be 
divided into two sessions. In the first session, supporting and opposing arguments 
for a given thesis or question were brought forward, and, in a preliminary way, 
clarified and determined by a student serving as the respondens under the 
supervision of the master. During the second session, the master himself would 
make the determination, give his answer and respond to all the opposing 
arguments. Some disputed questions we have in written form are clearly taken 
from different stages in this process, either a reportatio of the first day's session, 
some abbreviation of the debate, or one reflecting the master's answer and 
response to opposing objections, redacted after the second day's debate. . . . A 
question is tied to a specific textual problem or conflict, but has, like the 
disputation, arguments on opposing sides and the response or resolution and 
replies to opposite objections by the master. The disputation is centered around a 
systematic rather than a textual question, and the supporting and opposing 
arguments are supplied by students.  13
The institutionalization of learning can be clearly seen in the fact that, in the mid-13th 
century, the master’s responsibility included legere (to read), disputare (to dispute), 
praedicare (to preach). 
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I have already mentioned that Pecham has not only Quaestiones Disputatae, but also 
four Quodlibeta. A quodlibet grew out of an oral quodlibetal disputation, or a disputation 
about anything.  Such discussions occurred twice a year, near Christmas and Easter,  in 14 15
the faculties of arts, law, medicine, and especially theology. Quodlibets were discussions 
at which members of the audience could raise any problem they liked.  Many masters 16
refused to risk themselves in such disputations, but from those masters who did 
participate we have many written accounts of important questions, such as are found in 
Pecham’s own Quodlibeta. 
In John F. Wippel’s substantial work on the nature and history of quodlibetal 
questions, he notes five differences between quodlibetal disputations and other 
disputations.  I have already mentioned all of these differences but one: Wippel finds 17
that that the presiding master of a quodlibetal disputation was expected to develop a plan 
!101
 Ibid., 91-93. 14
 See Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” 171-172. 15
 See Palémon Glorieux, La Littérature Quodlibétique II, Bibliothéque thomiste 21 16
(Paris: J. Vrin, 1935), 10-11: “The session began around the hour of Terce perhaps, or of 
Sext; in any case, quite early in the morning, since there was the risk that it would go on 
for a long time. In fact, what characterized it was the capricious and off-hand manner in 
which it unfolded, along with an ever-present uncertainty hovering over the 
proceedings. . . . In ordinary disputes, the master had announced beforehand the subjects 
everyone would be occupied with; he had had time to mull them over, and to prepare 
them. In the quodlibetal dispute, it was everyone’s privilege to raise any kind of 
problem. . . . The questions or objections could come from every direction, and it 
mattered not at all if they sprang from hostility, simple inquisitiveness, or cunning. One 
could question the master in all good faith, simply to know his opinion, but one could 
also try to have him contradict himself, or oblige him to give his own views on burning 
subjects he would prefer never to touch upon. . . . Anyone, therefore, willing to hold a 
general disputation must have a presence of mind quite out of the common, and a 
competency almost universal in scope.” (As translated by Landry and Hughes in Chenu, 
Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, 92-93.)
 “Quodlibetal Questions,” 165-172.17
of organization prior to making his determination.  Wippel follows Palémon Glorieux’s 18
identification of the following five distinctive organizational plans:  19
• The Quodlibet Ordinaire. The master indicates with no theoretical justification 
the general headings or categories under which the questions originally posed 
are now to be placed. This is the most widely adopted form. 
• The Quodlibet ex Abrupto. Even the simple listing of appropriate general 
headings is missing.  
• The Quodlibet with an Introduction. The master gives some justification for his 
divisions and subdivisions. 
• The Quodlibet with a Summary. The master begins by presenting not only the 
main general headings which he will later subdivide, but also by mentioning all 
of the questions to be determined. “This amounts to an introductory essay … 
which lists and in some way justifies all of the divisions and subdivisions.”   20
• The Quodlibet with a Prologue. The master begins with a literary flourish, often 
by citing scripture or the church fathers, before moving on to a division of the 
particular questions. 
The majority of Pecham’s Quodlibeta fall clearly into Glorieux’s first category, although 
Pecham’s headings are quite brief.  Pecham’s fourth Quodlibet, however, has a prologue 21
which outlines the questions to follow and cites Augustine.  22
The unit of thought in which the scholastics wrote is the articulus (article).  Properly 23
speaking, an article just is a quaestio, but to call the question an article denotes that it is 
one of a plurality of articles that all contribute to settling one particular question. The 
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article begins with a question of doubt about a proposition (e.g., Circa primum quaeritur 
utrum, where the question’s point of departure is utrum [whether]).  
Before leaving this overview of medieval literary styles, consider that many articles 
were organized into larger questions in medieval summae (summaries). In fact, Aquinas’s 
Treatise on Human Nature, which I will discuss in subsequent chapters, is a selection of 
15 quaestiones from his Summa Theologiae. As a literary genre, summae can be 
considered the invention of Avicenna.  Yet Avicenna’s summae vary greatly in format 24
and methodology.  By the high Middle Ages, the summa method had itself been 25
formalized as an encyclopedic set of quaestiones—formatted as the quaestiones 
disputatae are and sorted topically into articles—on a particular topic. A summa’s 
questions are artificial, i.e., carefully composed imitations of disputations, not tied to an 
oral discussion.  26
In addition to works organizes into questions or articles, and beginning with John 
Blund’s Treatise De Anima in the first decade of the 13th century,  there is a tradition of 27
writing treatises on the soul (de anima).  These works typically discuss earlier works on 28
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the subject.  Summae de anima by Philip the Chancellor  and John of LaRochelle,  29 30 31
Richard Rufus’ commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima,  Pecham’s Tractatus and 32
Quaestiones De Anima, Aquinas’ Quaestiones De Anima, as well as many anonymous 
writers de anima,  are in this tradition. Among the previous medieval texts de anima 33
which influence these 13th-century works are Costa Ben Luca’s De Differentia Spiritu 
Animae et Spiritus,  Avicenna’s Liber De Anima, Dominicus Gundissalinus’ De Anima 34
and De Immortalitate Animae,  Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima,  and 35 36
Alcher of Clairvaux’s De Spiritu et Anima.  37
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Etzkorn’s revision of Spettmann’s edition of the Quaestiones will be used as the basis 
for my interpretation in this chapter. Before turning to Pecham’s text, consider some 
historical background information which is suggestive of the significance of this 
particular quaestio. By the 1260s, some in the arts faculty at Paris were advocating the 
position they derived from Averroes, that there is only one intellect for all men.  Richard 38
C. Dales has suggested that, in the controversy over Latin Averroism, Pecham “was not a 
worthy opponent on the philosophical level for the young artists.”  The present chapter 39
will help determine whether, or in what ways, such an assessment is accurate. In 
particular, quaestio five provides the best evidence for deciding whether Pecham 
provides a coherent critique of Latin Averroism. The present chapter will also provide 
further basis for a comparison between Pecham’s and Aquinas’s positions on 
anthropology (this comparison is the topic of chapter six in the present study). In 
discussing this disputed question, I will first discuss the Responsio Pecham ad 
quaestionem, in order to express Pecham’s position. Then, I will follow the arguments 
Pecham provides for both sides of the issue, first in the contra section and then in the 
ostenditur quod sic and its corresponding ad argumenta principalia. 
Responsio Pecham ad quaestionem 
In the responsio to the quaestio, utrum sit unus intellectus in omnibus hominibus, 
Pecham uses four main arguments against monopsychism.  Each of the first three is 40
based on what Pecham sees as an erroneous philosophical “foundation” (fundamenta) for 
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the doctrine. The last is a kind of reductio ad absurdum, namely that Averroes’ doctrine 
deprives each individual man of his own proper reason and therefore deprives each 
individual person of his reward for making the right moral choice. 
Pecham begins his response by saying that both the Catholic faith and the opinions of 
saints (sanctorum) support the view that there is one rational soul for each individual 
person, and that the individual soul is infused.  Pecham says that not one of “the 41
saints” (presumably patristic and medieval theological authorities, especially 
Augustine ) has ever doubted this view, even if it is conceded that some saints wavered 42
about the origin of souls, i.e., whether the souls of people are created from nothing or are 
passed on from the parents.  The error of monopsychism has to be destroyed “in its 43
foundations” (ut error destruatur in fundamentis), because the testimony of the saints has 
a greater foundation—a foundation in eternity. The overall foundation of the error has to 
do with the substance of the possible intellect.  44
The first aspect of the foundation (hereafter the “first foundation”) of the error is the 
claim that the possible intellect is substantially free from matter.  This mistake, which 45
Pecham sees as radically dissociating intellect from corporeally embodied people, has 
two unfortunate consequences. First, the possible intellect is no longer “something of 
particular beings” (non esse aliquod entium particularium).  Second, the possible 46
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intellect is no longer a perfection of this particular man. Pecham says that the way to 
avoid the first error is by understanding that even when something lacks corporeal matter, 
it may still have spiritual, intelligible matter (materia spiritualis intelligibilis).  On this 47
point Pecham claims the authority of Augustine, who says that “... God has made 
everything from nothing, since also if everything formed were formed from this formed 
matter, nevertheless this matter is made from nothing.”  Pecham observes that Averroes 48
has come close to admitting that spiritual matter is involved in the intellect, noting the 
following passage from Averroes’ Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle:  
For just as sensible being is divided into form and matter, so too intelligible being 
must be divided into things similar to these two, namely, into something similar to 
form and into something similar to matter. This is [something] necessarily present 
in every separate intelligence which understands something else. And if not, then 
there would be no multiplicity in separate forms.  49
Pecham emphasizes that he is citing Averroes’ own words. 
Pecham freely admits that the possible intellect is free of “changeable 
matter” (materiae transmutabilis), but argues that the intellect nonetheless has something 
similar to matter.  There is thus both corporeal matter and spiritual or intelligible matter. 50
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It is in virtue of this something (aliquid), this spiritual matter, that the possible intellect is 
a “this thing” and that there is numerical distinction among separate substances. Here, 
Pecham says that individuation relies on the material principle, but he will shortly say 
that individuation is reliant not exclusively upon a material principle.  Before doing so, 51
he will say more about the materiality of the intellect. 
Pecham clarifies how he interprets the relationship between the possible intellect and 
corporeal matter: “Moreover ... it does not follow that the intellect is already so 
thoroughly separated from matter that it cannot be the perfection of corporeal matter, but 
that it does not depend essentially on matter.”  Pecham develops a hierarchy of beings 52
that have matter: The angels are entirely free from corporeal matter “in being and 
perfecting” (in essendo et perficiendo), i.e., they receive all of their perfections from 
above. The souls of animals are on the opposite end of the spectrum, since they are 
conjoined in being and perfecting and receive complete perfection from matter. The 
human soul is in-between. As an intermediate spirit it does not depend on the body for its 
essence but is united with it “by perfecting” (perficiendo), so that it acquires perfection 
partly from above and partly from below.  Pecham claims the authority of Avicenna for 53
this position and for the metaphor that the intellect is not only perfected, but also 
sanctified and cleansed by the connection with the body.  A general principle is, 54
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“through the exercise in some body, through splendor of wisdom, the cleanness may be 
increased”.   55
Here Pecham discusses several ways in which the body perfects the soul: The rational 
soul has more potency than an angel has, because the rational soul has the potency to be 
conjoined. The intellect will be better able to understand when it is separated from the 
corporeal body and united to the glorified body. Due to the rational soul’s “inferior 
powers” it is inclined to the body and strives to be illuminated by sensible mediation.   56
Pecham cites Aristotle as authority for the view that the body falls in the definition of 
the soul,  and notes that Augustine calls the soul a “substance, participating in reason, 57
arranged for governing the body.”  And just as it is impossible to define the soul without 58
making reference to the body, so there is no way to reference the human body without 
referring to the soul (otherwise one would be speaking of the human body only 
equivocally).  Viewed this way, body and soul are not two separate things. Pecham says 59
that it is for this reason that Aristotle observes how difficult it is to explain the cause of 
the connection between the soul and body if the two are considered separate things.  60
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Matter is not the sole principle (tota causa) of individuation, since there is “one 
matter” distributed throughout all things.  Form complements matter in determining 61
individuation.  Pecham cites the authority of Avicenna on this point: “The name of the 62
soul is not imposed because it is substance, but because it is that which rules bodies and 
is concerned with them.”  Insofar as the soul is included in discussions about “matter 63
and motion” (materiam et motum), the soul can be included in discussions of nature.  64
This is why the treatment of the soul, as in Pecham’s Tractatus (the subject of the next 
chapter), represents in part a study of natural science. 
Pecham concludes this section on the first foundation of the error by saying that a 
person can be a particular being even though the person has something through which 
there is a multitude of separate substances.  Presumably the point here is that there is 65
that a particular being can have qualities which other particular beings have, and still all 
the beings are not one or common; Pecham has already argued that every angel has a 
material principle.  66
Pecham says that the second aspect of the foundation of the Averroist error (hereafter 
the “second foundation”) concerns the power of both the possible and active principles of 
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the human intellect.  Here we find that Pecham objects not only to the doctrine that the 67
possible intellect is common to all human beings, but also to the doctrine that the active 
intellect is common.  Pecham understands Averroes to be teaching that the active 68
intellect communicates itself to many “through the mode of perfection” (per modus 
perfectionis) and likewise receives many things from many individual people. Pecham 
responds initially by saying that Averroes’ position that the single mind takes and receives 
from individual people produces two errors:   69
First, Averroes’ position conflicts with the position that the soul is inclined to a single 
body, which he has already admitted is the case. There is a sense in which the intellect is 
indeterminate, but this is only because it is not understanding a vague, particular thing; 
the intellect is particularized when it is understanding an abstracted concept. After all, the 
human intellect is not a more abstracted essence than an angel, and an angel is 
particularized. Like an angel, the intellect cannot operate in more than one place at a 
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time.  John of Damascus confirms this when he says that angel is more communicable 70
according to how much simpler it is.  71
Second, Averroes erred when he said that the soul could perfect many individuals.  72
Aristotle negates this when he says that a number of movables are multiplied by a 
number of movers—not by a single mover.  Averroes errs in supposing that acts of 73
understanding can be alike in all, since understanding occurs in diverse people and at 
different times and in diverse ways, and so the human intellect understands continuously 
but only temporarily.  74
The third aspect of Averroes’ error (hereafter the “third foundation”) has to do with 
the operation of the intellect.  Pecham says that Averroes’ position is that man 75
understands only during the continuation of the intellect’s act (per continuationem 
intellecti cum eo in actu).  Pecham agrees that the intellect can understand only when it 76
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is in act, and that Averroes is right to oppose Aristotle’s view that the intellect is 
“conjoined” (coniuncti) to the body.  Yet one of Averroes’ positions, namely that man 77
“uses the intellect” (utitur intellectu experimento) actually works against monopsychism, 
because the position shows that man thinks to himself about his own faith and justice—
these are objects that a man could not possibly consider by looking outside of his own, 
particularized experience. Averroes has failed to take stock of the phenomenological data. 
Pecham finds support in Augustine, who says: “In what way, after all, is the 
understanding observed but by understanding? So too charity, joy, peace, long-suffering, 
kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, restraint (Gal. 5:22-23) and the rest, by 
which one draws near to God, and God himself.”  Pecham uses this argument as a 78
starting point to discuss two further Averroist errors associated with the phenomenon of 
individualized experience: 
• Averroes thinks that man is defined and perfected by reason, and yet monopsychism 
conflicts with this view.   79
• Averroes’ position implies that a particular man is not defined by reason and so he 
cannot perform natural, rational choice (electionem naturalem rationalem). 
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Pecham’s quotation is: “Quonam modo ipse intellectus nisi intelligendo conspicitur? Et 
caritas et gaudium, pax, longanimitas, fides et huiusmodi, quibus propinquatur Deo, et 
ispi Deus” (Quaestiones, 382). 
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Therefore, man cannot be rewarded for his right choices and punished for his wrong 
ones.  Under these circumstances, injustice is better than justice.  80
Pecham concludes his responsio by saying that the Averroist heresy is to be rejected, and 
that only one who is a madman (freneticus) or a thoroughly ignorant (penitus ignarus) 
would view Averroes’ doctrine as being anything other than improbable.  81
Contra 
In this section,  Pecham cites 15 arguments against the Averroistic position. (I am 82
taking it that each new argument is marked by the introductory word item in the text.) In 
some cases, Pecham does not spell out how the argument might contradict an Averroist 
thesis, but instead leaves the reader to deduce. Pecham’s arguments are influenced by a 
wide variety of sources. The first five, eighth, and 15th arguments are drawn directly 
from the authority of Scripture, philosophers, or theologians. The sixth, seventh, ninth, 
10th, 11th, and 12th arguments deal with problems that Pecham perceives to be inherent 
in Averroes’ position. The 13th and 14th arguments are based on Pecham’s own 
presuppositions about the soul.  
1. Pecham cites Psalms 33:15, which says that God “formed their hearts one by 





 Ibid., 373: “Qui finxit sigillatim corda eorum.” The passage from Psalms actually says: 83
“he who fashions the hearts of them all and observes all their deeds.” The passage (in 
isolation) might be taken to support Averroes’ position, because the word translated 
“all” (yachad) could be translated “alike” (Francis Brown, et al., Brown-Driver-Briggs 
Hebrew and English Lexicon [Peabody: Hendrickson, 1996]).
and that there is not just one soul that began when Adam was created and continues to 
live in all people currently.  
2. Pecham cites a statement by Augustine, in the dialogue called The Free Choice of 
the Will:  
Augustine: What about reason? Each person has his own, does he not? 
Sometimes it happens that I understand something when you do not understand it, 
and you are not able to know whether I understand, whereas I do know.  
Evodius: It is clear that each person has his own rational mind.   84
Pecham does not comment on this quotation, presumably because he takes the 
relationship between Augustine’s claim and the Averroist controversy to be self-
explanatory. However, Pecham does cite what he takes to be a companion passage in 
Peter Lombard.  85
3. Pecham cites Augustine’s statement to the effect that the soul did not pre-exist the 
body: “It ought not be taken ... that the soul lived [here] or there, whether in the body or 
apart from the body at any time”.  Pecham draws from this statement the point that every 86
soul totally begins with the body (anima omnis incipit cum corpore).   87
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 Liber Secundus Sententiarum (Florence: Quaracchi, 1885), 2.18.7. This passage asserts 85
that the soul of woman was not taken from the soul of man, because souls do not come 
through transduction. 
 Quaestiones, 373-374, bracketed item in orig.; cf. Augustine, Revisions, ed. and trans. 86
Boniface Ramsey (New York: New City Press, 2010).
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4. Pecham cites (but does not directly quote) a statement from one of Augustine’s 
letters to the effect that single souls are created and joined to single bodies.  Pecham 88
says that while Augustine doubted about the origin of the soul (i.e., whether each soul is 
created ex nihilo or given from the parents), he was certain that there is not just one soul 
for all.  
5. Pecham cites a passage from Gennadius’ De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, chapter 13: 
“The souls of men are not from the beginning among other intellectual creatures, nor 
created simultaneously, but created and infused when the body is informed.”  Pecham 89
does not comment on the passage, but it is obvious that the meaning of the passage agrees 
with Pecham’s interpretation of the Augustine passages that he has been considering. 
6. The sixth argument deals with the suitability of the possible intellect to do what the 
Averroist position requires, that is, to maintain both the singularity of the intellect and the 
particularization of instances of knowledge according to individual human beings.  In 90
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letter to Oceanus: “The difficulty which perplexes some in regard to this question, ‘How 
God can justly bestow souls on the offspring of persons guilty of adultery?’ does not 
embarrass me, seeing that not even their own sins, much less the sins of their parents, can 
prove prejudicial to persons of virtuous lives, converted to God, and living in faith and 
piety. The really difficult question is, if it be true that a new soul created out of nothing is 
imparted to each child at its birth, how can it be that the innumerable souls of those little 
ones, in regard to whom God knew with certainty that before attaining the age of reason, 
and before being able to know or understand what is right or wrong, they were to leave 
the body without being baptized, are justly given over to eternal death by Him with 
whom ‘there is no unrighteousness!’” (Confessions and Letters of St. Augustin with a 
Sketch of His Life and Work, ed. Philip Schaff, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the 
Christian Church Part 1 [Whitefish: Kessinger, 2004], letter CLXXX).
 Quaestiones, 374: “Animas hominum non esse ab initio inter ceteras intellectuales 89
creaturas, nec simul creatas, sed formato corpore creari et infundi.”
 Ibid., 375. 90
setting up the argument, Pecham provides the most detailed explanation of his 
understanding of Averroes’ position:  Averroes has argued that the agent intellect has the 91
same relationship to the possible intellect that light has to something that is transparent.  92
Furthermore, Averroes has argued that the possible intellect is neither substantially nor 
formally united to the body, but is connected to the individual human being through the 
phantasms which the senses supply via imagination to the intellect.  Pecham takes this to 93
mean that the possible intellect, in receiving a phantasm, understands “in” the different 
singulars and thereby understands various things. This view also entails that the agent 
intellect is composed from the possible intellect and the intelligible species, where the 
intelligible species are numbered and joined with the individual on the basis of formal 
species rather than on the basis of material species. Pecham says that, given the 
understanding of the intellect described here, if the intellect were to receive some species 
in a particular man (in isto homine) then the species must be converted into received 
species.  And, if the intellect is simple, then the whole intellect must be totally converted 94
on each occasion when a species is received. Such a conversion could not take place in 
any one person. Therefore, the Averroist position entails that all knowledge must be 
common to all humans, held in the single mind which all access by the conjunction with 
their phantasms. Each concept in the single mind must be in each person. 
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An objector might respond by saying that the intellect’s conversion is passive, and it 
is unproblematic for one and the same thing to suffer a number of changes at once.  95
Pecham responds by saying that no understanding occurs unless the intellect is 
assimilated perfectly and actively to the intelligible. For support, Pecham refers to 
Aristotle’s discussion of pure thought: Sed impossibile est quod simplex secundum idem 
in actu simul assimilaretur diversis.  Pecham says that when we consider thought itself 96
we find that the intellect—active or passive— cannot be converted to many objects at the 
same time.  That is, we have no experience that suggests that the intellect can do this, 97
but we do have philosophical authority to the contrary. 
It might be suggested that if the intellect can receive the species of one object then the 
intellect can also receive another species of the same object, and therefore it can receive 
infinite species from various objects at the same time.  Pecham responds to this 98
argument by citing a statement of Aristotle’s about the impossibility of multiple bodies 
being in the same place: “But the Philosopher says that if two bodies can be in the same 
place, then there can be three, and by the same reason an infinite number.”  Thus, if 99
Averroes wants to claim that the intellect can receive infinite species, he is going run 
counter to Aristotle and to a physical principle that only one thing can be in a place at a 
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eadem ratione infinita”; cf. Aristotle, Physics, trans. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, 213b.
20-22: “[I]t is impossible for two bodies to be together. Evidence of this they find also in 
what happens to ashes, which absorb as much water as the empty vessel.” 
time. Pecham’s response makes sense in light of his doctrine of species, which I will 
discuss briefly in the next chapter.  
Again, someone could respond, Pecham says, by saying that the intellect understands 
in receiving (recipiendo) and can receive from an infinite number of things.  Pecham 100
responds to this argument by saying that understanding is both passive and active. The 
intellect is passive in that it receives the species and is active in that it converts itself, by 
means of the species, into a likeness of the thing perceived (agit convertendo se supra 
rem per speciem). There must be a power by which the mind converts itself, and an 
infinite number of conversions would require an infinite power. Unless the Averroists are 
prepared to ascribe to the intellect infinite power, then their conception of the mind as 
infinitely convertible is contradictory. 
7. The seventh argument deals with the ontology of the phantasms and how the 
possible intellect relates to them. Pecham says that if a single possible intellect is 
connected with man, it has to be connected in the same way in which the agent intellect is 
connected.  If anything, the single possible intellect must be closer to the particular, 101
corporeal man than the agent intellect is, because the possible intellect is material in the 
sense that it is determinable, and something that is changeable is closer to man than to the 
divine.  Therefore, if the possible intellect is joined to man by means of the phantasms, 102
then there are three possibilities as to how this connection works. 
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• The phantasms may be some kind of images (i.e., images of objects in the external 
world).  Pecham says that this first way is impossible, because phantasms have 103
being in material images which are altogether different from intellectual 
substance.  In refuting this first possibility, Pecham sees no reason to even reach 104
the stage of discussing the connection to man. 
• If the phantasms are not images of external objects, then the possible intellect may 
join to man through the phantasm as already purified (depuratum) and connected to 
the intellect.  Apparently Pecham thinks of a “purification” in this context to mean 105
abstraction, for he says that a purified phantasm is already intelligible and has 
nothing in common with matter. Thus, the purified phantasm is not the object of the 
intellect as possible, but of the intellect as active, and so it is impossible to base a 
connection with a particular man upon already-purified phantasms. 
• Finally, the phantasm may shine (radiat) into the possible intellect.  Pecham 106
argues that this third possibility is impossible, because a phantasm must have 
already been moved by the agent intellect in order to shine on the possible intellect. 
Thus, the agent intellect would already be united with the human being before the 
possible intellect is united with the human being, which goes against Averroes’ 
stated view. 
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Pecham is alert to an argument that the agent intellect cannot be already united to man by 
means of something that is moving.  Pecham’s response is not entirely clear, but the gist 107
of it appears to be this: The possible intellect is united to man not by the phantasm’s 
shining, but rather only as a mover, and a mover that must be united to the particular man 
in a way that is prior to the way in which the active intellect is united to him. But the 
third possible model of the phantasm’s role above still requires that the agent intellect be 
united to man as a mover before the possible intellect is so united. Pecham maintains the 
impossibility of this order. 
8. Pecham bases the eighth argument on Aristotle’s authority for the position that this 
particular man understands, and that understanding is to be attributed to a composite 
(homo intelligit, et quod intelligere est coniuncti).  The “composite” refers generally to 108
the combination of soul and body, but the composite seems to refer more specifically to 
the joint activity of intellectual and sensitive powers. There is some essential part of the 
human being that elicits (elicit) an operation in the understanding. Yet there is no 
sensitive power that can cause an intellectual operation that deals with an intellectual 
object, since such an object is immaterial and purely abstract (pure abstractum).  The 109
intellectual power must be responsible for such operations. Therefore, Pecham says, 
!121
 Ibid.107
 Ibid.; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 408b.12-18: “Yet to say that it is the soul which is angry 108
is as if we were to say that it is the soul that weaves or builds houses. It is doubtless better 
to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks, and rather to say that it is the man 
who does this with his soul. What we mean is not that the movement is in the soul, but 
that sometimes it terminates in the soul and sometimes starts from it, sensation e.g. 
coming from without, and reminiscence starting from the soul and terminating with the 
movements or states of rest in the sense organs.”
 Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 429a.24-26.109
unless the (possible) intellect is considered to be a part of the human being, it cannot be 
said that a particular man understands.  110
There is the possible objection that that a sensory object does in fact attain to 
intelligible being (attingit secundum supremum esse intelligible).  The example cited in 111
support of this objection is that if color had the power of seeing, its would attain its 
species equally in the eye, even though color is beneath the level abstracted being in the 
intellect. Pecham brushes this objection aside quickly on the basis that it has not dealt 
with a fundamental distinction between the operation of the senses and the operation of 
the intellect: “Therefore in the same way no sensible power could participate in the act of 
understanding, or reach the intelligible species.”   112
9. The ninth contra argument is another reductio.  Pecham reminds his readers that 113
if the intellect is, as the Averroists say, united to man according to the intellect’s form, 
then this uniting has to occur according to intelligible species (from the phantasms) rather 
than according to the intellectual substance itself.  This view has two problematic 114
implications: First, the intellect is only accidentally united to man. Second, the perfection 
of an individual existing man is never the intellect in first being (in esse primo).  I take 115
this to be an insistence that the human intellect must be united to a human being because 
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it is a human intellect (i.e., at “first being”), and not due to an accidental reception of 
phantasms. 
10. The 10th argument deals further with the relationship between the rational soul 
and the individual knower.  The intellect is united to the individual either as perfection 116
and form, or only as a mover. Both of these two kinds of connection are problematic for 
the Averroist position: If the connection between the intellect and the individual is as a 
perfection/form, then the intellect must be multiplied according to the multiplication of 
matter (secundum multiplicationem materiae), since a form requires its own matter. 
Pecham further says that it is not possible for “just any soul” (quamlibet animam) to enter 
“just any body” (quodlibet corpus). An implication of this is that the number of human 
intellects is determined by the number of physical human beings. If the connection 
between the intellect and the individual is as mover to moved, then “the same thing must 
be”. Pecham does not explicitly say to what “the same thing” refers here, but it seems to 
refer to the state of affairs in which the number of intellects in the world (not necessarily 
in the afterlife) is determined by the number of physical human beings. Pecham cites the 
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authority of Aristotle’s principle that movers are numbered according to the number of 
motions.   117
11. The 11th argument is based on Averroes’ admission that “it is impossible that the 
same mover uses many instruments to the same end.”  Pecham says that, based on this 118
view, if the intellect is one for all men, then it could make use of only one man. 
Therefore, there are necessarily as many men as there are intellects.  
12. The 12th argument is based on a quote from Averroes: “[T]he diversity of the 
nature of the received thing causes the diversity of the nature of the thing 
receiving. . . .”  The intellect obviously receives diverse things, and so the intellect itself 119
must be diverse in nature. Pecham observes that Averroes could respond by saying that 
the diversity in phantasms is sufficient to account for the diversity in thoughts, but not a 
diversity of intellects.  But Pecham notes that Averroes also says that the intellect 120
understands some things through intelligible impressions rather than through mediating 
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first. . . .” (Metaphysics, 1071b.29-31; 1072a.9-15). 
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Averroes, Long Commentary, 305. 
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species.  If Averroes is right about this, and there is one universal mind, then any 121
thoughts that are independent of phantasms would also be common to all, and so if one 
man received a prophetic vision, then all men would receive it and therefore be prophets. 
This clearly does not happen.  
Pecham continues his attack based on intellectual diversity by challenging that the 
Averroistic account could even allow for diversity in received phantasms.  Pecham says 122
that species are understood when they are united to the intellect and stripped of their 
material conditions, a principle that would be consistent with Averroes’ position.  In 123
fact, this abstraction from all material conditions is a prerequisite for understanding. 
Therefore, Pecham says, if there were but one intellect, then every species would need to 
be in the same relation to the phantasms. The problem with this, although it goes unstated 
in Pecham’s argument, is that not all people are in the same spacial and sensible 
relationship with the same set of objects at the same time.  
13. The 13th contra argument is based on the soul’s relationship to the entire, single 
body.  The soul, being whole in every part of the body, senses every bodily lesion no 124
matter where in the body it is.  And, the soul is unimpeded by the phantasms drawn 125
from another sense. This presents a problem of cognitive location for the Averroists: 
“Therefore, if there is one intellect in all men, when to understand is to undergo, 
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whatever it cognizes in whatever place, it cognizes in any other place.”  The universal 126
mind would not be cognizing the pain as relating to a particular part of the body 
(presumably, this is because it is not by a phantasm that such pain is cognized), yet we do 
focus on the particular locale of a given pain. 
14. The 14th contra argument is based on the distinction between the angelic soul and 
the rational soul.  Pecham says that all the saints and philosophers hold that the angel 127
and the rational human soul are differentiated based on the fact that the rational soul is 
unitable to the corporeal body, whereas the angelic soul is not.  If this account is 128
correct, then the possible intellect is either a principle in an angelic being, or “formally 
unitable” (formaliter unibilis) and therefore capable of being multiplied according to the 
matter with which it is united. This argument does not include an argument that the 
possible intellect is truly particularized, but if it shows that the possible intellect is in 
principle unitable with matter, then it would preempt many Averroistic arguments about 
why there must be a universal intellect.  
15. Pecham bases the 15th contra argument on the authority of Aristotle.  We can 129
say that a man understands because his intellect is joined to him individually, but this 
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joining is actualized by the mediation of his form (sed actus est coniuncti mediante forma 
sua), therefore the form of a particular man is the intellect.   130
Ostenditur quod sic, and the corresponding Ad argumenta principalia 
By my count, Pecham brings up 25 possible arguments in favor of monopsychism, 
and he responds, at least in brief, to almost all of them (perhaps to all of them by some 
implication). The first three arguments and the seventh through ninth arguments are based 
on philosophical or theological authorities. The fourth, fifth, sixth, and 14th arguments 
are based on epistemological principles. The 10th through 12th arguments deal with 
ontological concerns related to the concepts of plurality and singularity. The 13th 
argument deals with concerns about generation and corruption. The 15th argument 
compares the intellect to separate substances. The 16th, 17th, and 18th arguments deal 
with ontological problems associated with individuation. The 19th argument deals with 
both the simplicity of the soul and with a problem related to time. The 20th argument is 
about the sensitive soul, and the 21st through 25th arguments deal with problems related 
to the infinity of souls that might be thought to obtain if there were more than one 
intellect. 
!127
 Pecham responds to a possible objection based on his reading of Alexander of 130
Aphrodisias: “Si dixeris cum Alexandro quod intellectus materialis est generatus et virtus 
facta ex complexione, — Ad illud improbandum sufficiant quae supra dicta sunt de 
immortalitate animae” (Quaestiones, 378; cf. Averroes, Long Commentary, 310). Pecham 
also mentions Alexander in connection with the immortal soul in the second quaestio 
(Quaestiones, 339). There are a number of arguments in the second quaestio to which 
Pecham may have been responding. See especially the “proof of the immortality from the 
dignity of its substance” (ibid., 344-345). 
1. The first argument in favor of monopsychism is based on Augustine.  Truth is 131
unified, and so truth must be unified in the subjects who know the truth, and anyone who 
acknowledges that something is true cannot fail to understand the changeless character of 
the truth. If a truth known in common is not numbered, then it must not be in numbered 
subjects. Furthermore, Averroes says that the material intellect must have the natural, first 
principles that are common to the whole species (principiis, naturalibus communibus) in 
order to receive understanding from the agent intellect.  132
The answer that Pecham provides for this argument is that propositions are known to 
be true in three ways, and all three ways must be included in an account of 
understanding.   133
• “Every whole is greater than its part” is known to be true by virtue of the 
material parts that are observed. 
• “Every whole is greater than its part” is known to be true by virtue of its formal 
being, which constitutes a habitus which can also be called the intellect. 
• “Every whole is greater than its part” is known to be true by virtue of the 
shining of eternal light.  
Pecham says that the first and second instances of knowledge are numbered according to 
a principle of the knowing subjects, whereas the third is not so numbered. In the third 
instance, it is not that the intellects are one, but that the light that shines on these 
propositions and makes them known is singular. The sun is a fitting model for God’s role 
in man’s coming to know, for we can say of the sun “that it is,” “that it shines,” and “that 
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it makes other things to be understood. . . .”  Pecham takes it that Augustine has 134
confirmed this approach.  Thus, the first argument in favor of monopsychism fails due 135
to a misunderstanding of how truth is known and of Augustine’s discussion of the subject. 
2. The second argument in favor of monopsychism  is also based on a passage 136
where Augustine finds it difficult to pronounce a judgment about how many souls there 
are due to the his audience’s possible responses:  
As to the number of souls, I do not know what to respond to you. For if I say it is 
one you will be confused, since in one it is happy, in another unhappy. Nor can 
one and the same thing be both happy and unhappy at the same time. If I should 
say that it is one and many at the same time, you will laugh, and I will not find it 
easy to make you restrain your laughter. But if I say only that it is many, I will 
laugh at myself.  137
The Averroist argument is that Augustine would not have a reason to laugh at himself if it 
were the case that there are many souls. (Yet Augustine plainly avoids deciding the matter 
in the immediate context.) 
The answer that Pecham provides for this argument  is neither that Augustine 138
refuses to take a position in the text, nor that there are passages where Augustine argues 
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for personal immortality or individual responsibility. Rather, Pecham says that Augustine 
never doubted about the issue of the soul’s individuality, but was rather trying to mix a 
“moral” (moralem) unity with a “natural” (naturali) unity. Augustine was concerned with 
how God could make one soul from many souls and one body from many bodies. 
Similarly, Augustine was concerned with understanding the relationship between the 
members of the Trinity, and unity in plurality in general.  In fact, Pecham takes 139
Augustine’s statement that “if I say only that it is many, I will laugh at myself” to mean 
that plurality and unity are not mutually exclusive in every sense.  
3. The third argument in favor of monopsychism  is based on a quotation from 140
Richard of St. Victor, who says: “Your doctrine can be another, and mine another, 
although on either side, as much in the person learning as in the person teaching, there is 
one science, his, which if that is his substance, it could be that both was one 
substance.”  The argument is that the teacher and the student must in some sense have 141
the same soul since the learning is the same in both of them.  
The answer that Pecham provides for this argument  is that the example is 142
insufficient to prove that the teacher and the student have the same soul. The teacher and 
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the student possess the same knowledge or science objectively, but not formally. The 
teacher and student have numerically different instances of science in their respective 
intellects. It is through the teacher that the student’s mind is “summoned” (excitatur) to 
the one light that Pecham mentioned in his answer to the first argument. Pecham goes on 
to say that even what is formally in each of the two people is numbered in each of them, 
although he does not here defend this position. 
4. The fourth argument in favor of monopsychism is that if two people understand the 
same thing, then the same species must be in both of them.  Identical species are 143
required because if two cognitions are predicated of diverse species, then there is one of 
two results, neither of which is possibly correct: (1) The species are totally different, and 
thus two totally different objects will be cognized. (2) The species are only partly 
different. In either case, there is no longer equal understanding between the two 
knowers.  144
The answer that Pecham provides for this argument  involves adapting the second 145
horn of the dilemma. He says that all species are numerically diverse, just as two rays 
from the sun are distinct even if they are alike. Two numerically different species, 
whether they be corporeal species from the sun or intelligible species in the intellect, can 
be alike and yet each maintain its singular being (singulari esse). For example, when 
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Peter and Paul both know something, then each of them can have the same species 
substantially and yet differ in individual substance.  146
5. The fifth argument in favor of monopsychism is based on the principle that the 
intellect is like the intelligible in some way, and that this identity is “truer” (veriori) than 
the identity by which matter and form makes a species, or that this identity makes it so 
that the intelligible in the mind is the same as the form which is in matter.  The 147
argument does not include an explanation of how the intellect incorporates its external 
object, but merely the conviction that in each case of knowing an object, the knower’s 
intellect must be informed by the same form that informs the matter outside the mind.  148
Claims that a knower cognizes external forms by virtue of merely similar forms lead to a 
contradiction, because the knower would already need to be aware of the similarity, and 
thus he would have to know the form to which the second form was similar. This could 
lead to an infinite regress.   149
The answer that Pecham provides for this argument  is that a universal species 150
always accompanies a singular species. There cannot be the species of a particular stone 
without the general species of stone, even though there can be the species of stone 
without the species of a particular stone. Thus in a case where there are two particular 
species of stone, these species have the universal species of stone in themselves. Pecham 
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argues that there is no infinite regress involved because there is nothing simpler in the 
kind under consideration (in illo genere) than a universal species; it is impossible to 
abstract any more general species from the universal species of stone.  In discussing the 151
next argument, Pecham will augment this response by addressing the question of the 
identity between the corporeal form and the form in the intellect. 
6. The sixth argument in favor of monopsychism  starts with the premise that a 152
universal must be in the soul as an object is in a subject. However, there is only one 
universal that stands for each group of objects (e.g., “man,” “horse”). Thus, when human 
knowers understand something, they all have the same universal as their object. This 
universal must be in the soul, otherwise it would be material and hence multiplied. 
Therefore the single universal object is either in a single intellect or it is nowhere.  153
The answer that Pecham provides for this argument  is based on the principle that 154
intelligible species are essentially different from the form that is in corporeal matter. An 
intelligible species leads to cognition because of its similarity, but not its identity, to the 
material form. The similarity of the intelligible species is not required to be foreknown by 
the knower, because understanding is not necessarily the result of a comparison of 
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various species; in some cases the intellect may confer species upon the stone. Pecham 
says that there is an analogue for this process in perception, although he does not say 
what it is. 
7. The seventh argument in favor of monopsychism (along with the two that follow it) 
is designed to prove that there are no singulars in the intellect, in an attempt to conflate 
universals as objects of the mind with the universality of the mind itself. It is based on a 
statement from Averroes that “The definition of the material intellect is that it is that 
which is in potency all the intentions of universal material forms, and is not actually any 
of the beings in act before the intellect understands any of them.”  And Aristotle says in 155
the Metaphysics that each person has his own being and cognition.  Just as cognition 156
begins as undetermined toward everything, so also is the essence of the mind 
undetermined to any particular kind of being.  Whatever is received in the intellect is 157
universal, because it is not in the intellect under individuating conditions; the universal is 
an accident as far as the intellect is concerned, and a formation of the intellect.  It is 158
also clear, the argument says, that the object of the intellect is a universal, because if a 
singular species is in one mind and another similar species is in another mind, then from 
these two species a third species could be abstracted. Presumably this third species would 
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have something in common with both of the original species. Similar abstractions could 
go on to infinity; each new abstraction would be simpler because it would be more distant 
from matter.  
The answer that Pecham gives to the seventh argument  is based on the principle 159
that, properly speaking, the universal itself is not in the soul, but rather a particular 
similitude of the universal, which is instantiated in the particular sensed object. The soul 
receives a species of a particular that carries with it the universal species (ita nec species 
singularis sine specie universali). Thus it is true that the intellect cognizes particulars, but 
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not immediately.  If the universal itself were really in the intellect, then the intellect 160
would be universal. Pecham cites Aristotle in support of this response.  The universal is 161
“one in many and of many”, and so the total substance (substantia) of a genus goes along 
with whatever particulars are in that genus.  There is no particular substance without 162
matter and form (and instances of a universal occur only in “this matter” and “this 
form”), therefore even if we were to think of a universal as excluding matter in its 
substance, then it cannot be in the soul according to substance, but only according to 
similitude. Furthermore, the universal, by being represented in the intellect, does not 
become anything other than a universal, because being in the intellect it inherently lacks 
the individuating conditions of the “here and now.” A universal is in matter in the sense 
that the matter of the intellect is formed through the universal, but whatever is received in 
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the intellect is a particular. Yet that particular object which the intellect receives can be 
universal with respect to objects outside the intellect.  
8. The eighth and ninth arguments in favor of monopsychism are brief developments 
of the seventh argument, i.e., further attempts to reason from the universality of the 
contents of the intellect to universality of the intellect itself.  The eighth argument is 163
that if the universal in the intellect is accidental for the intellect (as is suggested in the 
previous argument), then whatever attributes characterize the universal (as in a species) 
also characterize the accident. The answer that Pecham gives in response to the eighth 
argument  is based on a principle of order in the understanding. First, the intellect is 164
perfected by itself through its own form and matter. After the intellect is perfected in 
itself (i.e., in first being, or in being what it is), then it can be perfected through 
intelligible species (i.e., in second being, or in understanding). Until the intellect 
understands, it is still imperfect according to its second being, but not according to its 
first being. Therefore, the singularity or plurality of the intellect is established prior to its 
formation by intelligible species.  
9. The ninth argument in favor of monopsychism starts from the premise that a 
singular thing and a universal thing are not the same.  When Aristotle says that the 165
universal is one in many, he is saying that the universal is instantiated in many particular 
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things.  For example, in participatione speciei plures homines [sunt] unus homo.  The 166 167
answer that Pecham provides to the ninth argument  is to refer the reader to the citation 168
from Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics that is included in the answer to the seventh 
argument (above).  Pecham’s point is that the universal is not actually in the intellect, 169
but rather a similitude of the universal that is instantiated in the particular sensed object.  
10. The 10th, 11th, and 12th arguments in favor of monopsychism are based on the 
premise that plurality comes only through matter.  If the intellect has no matter, it must 170
be undivided. (A final answer from Pecham on the subject of materiality comes in the 
response to the 14th argument, which I will discuss below.) Pecham cites Averroes and 
Aristotle as supporting the view that a form/matter combination is potentially intelligible 
through abstraction, but is not already actually intelligible.  In order for understanding 171
to take place, the material must become immaterial, and immateriality (i.e., abstraction 
from corporeal conditions) precludes plurality. Pecham provides a joint answer to the 
10th and 11th arguments, and I will discuss it after the discussion of the 11th argument.  
11. The 11th argument in favor of monopsychism is a reductio ad absurdum based on 
the materiality of the intellect.  If the intellect were material (which, based on argument 172
10, would be required for plurality), then the intelligible species would not 
!138
 Ibid.; cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 100a.6-8. 166
 Quaestiones, 368, bracketed item in orig. This quotation is from Porphyry, Isagoge, 167
trans. Edward W. Warren (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1975), 40.
 Quaestiones, 386. 168
 Ibid., 387; cf. Posterior Analytics, trans. Jonathan Barnes, 100a.6-8.169
 Quaestiones, 368-369.170
 Ibid., 369; cf. Averroes, Long Commentary, 304-305; Aristotle, De Anima, 430a.6-7. 171
 Quaestiones, 369. 172
“represent” (indicaret) the whole substance of the intellect. For a material intellect to 
represent the whole of a substance that includes an intellectual component would be 
contrary to what Augustine says: “[W]hen the mind knows and approves itself, this same 
knowledge is in such way its word, as that it is altogether on a par and equal with it, and 
the same. . . .”  The “word” of the intellect would seem to be clearly immaterial, and 173
therefore would be excluded by a plurality of material intellects. 
The answer that Pecham provides to the 10th and 11th arguments  is that the 174
universal is not truly a thing “different from a particular in some way” (differens a 
particulari aliquo modo).  It is not merely accidental that various particulars within a 175
species have the same nature, and thus to take the position that universals occur only in 
“designated” (signato) individuals is not to oppose the idea that the universal—but still 
“designated”—similitude could be in an individual’s intellect.   176
12. The 12th argument in favor of monopsychism seeks to prove that even if we were 
to posit that the intellect includes some matter, the intellect still would not be plural.  177
The argument starts from the premise that if the intellect is in matter, then it must be in 
the whole matter of one particular being and in no other being. But if a form totally 
occupies a given material being, then similarly a form cannot inform more than one 
species any more than it can inform more than one being. Thus even if the intellect is 
associated with some matter, it is still singular.  
!139
 On the Trinity, 9.11. 173
 Quaestiones, 386-387. 174
 Ibid., 386. 175
 Ibid., 386-387. 176
 Ibid., 369. 177
The answer that Pecham gives to the 12th argument  is that it “concludes 178
well” (bene concludit) the the intellect can inform only one person, given what has 
already been said about universals in the intellect. Pecham reminds his readers that the 
universal is, properly speaking, not an accident or the formation of the intellect, but 
actually a different thing from the singular, just as a whole is different from a part. The 
universal is represented in the intellect, but does not inform the intellect by itself. 
Otherwise it would have been pointless for Aristotle to have distinguished between 
number, species, and genera, and it would be permissible to call the same thing both 
subject and accident.   179
13. The 13th argument in favor of monopsychism is based on the principle that 
material things are generated and corrupted.  If the intellect is numbered according to 180
the number of individual knowers, then it would be generated and corrupted along with 
each one. The only other alternative is that the man is not generated and corrupted as he 
appears to be, but rather goes through only accidental changes. Averroes is cited in 
support of this argument.  181
The answer that Pecham gives “to the 13th argument” is: de differentia singularis et 
universalis, concedo.  Presumably Pecham means to concede that the argument is 182
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correct insofar as it suggests the possibility that the intellect is not corrupted, but he does 
not explain how the difference between singulars and universals is supposed to help. It 
would seem, then, that Pecham’s response “to the 14th” is better suited to answer the 13th 
argument in favor of monopsychism.  This response starts by saying that the 183
proposition that the intellect is immaterial can be understood in three ways: (1) The 
intellect does not share at all in matter.  But this is false, as is shown in the first section 184
of Pecham’s responsio (see above). (2) The intellect is not the perfection of corporeal 
matter. But this is false and heretical, because the intellect gives being to matter and is the 
substantial form of matter insofar as “first being” is concerned. (3) The intellect does not 
operate through bodily mediation. This is the correct understanding, for intellect has an 
operation that depends on no organ. An example is when, in an act of second being, “[the 
intellect] is reflected on itself” (cum in se reflectatur).   185
14. The 14th argument in favor of monopsychism is a reductio ad absurdum based on 
the singularity of an individual’s intellect.  A single intellect, numbered according to an 186
individual, has the potency to understand (“in potency to the intelligible” in the words of 
the present argument) but is not actually understanding. However, nothing is intelligible 
unless it is abstracted from individuating conditions. Therefore, if the mind is in potency 
to the intelligible, then it would also be “in potency to receive itself” (in potentia 
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recipiens se ipsum), and so it would have to be both actual and potential in respect to the 
same thing.    187
It appears that part of Pecham’s response “to the 14th,”  reviewed just above, is his 188
response to this argument. In fact, the intellect may be said to be both in potency and in 
act.  The intellect is in potency because it does not always actively understand. If 189
someone says that the intellect must be potentially intelligible because it has both form 
and matter, then Pecham will respond by saying that this applies only to corporeal form/
matter compounds. The intellect is in act and present to itself because it understands itself 
and does not abstract in order to achieve such knowledge; the intellect is in potency 
because it may not always actively understand itself.  (Pecham cites Augustine’s 190
explanation of the mind’s ability to recall from memory objects that had been known 
before. ) Furthermore, the only circumstance in which we could say that an intelligible 191
is “in potency” (in potentia) would be when the intelligible is essentially potential, as in 
the case of forms of material things.   192
15. The 15th argument in favor of monopsychism seeks to show that there can be 
only one intellect by using a comparison to the angelic species.  The universal intellect, 193
as we might expect, is like the separated substances in that there is only one individual in 
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each species.  Therefore in the species of the human intellect, there can be only one 194
common intellect.   195
It seems that Pecham’s response to this argument comes in his response “to the 
16th”.  This argument is, in short, that the intellect occupies all of the matter of an 196
individual, but not the whole of the species. He says that forms occupying the whole of a 
species’ matter cannot be multiplied. For example, the sun occupies all of the matter in its 
species, and thus there can be only one sun. The human soul, on the other hand, occupies 
the whole matter of the individual by act and potency. This response does not directly 
address the 15th argument. Perhaps Pecham thinks that his response to the 15th argument, 
combined with the response “to the 16th,” suffices. The response “to the 15th” says that 
“a species which is produced is of the whole composite. Or if this is not suitable, it can be 
said of the form only, of which, however, ‘equal species’ is said only insofar as it is equal 
in nature to itself. . . .”  The idea seems to be that the species of human beings is 197
constituted by individual form/matter combinations; one cannot isolate the substantial 
form that these individual combinations share and then, because they all share the same 
form, conclude there is only one member of the species “human intellect.”  
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16. The 16th argument in favor of monopsychism seeks to prove that there is no 
coherent account of how the intellect is numbered according to individual members of the 
human species.  Such individuation cannot be caused by an intellect, for the intellect is 198
neither a body nor the power of a body. And, an intellect cannot be appropriated to a body 
because such appropriation would require the intellect to have either a receptive potency 
or an active potency. Such a potency could not be receptive, because a receptive potency 
would be indifferent to making a connection with a body. Nor could the potency be 
active, because an active potency appropriates something to itself only by reducing from 
some other potency of matter. According to this argument, there is no available potency 
that can appropriate the intellect to a body. 
Someone might say that there is an appropriation of soul to body on the basis of 
“proper organic dispositions of the body desiring this soul and not another. . . .”  But, 199
according to argument 16, This suggestion is incompatible with the view that the soul is 
immediately united to matter. Furthermore, the view that each soul is appropriated to a 
single body is itself problematic: The bodies of various species do not differ in their 
substantial and elementary differences, but only in their accidental differences. But the 
substantial appropriation of an immaterial form that is completely freed from matter 
cannot be according to accidents. Therefore, there is never a complete appropriation.  
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The answer to argument 16 appears to come in Pecham’s response “to the 17th”.  200
This response is that individual numeration can be understood in two ways. The 
numeration can be considered either as the efficient cause, or as an occasion (occasio) for 
the operation of another cause.  The first way is incorrect, but the second way is true, 201
because the multiplication of bodies is the occasion for which God creates and infuses 
souls. Also, because the human body naturally desires the rational soul, human 
reproduction cannot be understood as a merely biological function (“natura generantis 
non quiescit in aliquo quod a virtute seminis producatur” ), but must also include the 202
infusion of the rational soul. Pecham does not here take a position about whether the 
intellect is immediately or mediately united to the body, but he will take a position on this 
issue in the responses “to the 22nd and 23rd and 24th” arguments (below) and later, in the 
Tractatus.  
Someone might respond by asking how a true material unity that results from natural 
reproduction can also include the infusion of the rational soul.  Pecham deals with this 203
objection by saying that the God is the founder of nature and thus has wide freedom in 
dealing with nature. In this context he cites Augustine’s statement: “For what he — who 
is the source of all the measure, number, and order of nature — does will be natural to 
each thing.”  204
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17. The 17th argument in favor of monopsychism has to do with what happens to the 
individual body when the rational soul enters and departs.  Suppose that, prior to the 205
entrance of the rational soul, matter already has some form. This form can only be the 
form of man. If a substance’s prior dispositions and forms disappear whenever the 
rational soul enters, then when the rational soul departs at death, only prime matter would 
remain. However, it appears that when someone dies, the matter that remains is not prime 
matter but the forma corporeitatis.  Evidently the point here is supposed to be that, 206
since the body already has the forma corporeitatis, there is no role for the intellect as the 
form of the individual human body, and so there is no need for the intellect to be 
individualized. 
Someone might suggest that another form is generated in the body (or that the body 
generates another form) through transmutation when death occurs.  This is basically 207
Aquinas’s position. According to argument 17 this suggestion is problematic because if 
we want to say that the rational soul alone is the substantial form, then it is either 
generated from something, or from nothing.  If the rational soul is generated from 208
nothing then the only way for it to perish would be through a miracle.  If the rational 209
soul is generated from something other than prime matter, then it must be from some 
other potency. This potency must be identified with another form in matter besides the 
rational soul. Therefore there must be some principle other than prime matter that is 
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 This is indeed Pecham’s position (Delorme, “La Summa,” 66-67). 206
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associated with the body when it is apart from the rational soul. So, we are left with the 
conclusion that matter has the forma corporeitatis, and there is no reason why there 
cannot be one intellect for all. 
At this point Pecham provides two responses that do not appear to belong with the 
17th argument.  First, consider the response “to the 18th”: If there were one universal 210
substance, the intellect (including its possible aspect) would not always understand itself 
in act, but it could understand itself. Is the intellect in act or in potency? Pecham says (as 
he has before) that there is a sense in which the intellect is both active and passive. And 
yet, the intellect could not be essentially in potency to understand itself just as it is in 
potency in respect of material forms. Second, there is the response “to the 19th”, which is 
simply this: “per interemptionem respondendum. Item, nec est omnino a materia 
separatus.”  It is not obvious to which argument this response is directed.  211
Pecham does address the plurality of substantial forms in the human being in the 
Tractatus, and says more about the forma corporeitatis.  So, while Pecham may not 212
answer this 17th argument in favor of monopsychism here, he attempts to do so 
elsewhere. 
18. The brief 18th argument in favor of monopsychism seeks to show that if the 
rational soul were to enter the individual human being, that rational soul would be at once 
corrupted.  If we suppose that when the rational soul enters, the other forms are 213
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corrupted, then they can be corrupted only into contraries. “Therefore, the rational soul 
will stand with its contrary form to the disposition which is to itself. But effects of 
contraries are contraries. Therefore, just as it comes in through the disposition, so after 
the coming in it recedes immediately due to the contrary form.”  Given that the rational 214
soul is a contrary form to the forms that already have informed the body but now recede, 
the rational soul will also recede.  
The answer that Pecham gives to this argument (“to the 20th”)  starts from the 215
principle that the rational soul is appropriated simpliciter to the human body.  The body 216
itself is “of the most noble and most equal complexity [complexionis]” and the soul is 
united to it substantially as its substantial form. A particular soul is united to a particular 
body because of differences in complexion (complexionis) and the combination is not 
accidental. Even though the differences among various souls and bodies and 
combinations may be accidental, this does not mean that the coming together of a 
particular soul with a particular body is itself accidental.  Peter Lombard confirms that 217
among souls there are degrees of subtlety, and thus there can also be diversity of bodies 
within the limits of species.  218
19. The 19th argument in favor of monopsychism returns to the topic of simplicity, 
although the principle under consideration here is different from the principle discussed 
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in the seventh argument (above).  The present argument says that the more simple 219
something is, the more it is of communicable existence.  The argument seeks to show 220
that if the rational soul is essentially simple in the same way in which an angel is simple, 
then the rational can in fact be be in many. This is particularly interesting because 
previous arguments sought to show that the universal mind could not be “in” individual 
knowers. That the rational soul can be in many is proved in three ways: (1) God is simple 
and yet can be in all things. If the intellect participates in divine simplicity, then the 
intellect also participates in any and all effects of divine simplicity. Therefore the single 
human intellect can be in all men. (2) The spirit has a more communicable existence than 
that of the body. If there is one body that makes all bodies perfect by containing and 
illuminating them, therefore there could also be a spirit that perfects and contains all 
bodies. (3) If a single accident can be numerically in many beings, then so much more is 
a single spirit communicable to many beings: “[E]rgo magis potest esse unus spiritus in 
omnibus corporibus”.  221
Someone might suggest that time is in the movement of the prime mover as a subject, 
and that time is in other beings only insofar as they are measured by the prime mover. 
This response would seem to challenge argument (1) in the above paragraph: When a 
being participates in God’s simplicity the being does not necessarily “have” simplicity in 
the same way, nor does the being necessarily have the other divine attributes. But there is 
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the counterexample that if heaven stood still and the potter’s wheel moved, then time 
would be measured according to the wheel. However, the movement of heaven does not 
preclude the wheel having its own movement.  As it is, says argument 19, time is 222
measured according to heaven and there is only one time.  In fact, even if there were 223
multiple heavens there would be only one time, because any motion at all is sufficient for 
there to be time (time is sufficiently measurable according to the movement of either 
heaven or the potter’s wheel). This argument about time is evidently meant to suggest 
that attributes have the same meaning —at least analogically—wherever they are found, 
e.g., wherever we find spiritual simplicity, it is in some sense the same. If we can say that 
the human intellect shares in God’s simplicity in any sense, then, there can be only one 
intellect.  
Pecham’s text does not seem to provide a single response that works as an obvious 
answer to this argument. However, Pecham has already said enough in his responsio to 
give an idea about what his response would be: The intellect, as a form/matter composite 
itself, does not share in God’s simplicity. Here, I will consider what Pecham says in the 
various remaining responses as possible answers. In Pecham’s responses “to the 22nd and 
23rd and 24th”  he says that the soul is not immediately united to the body, but rather 224
there is a sense in which similarities and differences mediate between the body and soul. 
Therefore (quoting from Alcher of Clairvaux), 
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the soul which truly is spirit, and flesh which is body are easily and conveniently 
united in their outermost parts, that is in the imaginary knowledge which is not 
body, but is like the body and the sensuality of the flesh which is truly spirit 
because without the soul it could not happen.   225
In the answer that Pecham provides “to the 26th” argument,  he says that a body is not 226
united to a soul unless the soul flows into the body. Yet it is possible that one spirit may 
flow into all others who by themselves are not subject to its influence. That is, individual 
knowers can accept the influence of Christ’s soul while still maintaining their own 
individual souls. In the cases of someone being converted to Christ, the soul of Christ 
may be said to “come into” the convert’s body.  
Pecham deals with the issue of time in the response “to the 28th”.  Time follows 227
different motions according to how it is united by the “flowing in” (influendo). Just as 
many lines can come together at one point, and yet there is a point that has a line as its 
subject, so also many motions that exist simultaneously are one subject of time. This is 
not because all the motions are one subject essentially, but they are one subject through 
their flowing together [confluentiam]. Yet in this discussion of time, Pecham does not 
respond directly to any of the 19th argument’s implications about the soul.  
20. The 20th argument in favor of monopsychism is based on the idea that the 
sensitive soul can be in many at one time.  Therefore, so much more can the rational 228
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soul be in many at once. The argument claims the support of both Augustine and 
Aristotle: (1) Augustine says that the phantasm of a man may appear (mistakenly, in this 
case) in various people at the same time.  (2) Aristotle says that the world is eternal and 229
continually generates humans, animals, and plants.  However, Aristotle denies that there 230
can be an actual infinite.  Thus, if each individual has his own rational soul, there would 231
be an actual infinity of souls, which Aristotle denies.  
Someone might suggest that Aristotle allowed for the actual infinite in principle, and 
objected only insofar as an actual infinite would overfill all places.  This response is not 232
damaging to the 20th argument, because if an actual infinity of souls is allowed at all, 
then it must also be allowed that God could in principle give a body to each soul. This 
situation would result in all places being overfilled anyway, and so it provides no help to 
those who want support from Aristotle for the view that there could be an infinite number 
of humans, each with his own intellect. 
Again, there does not appear to be a single response that works as an answer to this 
argument, arguing directly that a plurality of intellects does not imply an infinity of 
individual people, yet Pecham’s responses “to the 29th” and “to the 30th”  (the last two 233
responses of the quaestio) discuss evidence from Augustine and from Aristotle, 
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respectively. In these responses, Pecham uses these authorities to deny the possibility of 
an actual infinity of individuals to begin with. Pecham says that Augustine’s point is not 
that the phantasm of a man may go into the various knowers’ minds essentially. It is 
merely that a man appears similarly to various knowers. Pecham begins his response “to 
the 30th” by saying that “that was never the intention of the Philosopher.”  By this 234
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Pecham evidently means that Aristotle did not support the idea of an eternal world.  Yet 235
even if we posit the eternity of the world, Pecham says, the Averroist might still suggest 
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refuting the possibility that there has been an actual infinity of men in history (Questions 
Concerning the Eternity of the World, 26-27; cf. Dales, Medieval Discussions of the 
Eternity of the World [Leiden: Brill, 1990]). In the same context, Pecham appeals to 
Aristotle in arguing against the idea that souls are rotated successively from body to body 
(ibid.). Aristotle says that “[T]here must always be an underlying something, namely that 
which becomes. . . . [T]here must be something underlying the contraries. . . . The 
underlying nature can be known by analogy. For as the bronze is to the statue, the wood 
to the bed, or the matter and the formless before receiving form to any thing which has 
form, so is the underling nature to substance” (Physics, 190a.14-15, 191a.4-5, 9-11). On 
the situation in the 13th century concerning Aristotle’s position on the eternity of the 
world, consider Potter’s comment: “Both Franciscan and Dominican theologians rejected 
the Averroist position on the world’s eternity but for rather different reasons. To 
understand the issues in this three-sided debate, it would be well to recall some of the 
basic tents of ‘radical’ or ‘integral’ Aristotelianism. First, the Latin Averroists assumed 
(with Aristotle and all the ancient Greeks) that whatever is, always was, and always will 
be is necessary, that is, not contingent. Second, they held as self-evident the principle 
‘From nothing, nothing comes,’ understood in the sense that every coming-to-be requires 
a material cause and so generation is the only conceivable kind of coming-to-be. Hence if 
the world ever is, it always was and always will be. If there ever is any coming-to-be, 
there must be an infinity of comings-to-be a parte ante and post. The upshot of these two 
assumptions is that the world is ontologically necessary, hence non-contingent, hence not 
at all created in the orthodox Christian sense. . . . The Franciscans adopted the contrary 
position to the Averroists: namely that it can be demonstrated that the world had a 
beginning (and perhaps also an end). The Dominicans adopted the contradictory position 
to the Averroists: namely, that it cannot be demonstrated that the world had no beginning. 
They also contradicted the Franciscans in that they denied one could demonstrate that the 
world had a beginning. . . . Thomas Aquinas held that neither the ‘eternity’ nor the ‘non-
eternity’ of the world is demonstrable by reason alone. Thomas was convinced that faith 
required Christians to hold that in fact the world is not eternal, but this comes solely from 
faith and not from reason” (introduction to Pecham, Questions Concerning the Eternity of 
the World, xi, xii-xiii, emp. and parenthetical items in orig.). It should be noted that later 
Franciscans, such as William of Ockham, allowed for the philosophical possibility of an 
eternal world (see Dales, Medieval Discussions; ibid., “The Friars and the Eternity of the 
World,” Monks, Nuns, and Friars, 63-70; cf. Francis of Marchia, Francisci de Marchia 
Opera philosophica et theologica, Volume 1, ed. Girard Etzkorn, et al. [Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 2008], introduction). 
the seemingly impossible situation where any given soul can go into any (suitable) body. 
Without a suitable body, however, the spiritual substance would remain idle. 
The text does not provide responses to the final five arguments in favor of 
monopsychism. However, all five arguments deal with the implications of infinity,  and 236
perhaps Pecham thought that he had already dealt with this issue sufficiently in the text, 
having argued that a plurality of intellects does not imply an infinity of individual people. 
After all, Pecham says that if we posit an eternal world with infinite humans, then further 
impossibilities follow:  
But it is not surprising if from one impossible proposition another follows. 
However, in no way is it to be believed that [Aristotle] posited an infinity in act at 
the same time. And if in some way [Averroes] will have posited a revolution, he 
erred without a doubt, because one error cannot be sustained without another.”   237
Creationism would not allow the Christian to believe in an infinity of souls, and so 
arguments in favor of monopsychism that are based on the impossibility of an infinity 
would be unconvincing to many anyway. 
21. The 21st argument in favor of monopsychism is based on the principle that each 
good creature adds something to the total goodness in the universe.  Therefore, if there 238
were an infinity of souls, then the universe would be infinitely good. The unstated minor 
premise is that the universe is not infinitely good. The unstated conclusion is that there 
cannot be an infinite number of souls. The unstated corollary (from argument 20) is that 
there can be only one rational soul. 
!155
 Quaestiones, 372-373. 236
 Ibid., 391: “Sed nec est mirum si ex uno impossibili sequatur aliud. Nullo tamen modo 237
credendum ipsum posuisse simul infinita actu. Et si aliquo modo revolutionem posuerit, 
procul dubio erravit, quia error unus sine alio sustineri non potest.”
 Ibid., 372.238
22. The 22nd argument in favor of monopsychism seeks to prove that if there were an 
infinity of souls, then any given individual soul would itself have infinite properties.  A 239
given individual member of a species differs from other members of the species, but 
differs more from members of other species.  Therefore, if one individual differs from 240
an infinite number of others, then the individual must have infinite reasons for its 
differences.  241
23. The 23rd argument in favor of monopsychism is based on problems that arise 
concerning the numbers of parts and wholes when an infinity of things is posited.  If 242
there is an infinity of things, then there are just as many parts as there are wholes. In fact, 
the part is equal to the whole not only numerically but in every way. It is not made clear 
how it is proved that parts become equal to wholes “in every way” (non solum numero 
sed omnimode) in the context of an actual infinity. 
24. The 24th argument in favor of monopsychism is based on spatial and geometrical 
problems associated with an infinity of things.  If there were an infinite number of 243
things in the whole world (mundo toto), then the center would be in the middle of the 
world. In this case, an infinity would have a middle point, which is impossible. Someone 
might respond to this argument by saying that such an infinity would not be in a place at 







objection is that souls could operate in various parts of the universe, and since each of 
these parts would be infinitely divisible, the argument holds.  
25. The 25th and final argument in favor of monopsychism is that where there is an 
actual infinity of individuals, there cannot be order among the individuals.   244
Conclusion  
The fifth of Pecham’s Quaestiones De Anima is critical to understanding his approach  
to controversies not only with the Latin Averroists of his day, as is obvious from the text 
of the fifth quaestio alone, but also with Thomas Aquinas on the issue of substantial 
forms. In the fifth chapter, I will use data from this exposition to draw conclusions about 
Pecham’s strategy. In the sixth chapter, will show how the quaestio functions in the 













EXPOSITION OF PECHAM’S TRACTATUS DE ANIMA 
Melani’s edition of Pecham’s Tractatus was originally published in 1948, and will be 
used as the basis for this chapter. The purpose of this chapter is the exposition of 
Pecham’s arguments whereas evaluation of many of these arguments will be presented in 
chapters five and six. This exposition will provide a partial basis for that comparison with 
Aquinas’s arguments against Latin Averroism. Furthermore, an understanding of the 
Tractatus is essential for understanding how Pecham deals with his sources, which I will 
discuss in the fifth chapter. 
The Tractatus is especially interesting because in it Pecham presents his own 
psychological anthropology while avoiding direct discussion of controversies that were 
prominent at the time.  Pecham addresses such controversies directly in the Quaestiones, 1
which I discussed in the previous chapter and to which I will continue to make reference, 
particularly concerning Pecham’s disagreement with Aquinas. 
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 Tractatus, 3. While Pecham states in the prologue that he wants to discuss the 1
substance, power, and action of the rational soul, in the second part of the Tractatus he 
discusses all of the capacities of the soul. This is significant in connection with Pecham’s 
view that the rational soul is the form of the body (cf. Pecham, Quaestiones, 333, 349, 
363-364).  
Prologue 
Pecham makes a number of statements in the prologue that provide insight into the 
nature of his project. First, Pecham motivates the study of the soul not by saying that the 
soul needs to be understood in order to defend a Franciscan party line at Paris or so that 
heresies can be criticized, but simply by stating his own personal wonder at the soul and 
its operation.  Pecham does not question whether humans have individuated souls.  2 3
Indeed, Pecham takes for his starting point the intuition that the soul observes its own 
wondering.  Pecham also recognizes the paradox that a person’s soul is more present to 4
that person than anything else; it is very present and intimate to itself, and yet not well 
known to itself.  The soul is obscure because it is concealed by phantasms; the eye of the 5
soul is turned toward fleshly matters even though it is capable of turning toward spiritual 
things.  This view is similar to Avicenna’s doctrine of the soul’s “two faces,” which 6
Pecham may have adopted due to the influence of Alexander of Hales, John of La 
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 For Pecham, that human beings have souls is, as it is for Avicenna, “an almost 3
observable fact” (Jon McGinnis, “Avicenna [Ibn Sina],” The History of Western 
Philosophy of Religion, ed. Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis [Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009], 2:67). 
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admiratione decernentem. Quomodo enim non sibi notissima, quae sibi praesentissima, 
sibi intima, sibi simillima? Qualiter in ceteris acuta et sibi obtusa?” 
 Ibid.5
 This does not mean that Pecham thinks that phantasms are necessary for every 6
cognition, as Aquinas does. For Pecham there are not only those species which are 
derived from sensible perceptions, but also “innate” (innatam) and 
“impressed” (impressam) species, which occur without phantasms (e.g., Quaestiones, 
430). 
Rochelle and other Paris Franciscans.  “Two faces” has reference to Avicenna’s division 7
of the human intellect—conceptually at least—into two aspects,  
the practical and the theoretical intellect. As an image to help grasp the relation 
between the practical and theoretical intellects, Avicenna likens them to two faces 
of the human soul. . . . [T]he practical intellect is turned downward toward the 
management of the body, being influenced by the body and material needs and 
desires, while the theoretical intellect is turned upward toward the higher 
principles and causes, which are the source of all knowledge and understanding.  8
Pecham does not make explicit in the prologue whether he is borrowing from Avicenna. It 
is clear, however, that Avicenna and Pecham (as we shall see) both think of the 
psychological powers as forming a hierarchy.  And, as Pecham will soon make clear, he 9
thinks of God’s intellect and the individuated human intellect as being jointly responsible 
for human understanding.  10
Second, Pecham’s description of the process whereby the soul can be understood 
reminds one of mystics such as Meister Eckhart: “But let me take of little by little the 
tunic of the phantasms, let me take off, let me uncover [the veil] of sensible scales; let me 
see, the Lord leading me, my more secret places, and I will drive the flock of my thoughts 
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to the hidden desert if perhaps the consoler of my soul would appear to me.”  Pecham 11
has a doctrine of divine illumination, but it is another question as to whether portions of 
Pecham’s work could be categorized alongside medieval mysticism. On the one hand, 
Pecham relies heavily on Pseudo-Dionysius in both the Tractatus and in the Quaestiones. 
He also discusses a delight in God’s love that can occur only when cognition ceases.  On 12
the other hand, however, Pecham consistently presents his doctrine primarily as the joint 
product of reason (citing Aristotle often) and Christian teaching, and at no point as a 
product of spiritual experience as such. For Pecham, the result of the journey into the 
hidden desert is a doctrine that is “without conflict of reasonings” (sine rationum 
conflictu)  and one that he takes to be free of conflict with Aristotle.  Pecham provides 13 14
no further explanation regarding the nature of the hidden desert, and so one is safe in 
assuming that Pecham’s view of the soul’s contact with God is best understood in light of 
his discussions of illumination later in the Tractatus and in the Quaestiones. 
Part One. Chapter One.  
The first major division (or “part”) of the Tractatus deals with the operation or 
working (operatione) of the soul, although it cannot be said that any part of the Tractatus 
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 Tractatus, 45.12
 Ibid., 3. 13
 This becomes evident in the Quaestiones, but is less evident in the Tractatus. 14
avoids discussion of the soul’s operations. Pecham begins by saying that life is the “first 
and equal act,” of the soul.  Notice that Pecham cites a work that he calls the Fons Vitae 15
for support on this point. As I mentioned in the first chapter of the present study, 
Pecham’s citation is not from Avicebron’s Fons Vitae, but rather from the De Motu 
Cordis by Alfred of Sareshel. It may be that Pecham was not mistaken about the 
authorship of the De Motu Cordis; rather, he may have considered Alfred’s text to be a 
kind of fons vitae. In the fifth chapter of the present study, which focuses on Pecham’s 
use of his sources, I will discuss in some detail the influence of the De Motu Cordis in the 
Tractatus.  
Pecham also makes a clear distinction between the life of the body and the life of the 
soul. The life of the soul overflows into the life of the body. The critical point is that 
Pecham associates the soul with life, and then explains the implications he draws from 
this position. Pecham will later clarify by saying that there is a drive that is “the life of 
the soul”.  Pecham appeals to Avicenna for the view that the rational soul is both an 16
impression and emanation for the body instead of simply “the life of the body.” Pecham 
does not here explain his understanding of emanation. Avicenna accepted an emanationist 
cosmology, but also rejected the theory of a pre-existent soul.  Thus, if Pecham is 17
following Avicenna in these areas, then Pecham is espousing (1) that person is 
individuated upon the soul’s combination with the body, and (2) that the rational soul is 
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 Tractatus, 4: “Vita est actus primus et aequalis.”; cf. Alfred of Sareshel, De Motu 15
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 Marmura, “Avicenna,” 87-88; Sajjad H. Rizvi, “Avicenna (Ibn Sina),” University of 17
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also the result of an emanation rather than a creation. However, there is reason to doubt 
that Pecham espoused (2), due to his stated position to the contrary in the first of the 
Quaestiones, which answers in the negative the question of whether the soul is given 
from the parents, and due to his insistence that souls are created and infused one by one.  
Pecham’s emphasis on life also reflects the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius, who 
associates life with being as such rather than with a particular level of ensoulment: 
All beings, to the extent that they exist, are good and come from the Good and 
they fall short of goodness and being in proportion to their remoteness from the 
Good. In the case of other qualities such as heat or cold the things which have 
experienced warmth can lose warmth. Indeed there are things which have no life 
and no mind. True, there is God who is on a level above being and is therefore 
transcendental. But with entities generally, if a quality is lost for them, or was 
never there in fact, it is still the case that these entities possess being and 
subsistence. However, that which is totally bereft of the Good never had, does not 
have, never shall have, never can have any kind of being at all. Take the example 
of a person who lives intemperately. He is deprived of the Good in direct 
proportion to his irrational urges. To this extent he is lacking in being and his 
desire is for what has no real existence. Nevertheless he has some share in the 
Good, since there is in him a distorted echo of real love and of real unity.   18
Pecham starts with Pseudo-Dionysius’ framework but provides more specification 
concerning how life functions.  
Pecham has said that the rational soul is an impression, and immediately mentions a 
particular understanding of “impression” that is not limited to the rational aspect of the 
soul.  He says that the biological processes of the body, specifically the blood, jointly 19
constitute a disposition toward the impression. Pecham thinks this position must be right 
because of Leviticus 17:14, which Pecham quotes as follows: “The life and soul of all 
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flesh is in the blood.”  At this stage Pecham has left available the option of viewing of 20
the soul-body connections such that (at least) the body is disposed by its sensitive and 
vegetative aspects to receive the rational soul, or (at most) the rational soul is directly 
involved in the preparation of the body.   21
Having stated that the soul is integrally related to the concept of life, Pecham 
proceeds to explain the soul-life relationship. He asks, what is “the first and per se act of 
life in the soul?”  It is obvious that Pecham is discussing not only the rational soul at this 22
point, because he considers understanding, sensation, and vegetation as answers to the 
question about the soul’s first act of life. Pecham rejects these three possible answers as 
follows:  Understanding or knowledge cannot be the per se act of the soul, because 23
Aristotle says that “all men desire to know,”  thus desire precedes understanding. 24
Furthermore, we are alive in various instances in which we are not actively understanding 
(e.g., during sleep). Neither vegetation nor sensation can be the per se act of the soul, 
because vegetation and sensation involve not only living, but “giving life” to another. 
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 Pecham’s quotation of Leviticus 17:14 is not a literal translation of the Vulgate, which 20
reads: “Anima enim omnis carnis in sanguine est unde dixi filiis Israhel sanguinem 
universae carnis non comedetis quia anima carnis in sanguine est et quicumque comederit 
illum interibit.” All citations from the Vulgate are from Biblia Sacra: Iuxta Vulgata 
Versionem (Stuttgart: Gesamtherstellung Biblia-Druck, 1994).
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Pecham says that rational souls are created and infused individually (323). In the13th 
quaestio Pecham says that it is natural for the material form to “strive to 
perfect” (“appetere perficere”) and that the soul has a desire to be embodied in order to 
carry out its natural progress toward perfection (450-452).
 Tractatus, 5. 22
 Ibid., 5-6. 23
 Cf. Metaphysics, trans. W.D. Ross, 980a.21, emp. added; cf. Augustine, On the Trinity, 24
9.12.
Something must already be alive before it can give life to another, and so life must 
precede even nutrition. To “give life” on this view seems to be the fulfillment of a 
condition for bodily integrity.  Pecham evidently thinks that even though the vegetative 25
and sensitive aspects of the soul are required for bodily integrity, the presence of the 
vegetative and sensitive functions must itself be explained. Life is the active principle or 
force that provides this explanation. Furthermore, Pecham notes that old age corrupts the 
body, but says that it not therefore right to say that an old man is less alive than a young 
man.  If the gradual diminishing of various physical powers is not a reduction in life, 26
then the normal operations of such powers cannot be a measure of life as such. A further 
implication is that a thing is either alive or it is not—there is no in-between stage. 
As he begins the next chapter Pecham will conclude from this discussion that the 
primary act of life in the soul is “the first act of form”.   27
Part One. Chapter Two.  
This first act of form is a “continuous drive” that is the common cause for vegetative, 
sensitive, and rational life. All creatures have this cause in a similar or analogous way.  28
Pecham claims as additional authority a statement in the Book of Causes: “Life is 
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 This is opposed to the view of Aristotle, who says: “This power of self-nutrition can be 25
separated from the other powers mentioned, but not they from it—in mortal beings at 
least. The fact is obvious in plants; for it is the only psychic power they possess. This is 
the originative power the possession of which leads us to speak of things as living at 
all. . . .” (De Anima, trans. J.A. Smith, 413a.32-413b.2). 
 Tractatus, 5-6. 26
 Ibid., 6. Pecham says that this point comes from the Fons Vitae of Avicebron, however 27
the phrase is really in the De Motu Cordis (chapter 1). 
 Tractatus, 6. 28
proceeding out of the first Being, quiet and eternal and the first motion. . . .”  Pecham 29
also cites Plato’s idea that the soul is self-moving.  This first principle, which Pecham 30
has so far called a motion, an act, and a form, is more readily identified with an efficient 
cause than any other of the four Aristotelian causes. Pecham says that this form is 
“structurable from itself and can complete its own fulfillment.”  It is not the forma 31
corporeitatis, for Pecham makes clear that the first principle is neither any combination 
of elements nor anything separate from the elements themselves, nor the specification of 
any of the elements, nor any principle that specifies the species of the creature.  Rather, 32
it is the elementary life-form, which moves the living thing “to the perfecting of its 
fulfillment.”  In other words, the form is just life itself, and is irreducible to any other 33
form.  Pecham cites as a good summary of his view the statement of Alexander of Hales: 34
“The actuality of vigor is instilled by the Creator in creatures, and by means of this they 
are efficaciously ordered towards their complement and in achieving this in themselves 
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Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, 111, bracketed items in orig.
 Tractatus, 6; Plato, Phaedrus, 245c-246a; cf. Raphael Demos, “Plato’s Doctrine of the 30
Psyche as a Self-Moving Motion,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 6, no. 2 (1968):
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 Tractatus, 6: “... ex se ordinabilis est et potest perficere ad sui complementum.”31
 Ibid., 6-7: “Actus enim formae elementaris vita non est, quoniam nec supra formam 32
elementarem aliquid est, quod requiratur ad speciem elementi, nec infra aliquid quod 
speciei sufficiat. . . .”
 Ibid., 7: [S]ed in rebus viventibus vigor est continuus et ex vigore oriens appetitus 33
excitans et promovens rem viventem ad consequendum sui complementum.”
 Ibid.34
they are at rest.”  The role of the Creator as the direct contributor of the rational soul will 35
be developed in some detail by Pecham in the first of his Quaestiones. (Pecham clearly 
intends to avoid problems associated with double vegetative and sensitive souls. ) 36
Having established that the per se act of the soul is life and that this is equivalent to 
the first form, Pecham now mentions the other human forms, making explicit his view 
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efficaciter ordinatur et ipso obtento in eo quietantur”; cf. Alexander, Summa Theologiae 
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 Quaestiones, 323-324: “dicendum animas singillatim creari de nihilo cotidie, et 36
formatis infundi corporibus. Cuius ratio sumitur ex parte divinae operationis, et a parte 
operationis naturalis, et a parte originalis, sive rationis causalis vel seminalis. . . . Quod si 
ponatur facere animam rationalem natura cooperante, hoc est ponere animam rationalem 
habere rationem seminalem, et posse per virtutem naturalem educi de potentia in actum, 
quod est impossibile. Quoniam operatio naturalis est operatio virtutis corporalis quae non 
[potest] attingere [nisi] ad formam corporalem, vel quae extenditur in corpore vel 
dependet a corpore, quod non est intellectus” (bracketed items in orig.);  See Dales, The 
Problem of the Rational Soul, 30-31, 103-104. “The dualism of body and soul was 
maintained by all masters prior to Aquinas, and except for Roland of Cremona, Peter of 
Spain, and Albert the Great, required that the body, as body, had a form of its own. 
Whether this was identified with the sensitive soul (Fishacre, William of Auvergne) or as 
the corporeal form (Alexander of Hales), it comes perilously close to the position of 
Averroes, and even more so when a double vegetative-sensitive soul is admitted, as it was 
by Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and Bonaventure” (ibid., 194, parenthetical items 
in orig.). 
that the human being has a plurality of forms.  According to the view that Pecham 37
advocates, and which his predecessor at Canterbury had advocated, there is a “pluralism 
of vegetative, sensitive, and intellective forms” in the single human being.  As will 38
become clear, Pecham thinks there is also the form of corporeality in addition to the form 
that is the driving force of life. The rational soul is a form which subsists in corporeal 
matter, but does not need such matter in order to live. The intellect does not live in itself 
only by contributing life to something else. In this the intellect is the same as the 
separated substances. Other forms are unlike the rational soul because they receive their 
“foundation of existing” (fundamentum exsistendi) in matter, and thus necessarily 
!168
 Tractatus, 7-8; cf. ibid., Quodlibeta, 256: “Quia licet anima rationalis sit forma 37
immaterialis, tamen complet omnes formas materiales et perficit eas, ut esse et operari 
possint operationes consonas speciei.” Aristotle holds that there is but one substantial 
human form, yet describes in hierarchical terms the soul’s various powers: “The primary 
form of sense is touch, which belongs to all animals. Just as the power of self-nutrition 
can be separated from touch and sensation generally, so touch can be separated from all 
other forms of sense. (By the power of self-nutrition we mean that part of the soul which 
is common to plants and animals: all animals whatsoever are observed to have the sense 
of touch.) What the explanation of these two facts is, we must discuss later. At present we 
must confine ourselves to saying that soul is the source of these phenomena and is 
characterized by them, viz. by the powers of self-nutrition, sensation, thinking, and 
movement. Is each of these a soul or a part of a soul? And if a part, a part merely 
distinguishable by definition or a part distinct in local situation as well? In the case of 
certain of these powers, the answers to these questions are easy, in the case of others we 
are puzzled what to say. Just as in the case of plants which when divided are observed to 
continue to live though separated from one another (thus showing that in their case the 
soul of each individual plant was actually one, potentially many), so we notice a similar 
result in other varieties of soul, i.e. in insects which have been cut in two; each of the 
segments possesses both sensation and local movement; and if sensation, necessarily also 
imagination and appetition; for, where there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain, 
and where these, necessarily also desire” (De Anima, 413b.4-24, parenthetical items in 
orig.). Furthermore, just as Pecham does not make value judgments about the various 
levels in the hierarchy of forms, Aristotle refrains from making value judgments about the 
various levels of powers (De Anima, 413a.21ff). 
 Lewry, “Robert Kilwardby,” 260. 38
contribute life to something else. These forms “die” simultaneously with the body and 
“arise from the principles of the body” (oriuntur a principiis corporis). The only such 
form that does not perish when the body dies is the forma corporeitatis.  Pecham 39
emphasizes that the primary role of the intellectual soul is not to be involved in any 
particular bodily events—although it will be integrally involved in many such events and 
even needs the body to accomplish some of its purposes—but rather to provide the 
“power” that explains any human events whatsoever. 
Pecham groups all of the forms, diverse as they are, into the category of “vital forms.” 
Thus every human form, including the intellect, is ordered to human life and perfection, 
even though the various forms have diverse objects: “Again, since some of the vital 
forms are ordered by the drive of life toward fulfillment, some are ordered to purely 
spiritual fulfillment, some to purely corporeal fulfillment, some to both ways.”  Here, 40
Pecham offers three examples of vital forms: On one extreme, the vegetative soul or form 
tends to perfection by physical multiplication, as Pseudo-Dionysius confirms: Pecham 
takes the Neoplatonic position that the plants have “the farthest resonance of life.”  On 41
the other extreme is what Pecham calls “the first substances,” which are separate from 
matter. (Given that “matter” [materia] refers to corporeal matter, then this statement does 
not represent an exception to the universal hylomorphism that Pecham elsewhere 
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 Divine Names, 856B.41
endorses. ) Pecham does not here identify the first substances as angels here; they do 42
have “the serenity of supernal clarity.” Somewhere between these two extremes is the 
rational soul, which is “marked by the image of God” (insignita Dei imagine). The 
rational soul, or mind, is ordered to the same illuminations as are the “first substances” 
just mentioned. Here is the first appearance of Pecham’s illuminationism. He does not 
spell out a detailed epistemology at this point, but does imply that divine light is involved 
at all levels of life, i.e., all creatures receive the “divine brightness” (divina claritas). The 
mind is “touched on the inside” with this brightness, which is required for any 
knowledge. Insofar as the mind is separated from matter, it is touched in a “prior and 
purer and more efficacious mode” as it perceives illuminations.  Yet because the same 43
soul is also the administrator of the body, there is a lower perceptive mode. 
Pecham sees a reflexive relationship between intellect and body. The soul is “inclined 
to the perfection of the body” (ad perfectionem corporis inclinatur) because the body 
allows for the intellect to be perfected, sanctified, and cleansed. Here, the managerial role 
of the intellect is used to explain how there is a single, unitary human being, and in 
subsequent chapters (three, four, and seven) of the Tractatus the intellect’s involvement 
with the body will exemplify how there can be numerous potencies that are involved in a 
single human function. Thus Pecham’s pluralism is an attempt to broadly explain human 
substance and function. 
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At this point Pecham introduces his view of the sensitive soul’s role in human 
knowledge, which he develops in the next chapter of the Tractatus. He says that the 
sensitive soul is “perfected by corporeal forms received incorporeally.”  He takes this to 44
be the position of Aristotle, who says that “a sense is what has the power of receiving into 
itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in which a piece of wax 
takes on the impress of a signet ring without the iron or gold. . . .”  Here Pecham says 45
that the sensitive soul is ordered strictly to the corporeal good, even though the corporeal 
good can be “lifted to another” level. Pecham takes this also to be the position of 
Aristotle, who says that “what actual sensation apprehends are the individuals, while 
what knowledge apprehends are universals, and these are in a sense within the soul 
itself.”  In other words, the sensitive soul has a purely corporeal operation, the result of 46
which is taken up (in humans) by the higher form, the intellect. The “sensitive 
cognition” (sensitiva cognitio) is an intellectual principle in the sense that the intellect 
lifts it to the higher level.   47
Pecham concludes the second chapter by summarizing what he has said thus far:  48
The first act of life is for a thing to be in force, i.e., to strive toward perfection, or to 
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 Tractatus, 8. Compare this position to Augustine’s, as described by O’Daly: “[S]ense-47
perception is ... a psychological process. There is in fact interaction of body and soul in 
sense-perception. . . . so perception is an activity exercised upon the sensory stimulus 
rather than a passive reception of the latter. . . . The awareness of such activity or motion 
in the soul is precisely the Augustinian definition of perception (Augustine’s Philosophy, 
84, 86). See Augustine, On Music, trans. Robert Catesbury Taliaferro, in The Immortality 
of the Soul. . . ., 4.9-10.  
 Tractatus, 8-9. 48
persist in being what it is. Immediately following  this force is the act of the vital form, 49
which is present in all living things and is still prior to understanding (apprehensione).  50
This distinction is a greater specification than was previously given, and the two 
principles—life and the vital form—are difficult to distinguish. Pecham’s discussion 
lends itself to the conclusion that either principle can be called “life itself.” He reminds 
his readers that man naturally desires to know, i.e., man can desire to understand prior to 
his having understood.  At lower levels of life there is merely the resonance of 51
understanding, by which living things can draw to themselves what is fitting and repel 
other things.  Now it has become clear that Pecham sees life as the primary principle 52
(sometimes he calls it a “form”) of any substance. It is ontologically prior to all forms, 
but it directly gives rise to the vital form or continuous power of perfection. The critical 
point is that life itself precedes the activities of the vegetative, sensitive, and rational 
activities. The force of life, or “life itself,” derived from the original source of all life 
(God), is evidently sui generis.  
Part One. Chapter Three.  
For the topic of the third and fourth chapters of the Tractatus,  Pecham focuses on 53
apprehension, which is an “act of life” and involves the vegetative and sensitive souls.  54
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opposed to a temporal sense.
 Ibid., 8.50
 Ibid., 8-9.51
 I take this to be the meaning of Pecham’s statement that at the stage of apprehension, 52
“est tamen quaedam apprehensionis resonantia, qua convenientiora attrahat et reiciat 
contraria. . . .” (ibid., 9). 
 9-17.53
 Ibid., 9ff. 54
Pecham names apprehension as the first act following the general force of life. Yet, the 
subject matter of chapters three and four includes intellectual knowledge, so Pecham 
thinks of apprehension as encompassing far more than what a person could do during the 
earliest stages of life.  And one can only conclude that Pecham refers here to the active 55
life of a human or another animal, for vegetative souls do not allow the kind of 
apprehension that he discusses.  Pecham’s view of sensible apprehension of external 56
objects appears to be similar to that of Roger Bacon, although Pecham’s position on the 
agent intellect is a little different from that of Bacon.  Bacon had already followed 57
Alhacen in his discussion or “sensory knowledge,” or distinct knowledge of singulars, 
which all animals have. That Pecham is teaching a multiplication of species doctrine like 
that of Bacon is confirmed when Pecham states: “The soul transforms itself into the 
similitude of the thing the species of which is an organ. . . .”  We find further 58
confirmation of Pecham’s view in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences  and in 59
his Perspectiva Communis. Lindberg describes Bacon’s view:  
No longer does ‘species’ apply merely to the perceptual realm; now it denotes the 
likeness of any object, emanating from the object, whether or not a percipient 
being is present to receive it. . . . the species is, of course, the similitude of the 
object from which it emanates, but it is more than that; it is the force or power by 
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 However, Pecham says that vegetables have “a certain resonance of 56
apprehension” (ibid., 9).  
 See Hackett, “Roger Bacon.” 57
 Tractatus, 14: “Anima transformat se in similitudinem rei cuius species est in 58
organo. . . .”; cf. Bacon, Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature.
 Tractatus, 135; cf. Lindberg, “Composition and Influence of the Perspectiva 59
communis,” John Pecham and the Science of Optics, 25ff. 
which any object acts on its surroundings. . . . It is apparent that Bacon attributes 
all natural causation to the multiplication of species.  60
For Bacon, sensory knowledge is caused by the multiplied species acting on the sensory 
organs. And, while Bacon does not provide a theory that accounted for intellectual 
knowledge via intelligible species, he planned to provide such a theory:  
Likewise, if a thing acts on the intellect, it will produce only its species, just as 
when it acts on sense or on its contrary. But how, in general and in particular, 
species are produced in various recipients, both spiritual and corporeal, will be 
revealed below. Here, though, I deal with recipients only from the standpoint of 
the agent producing in them the same first effect, no matter what recipient it acts 
upon.  61
Bacon does not ignore intellectual knowledge in his work, but rather focuses on the 
scientific theory of sensible perception.  And Pecham does not provide a detailed 62
account of intellectual species here, either. Elsewhere Pecham says that, while sensible 
species do not impress on the intellect, the intellect forms similitudes based on the 
similitudes in the senses.   63
Perhaps Pecham thought that Augustine had set the bounds of the discussion of sense 
knowledge when he wrote in The Literal Meaning of Genesis, a book that Pecham quotes 
often and cites here:  
There can, after all, be no bodily vision without the spiritual, seeing that the 
moment contact is made with a body by a sense of the body, some such thing is 
also produced in the spirit, not to be exactly what the body is, but to be like it; and 
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 See Hackett, “Roger Bacon on Animal and Human Knowledge in the Perspectiva: 62
(Opus Maius, Part Five),” Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought, 223-242.
 Quodlibeta, 151: “Dico ad praesens quod impossibile est speciem corporalem 63
imprimere in animam rationalem, sicut Augustinus, VI Musicae. Sed excitatur a sensu et 
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if this were not produced, neither would there be that sensation by which 
extraneous things present are sensed.  64
According to Bacon and Pecham, humans are the only creatures who have intellective 
souls, and the connection between sensory knowledge and intellectual knowledge is 
complex. Pecham’s conviction that the rational soul may in a sense be called the form of 
the body (although obviously not in an Aristotelian sense) is illustrated here by his 
position that the fulfillment of the soul’s natural desire to understand everything is 
partially contingent upon the what is provided by the senses.   65
For any apprehended thing to be intellectually known, it must be assimilated to an 
eternal exemplar.  Thus everything is known by its representation of a higher exemplar, 66
and the highest exemplar exemplifies itself. This activity, which occurs in the context of 
“eternal light,” is the end result of the process begun by apprehension.  The process of 67
intellection involves a “plenitude of eternal and perfect wisdom stretched out in the 
plenitude of knowledge, accompanying its origin.”  Clearly the discussion of the 68
apprehension implicates the senses but also leads directly to a discussion of the sensitive 
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 “Sed causa scientiae est lux aeterna. Nec enim species rerum corporalium animae 67
illabuntur vel animae imprimuntur” (ibid., 10). 
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soul and even the rational soul. Pecham follows the principle that a greater cannot be the 
passive subject of a lesser. In this he claims to follow Aristotle: “[T]he soul is all things in 
a certain way, because sense is all sensible things, the intellect all intelligible things, and 
because the intellect is the species of species, just as the hand is the organ of organs.”   69
The soul has its own part to play, and similitudes may have a source other than the 
sense perception of objects in the world. Pecham says (citing Augustine ) that images of 70
bodies are not the bodies themselves, and the soul cannot be the material subject of the 
body. Taking his cue from Aristotle’s comparison between the soul and the hand, Pecham 
says that the soul is in potency to receive everything. The soul is created “in bareness” (in 
nuditate) and is thus totally assimilable, yet the soul is responsible (vigore ... suo et vi) for 
its own transformation into various similitudes (similitudines) or likenesses. Pecham is at 
once rejecting two views of knowledge: (1) The view of cognition where sense data is 
somehow directly responsible for knowledge without intelligible species or reference to 
the eternal reasons. This can never occur because the mind, in cooperation (of some kind) 
with the eternal reasons, contributes something of itself to the cognition. (2) The view of 
cognition that excludes sense data altogether. Sometimes sense data does provide content 
for similitudes, and yet such should be viewed as only a subordinate contribution to 
cognition. 
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Pecham brings in Aristotle’s illustration of the seal in the wax. Aristotle’s text reads as 
follows: 
Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power 
of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way 
in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or 
gold; what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but not qua 
bronze or gold: in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or 
flavoured or sounding not insofar as each is what it is, but insofar as it is of such 
and such a sort and according to its form.  71
Pecham emphasizes the wax’s potentiality to be formed in the shape of the seal.  The 72
figure on the seal is not changing, whereas the wax does undergo a change. Thus Pecham 
thinks that, properly speaking, the form of the wax is attributable to the wax itself rather 
than to the seal. The illustration about the wax leads Pecham to make three arguments 
about the nature of corporeal species and their relation to knowledge.  
1. The first argument starts with the assumption that the similitudes are active 
accidents that were formerly in potency. If the formal species were put into the soul from 
some perceived object outside the soul, then the species would already be in act. And, 
given Pecham’s assertions about the wax figure, the placing of the species in the soul 
would then be a process whereby an accident would move its subject. Pecham sees such a 
result as impossible, even though his position does not require that the intellect is totally 
responsible for its own knowledge of perceived objects.  
2. Does Pecham’s principle that intelligible species cannot be put into the soul from 
outside (in the first argument just above) have an analogue that applies to corporeal 
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species? Pecham’s second argument seems to present such an analogue: Corporeal things 
are “utterly incomparable” (penitus improportionalis) to spiritual things, and a finite 
power cannot make a spiritual thing from a corporeal thing. But a corporeal species in an 
organ is corporeal and measured by the dimensions of the organ (Pecham takes this to be 
obvious from the fact that everything that is seen is seen from an angle, or from a certain 
perspective). This means that it is impossible for a spiritual species to be made entirely 
from a corporeal species already existing in the soul. This conclusion is also obvious 
from the fact, Pecham says, that an effect cannot be more noble than its cause. Rather, 
“intelligible species is not the light but the illuminable.”  Divine light is thus implicated 73
in the production of intelligible species from corporeal species.  
3. The third argument has to do with the soul’s simplicity and provides further 
information about the illumination to which Pecham refers in the second argument. If 
corporeal species were added to the “material” of the soul, then the soul would no longer 
be simple, and the soul’s understanding would not be due to its own strength, but rather 
the soul would decrease in simplicity. Pecham says that divine light does not destroy the 
soul’s simplicity; it does not produce a mixture when it cooperates with the human soul to 
produce knowledge. 
Pecham now distinguishes between those things that are naturally the subjects of the 
intellect (due to the intellect’s own natural potency) and those things that are not, because 
they exceed the intellect’s natural potency.  In the case of those things that exceed the 74
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intellect’s power, understanding itself descends from the “Father of lights” (patre 
luminum).  Yet the cognition is also said to be caused by a superior power in the 75
intellect. Properly speaking, God is responsible for cognition, but there is activity on the 
side of the human intellect as well. This raises the question of what God contributes in 
human intellection and what man contributes. Pecham will deal with this issue in some 
detail in the next chapter of the Tractatus, but he first mentions his belief that angelic 
intermediaries assist in human knowledge by providing illuminations.  He cites 76
Augustine as an authority for this, which is plausible in light of what Roland J. Teske 
says about Augustine’s view of angels: 
[I]t seems that Augustine at one time early in his career held that there was a soul 
of the world such that the world is an animal. He later regarded the claim that the 
world is an animal as rash, that is, not as false, but as without sufficient 
foundation in either reason or Scripture. But even after he surrendered his 
previous claim that the world is an animal, he still—even to the end of his life—
maintained a single living spiritual power that adorns and administers the world 
under God in angels and holy souls. That is, he maintained to the end a living 
spiritual power that is both one and many, a spiritual creature with which 
individual souls and angels are one.  77
What exactly does Pecham think that angels do for us as we come to know? The angels 
do not impart their own knowledge to the knower, but rather the angels provide 
“excitations of the souls so that they are turned to the divine ray.”  An angel removes 78
impediments to cognition, orders the phantasms, and serves as a channel through which 
the divine light can shine. Pecham adds another metaphor: “[J]ust as the person has who 
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opens the window of the house to the illumination of the sun.”  Such metaphors add 79
little detail to our understanding of the process. Perhaps Pecham considers the operation 
of angelic intermediaries to be an unavoidably nebulous topic.   80
Part One. Chapter Four.  
The fourth chapter continues the discussion of apprehension by considering how the 
soul transforms itself into the similitudes of things, and the method is largely a response 
to challenges concerning the soul’s understanding in the next life.  As vision and light 81
have previously served as literal and metaphorical bases for Pecham’s discussions about 
perception and understanding, vision is again the topic here. The visive power and the 
eye constitute one “essence and potency of seeing.”  The visive power is the perfection 82
of the eye, just as the whole soul is the perfection of the whole body. This is a key 
principle for understanding Pecham’s natural teleology. Prior to seeing anything the eye 
is uncolored or “in a certain middle and indifference to all colors and visible 
intentions,”  which means that it is capable of perceiving all colors. 83
In the act of seeing, the soul is equally involved as the eye is. Pecham says that when 
Aristotle says “Sense is in potency to all sensibles,”  that such potency refers not just to 84
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bodily passion, but to bodily compassion. That is, sensation is an act of the soul in 
conjunction with the sensory apparatus. Pecham reminds his readers of the general 
principle that the soul is united to the body by the soul’s desire to govern the body, citing 
the authority of Avicenna.  Pecham cites Augustine as saying that the addition of one 85
star in the celestial orbit would require the labor of the Mover of the world,  suggesting 86
that the soul as the mover of the body is necessarily aware of bodily involvement in the 
acquisition of sensory knowledge. Indeed, it is by both cognition and movement that the 
soul/body relationship is explained, or at least exemplified.  
Pecham next deals with a possible objection to the theory of knowledge by 
similitudes.  The objection says that if we suppose that the soul transforms itself into the 87
similitude of a species of a thing in order to produce knowledge, then we must ask 
whether the potential knower already had knowledge of the thing.  If he already had 88
knowledge, then he would not need a similitude, and if he did not have previous 
knowledge of the thing, it would only be by accident that he would make the connection 
between the similitude and the object that is to be known. Pecham responds to this 
argument by saying that the non-knower’s first acquisition of knowledge is either the 
mind noticing something that is stored in the memory or is from divine light. Although 
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this does not prevent the knower from learning something that seems new to the knower, 
there is never a time when knowledge is produced from no previous knowledge 
whatsoever, since there is a previous a priori knowledge in either the mind of the knower 
or in the mind of God.  
Recall that, in the first chapter of the Tractatus, Pecham affirms that “all men desire 
to know.”  Does Pecham believe in innate human knowledge or not? He clearly does in 89
some sense, but does not explain in detail. Perhaps he takes himself to have already dealt 
with this issue in the Quaestiones De Anima, where he connects the formal and efficient 
causality of divine illumination with human cognition.  However, here Pecham focuses 90
on the naturalistic aspect of coming to know. What Pecham says here does not commit 
him to the view that man has innate knowledge prior to the contribution of knowledge 
from God’s mind. Furthermore, Pecham’s position in the first chapter could be read as 
meaning that desire usually precedes knowledge. Pecham denies that knowledge can be 
acquired by chance as the objection stated, because understanding occurs only when the 
intention of the soul is “moving around the cognition” (circa cognitionem satagentis).  91
This is the transformation of the soul into the similitude, or what Pecham calls the natural 
collection of the intellect to what is unchanged. The objector has evidently misunderstood 
the role of the similitudes—they are not pictures that may or may not conform to reality 
outside the mind (such that the knower would have to assess the conformity), but rather 
the abstraction of some data from the corporeal species.  
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Cognition is, for Pecham, evidence of how closely the soul and body are related to 
one another:  
Nor is it surprising if the body and soul are joined together, since they seem to go 
together better than the incidental and reflected angle, which always are equal. 
Whence when a ray is falling on the smooth body, while the body is moved and 
the incidental angle itself is varied to a greater or lesser degree, it is necessary that 
the reflected angle vary or change.  92
Pecham says that he learned his view from “the Saints” (sanctis, learned doctors of the 
church) and “Philosophers,” all of whom he takes to be in agreement: Augustine, 
Boethius, and Aristotle.  Pecham urges his readers not to take his views to the unlearned, 93
because they will ridicule his position. 
 Pecham now responds to the objection drawn from the idea that the separated soul 
cognizes solely by immediate divine illumination “in the higher world” (in mundo 
superiori).  Some have claimed, Pecham says, that the human intellect is the last in a 94
chain of radiated intelligences,  and the separated soul receives its understanding from a 95
higher intelligence and therefore needs no senses. This amounts to a challenge to 
Pecham’s emphasis on the integral role of the sensitive soul in the production of human 
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knowledge, and thus to his emphasis on body/soul unity. Pecham objects to this view, 
because it makes the soul rely totally on other intelligences for natural knowledge.  On 96
the other hand, others have said that the separated soul takes with it its sensitive powers, 
or that the sensitive powers are conjoined to the separated soul by reason.  Pecham 97
acknowledges that a statement of Augustine’s could be cited in favor of this view: “For 
the body does not sense but the soul through the body, which it uses as an instrument to 
forming in itself what rests on the exterior.”  Furthermore, a statement of Aristotle’s to 98
the effect that sense is a “movement of the soul through the body” might concord with the 
objection.  Those who make this objection say that the soul, when conjoined to the 99
corporeal body, senses only by bodily mediation.  Pecham’s response includes the 100
following four points:  101
• The separated soul does not need bodily mediation or a medium in order to gain 
knowledge from the senses, as the soul does when it is conjoined to the body. 
• The pseudo-Augustinian book De Spiritu et Anima (by Alcher of Clairvaux) says 
that “the soul takes along with it the imaginative, concupiscible, and irascible” 
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aspects.  And, the imaginative power is identified with the sensitive power 102
(Pecham will discuss the imagination in chapter 10). Therefore the separated soul 
itself can sense, but not through bodily mediation.  
• Some have tried to compromise by saying that the separated soul takes with it the 
intellect without the sensitive potencies, but that the intellect is still able to cognize 
all particulars.  This cannot be right, for the act of understanding is the act of the 103
intellect conjoined to the phantasms just as the eye joins itself to colors. The 
intellect requires phantasms, but this does not mean that the only source for the 
phantasms is corporeal vision. A sensitive potency is not equivalent to the operation 
of a corporeal sense organ. 
• The separated soul can cognize through its own visive power without the corporeal 
species that are necessary for vision by the corporeal body, and can transform itself 
into similitudes.   104
Here, Pecham does not describe in detail how the separated soul’s sensation works. 
Pecham does, however, respond to the view that the species that emanate from the objects 
do not represent the object’s accidental qualities, but rather its substance.  The separated 105
soul receives this special kind of species. Pecham tentatively disagrees, saying that the 
separated soul cognizes not only the quiddities of things, but also the same quantities and 
qualities which sense discerns.   106
Someone might respond that species may represent the essences of the accidents 
themselves. Pecham’s solution is that anything the intellect receives is received through 
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the mode of the receiver.  Thus Pecham concludes that the separated soul requires for 107
cognition the excitation of some sensory capacity by species, albeit incorporeal. 
Furthermore, this process occurs as the soul occupies a place in a spiritual way so that no 
other spirit can be in that place.  
There is yet another opinion to which Pecham thinks he must respond. Some have 
minimized the role of sensation by eliminating the need for corporeal species in the 
following way: they say that a spirit is in a place only in the sense that it is operating, but 
not according to a quantity of dimension.  Pecham sees this view as presenting an 108
ontological difficulty.  A thing must be in a place before it can operate in a place; in the 109
present world at least, the intellect can receive species and thus transform itself into 
!186
 Cf. The Book of Causes: “Therefore, the effect is in the cause after the mode of the 107
cause, and the cause is in the effect after the mode of the effect. . . .” (30). 
 Roger Bacon, for example, takes the position that the soul is literally nowhere, even 108
though it is operating (see R. James Long, “Roger Bacon on the Nature and Place of 
Angels,” Vivarium 35, no. 2 (1997): 271-277). Another example is Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologiae, 1.52.1; cf. John Damascene, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, trans. 
E.W. Watson and L. Pullan, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series 9, ed. Philip 
Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1899), 2.3; Bonaventure, 
Commentary on the Sentences (Florence: Quaracchi, 1882-1902), 1.37.3.ad.2. This 
position was condemned in 1277: “52A. That the separated substances, in so far as they 
have a single appetite, do not change in their operation. 53A. That an intelligence or an 
angel or a separated soul is nowhere. 54A. That the separated substances are nowhere 
according to their substance.—This is erroneous if so understood as to mean that 
substance is not in a place. If, however, it is so understood as to mean that substance is 
the reason for being in a place, it is true that they are nowhere according to their 
substance. 55A. That the separated substances are somewhere by their operation, and that 
they cannot move from one extreme to another or to the middle except in so far as they 
can will to operate either in the middle or in the extremes.—This is erroneous if so 
understood as to mean that without operation a substance is not in a place and that it does 
not pass from one place to another” (“The Condemnation of 1277,” Philosophy in the 
Middle Ages, 587). 
 Tractatus, 16-17. 109
similitudes only by “communicating itself to place by altering the species of corporeal 
things”.  Pecham finishes the fourth chapter by reminding his readers that when the soul 110
is separated from its earthly body, it will be more “free” to cognize than when it is 
conjoined to the corporeal. This is because the corporeal body brings with it corruption 
that aggravates the soul.  The separated sensitive soul, embodied differently after this 111
life (particularly with some new kind of visive power) is not so obstructed. Pecham will 
discuss the glorified body further in the eighth chapter. 
Part One. Chapter Five.  
The fifth chapter is Pecham’s discussion about intellectual cognition through 
illumination.  Pecham begins by identifying his view with that of Augustine, rather than 112
with Aquinas, Bonaventure, and others who espouse the view that the separated soul 
occupies a place only by operating. The major premise of what Pecham takes to be the 
relevant portion of Augustine’s position is: “[E]verything which we understand we 
cognize through eternal light and in it. In it we cognize the scientific principles, in it we 
see the things which are deduced after the principles from the principles.”  Divine light 113
is therefore associated with fundamental principles that allow for scientific knowledge. 
Pecham offers to clarify this by comparing cognition to vision. Perceptual vision is a 
model for intellectual cognition.  
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A number of things are required for corporeal vision: “Transparency in the eye, 
brightness of the natural eye, and the light of the sun shining on the eye, medium, and 
object, positing the visible species in the act of multiplication.”  Pecham explains why 114
each of the first three items is necessary.  Transparancy is necessary because without it, 115
the eye could not receive the species. The brightness of the natural eye is necessary 
because, as Aristotle has said, that the eye is not only passive but also “acts in a splendid 
manner” (agit quemadmodum splendida).  Pecham illustrates the necessity of the eye’s 116
activity by noticing that a person’s “prominent” or stronger eye sees poorly at long 
distance, whereas a person’s “dense” (profundus) or weaker eye sees well from long 
distance.  If the eyes were inactive in receiving the species, it would not matter which 117
eye is stronger or weaker; the species would all be received just the same so long as there 
was an eye there to receive at all. Furthermore, vision is undivided because the two eyes 
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assist one another. Pecham says there is no difference between saying that the eye sees 
and saying that vision goes out to the thing seen.  118
Pecham has here indicated that his position on vision is a blend of the intromission 
and extramission theories of vision. Now he notes that there is division between those 
who subscribe to the intromission theory and those who subscribe to extramission. 
According to Pecham, Plato—against Aristotle—posited the extramission theory, as did 
the authors of the books on vision (presumably Al-Kindi ). The philosophantes are 119
confused about the subject, evidently not understanding that prominent authorities 
believed with Pecham that intromission plays an important role. It has been said that 
“rays spring forth from the eye” and fall on the visible things.  The rays are “dipped and 120
dashed on the visible form,” “soak” the visible form, and then are reflected to the eye 
from the visible thing.  Pecham holds that the model as stated is false. 121
Pecham briefly presents his own theory of vision, which is, like that of Bacon, a blend 
of the intromission and extramission theories, and in which he uses the word 
“rays” (radii) as synonymous with species.  Rays, or the species of the visible forms, 122
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come to the eye but are not automatically proportional to the eye. Rather, the species 
must be “tempered to the eye by the connatural light of the eye.”  How does the eye’s 123
intervention work? Pecham explains that the eye does indeed send out rays and that these 
rays observe visible species, but do not take hold of and saturate them as the previous 
philosophers had said.  This is clear because rays emitted by different species of 124
animals have different levels of potency. Some animals do not need sunlight in order to 
see (lion, snake, cat), even though all animals need the general celestial power working 
on the elements. Human vision is no different in requiring “superior 
illumination” (superiore illustratione). Pecham thinks that his account, by incorporating 
intromission, explains how species can transcend the faculty of the eye, as when light is 
too bright. In cases where the eyes are overwhelmed “the visible species transcends the 
faculty of the eye.”   125
Having explained something of his theory of vision, Pecham is now in a position to 
discuss the comparison between corporeal vision and intellection.  The intellective soul 126
has “so to speak a transparency of the mind as possibility, which is transformable to the 
similitudes or differences of all forms, and this power, just as I believe, is called the 
possible intellect. . . .”  The intellect also has an active power which produces the 127
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similitudes by virtue of the superior light, the divine illumination in which everything is 
known. In making contact with the divine light the active intellect contacts the “reason of 
seeing” (rationem videndi) which is apart from what can be found in the object. Pecham 
does not develop the theory of divine reasons here. However there is a tradition of divine 
reasons, inspired by Augustine and adapted by Bonaventure, and given what Pecham has 
already said about exemplars in the present work, we may assume that Pecham has this 
tradition in mind.  If this assumption is correct, we may say that, generally speaking, 128
Pecham thinks knowledge occurs by comprehending things in light of their ultimate 
explanations, which are available only in God. Pecham says elsewhere that man has 
access to the divine reasons by virtue of innate, noncomplex “first impressions,” which 
are principles such as “being” and “good,” i.e., transcendentals.   129
Pecham goes into some detail about how the intellect is “completed” through the 
divine light.  He offers the example that the human soul intuitively understands that the 130
whole is greater than its parts, but that when the soul has an image of a whole, it does not 
also have an image of all of the parts and therefore lacks understanding of all of the 
relevant reasons. Thus the soul “never has in itself in actuality the reason of the whole 
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and of the part simultaneously.”  Yet the soul’s knowledge that the whole is greater than 131
its parts is precisely what allows the soul to understand that the eternal light is necessary 
for true understanding:  
Thus the soul, running to and fro through portrayed species according to its 
highest end, touches the reasons of the same parts in eternal light and there 
discerns the unchanging truth of the utterable and from there drinks up the truth, 
just as Augustine says. . . .  132
Pecham says that the agent intellect is responsible for accessing the eternal reasons. 
Given that Pecham has just mentioned the human possible intellect, there is no reason to 
presuppose that the agent intellect here, in the human person, must refer to God or some 
intelligence higher than man. Yet Pecham cites Aristotle and Avicenna here in order to 
reference a higher intelligence as the agent intellect which radiates onto the human 
intellect: Aristotle says the agent intellect can understand all things at once, and 
“Avicenna says that to understand is in us, through this which intelligible forms radiate 
on our intellect from the agent intellect.”  Pecham clarifies his position immediately by 133
stating that there is both a created agent intellect an an uncreated agent intellect.  The 134
divine agent intellect provides the illumination discussed above, whereas the human 
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Avicenna, De Anima, 5.5; Aristotle, De Anima, 430a.10-18.
 He says that he is reiterating (Duplicem ... pono) something that he already said about 134
this, but there is no prior statement on the issue in the Tractatus. Pecham does state his 
position on the twofold agent intellect elsewhere (Quaestiones, 343, 403, 415). 
agent intellect abstracts species from the phantasms and unites with the human possible 
intellect, which is activated or excited by the phantasms and is “multiply 
assimilable” (multipliciter assimilabilis). Action and passion must both be involved in 
cognition at the level of the individual human being. The memory is also included as an 
active and passive power.   135
Pecham says that he has explained further how everything is seen in the divine light 
in his Quaestiones on Peter Lombard’s Sentences.  In a passage from that text, Pecham 136
asks two questions. The first is “Whether God is the reason of cognizing everything 
cognized by the intellect with certitude.”  Pecham’s answer to the first question is 137
summarized: “the created habitus does not suffice to illustrate the soul, without the 
flowing in of the uncreated light.”  The second question is: “Whether everything false is 138
cognized in eternal light through itself.”  Pecham’s answer to the second is: “[A 139
knower] would not see the falsity of the cognition unless in these reasons, by which all 
things are made.”  It is not that the divine light conveys false information, but that all 140
cognition (even if it results in a false judgment) requires divine illumination to begin 
with.  And, only divine light makes it possible to recognize falsity. 141
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 Ibid., 136: “Praeterea, habitus creatus non sufficit animae illustrandae, nisi luce 138
increata superinfluente.”
 Ibid., 134: “Iuxta hoc quaeritur utrum omne falsum cognoscatur in luce aeterna vel per 139
ipsam”.  
 Ibid., 135 (bracketed item added): “Non enim cognitione videret esse faciendum nisi 140
in iis rationibus, quibus facta sunt omnia”; cf. Augustine, On Free Choice, 3.5.13.  
 See ibid., 136-136.141
Before concluding chapter five, Pecham summarizes the discussion of intellection to 
this point.  The summary includes the following major points: 142
• To understand is to discern the habitudes (habitudines) of things in the 
reflection of eternal light.   143
• To judge is to examine what is understood with reference to the eternal reasons. 
• The memory is the repository of knowledge.  
In this summary Pecham also adds details about memory. It is a two-fold act: (1) The 
treasury of intelligence, which is to hold the things pertaining to knowledge; (2) The 
representation of the treasury’s content to the intellect. There is also a difference between 
intellectual and sensible memory (Pecham will elaborate on this difference in chapter 10). 
In one way knowledge is temporally prior to memory, but in memory’s proper use it runs 
ahead of knowledge and memory is the “parent” (parens) of the intellect.  This would 144
seem to refer to God as the source of some of the memory’s contents.   145
Part One. Chapter Six.  
The sixth chapter is nominally Pecham’s discussion of the quiddity of love, but it also 
includes a discussion of the passions generally, and concludes the longer section on “the 
acts of the soul and the cognitive and affective motions.”  Love troubles the soul when 146
the beloved is absent, and refreshes the soul and is at rest when the beloved is present.  147
Pecham interprets a statement from Augustine as meaning that love is a kind of life that 
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 I take the eternal light here to refer to the eternal reasons, per Pecham’s discussion 143
above (ibid., chapters three and five).
 Tractatus, 21. 144
 Cf. Augustine, Confessions, 10.10.17ff. 145
 Tractatus, 24. 146
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occurs when two come together in the context of desiring one another.  Pecham takes 148
literally the principle that “love is life and life coming together”  by applying it to the 149
vital movement or appetite by which a living thing seeks a complement. Thus love is 
involved at the foundational level of formed life, as discussed earlier in the Tractatus.  150
Love is not per se the appetite to know, even though cognition can determine the object 
of desire and thus make the appetite inclined more efficaciously to its object. Pecham 
says that this point is not merely the result of abstract reasoning about love and the 
beloved, but is also prompted by phenomenological observation: “So indeed it is the 
desire that afflicts if the desired thing is moved away; it loves too much if it is shown as 
desired.”  It is also separate from the process of cognition as described in the context of 151
intelligible and corporeal species. It is clear that love can be included in the process of 
intellection only as the motivation of the process. It is through the life of the soul that 
desire is “specified” (specificatur)  and it is by desire that cognition is “drawn together, ... 
fortified, and quieted.”  On this view, love can be called the unitive, transformative, and 152
assimilative power.   153
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Names, chapter 4) in connection with this principle.
 Pecham’s view of love as permeating living this is reflective of Pseudo-Dionysius (see 150
Eric D. Perl, “Pseudo-Dionysius,” A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 
542-544).  
 Tractatus, 22: “Sic quidem est desiderium quod affligit si differtur quod desideratur, 151
delectat nimis si desiderate exhibetur.” For confirmation on this point, Pecham cites 
Augustine: “The appetite of seeking is made the love of enjoying” (cf. Augustine, On the 
Trinity, 15.26.47). 
 Tractatus, 22: “... contrahitur, fortificatur et quietatur.” 152
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Having defined love, Pecham now moves to a problem associated with human desire. 
Love does not automatically rest as it should, but rather the soul can be “hurt,” “as if 
weakened,” and “moved by loving.”  Corruption and aggravation result from corporeal 154
embodiment, thus human love is imperfect.  The divine love that rests in man must be 155
purged by connection with the rule of love, i.e., the rule of the Holy Spirit. Pecham says 
that a human may love in accord with this rule and thus have what Pecham calls the 
disposition and inhering form of divine love.  The framework of species multiplication 156
comes up again in the discussion of this habitus of love: “And by how much the power of 
love is stronger, the passion of love is so much more intense and by the multiplication of 
the act of love on the beloved, a disposition of love is established and from the multiplied 
passion the affect of love is born, which is the ground of all affections.”  This is why, 157
according to Pecham, “Augustine says: affections are good if the love is good, bad if the 
love is bad.”  On Augustine’s view, which Pecham seems to be adopting here, good 158
love refers to the love of a worthy object, and bad love to the love of an unworthy 
object.  159
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 Ibid.: “Et quanto vis amoris est fortior, tanto et passio amoris intensior et 157
multiplicatione actuum amoris super amatum, amoris habitus firmatur et ex passione 
multiplicata affectio amoris nascitur, quae radix est omnium affectionum.”
 Ibid.: “... dicit Augustinus: bonae sunt affectiones si bonus est amor, malae si malus 158
est amor.”
 City of God, 14.7.159
Pecham now specifies his discussion of love by considering the four particular human 
passions: joy, hope, fear, and pain.  Each relates to love in a different way. Pain occurs 160
when love is offended, and pain is greater according to how intensely the absent object of 
love is desired.  Joy occurs when love is at rest because the beloved has been obtained. 161
Hope and fear both relate to the future. Hope “opens wide to obtain what it expects” (and 
presumably desires) whereas fear “mistrusts to let go” of the beloved.  “[W]e advance 162
when we desire or hope, we flee when we fear.”  Pecham offers examples: There is a 163
certain diffusion of the soul when rejoicing occurs, a diffusion which Pecham calls 
exultation (laetitia) as well as joy (gaudium). Pecham thinks that the passions are alike in 
humans and animals. The difference in the human being is that the rational soul rules the 
passions, in a better or worse way depending on how much the rational soul abounds in 
virtues.  164
Pecham says that the philosophantes have erred by saying that the passions are to be 
ascribed only to the sensitive soul, but in reality the passions relate in some way to the 
intellect as well.  Pecham sees the passions as gifts from God and as necessary to carry 165
out righteous acts rather than as seductions to sin.  Passion that obeys the intellect 166
!197
 Tractatus, 23-24. 160
 Ibid., 23. 161
 Ibid.: “Spes enim inhiat obtinere quod expectatur, timor amittere suspicatur.” 162
 Ibid.: “ ... progredimur cum appetimus vel speramus, fugimus cum timemus.” 163
 Ibid., 24. 164
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allows a person to choose rightly even when difficult consequences accompany the 
choice. Thus, the martyrs had not only “love regulating choice,” but also the “intoxicating 
love of affections.”  On this view love is not, properly speaking, one of a plurality 167
passions, but it is the main factor determining which action will be chosen, and it is 
conditioned by an interrelation of belief and feeling. Pecham explains that love is in the 
rational part of the soul, whereas in the irrational part of the soul the passions reside 
alongside concupiscence (concupiscentia), which is similar to love in that it involves 
desire. 
Part One. Chapter Seven.  
Pecham has already said that the soul is troubled by embodiment, and chapter seven 
develops this theme.  The chapter also discusses more broadly the relationship between 168
soul and body.   169
The intellect is made for contemplation and needs the body not for its operation, but 
for assistance in acquiring some material for thought and then using it (presumably also 
putting the material to practical use in the corporeal world). The intellect needs the body 
only in the sense that a sailor needs a ship only until he is brought to port.  Specifically, 170
reason needs the help of the phantasms in order to reach the intelligibles, just as a set of 
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G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve, 487e-489a).
equal lines that reach from inside a circle to its circumference require the center of a 
circle as a starting point.   171
However, even when the intellect has its knowledge, it is still entangled 
(praepediuntur) due to the ineptitude of the body, and this restricts (although it does not 
eliminate) a person’s freedom of choice. Pecham says that Avicenna is correct in saying 
that this restriction occurs because one power impedes another and all of these powers are 
part of the same essence.  The most obvious example of this is when a person gets tired 172
of contemplation and must rest.  During sleep the natural operations of the body are the 173
strongest, and the intellect is at its weakest, although the intellect’s operations are not 
fully obstructed (some people seem to think logically when asleep). Still, Pecham says 
that sleep impedes cognition and abstraction, for something must be cognized before it 
can be loved. That is, because a person’s affections are not necessarily the same in sleep 
as they are in wakefulness, we can trust that the person’s normal cognitive activity has 
been interrupted. Citing Avicenna, Pecham observes that changes in the various humors 
can affect the “spirits” (spiritus) or “vehicles of animal powers” (vehicula virtutum 
animalium), and thus problems with principal organs can negatively affect intellectual 
powers, even to the point of madness.   174
The spirits are critical to Pecham’s understanding of the soul’s coming together with 
the body. Pecham argues that because the rational soul is united not to every kind of 
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“dispositions” (Tractatus, 27). 
body, but only to the human body, the body must have a subsisting, mediating 
disposition.  This spiritual disposition Pecham calls the most noble of all the bodily 175
spirits. This disposition itself is not intellectual, but ministers to the intellect’s operation; 
the spirits are not vehicles of intelligence, but rather a compartmentalization 
(comportionatum) of the body. By positing this kind of connection between the soul and 
body, Pecham does not take himself to be ruling out purely supernatural knowledge.  176
The source of such knowledge is not the individual knower’s active intellect or senses, 
but rather an impression(s) from the superior divine mind onto the inferior mind.  This 177
distinction is the first aspect of Pecham’s account of revelations in dreams. The second 
aspect is God’s inspiration through both the respiration of the knower and the provision 
of phantasms via the angelic ministry.  This inspiration occurs most frequently in those 178
who are mad and near death, because the souls of such people are freer from the 
restrictions of the body and may even be pulling away from the body.  As a general 179
rule, the more the senses are obscured, the more likely it is that a person will receive an 
impression from above.  
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influentiae per aversionem a sensibus, et hoc vel per alienationem factam ab aliquo 
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Super Genesim, cap. 5”; Etzkorn, “Franciscan Quodlibeta,” 140. 
Pecham concludes the first part of the Tractatus by saying that his positions have 
been taken without any prejudice based on the opinions of someone more prestigious 
than himself. 
Part Two. Chapter Eight.  
The second part of the Tractatus deals with the powers of the soul. What is the 
difference between the “powers” of the soul and what Pecham calls the “operations” of 
the soul (the topic of the first part of the Tractatus)? The two words are misleading labels 
for Pecham’s structure. Pecham’s discussion of the operations of the soul concerns the 
broad discussion of the soul’s definition, its relationship to God and to the sensible world, 
as well as its potencies. However, the discussion of the soul’s powers is a narrower 
discussion of the various aspects of its potencies and how they are activated.  
Pecham begins the second part, in chapter eight, by discussing the soul’s power 
broadly.  The soul cannot be measured as if it were some quantity in mass.  Rather the 180 181
soul is incorporeal, a simple essence which has a quantity only potentially.  This 182
explains how the soul takes on incorporeal things and corporeal things incorporeally.  183
Pecham’s example here is the line: When a line is drawn onto paper, it has width and is 
not perfectly straight. However, when the line is represented in the soul, it is perfectly 
straight and need not have width. The soul can receive “spiritual things in a spiritual 
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mode and things made in matter are true in the soul.”  The intellect “abstracts its 184
intelligible from measurement and position,”  since nothing that exists in a body lacks 185
dimension and situation.  The soul has no physical parts, but it has what Pecham calls 186
virtual parts, or parts in principle.  Pecham uses the idea of virtual parts to explain how 187
a single soul can communicate itself as the whole soul to any part of the body and perfect 
the various potencies that are associated with the diverse organs.  
Pecham says that this has been difficult for some to understand, because they take the 
soul’s simplicity to indicate a very small point or dot. Such a point, however, could not be 
communicated to the whole quantity of the body. Intellectual simplicity is not spatial 
smallness, but rather a communicable unity. The soul is one kind of thing wherever it is, 
unlike corporeal bodies, which are heterogenous.  188
The soul is essentially in the whole body, but the various potencies of the soul are the 
perfections of the body’s diverse organs.  Perfection (perfectio) refers to the fulfillment 189
of the organs’ potencies (potentiarum). For example, the human soul is the perfection of 
the eye insofar as it brings together species, making possible the visive power. The same 
essence that provides for the fulfillment of the eye’s function also provides for the 
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the glorified body (cf. Augustine, Magnitude of the Soul, 15.25-16.28; Immortality of the 
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fulfillment of the ear’s and nose’s functions, providing the visive, auditive, and olfactory 
potencies to the correct organs. Pecham responds to the materialists’ objection that the 
organs contain within themselves the various potencies by saying that the intellectual 
powers “are streamed in by no organ” (nulli organo influuntur).  On this point he cites 190
Aristotle, crediting him with the view that the intellect is not part of any act of the 
body.  Pecham’s view of the intellect applies to all of the soul’s powers: “all powers, 191
which are under the intellect, are applied by the organs.  192
Pecham notes Augustine’s view of the glorified body, which might imply that there is 
a problem for Pecham’s view of the soul’s relation to the various physical organs:  One 193
might suppose that just as the head is different from the foot, so it has a different 
immortality from that of the foot.  This would contradict the view that Pecham 194
endorsed in chapter four of the Tractatus. Pecham responds by saying that immortality 
“has intension with extension.”  I take this to mean that immortality can subsist in a 195
physical, extensive body, and also in an incorporeal, intensive body. This allows the soul, 
no matter what body in which it resides, to be one and the same in the whole and in the 
parts of that body, whether corporeal or glorified.  
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Part Two. Chapter Nine. 
The ninth chapter begins the discussion of the makeup of the soul in terms of its 
potencies, and provides a breakdown of the nutritive potency.   196
As already mentioned, there are three primary divisions of the soul: vegetative, 
sensitive, and intellective.  Some ensouled beings only have the vegetative aspect of 197
soul, and some have more. The human being has presented a special problem for 
philosophers, some of whom—most of all the philosophantes—have said that the human 
has three substances (the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective) that make up one soul, 
just as matter and form are different natures that make up one substance.  This is similar 198
to how some people say that lights in the medium are plural, but that there is only one act 
of the medium. Pecham observes Aristotle’s statement to the effect that “only the intellect 
enters from outside,” and that the theologians agree with this.  In this connection, 199
Pecham says that it seems that the fetus is an animal prior to being a man.  Pecham says 200
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that a particular law  about accidental abortion can only apply to those fetuses that are 201
“formed.” 
Others have taken the position that the rational soul, although created by God, 
includes within itself the three potencies and that these potencies are not themselves 
substances.  The principle that might support this view is that whatever a lower power 202
can do a higher power can also do, but not the other way around. Indeed, animals have 
sensitivity and also have the power of vegetation. Pecham says that the views of the 
“doctors and theologians” are more in line with this account than the view according to 
which the human being is a structure of three substances. While Pecham takes clearly 
takes the pluralist position with regard to the substantial plurality of forms elsewhere, 
even allowing them to be called substances,  he does not argue for that position at this 203
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juncture.  (I will discuss Pecham’s usage of substantia in the sixth chapter of the 204
present study.) 
Pecham says that his own view of the vegetative soul agrees with Aristotle and 
Avicenna who say that within the vegetative aspect of the soul there are various powers: 
nutritive, augmentative, and generative.  In support of each of these powers are various 205
“subministers” (subministrantes) or sub-powers. First Pecham discusses the nutritive 
power, which generates nourishment in the body perpetually and provides for bodily 
warmth. In this way the nutritive power is a condition for the augmentative and 
generative powers. The ministers for the nutritive power are the expulsive, retentive, 
digestive, and attractive. Pecham does not describe in detail what these ministers do, but 
he does note that doctors say that these powers thrive in the stomach. 
The augmentative power is responsible for physical growth, taking the nutrition that 
has been generated and applying it to other parts of the body. The ministers for the 
augmentative power are the extensive, unitive, and ablative. The extensive extends the 
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parts of the body “according to the aptitude of augmentation” (secundum aptitudinem 
augmentati). The unitive organizes what the nutritive power has generated. The unitive 
governs the growth according to the perfections of quantity that apply to the individual. 
Pecham claims Augustine as an authority on this point, saying that when infants are born 
they are already either short or long, but some body parts that are short will be long and 
vice versa.  The ablative power governs the moving of nutriment from one part of the 206
body to the part that needs it. This explains why the proportions between the sizes of the 
various body parts do not remain the same throughout life.  
The generative power “overflows in the individual” and through reproduction is 
responsible for the conservation of the species.  Pecham calls the ministers for the 207
generative power the decisive and informative, but does not describe their roles. He 
concludes the ninth chapter by observing that the sub-powers are not typically considered 
to be diverse powers, but rather diverse duties of the multi-faceted instruments involved 
in the nutritive, augmentative, and generative powers, i.e., we tend to associate human 
potencies with the parts of the body through which the potencies are exercised.   208
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Part Two. Chapter Ten. 
The 10th chapter treats the sensitive soul in greater detail.  There are two parts, the 209
motive and apprehensive, and each part has two “differentia”: the aspects that govern 
motion and those that produce motion.  The concupiscible and the irascible aspects 210
govern motion. If an apprehended thing is agreeable (conveniens), the concupiscible 
impels a person to draw near to the thing, but if the apprehended thing is disagreeable 
(disconveniens), the irascible repels the person from the thing. 
Pecham takes the sensitive soul’s involvement in pain as an example, albeit a difficult 
one. The motive power causes the contraction and relaxation of ligaments. (Some have 
associated the motive power with the vegetative, but Avicenna numbers it among the 
sensitive powers, and so Pecham does as well. ) The soul senses the body’s pain even 211
though the soul requires “sensing matter.”  This is obvious to Pecham because he takes 212
it that Augustine has defined pain as not inherently an efficient motion, but rather 
something that is perceived.  Pecham cites Avicenna as saying that perception of pains 213
pertains to the sense of touch.  However, Augustine says that apprehension alone is not 214
pain, but rather the undoing of a good disposition of the body, to which the “ruling 
motive power” of the body must attend.  The irascible and concupiscible are not only in 215
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 Augustine argues that the soul must be an efficient mover in order to avoid infinite 215
regress in an account of the human being (Immortality of the Soul, chapter 3). 
the sensitive soul, but also pertain to the intellect (as the saints say), and are not corporeal 
at all.   216
The apprehensive powers can be divided into those that apprehend externally and 
those that apprehend internally. Pecham discusses the external apprehensive powers first. 
They are the five senses with which we today are most familiar: vision, hearing, taste, 
smell, and touch. Pecham points to Augustine’s explanation of how each of the senses 
flourishes in a different kind of medium.  This diversity fits the diversity of organs. Fire 217
is the exception, because fire penetrates all mediums. The movement of all senses begins, 
in a sense, with fire:  
In vision it reaches to its light through repressed color; in hearing it penetrates to 
the purer, airy, strength and heat of fire; in smell it traverses the pure air and 
comes through to the exhalation that is to be had; but in taste, going through, it 
comes to the more corpulent humor and further on in earthly gravity, to the final 
advance.   218
All these, Pecham says, are the opinions of Augustine. Touch is unique in that it can sense 
the objects of other senses, i.e., it can discern between hot and cold, humid and dry, hard 
and soft, rough and smooth.  Pecham notes Avicenna’s view that touch is the only sense 219
“of general variety” (varietate generis).  220
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Now Pecham turns to the internal apprehensive powers, following Avicenna in 
numbering these powers as five and in describing them.  Each of the first three are is 221
called imagination under a distinct aspect. First, Pecham discusses what he calls 
imagination as common sense (sensum communem). Common sense is the “center of all 
senses ... in which all senses are rooted.”  The common sense is ordered to the first 222
concavity of the skull and receives through itself every form that is from the five senses, 
distinguishing between things such as white and sweet.   
Second, Pecham discusses what he calls imagination as the retainer of data that the 
common sense receives from the five senses.  This second imagination is what we 223
commonly call “memory.” Pecham says that this power is necessary because something 
that receives does not necessarily retain well. Pecham’s example is that water is easily 
shaped, but does not retain its figure.  
Third, Pecham discusses imagination as the power to compose and divide by using 
the “estimable intentions” or images in the imagination.  This power occurs only in 224
man, is located in the middle concavity, and is usually known as the cogitative sense.  225
The cogitative sense’s manipulation of images can result in compositions that do not 
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reflect external reality, such as a man with two heads. This operation is a prerequisite for 
most intellectual function, since intellection usually requires estimable images. (So 
Pecham, like Aquinas, will use “cognition” or “cogitation” to refer to both sensitive and 
intellectual activity, as well as the combination of the two. ) The phantasia functions 226
differently in wakefulness and sleep, or according to how much the cogitative sense and 
reason is hindered.  Whether in wakefulness or sleep, species are always required. 227
Dreams are simply an overflow of cogitations and typically do not impart knowledge. In 
cases where dreams do impart knowledge the knower is more reliant on impressions 
received from a superior mind, and noble souls are more receptive to such impressions. 
Dreams that impart knowledge need to be interpreted. There are also dreams that have 
“natural or voluntary causes” (causas naturales vel volutarias). For example, people who 
have devious schemes, get drunk, have physical infirmities or sorrows seldom have 
revelatory dreams, because their dreams regularly result from a flux of phantasms 
produced by a deformed disposition.  Those who have a temperate complexion, on the 228
other hand, often receive true dreams, because bad digestion or severe movements of the 
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humors seldom interfere.  It is generally difficult to interpret dreams because of the 229
difficulty in determining whether dreams derive from natural or supernatural causes, or 
from good spirits or bad.  
The fourth power is the estimative faculty, which is located in the middle concavity. It 
apprehends not sensitive intentions from the five senses, but rather intentions that are 
conjoined to sensations and that convey friendship or enmity. The estimative faculty 
provides natural caution, e.g., the sheep fears the wolf, the dog fears someone who makes 
a motion to throw a stone, and a hurt animal seeks things that will soothe pain. The 
estimative faculty in animals is not the same as memory in man, because memory 
involves the additional step of recalling what has been forgotten.  
The fifth power is memory itself, or the “box of intentions”, which is located in the 
posterior concavity of the skull. This memory retains the estimative apprehensions, and is 
thus connected to the estimative faculty as the imagination is connected to the common 
sense. Memory is an innate power that is found only in man. Pecham cites Augustine in 
support of the view that some animals have a kind of memory as well.  There is a 230
merely sensitive kind of memory which animals and man share, and an intelligible kind 
of memory which only man has, and which will come up in the next chapter of the 
Tractatus, which deals with the division of the intellective powers. Pecham thinks it is 
clear that these two kinds of memory cannot be the result of the same faculty, because it 
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is very rare to find a man who has excellent sensitive memory and excellent intelligible 
memory.  Pecham says the ability to remember is contingent upon the texture of the 231
humor involved. It is essential that an impressed humor become dry and hard so that an 
impression will last. Young boys have moist humors and so they cannot remember well, 
although boys seem to be able to remember more things because their minds are little 
occupied. 
Part Two. Chapter Eleven. 
Whereas the 10th chapter dealt with the divisions of the sensitive powers, the 11th 
chapter deals with the divisions of the intellective powers.  Pecham says that just as the 232
sensitive and motive powers control apprehension and motion, the intellect also controls 
these activities.  Pecham says that he will follow Aristotle’s division of the intellect into 233
“agent and possible, speculative and practical” (agentem et possibilem, speculativum et 
practicum) and that Aristotle is right to call the intellect the habitus of principles.  And 234
just as Pecham followed Avicenna in the divisions of the sensitive soul’s powers, Pecham 
says that he is following Avicenna in the divisions of the rational soul’s powers as well.  235
There are five powers of the intellect:  The first power is the material intellect, 236
which is like prime matter in physics. The material intellect has no species essentially—it 
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is like a blank slate (tabula rasa). Aristotle calls this the possible intellect.  The second 237
power is the intellect in habitus, or the state of the intellect when it is attending to 
intelligibles that it has noted. The third power is the intellect in effect, or the obtained 
intellect. This is intelligible memory or the second of the two memorative powers 
mentioned in the previous chapter of the Tractatus.  
The fourth power is the accommodated or agent intellect. Pecham claims Avicenna’s 
authority for the view that the agent intellect is always in act, and that it imprints on the 
potential intellect. Presumably “potential intellect” [intellectus in potentia] refers to the 
material or possible intellect, the first intellectual power.  In his introduction to 238
Avicenna’s Long Commentary, Richard C. Taylor says of the distinction between the 
material intellect and the active intellect: “The Arabic tradition accepted that Aristotle’s 
distinction between active and receptive aspects of intellect in De Anima 3.5 was a 
distinction between a distinct active, separate, intellectual entity and a receptive human 
power of understanding.”  Pecham says that if Avicenna thought of the soul as 239
resembling a world or as being a created intelligence that is separate from the human 
being, he erred. Rather, Augustine takes the correct position in saying that eternal light is 
the “giver or illustrator of all intelligence.”  Nonetheless the individual, human agent 240
intellect cannot formulate species on its own.  
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The fifth power is the practical or operative intellect, which is perfected by art or 
prudence. Art is the perfection of the practical intellect with regard to objects that can be 
formed. Prudence is the perfection of the practical intellect with regard to the use of 
formable things.   241
Pecham points out that he differs with Augustine—at least on the surface—about how 
to divide the intellect.  Pecham describes Augustine’s division of the intellect as the 242
division between “the superior and inferior reason.”  However, Pecham says that 243
Augustine is not distinguishing among powers, but among duties or roles (officiorum).  244
The “superior reason” that Augustine discusses consults eternal reasons whereas the 
inferior reason tends to inferior things, although still in a superior way. Pecham allows 
that the intellect can be variously named or informed according to the dispositions 
involved in various cases. The agent intellect may be said to have the 
“sapientials” (sapientiales) whereas the possible intellect has the 
“scientials” (scientiales). Pecham does not say more about this division, presumably 
because of what he admits next: He does not care much about how the different powers 
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are arranged, since it is better to say that there is one intellective potency that is designed 
to “catch” all inferior and superior intelligibles according to various aptitudes and duties.  
In addition to the five aforementioned powers of the intellect is the “motive 
intelligence” or the rational will, which Pecham seems to consider as a separate power of 
the intellect. Pecham says that Aristotle divides the will into the irascible and 
concupiscible,  but that this is contrary to what we find in the book De Spiritu et Anima, 245
i.e., that one can account for the entire soul by including “rationability, concupiscability, 
and irascibility, just as the trinity itself.”  Pecham says that these three powers must all 246
pertain to the rational soul, even though the rational soul is not the only part of the soul. 
This is obvious to Pecham because wrath, while being the passion of the irascible aspect 
of the sensitive soul, also has a role in the intellectual soul, as in the case of demons (and 
the same is true of concupiscibility and irascibility).  An implication of this view is that 247
any affect of the rational soul is bipartite—its rules both thought and motion.   248
Before concluding the chapter, Pecham discusses freedom of choice. It is not a third 
faculty beyond intellect and will but is rather the faculty of the rational will to strive for 
or not to strive for what the appetite presents to the reason. This differentiates free choice 
from the result of the “irrational appetite” (discussed in chapter 10) which the human 
necessarily desires (e.g., food). The only thing that can stop a person from following the 
irrational appetite is to be “terribly repelled” by something. Similarly, sensitive powers 
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cannot avoid sensing, because these powers are completely tied to their organs and thus 
to their objects. Even the intellect is unavoidably passive, in the sense that it can be 
forced by God. Only the will cannot be forced by anything. 
Part Two. Chapter Twelve. 
Chapter 12 is about the soul’s self-reflection.  The intellect can reflect on itself 249
directly, but only indirectly on the soul’s other powers.  No medium falls between the 250
intellect and itself, whereas there is a medium between the sensitive soul and any of its 
possible objects.  Vegetative powers are completely immersed in the body.  They are 251 252
not cognitive, but have some resonance (resonantiam) of cognition, insofar they may be 
said to discern what things in nature will be good for the subject. The vegetative powers 
are remote from the “eye of the interior soul,” even though the rational soul could direct 
its attention to the vegetative operations via the sensory capacities. Anything that the 
sensitive soul apprehends, on the other hand, is apprehended in a medium. There is no 
medium between the intellect and itself, and no corporeal organ senses the intellect’s 
operation.  
Only in a supportive or ministering way can any corporeal organ be considered 
operative in the intellect’s self-reflection.  No sensitive power is reflected on itself, yet 253
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much study (see Tractatus, 26).
powers governs itself, i.e., the imagination does not imagine itself to be imagining, not 
does the estimative sense estimate itself to be estimating. Pecham says that this is why 
Plato posited a circle in the intellective soul, but not in the souls of brutes.   254
Pecham says that some doubt his view of the intellect’s self-reflection, and so here he 
clarifies his position.  He cites the Book of Causes: “Everything knowing its essence is 255
returning on it by complete reduction.”  Because the intellect is conjoined to the earthly 256
body it cannot, properly speaking, understand itself transparently.  Because of the 257
mediating phantasms involved in many instances of knowledge, the soul cannot have a 
complete understanding of itself and sometimes thinks itself to be something that it is not. 
Nor can the embodied soul be altogether ignorant about itself since it is most present to 
itself. In order to have a perfectly transparent understanding of itself, the soul would 
require what Pecham calls the “stable effect” (stabilem affectum) which angels have. An 
angel is unchangeable in the same sense in which the human soul will be stabilized in the 
next life. 
Pecham says that while Anselm and Plato have taken the view that the soul is self-
moving, Aristotle has said that everything that is moved is moved by another.  On 258
!218
 See Plato, Timaeus, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, 44c-d.254
 Tractatus, 43. 255
 The Latin in the Liber de Causis is: “Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam est rediens 256
ad essentiam suam reditione completa.”
 Tractatus, 43. 257
 Tractatus, 43-44; See Anselm, On the Harmony of God’s Foreknowledge, 258
Predestination, and Grace with Free Choice, in Anselm, Basic Works, ed. and trans. 
Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007), 3.3; Plato, Laws, trans. Trevor J. 
Saunders, 894d-896a; Aristotle, Physics, 256a.4-258b.9; De Anima, 415b.22-27. Pecham 
has his own discussion about the soul as a self-moving number, a discussion which is 
included as the second appendix in Spettmann’s edition of the Tractatus (143-144). 
Pecham’s interpretation of this latter view, the mover is in act in respect of which the 
mobile is in potency, but nothing is both in act and in potency at the same time. To 
alleviate this problem, Pecham explains his own view according to which the soul is self-
moving.  Revisiting the subject matter of previous chapters, he says that the life of the 259
soul is the root of essence (radix essentiae), in which every human capability is united. 
This allows us to say that the whole man sees, walks, and wills. The common root of the 
soul itself leads first to apprehension, which in turn allows for the intelligence to be 
excited, and then a person can will in favor of one outcome or another. The will is clearly 
not ontologically prior to all other faculties, yet there is a way in which the will in 
particular can be called self-moving. The will “is reflected on itself and is the end of its 
proper act; and it moves in the reason of imposing and is moved as it is imposed. Also the 
choice moves and the affection is moved.”   260
Part Two. Chapter Thirteen. 
Chapter 13 continues the discussion of the will by focusing on the soul’s perfection 
through grace.  Pecham says that every creature has the defect of changeability, unless 261
lifted up and freely held in God’s hand.  The rational soul has not only changeability, 262
whereby it would go out of existence if not preserved by God, but also the defect of 
choosing, whereby it chooses evil when grace is absent. The soul is weakened by its 
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conjunction with corruption and is prone toward bodily concerns unless elevated by grace 
and regulated by the highest rectitude.  This elevation occurs when the soul is conjoined 263
with the stable life, the impression of which is the grace that proceeds from the father of 
lights.  
The father of lights is the same one who is responsible for providing humans with the 
various psychological powers which work together so that the human being might desire 
properly. This conjunction between the powers and the stable life begins with cognition, 
advances in the strength of life, and fails at some stage. Nonetheless, the stable life uses 
human frailty as an occasion to “exceed in love” (excedit in amorem), as various biblical 
passages show.  The highest kind of love occurs when cognitive operation ceases and a 264
person experiences “the highest apex of love in the delight of God.”  Such experiences 265
of being united with God in affection cannot be interpreted into human explanation, but 
can be said to lead to elevated desire, and to occur after the purification of the intellect.  266
Pecham does not elaborate on the purification that is a prerequisite for the kind of 
experience he is discussing, but presumably we can associate the process with obeying 
the rule of love discussed in chapter six of the Tractatus.  
Part Three. Chapter Fourteen. 
The third part of the Tractatus is said to deal with the substance of the soul. If the 
righteous soul moves toward God as chapter 13 indicates, then we want an account of the 
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the soul’s movement. Chapter 14 is, therefore, a further discussion of efficient 
causation.  Pecham notes that Aristotle has described how the ancients defined the soul 267
according to apprehension and motion.  Some thought that similars are cognized from 268
similars, and that therefore the soul must consist of everything (consistere ex omnibus) in 
order that everything would cognize. Others thought that the soul was fire, since the soul 
could easily move. Pecham says that the soul is an incorporeal substance in cognitive 
potency of all things, and is transformable into the similitude of all things, just as wax has 
a “transformable aptitude”.  Here Pecham introduces the principle that the mover of 269
every corporeal thing is ultimately an incorporeal thing. He cites Gregory: “Take away 
what is not seen in the body, and soon only immobile things will remain.”  Pecham also 270
claims the authority of Augustine for the view that corporeal causes are only derivatively 
called efficients, since they derive their efficiency from spirits.   271
Pecham argues further for his view of efficient causation, again drawing from his 
interpretation of Augustine.  Only a thing that possesses something can give it to 272
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another.  Therefore, if a mover gives a place to a body, then the mover must have itself 273
have place. On this basis we conclude that mover of all things must be in different places 
or in different parts of the body’s place. More technically, the body includes various parts 
of different places, so nothing that is like the body in the sense of being so varied could 
move the whole body. Only a spiritual substance could, for example, be in both the 
posterior part and the anterior part at the same time and move both of them.  
Furthermore, the mover of each thing is actualized prior to its natural movement. The 
corporeal form (forma corporeitatis) of the body is supported by the corporeal matter in 
which it is extended (the whole body).  Therefore it cannot actualize the movement of 274
the body by itself, and as the mover of the various parts of the body, the soul cannot be 
supported entirely by the whole body. 
The rational soul as an incorporeal, spiritual substance is required to move the whole 
body. The soul is constituted by its own matter and form. On this point, Pecham cites 
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Gundissalinus (incorrectly as Boethius) and Avicenna.  Pecham cites Avicenna as 275
saying that the essence of evil is a potency that occurs through matter. The implication of 
this, Pecham says, is that every angel and rational soul is composed from both form and 
matter.  (Otherwise how could angels and men sin?) Pecham says that he will take up 276
the question of the rational soul’s immortality in the next chapter.  
Part Three. Chapter Fifteen. 
Chapter 15 is a series of 10 arguments for the rational soul’s survival of the body’s 
physical death.  The first set of five arguments consists of negative responses to 277
arguments for the soul’s annihilation. The second set of five arguments can be read as a 
collection of positive arguments for the soul’s immortality.  
Pecham’s first argument is about the cause for a thing’s destruction:   278
• A thing cannot be destroyed simply because it reasons to its own destruction. (A 
substance’s own power cannot destroy it, because that would be contrary to nature.)  
• The rational soul reasons properly to the conclusion that the body of man must die, 
because of divine justice. However, the rational soul’s own destruction is a separate 
issue.  
• Conclusion (unstated): The death of the body cannot cause the death of the soul. 
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Pecham claims the authority of Augustine for his second argument:   279
• The rational soul is capable of holding unchangeable truth, whereas the sensitive 
soul is capable only of accidental, variable truth.  
• There must be a proportion of power between a potency and its object. If a 
potency’s object exceeds the object of another potency, then by that much the first 
potency’s power exceeds that of the second potency.  
• By however much incorruptible exceeds the corruptible, the rational soul is greater 
than the sensitive soul. 
• Conclusion: (unstated) The rational soul is incorruptible. 
The second argument says that the rational soul is “capable” of truth, but says nothing 
about how the soul attains truth. So, Pecham adds a third argument for the soul’s 
immortality, and this one is based on how the rational soul comes to know truth. For this 
argument Pecham cites the authority of Aristotle.   280
• Truth is not apprehended through a mediating sensory organ. When truth is wholly 
abstracted from material things, it is understood in the context of divine light, as 
discussed above.  
• A potency that works without an organ must be without an organ, since its operation 
must be from its form, which gives being, and it must be independent of body. 
• Conclusion (unstated): The rational soul, with its greater potency that makes 
possible knowledge of incorruptible truth, is free from corporeal corruption.   
Pecham gives a brief fourth argument that presupposes the third argument: 
• It is greater to operate than to merely be.  
• The rational soul can operate without the body (from the third argument). 
• Conclusion: The rational soul does not require the body for its own being. 
Pecham’s fifth argument is based on the difference between act and potency.   281
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• An act is always an act of a potency, and according to its own mode.  
• If an act is indefectible (indefectibilis), so also is its potency.  
• The rational soul’s act is indefectible, as can be shown through three experiences: 
1. The first experience comes from considering the rational soul’s object (truth). 
A rational soul is not weakened by the excellence of its object or from the 
number of objects cognized over time, but rather these things make the rational 
soul stronger. Such strengthening does not occur in the cases of the defectible 
(defectibiles) objects of defectible organs, such as the eye.  
2. The second experience comes from considering the subject. The intellective 
potency is not debilitated in age, but rather enhanced.  282
3. The third experience has to do with the delight (delectatio) produced by 
contemplation. This delight has neither a contrary nor an excess. The corporeal 
body, unlike this delight, consists of contraries and is corrupted through excess. 
• Conclusion: The act of the rational soul fails neither because of the excellence of its 
object, nor because of its own deficiency as subject, nor because of the violence of 
contraries. 
Pecham’s sixth argument is based on the theoretical possibility of unending intellectual 
growth.   283
• A power that is not weakened by continual use can go on to infinity. 
• The intellect’s capacity for receiving intelligible forms is not diminished by use. 
Nor is the intellect’s capacity for understanding reduced because it has understood 
better or because it has understood more things. Rather, the more the intellect 
understands, the greater its capacity for understanding. 
• Conclusion (unstated): The rational soul can go on infinitely. 
Pecham’s seventh argument is based on the nature of a corporeal form.  
• If a corporeal form that perfects matter is incorruptible, then so much more is a 
spiritual form that perfects a body incorruptible. 
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• (unstated) The forma corporeitatis is incorruptible,  although the body itself is 284
corruptible.  
• The most noble of all forms is the rational soul. 
• Conclusion (unstated): The rational soul is incorruptible.  
The eighth argument, for which Pecham cites Pythagoras, is a reductio based on a 
defect:  285
• A virtuous man is always less restricted than a vicious man.  
• If there were no eternal life after this earthly life, then there would be no retribution. 
Thus, injustice would be less restricted than justice, and the just would receive no 
advantage over the unjust. 
• Conclusion (unstated): There must be an eternal life after this earthly life. 
Pecham does not argue for the claim that eternal life is the exclusive method of ultimate 
retribution.  
The ninth argument is based on the end (finis) of man:  286
• The end of man is the rational soul’s immediate conjunction with the unchangeable 
God, or the highest good.  
• The conjunction with the highest good occurs through love. 
• Contraries are contrary to a cause, and so hatred is the prevention of the conjunction 
with God, or the cause of separation from God.  
• If the soul becomes full of hate, then it is contrary to the highest good. If anything 
can destroy the soul’s being, it is the soul’s own opposition to the highest good.  
• People who love God die just as people who hate God. Thus death is no indication 
of whether someone’s soul is destroyed by hatred of the highest good.  
• Conclusion: The rational soul cannot be destroyed. 
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This argument contrasts love (amor) and hatred as contraries, whereas Pecham said in the 
fifth argument (above) that delight (delectatio) has no contrary. A charitable reading of 
this apparent contradiction might be to assume that Pecham means to say that love has no 
parts and thus cannot be divided, even though hatred is indeed its contrary in a sense.   287
The 10th argument is a reductio based on different ways in which the soul could be 
“sent away” or “lost” (amitteret). Evidently, to be “sent away” means “to cease to be.” 
• The rational soul’s cessation could occur only through natural corruption (a change 
into another kind of thing) or through corruption to non-being. 
• Natural corruption would be either corruption in or with the corruption of its subject 
(the body) or corruption of itself and in itself. The first is impossible since the 
rational soul does not depend on the body for operation or being.  The second is 288
impossible since the rational soul is not composed of contraries; it has neither a 
contrary nor a nature that is subject to change.  
• The soul cannot be corrupted to non-being, because the soul’s being does not imply 
the loss of anything through change. A change to non-being would indeed be a 
special kind of change, one that the soul could not facilitate on its own. The 
inability to self-determine being or non-being is due to the soul’s total dependence 
on God. 
• Conclusion: God does not give the soul non-being, because annihilation is most 
remote from God.   289
The conclusion of chapter 15 is that the rational soul is “the immortal substance from the 
benevolence of the Creator, persevering sempiternally in received being.”  290
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Conclusion 
Pecham’s Tractatus contains his mature statement concerning philosophical 
anthropology. Thus, an understanding of the text is essential for the evaluation of his 
thought on the subject, which I will attempt in the fifth and sixth chapters of the present 
study. Such an understanding is also essential for a comparison between Pecham’s 






AQUINAS AND LATIN AVERROISM 
In this chapter I will explicate Aquinas’s arguments against Latin Averroism, with the 
goal of facilitating a comparison (in chapter six) between Aquinas’s and Pecham’s 
arguments against Latin Averroism. I will consider especially Aquinas’s Against the 
Averroists On There Being Only One Intellect, his Quaestiones De Anima, and his 
Treatise on Human Nature. A comment on the chronology of these two works, and a brief 
introduction to Latin Averroism, can be found in the introduction to the present study. 
Aquinas’s Against the Averroists On There Being Only One Intellect 
Against the Averroists is a treatise in five chapters. This work is explicitly not a 
theological polemic designed to demonstrate Averroism’s opposition to Christianity, but 
rather a philosophical refutation.  
There is no need to show that the foregoing position [that there is but one 
intellect] is erroneous because repugnant to Christian faith; a moment’s reflection 
makes this clear to anyone. Take away from men diversity of intellect, which 
alone among the soul’s parts seems incorruptible and immortal, and it follows that 
nothing of the souls of men would remain after death except a unique intellectual 
substance, with the result that reward and punishment and their difference 
disappear. We intend to show that the foregoing position is opposed to the 
principles of philosophy every bit as much as it is to the teaching of faith. And, 
Latin writers on this matter not being to the taste of some, who tell us that they 
prefer to follow the words of the Peripatetics, though of them they have seen only 
the works of Aristotle, the founder of the school, we will first show the foregoing 
position to be in every way repugnant to his words and judgments.   1
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Thus, Aquinas orients his project in Against the Averroists as being outside the realm of 
religious dogma.  
The first set of arguments has to do with the interpretation of Aristotle, who says that 
the soul is “the first act of a physically organized body.”  Thus some part of the soul must 2
be inseparable from the body, but Aquinas maintains that Averroes’ position disallows all 
such inseparability.  Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not commit himself to a separated soul.  3 4
According to Aquinas’s reading of Aristotle, the various parts of the soul (vegetative, 
intellective, locomotive) are united to the body as form or act rather than as a sailor is 
united to a ship.  The vegetative soul is that whereby the person first lives, the sensitive 5
soul that whereby the person senses, the locomotive that whereby the person moves, and 
the intellective soul that whereby the person understands. The soul, then, is an account or 
essence rather than a matter or subject.   6
 Aquinas says that Aristotle’s discussion of the intellect in De Anima book three 
militates against the Averroist position. Aristotle says that the intellect is the part of the 
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soul whereby the soul knows, and says there is a difference between the account of the 
imagination and the account of the speculative intellect.  Aquinas says that Aristotle does 7
not intend to distinguish the possible intellect from the active at this juncture because he 
has not yet said that there are two such principles.  And in any case Aristotle attempts to 8
differentiate the intellect from the other aspects of the soul only insofar as the operation 
of the intellect differs from the operations of the other aspects.  Aquinas insists that 9
Aristotle never implies that the intellect is external to the individual human soul, which 
the the act of a physical body.   10
On Aristotle’s view the intellect is capable of receiving the intelligible form of its 
object and is in this sense in potency (“Thought must be related to what is thinkable, as 
sense is to what is sensible”).  The intellect is capable of knowing all things whatsoever; 11
therefore it must be unmixed.  The fact that the intellect does not have its own 12
determined nature implies that it cannot be mixed with a body.  With this background in 13
mind, Aquinas says, it is clear that when Aristotle says that the intellect “is, before it 
thinks, not actually any real thing,” he cannot be speaking of a substance separate from 
the individual knower.   14
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Sense and intellect are not the same in every way. Sense is destroyed by an excessive 
sensible, but intellect is not destroyed by an excessive intelligible.  Intellect is separate 15
from sense because, according to Aquinas, 
sense has an organ, but intellect does not.  
Quite obviously, therefore, and without any doubt so far as the text of 
Aristotle is concerned, it is clear that his view is that possible intellect belongs to 
the soul, which is the act of body, such that the soul’s intellect has no bodily 
organ, as the other powers of the soul certainly have.  16
Aquinas will return to his interpretation of the De Anima, but he first explains on his own 
terms how it can be that the soul is the form of a body, and yet some power of the soul is 
not a power of the body.  Aquinas says that forms in general have powers that are greater 17
than the matter with which they are associated. A form is the act of a body of mixed 
elements and yet has a power associated with no particular element. A power might 
belong to a form because of a higher principle such as a celestial body (Aquinas’s 
example is that the magnet has the power to attract iron). Furthermore, the natural 
philosopher considers form only insofar as it is in matter just as the physician considers 
the nerve only insofar as the nerve contributes to health.  Just because a philosopher 18
considers a thing in one context does not mean that the thing has no role in another 
context. Aquinas concludes this consideration by saying that the soul is on the border 
between material and separated forms.  
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Aquinas argues that the incorruptibility of the soul does not prove that the soul cannot 
be the form of a body.  Aristotle taught that only the active intellect is incorruptible.  19 20
Yet one might wonder how something that is incorruptible at all could be the form of a 
body; it might seem that the form of a body would necessarily be destroyed when the 
body is destroyed.  After all, Aristotle believes that forms come to be in matter. Aquinas 21
responds to this by interpreting a statement by Aristotle in the Metaphysics as meaning 
that nothing prevents the intellective soul from remaining after the body dies, because 
nothing prevents the intellect from being prior to corporeal embodiment either.  22
Furthermore, Aquinas says, the intellect is unique from other forms because the intellect 
does not exist simply in virtue of the existence of the composite ... but rather the 
composite exists in virtue of its existence. Therefore, the composite being 
destroyed, a form that exists thanks to the existence of the composite is destroyed, 
whereas a form through whose existence the composite exists, not vice versa, 
need not be destroyed when the composite is destroyed.  23
Aquinas admits that there are passages in which Aristotle speaks of the intellect 
“problematically”, “as one inquiring”, and credits intellectual activities to the composite 
and not to the mind as such.  However, even if we were to take Aristotle to be speaking 24
decisively in such passages, there would still remain a solution: Understanding can be 
called the accidental act of the composite insofar as its object, the phantasm, is in a bodily 
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organ, but not because the intellectual activity is exercised through a bodily organ.  25
When the soul is separated it has a different way of understanding—a way similar to that 
of separate substances.  It is essential to the soul that it be united to a body, and this 26
union may be accidentally impeded by bodily corruption just as a light thing is naturally 
up but may accidentally be pulled down.   27
Before concluding the first chapter, Aquinas responds to the Averroists’ argument 
based on the following statement by Aristotle in the Generation of Animals: “[I]ntellect 
comes only from without and it alone is divine.”  The Averroists say that the Aristotle 28
passage teaches that the intellect is neither part of the human soul nor the form of the 
body, because the intellect is not educed from the potency of matter.  Aquinas says that 29
the passage does not prove that the intellect cannot be the form of the body. His response 
is in three parts:  (1) Potency is a correlative of act, and so a thing must be in potency in 30
the same respect that it is later in actuality.  Aquinas points out that Aristotle also says in 31
Generation of Animals: “For at first all such embryos seem to live the life of a plant. And 
it is clear that we must be guided by this in speaking of the active and sensitive and 
rational soul. For all three kinds of soul must be possessed potentially before they are 
possessed actually.”  (2) No soul is caused by the mingling of elements, as the Averroists 32
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say.  All souls have a connection with matter that is different from and more divine than 33
the so-called elements. (3) It is possible that some forms are wholly educed from matter, 
whereas others are not.  Aquinas takes it that Aristotle leaves undecided whether the 34
intellect differs from the other parts of the soul in its subject or location or merely in its 
definition.  But even if Aristotle were saying that all parts of the soul were in the same 35
subject, it would still be the case that the vegetative and sensitive are in the intellective 
“as triangle and square are in the pentagon.”  Aquinas provides a more literal way of 36
explaining his position: The intellective soul has the powers had by the vegetative and 
sensitive souls, which are produced by inferior agents. Aquinas thinks that his position 
about the connection between these three aspects of the soul holds even if the vegetative 
and sensitive souls are from the same extrinsic source that produces the intellective soul. 
In the second chapter Aquinas discusses the Averroists’ conflict with other 
Peripatetics, including Greeks and Arabs.  The thrust of the chapter is that not only Latin 37
writers, but also writers in the Greek and Arabic traditions have thought that the intellect 
is a power and faculty of individual souls, each of which is the form of a body. Thus the 
Averroists have no right to claim that their doctrine is derived from true Peripatetic 
philosophy. Aquinas reports what he takes to be the views belonging to Theophrastus, 
Themistius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Avicenna, and Algazel. I will now summarize 
Aquinas’s reports.  
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Themistius says that the possible intellect is “more connatural to the soul” than the 
agent intellect is.  The active intellect supervenes on the potential intellect, becoming 38
one with it. Themistius’ view emphasizes that a human is what it is, not because of the 
sensitive soul—as the Averroist position implies—but because of the active intellect, the 
principal part.  On Themistius’ view it is misleading, Aquinas says, to say that what is in 39
potency and what is in act are two different things.  If such were the case a person would 40
be different from his own existence. The intellect composed of potency and act carries 
out the act of writing, but only insofar as that intellect is active. What it is for a human to 
exist comes from the human soul, but not from every part of it.  The sensitive soul is the 41
matter to the imaginative aspect of the soul, and the imaginative is the matter for the 
possible intellect.  The possible intellect is the matter for the agent intellect, and what it 42
is for a human to exist comes only from the agent intellect.  Nature can be said to “stop” 43
with the agent intellect, and so in short “we are the agent intellect.”  44
Theophrastus says that we should not understand the intellect as having been added 
from outside as if it were something accidentally conjoined or temporally prior.  The 45
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intellect is there from the first coming-into-being, “as containing and comprehending 
human nature.”  46
Alexander says that the possible intellect is the form of the body.  Aquinas says that 47
Averroes had claimed that when Alexander said that the possible intellect is the 
preparation in human nature for the agent intellect and for the intelligibles, this meant 
that the intellect is not associated with a particular body because no preparation is 
associated with a body. Aquinas says that this is a perverse understanding of Alexander.  
Avicenna holds the intellect to be a power of the soul and the form of a body, 
although he says that the “contemplative intellect” is a power separate from the human 
being.  The intellect nonetheless needs the bodily powers for its own actions.  Algazel 48 49
says that the soul is a form more beautiful than the forms that arise from the elements, 
and that this highest form is given from “the giver of forms”.  The soul is still related to 50
body as form, according to Algazel’s position. And, Algazel makes it clear that the 
“knowing power” of the human soul does not operate through a bodily organ.   51
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In the third chapter Aquinas considers the nature of the intellect in the abstract.  A 52
passage from Aristotle’s De Anima is the starting point for a series of arguments designed 
to show that the Averroist position cannot account for individualized knowledge.  53
Aristotle says that the soul is “that whereby we first live and understand; therefore it is a 
certain form and species” of a body.  Aquinas says that it must be true that “this singular 54
man understands,” because individuals would not ask for an explanation about the 
intellect unless they themselves had understanding.   55
That whereby a human being first does anything is his form, and so whatever it is that 
primarily accounts for a singular man’s understanding must be his form: “Anything acts 
insofar as it is in act; anything is in act through its form; therefore that through which 
something first acts must be its form.”  Aquinas says that if one rejects the view that the 56
intellect is the form of the individual, then he will have to find another way to explain 
how the act of an intellectual principle can be the act of an individual man. Averroes says 
that the possible intellect is a part of the soul only equivocally. On his view, the intellect 
is a separated substance. The separate substance’s understanding is the individual’s 
insofar as the possible intellect is joined to the individual through the phantasms. An 
intelligible species that becomes one with the possible intellect has two subjects: the 
phantasms and the possible intellect.  
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Aquinas says that there are three ways of refuting Averroes’ position about the 
conjunction between the individual man and the phantasms.  (1) The union of intellect 57
and man would not come into being at the moment when a man comes into being, 
because a man would not have an intellect “from generation”, but only through the 
operation of sense.  (2) Intelligible species exist in the possible intellect only when they 58
have been abstracted from phantasms.  But on Averroes’ view the possible intellect is 59
separated from phantasms, and so the phantasms can no longer explain the the union 
between intellect and body. The union cannot be explained by an analogy with the 
mirror’s representation of a man, because such a representation would be the mirror’s act 
and not the man’s act. (3) Even if it were granted that numerically one and the same 
species were both the form of the possible intellect and in the phantasms at the same 
time, such a conjunction would not explain how “this man understands”.  When 60
sensation occurs, something happens through an individual’s sensitive species, but also 
through his sensitive power. Thus, knowledge occurs not only through intelligible 
species, but also through the individual’s power. (Similarly, a wall has color “in it” which 
is being sensed, but this does not mean that the wall senses, because the wall does not 
have the power of sensation.) 
Next, Aquinas criticizes the view that the Averroists can explain how “this man 
thinks” by saying that the intellect is united to the body as its mover, i.e., the operation of 
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the intellect is attributed to this man just as the operation of the eye is attributed to this 
man.  Aquinas first attempts to reduce this view to absurdity on the basis that it cannot 61
explain what a given man, Socrates, is: 
(1) Suppose Socrates is composed of both the vegetative and sensitive soul.  62
Aristotle says that a substantial unity must have a cause for its unity.  An Averroist might 63
respond by saying that Socrates is not one thing absolutely, but is rather the result of the 
coming together of mover and moved.  Incoherencies follow this assertion, however. If 64
Socrates is just the coming together of a mover and a moved, then he is not a being in a 
species and genus. Furthermore, he could not act, because he would not be a human 
being. And, his understanding is really the activity of the intellect using the body of 
Socrates, as the sailor uses a ship.   65
(2) Suppose Socrates is just a body that is animated by a vegetative and sensitive 
soul.  On this view, the intellect’s action cannot be attributed to Socrates, because 66
Aristotle says that the movement is in the thing being moved; when there is no product of 
the activity other than the actuality, the actuality can be located only in the agent (the 
intellect) and not thing moved (the body).  It is no help for the Averroist to say that the 67
understanding itself and not the intellect is the act of the body, because there can be no 
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understanding that is not the act of the intellect (just as there can be no seeing apart from 
sight).  This is clear because the proper act of a mover is attributed neither to the 68
instrument nor to that which is moved, but to the mover itself (e.g., the saw does not 
make the artifact). Even in transitive activities, Aquinas says, actions are attributed in 
opposite ways to movers and moved things (e.g., thanks to the action of building the 
builder builds and the building is built). Sometimes the action of a mover passes into the 
thing moved, as when the heated thing heats.  But still the heated thing requires heat 69
from another, primary source before it can heat a third thing. Aristotle says that Socrates 
primarily understands, and by virtue of an intellect that is potentially all things.  70
Therefore, a separate intellect moving Socrates could not be void of determinate nature at 
the moment when it moves Socrates, and so Socrates could not just be the body that is 
moved by the intellect.     71
(3) Suppose Socrates is just an intellect.  Gregory of Nyssa has attributed this 72
position to Plato, and Macrobius attributes the position to Plotinus.  The position may 73
seem close to that of Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he says that man is the 
intellectual element.  However, Aquinas says that Aristotle’s position is that man is the 74
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intellect only in the sense that the intellect is the “chief thing in man.”  Aquinas presents 75
three reasons why man is not intellect or soul alone: First, as Gregory points out, a tunic 
and its wearer cannot be one thing.  Second, Aristotle says that “man and horse and the 76
like” are not forms alone, but are forms that are correlated to some individuating matter.  77
No part of the body can be defined independent of soul.  Third, since the intellect moves 78
only through the will, as Aristotle says, then if man were only an intellect he could 
remove his body whenever he wished.   79
Next, Aquinas argues that, even if the intellect were Socrates’ mover, this would not 
advance the claim that Socrates understands.  A particular man is in some species, but 80
species is derived from form, so that through which Socrates has a species is his form.  81
But each thing has its species from that which is the principle of the species’ proper 
activity. Man’s proper activity is intellectual, and so the intellect must be united to the 
body as form. Furthermore, Aquinas says, it is in our power to will, and Aristotle says 
that the will is in the intellect.  This is obvious from observing that separate intelligences 82
have wills, and from the fact that some things are universally loved and hated.  But if 83
intellect cannot be attributed to an individual man, then neither can the will be so 
attributed, and man would no longer have “dominion” over his acts.  
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Next, Aquinas refutes a positive argument designed to prove that the Averroist 
position allows for individual knowledge.  The Averroists’ argument is that if the 84
possible intellect is not one for all, then the possible intellect would have to be a material 
form.   But this is false, Aquinas says, because understanding results from abstraction 85
after the intellect receives a material form. The soul is not the form the body according to 
the intellective power, but rather the soul is immaterial and receives immaterially and 
understands itself.  Someone might object by saying that a power of the soul cannot be 86
more immaterial or simpler than its essence.  Yet Aquinas says that the human soul 87
exists not merely in a state of dependence on other forms that have no existence apart 
from the body and are “immersed in matter.” The human soul as a form is too dignified to 
be a merely capacity of matter. 
In concluding chapter three, Aquinas argues that if the intellect existed separately 
from the soul, then it would always be understanding and understood all by itself.  In 88
fact, it would not need to use intelligibles in order to understand. Rather, such a separate 
intellect would understand just as other separate substances do. Higher substances do not 
require lower substances for their own principal perfection.  
!243
 Ibid., 99.84
 This argument is clearer in the translation of Beatrice H. Zedler, in Aquinas, On the 85
Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 
19 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968), 57. 
 Against the Averroists, trans. McInerny, 99, cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 429a.27-29.86
 Against the Averroists, 99. 87
 Ibid., 101.88
In chapter four Aquinas discusses the problems that follow from claiming that there is 
one intellect for everybody.  Aquinas admits that it is plausible to claim that there is one 89
agent intellect for everybody, because several things can be perfected by a single agent 
(e.g., the sun allows all animals to see).  He points out, however, that it is not Aristotle’s 90
intention to teach that the agent intellect is separate from the individual soul, though 
Aristotle does compare the agent intellect to light, as Plato does. Before returning to his 
discussion of Aristotle, Aquinas brings up a number of reasons why it is implausible to 
think that there is one possible intellect for everybody.   91
If individual human beings understand by virtue of a single possible intellect, then 
there are three possibilities:  (1) A man who understands is the intellect. But if this is the 92
case, then there would be only one man. (2) The intellect formally inheres in the man as a 
power of the soul. But if the intellect inheres in a human knower formally, then there 
must be different forms for different bodies and there would necessarily be multiple 
intellects. (3) The intellect relates to the individual as a mover. But this view was refuted 
in the third chapter. 
To expand on his rejection of (3), Aquinas uses an illustration involving sight and the 
eye to show that even if the intellect were the body’s mover, then the Averroist position 
still could not explain how this particular man thinks: Suppose that the intellect could 
relate to Socrates as a mover.  In this case Socrates thinks because his intellect thinks, in 93
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the same way in which a man sees because his eye sees. And suppose there is one eye for 
all men. At this point we can ask whether there is one seeing entity, or multiple seeing 
entities. In answering this question, we must keep some principles in mind: 
• If many men are using a single instrument, then there are many agents.  
• If the chief agent is singular but uses many instruments, then there is still one agent.  
So, if the eye is principal in man, then many people using the same eye would constitute 
one seeing thing. However, if the eye were not principal in man, then the reverse would 
be true (i.e., many things capable of seeing would use the the single eye as an 
instrument). Now, the intellect is obviously the principal in man, so if there were only one 
intellect, then there would be only one knower and one agent who wills.  But in this 94
case, there would be no more moral science, which is natural to man.   95
Next, Aquinas argues that the Averroist position destroys the particularity of 
intellectual objects and acts.  If all men understand by using one intellect (however it 96
may be united to the individual men), then there could be only one object of 
understanding at a time, and only one act of understanding at a time. Phantasms are only 
“preambles” to intellectual acts, and so if there were only one intellect, the phantasms 
could provide no differentiation between simultaneous intellectual acts.  
Aquinas now returns to Aristotle.  Aquinas says that, when Aristotle asserts that the 97
possible intellect is separate and potentially all things, he is referring to the state of an 
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individual’s intellect prior to active thought.  The intellect is in potency prior to learning 98
or discovery; it is like a tablet on which nothing is yet written. The “habit” of science is 
the first act of the possible intellect.  Through learning, the possible intellect becomes 99
actual. Aquinas says that this process of coming to know would be impossible if there 
were but one intellect for all people in all times.  
Next, Aquinas discusses intelligible species, with the aim of showing that the 
Averroist position cannot explain the relationship between the species, the phantasms, 
and the intellect.  Species are conserved in the intellect because the intellect is the place 100
of forms, and science is a “permanent habit”.  Thus, if a teacher knows something by 101
virtue of the one possible intellect, then it would be impossible for the student to come to 
know that same thing by virtue of the possible intellect.  
Someone might object by saying that, according to Aristotle, since there have always 
been men there would never have been a first man who understood.  Therefore, 102
according to the objector, intelligible species are not acquired through any one person’s 
phantasms. But the objection implies that Aristotle vainly posited an agent intellect to 
make potentially intelligible things actually intelligible, and that Aristotle vainly posited 
that phantasms are due to the possible intellect as colors are to sight. (If phantasms 
contribute nothing to the possible intellect, why did Aristotle think that human knowers 
need them?) Anyway it is irrational to suppose that a separated substance should need our 
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phantasms or that it cannot understand itself save through the learning of particular 
humans.  
Someone might say that Aristotle’s discussion had to do with the possible intellect 
only as it is united to humans and not as it is in itself.  But, Aquinas says, Aristotle 103
speaks of the possible intellect in terms of what is proper to it insofar as it is 
distinguished from the agent intellect. For the sake of argument, however, suppose that 
the single possible intellect has intelligible species eternally through which it is made one 
with individual knowers according to their phantasms. These intelligible species would 
need to be related to the individual knower’s phantasms by one of three means:  (1) The 104
intelligible species in the possible intellect are taken from the phantasms in the 
individuals. But this is ruled out a priori by the position under consideration (i.e., that the 
possible intellect has its intelligible species eternally). (2) The intelligible species are not 
taken from phantasms, but are “shining upon our phantasms” (irradiantes supra 
fantasmata) just as if there were species in the eye that shine upon the colors in the wall. 
There are several problems with the idea that the intelligible species shine on the 
phantasms to produce individualized knowledge. First, it implies that phantasms come to 
be actually intelligible not through the agent intellect but through the possible intellect. 
Second, such a shining could not make phantasms actually intelligible, for phantasms 
become actually intelligible only through abstraction. Third, any reception occurs 




would be in a sensible and material mode. Material illumination could not directly 
provide understanding. (3) The third possibility about the relationship between the 
possible intellect and the individual knower’s phantasms is that intelligible species are 
neither received in the possible intellect from the phantasms nor do they imprint 
something on the phantasms. But in this case, the intelligible species in the possible 
intellect would have nothing at all to do with the individual’s understanding.  
In the fifth chapter Aquinas responds to five objections to the view that there is a 
plurality of possible intellects.  In some cases the responses include extended 105
discussions. 
The first objection is this: Whatever is multiplied according to matter is a material 
form, which is why substances that are separate from matter cannot be members of the 
same species.  So, if there were a plurality of intellects in numerically different men, 106
then intellect would be a material form. Form freed from matter is not one of a number of 
members of a species, because numeration is caused by matter. It would therefore be a 
contradiction for God to make many intellects of the same species in diverse men.  
Aquinas has a number of responses to this objection: 
• The Averroists have misunderstood unity. In fact, “unity” can describe a member of 
a species that has multiple members,  and so the objection represents a 107
misunderstanding of Aristotle’s words that “the essence of each thing is one in no 
merely accidental way.”  Aristotle also says that things which have no matter have 108
no cause of being or of being one thing.  There are four kinds of unity on 109
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Aristotle’s view: numeric, specific, generic, and proportional.  Separate 110
substances are not one specifically or generically, so their unity must be numerical 
because each of them is undivided.   111
• If every case of numeration is caused by matter, it would not have made sense for 
Aristotle to search for the number of the immaterial, separated substances, which he 
did.  A separate substance is both singular and individuated, since it has an 112
operation, although it is immaterial.  Matter is the principle of individuation in 113
material things insofar as matter is not shareable by many.  Matter is the “first 114
subject not existing in another.”   115
• Aristotle argues against Plato by saying that a separate Idea will not be predicated 
of many, nor will it be more definable than other individuals that are unique in their 
species, such as the sun and the moon.   116
Someone might respond to this last argument by saying that souls multiplied according to 
bodies could not remain when the bodies have been destroyed.  However, Aquinas says, 117
it has already been explained how the individualized intellect can continue after the death 
of the body, and each soul will remain in its unity.  118
The second objection to the plurality of intellects is: It would be contradictory for 
God to bring about many intellects.   119
Aquinas has two (similar) responses to this objection:    120
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• Even if it is granted that intellect is not essentially multiplied, it does not therefore 
follow that the multiplying of intellect involves a contradiction. A first thing can get 
something from a second thing that is not natural for the first thing to have (e.g., a 
heavy thing is lifted high by another thing). If the intellect were naturally one for all 
because it had no natural cause of multiplication, then a supernatural cause could 
still multiply it without contradiction.  
• The same argument that the objector uses to prove that it would be contradictory for 
God to bring about many intellects could just as well be used to prove that God 
could not raise the dead or restore vision to the blind. 
The third objection to the plurality of intellects is this: If you and I understand the 
same thing, then there is only one understanding.  If understanding in two people is 121
numerically two but specifically one, then there is really one thing that is understood, 
because there is one quiddity through which the understanding takes place. Then there 
must also be a quiddity through which the first quiddity is understood, and so on to 
infinity, which is impossible.  
Aquinas has two responses to this objection:   122
• If a thing is understood, then nothing needs to be abstracted from it in order for it to 
be understood. On the basis of the objection, there can be only one thing 
understood. This would mean not only that our intellect is a separate substance, but 
also that the separate substance is God.  
• An object of the understanding does not take its species from the act or power of the 
intellect, but rather the other way around. Thus the understanding of a stone is one 
thing in all intelligences. 
Aquinas says that someone  might respond to this last argument by saying that the thing 123




 I.e., someone among those who “unwittingly slide into the teaching of Plato” (ibid., 123
131).
science of sensible things.  Because Plato taught that the Forms are themselves 124
subsistent, he could maintain that multiple intellects derive knowledge of one truth from 
one separate Form. The Averroists, however, believe that the immaterial forms are the 
immaterial objects of the intellect and thus the Averroists cannot allow for multiple 
minds.  
Admittedly, Aristotle says that an object of the understanding is a quiddity or nature 
of a thing, although the sciences are about the particular things rather than about the 
understood species (otherwise I could not know the stone, but only a species abstracted 
from the stone).  However, if understanding were a transitive action, like burning or 125
moving, then it would follow that understanding exists in the way that the nature of a 
singular thing exists in it.  As it is, understanding occurs according to the mode of the 126
person who is doing the understanding; the intellect understands the universal nature after 
abstracting it from individual principles. Two people understand the same thing by virtue 
of numerically different intelligible species. Materiality—not singularity—is repugnant to 
intelligibility.  Thus it is clear how the same science can be in the teacher and in the 127
learner. Each has his own intelligible species. And, just as health comes about by the 
capacity of nature and not by the power of the physician, so knowledge is not caused in 





 Ibid., 135. 127
 The fourth objection to the plurality of intellects is this: If there are individuated 
intellects, then when the bodies of humans are destroyed, many intellectual substances 
would remain, and this possibility is opposed to Aristotle’s teaching.   128
Aquinas has two responses to this objection: 
• While Aristotle did think that it would be futile for there to be separate substances 
(in addition to the heavenly bodies) that are not moving bodies, he did not say that it 
was necessarily false that there are separate substances.  In fact, Aristotle says that 129
if a substance is immune from change, it has attained its best state.  A thing is 130
futile if it does not attain the end for which it is designed. The movement of bodies 
cannot be the purpose of separate substances, which have a higher end. 
• The human soul, separated from the body, does not have the ultimate perfection of 
its nature, since the soul is part of human nature. Still, the soul is not frustrated. The 
end of the human soul is not to move the body but rather to understand, as Aristotle 
says in the Nicomachean Ethics.    131
 The fifth objection is this: If there were many incorruptible intellects, and Aristotle is 
correct in saying that the world is eternal, then there would be an infinity of intellects.  132
But Algazel says that if there is an absence of either quantity or order, then it is 
impossible to show that there is not an infinity.  Algazel concludes from this that since 133
souls are neither numbered nor ordered, there is an infinity of souls.  The unstated 134
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implication is that a plurality of intellects implies that there is an infinity of intellects, and 
such an infinity is offensive to reason.  
Aquinas has three responses to this objection:   135
• The objection causes no concern to Catholics, who hold that the world began.   136
• Not only Latins but Arabs, such as Algazel (as already discussed) and Avicenna, 
have taught that the soul is numerically many, though of one species.   137
• Themistius, a Greek, says that the agent intellect is multiple.  He says that the 138
“first illuminator is one”, a separate substance which Catholics call God.  139
Avicenna calls this being the ultimate intelligence.  Themistius makes it clear that 140
Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus all believed the possible intellect to be multiple 
as well. Averroes has distorted Themistius’ and Theophrastus’ reports.  Some 141
people unfortunately read only Averroes and then claim to report the common views 
of all philosophers.  
Aquinas concludes the final chapter by saying that it is unfortunate that some accuse 
Latins of rejecting the unity of the intellect merely “because their law is contrary to it.”  142
It is also unfortunate, however, that some claim to believe Averroes according to reason 
and to believe the opposite position according to faith. Such a position suggests that faith 
concerns things whose contraries are concluded necessarily.  
Aquinas’s First Quaestio 
In James H. Robb’s introduction to the Quaestiones, he says that “Question 1 can be 
seen as a map for understanding St. Thomas’ view of the human being as an incarnate 
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spirit. It presents in broad lines the whole of his doctrine; questions 2 and 3 add a number 
of clarifications and precisions.”  The first question is “Whether a human soul can be 143
both a form and an entity”,  the second is “Whether a human soul is separate from its 144
body in existence”,  and the third is “Whether the possible intellect or the intellective 145
soul is one for all human beings.”  146
In Aquinas’s own response to question one, he argues for the view that the human 
soul is both an entity and the form of a living body.  Aquinas argues for these two major 147
claims in turn. First, he argues that the soul is an entity in the Aristotelian sense, i.e., that 
the soul has the following two qualifications: (1) The soul is “an individual in the genus 
of substance.” (2) The soul is “complete in a given species and genus of substance.”  To 148
deny that the soul meets these qualifications is to say that the soul cannot subsist per se 
but is instead “simply a form like other material forms.”  And, to assert that the soul 149
meets the qualifications is not to assert that the soul is an entity “in the sense of being a 
complete substance which possesses its specific nature but rather in the sense of being 
part of a being which has complete specific nature. . . .”  Existence is a single property 150
!254
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that the body and soul share, and which they lose upon their separation (the soul 
continues to exist after the separation).  151
Although some have denied that the soul satisfies the two qualifications, Aquinas 
maintains that even the vegetative aspect of the soul meets the qualifications since the 
vegetative soul’s operations “must possess a principle which transcends active and 
passive qualities, which in the process of nutrition and growth are instrumental qualities 
only.”  The denial that the rational aspect of the soul meets the two qualifications is 152
even more untenable, for two reasons. (1) The rational soul has operations that “consist in 
abstracting species, not only from matter but also from all individuating, material 
conditions, and these operations are required for knowing a universal.”  (2) In the 153
essential operation of the intellect “no bodily organ has any share, so that there would be 
a corporeal organ of understanding in the way that an eye is the organ of seeing, as is 
proved in Book III of the De Anima.”   154
Having established that the rational soul has an operation that is separate from the 
body, Aquinas observes that forms which have an act of existing that depends on matter 
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do not have per se operations.  For example, heat itself does not act, but rather 155
something that is hot acts.  Thus Aquinas concludes that “[I]t is necessary that an 156
intellective soul operate per se, inasmuch as it possesses an essential operation in which 
the body does not share.”  Aquinas cites the authority of both Plato and Aristotle for this 157
position, but distinguishes Plato’s position on the basis that  
Plato goes further and holds that a soul not only subsists per se but even that it 
possesses in itself the fulness of a specific nature. For he held that the full nature of 
the species is in the soul, defining a human being not as something composed of 
soul and body but as a soul using a body, and thus the relation of the soul to its body 
is that of a sailor to his ship or of a clothed man to his garments.  158
In a passage from the Alcibiades, Socrates says that man is that which “rules the body” 
and that which rules the body must be the soul.  Aquinas specifically denies the view, 159
ascribed here to Plato, that the soul “possesses in itself the fulness of a specific nature”: 
“Although a human soul is able to subsist per se, still it does not per se possess a 
complete specific nature. Whence it would not be possible that separated souls would 
constitute a distinct grade of beings.”  Aquinas disagrees with what he takes to be 160
Plato’s position on the basis that “that by which the body lives is its soul,” that the being 
of a body comes from the soul.   161
!256
 Quaestiones, 47. 155
 Ibid.156
 Ibid.157
 Ibid.; cf. Aristotle: “But thought seems to be an independent substance implanted 158
within us and to be incapable of being destroyed” (De Anima, 408b.18-19). Aquinas says 
that Plato thought the soul was shown to be “immortal and per se subsistent from the fact 
that it is self-moving. For Plato took motion in a broad sense to apply to any kind of 
operation, and thus it is to be understood that an intellect moves itself because it operates 
through itself” (Quaestiones, 47; cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 245c-246a). 
 Trans. D.S. Hutchinson, 129e-130c. 159
 Quaestiones, 49. 160
 Ibid., 47. 161
Having argued for his first claim (i.e., that the soul is an entity), Aquinas now argues 
for his second major claim, i.e., that the soul is the form of a living body:   162
• The soul gives being to a body.  
• To confer being is a characteristic of a form.  
• Therefore, a human soul is the form of its body.  
Aquinas provides a second argument, directed against the dualist position already 
mentioned:  163
• If the soul were in its body as a sailor is in a ship, then the soul would not give 
“specific nature” to the body or to its parts.   164
• But we know that the soul does give specific nature to the body and its parts, 
because when the soul leaves the body, the individual parts do not retain their 
original names except in an equivocal sense.  
• (Unstated conclusion): The soul gives specific nature to the body and to its parts.  
And a third argument, also against dualism:  165
• If the soul were in the body as a sailor is in a ship, it would follow that the union of 
soul and body is accidental.  
• If the soul-body union were accidental, then the separation of soul and body would 
not be a substantial corruption.  
• But the soul-body separation is a substantial corruption. 
• Therefore, the soul is an entity, able to subsist per se but not as possessing in itself a 
complete specific nature, but rather as completing human nature insofar as it is the 






Aquinas now illustrates his view of the soul as both entity and form by considering 
“the order of natural forms.”  This hierarchy includes the following levels:   166 167
• The forms of “lower bodies” (e.g., elements) which possess no operation exceeding 
active and passive qualities. These forms are “closest to matter” and possess no 
operation that exceeds active and passive qualities of matter such as “rarified” and 
“compact”.  
• The forms of “compounds,” which have an operation that is derived from a celestial 
nature. For example, “magnets attract iron, not because of heat or cold or any 
quality of this sort, but because they participate in some fashion in celestial power.” 
• The forms of plants (at this level Aquinas begins to refer to forms as “souls”) which 
are like not only celestial bodies but also the movers of the celestial bodies, since 
the souls of plants belong to beings that move themselves.  
• Animal souls, which are also like the substances that move the heavenly bodies, but 
in a yet higher way, since the souls of animals are capable of knowledge. Animal 
knowledge is of material things only and occurs in a material way. Therefore animal 
souls need bodily organs for all of their functions. 
• Human souls, which bear an even closer likeness to the knowledge of the higher 
substances, since humans are able to know immaterial things. Human souls differ 
from the higher substances in that humans use knowledge that comes from sensing 
material things in order to acquire the aforementioned knowledge of immaterial 
things.  
Aquinas believes that from this hierarchy the mode of the human soul’s existence can be 
known.  Consequently he makes the following argument:  168 169
• The soul has an operation that transcends material things, and so its existence does 
not depend on its body.  
• The soul acquires its immaterial knowledge from what is material.  
• Therefore, the soul’s nature can be fulfilled only in conjunction with the body. 
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Aquinas immediately uses this conclusion as the basis for a further claim that does not 
straightforwardly or obviously follow:  
[T]herefore, a human soul insofar as it is united to its body as its form still 
possesses an act of existence which is elevated above the body and does not 
depend on it; clearly then this soul is constituted on the boundary line between 
corporeal and separate substances.   170
Now Aquinas has provided two separate justifications for the claim that the soul is the 
form of the body. These two arguments seem to lead to two understandings of form. First, 
Aquinas said that we know the soul to be the form of the body because we can see that 
the body parts have a different being when the soul leaves the body.  Second, Aquinas 171
said that we know the soul to be the form of the body because the soul requires data that 
can arise only in conjunction with the work of the bodily organs.  The first argument 172
reflects the view that the soul is related to the body along the lines of some combination 
of the four Aristotelian causes (soul as giver of shape, soul as efficient mover, etc.). The 
second argument implies that the body is informed by the soul in the sense that the body 
conduces or produces information for the soul.  
Fortunately, this is not all Aquinas has to say on the topic of form in the first quaestio. 
There are at least two additional explanations or justifications of the soul’s role as form in 
the human being. (1) Recall that Aquinas has already asserted that form provides the 
species for any given substance,  and in the ad contra section he provides further 173
application of this general principle to the particular case of human beings.  If and only 174
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if a being is rational is it a member of the human species, and therefore the rational soul 
is the essential form of a human being. (2) The soul is the form of its body because the 
soul is related to the body as act to potency.  However, Aquinas maintains that when the 175
body dies the soul does not cease to have the property whereby it is a form: “When the 
body ceases to be through corruption, the soul does not lose that essential feature by 
which it is appropriate to the soul to be a form, although the soul does not actually perfect 
matter so that it is a form.”  What is corrupted when death occurs is not the matter or 176
form, but the composite:  
The body’s existence is said to be corruptible insofar as the body through the 
process of corruption loses that act of existing which was shared by it and the 
soul, and which remains in the subsistent soul. For the same reason the act of 
existing of the body can be said to consist of parts because it is so constituted by 
its parts as to be able to receive existence from the soul.  177
Aquinas’s Second Quaestio 
Aquinas’s second question is “Whether a human soul is separate from its body in 
existence.” Aquinas’s position, as already seen his response to the first question, is that 
the soul is not separate from the body in existence.  Aquinas’s response to the question 178
begins from the principle that anything that can be in act or not must have a principle of 
potency. Humans are potentially active in sense and intellect, and so “we must admit that 
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there is in a human being an intellective principle which is in potency to intelligible 
things.”  Aquinas says that Aristotle calls the principle of potentiality the possible 179
intellect.  Aquinas then compares the possible intellect to the pupil of the eye, which 180
has no color but is capable of “receiving all colors.”  One of Aquinas’s explanations of 181
the possible intellect in the quaestio is in an ad contra argument.  Here Aquinas says 182
that the possible intellect possesses an intelligible form only in potency but not in act. 
This does not mean that the possible intellect is one for all men, but rather that it is one 
with respect to all intelligible forms, “just as prime matter is one with respect to all 
sensible forms.” This is an interesting comparison because Aquinas thinks that prime 
matter (i.e., matter without any form) has being only in thought, whereas he thinks that 
possible intellects exist in reality.  183
This complete possibility associated with the possible intellect is also Aquinas’s 
reason why the possible intellect cannot have any bodily organ: “For if it possessed a 
bodily organ, the possible intellect would be determined to a particular sensible nature; 
just as the power of sight is restricted to the nature of the eye.”  However, Aquinas is 184
quick to add that the possible intellect is not entirely separate from the body as some 
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suggest: “Now other men ... fall into the opposing error. For they hold that the possible 
intellect is so devoid of any sensible nature and so unmixed with body that it is a 
substance separate in existence from the body so that it should be in potency to all 
intelligible forms.”  Thus begins Aquinas’s direct criticism of the Averroist position 185
(Aquinas names Averroes as “a follower of this position” ). Here are the first three 186
arguments that Aquinas presents against the Averroist position in the second quaestio: 
• Aristotle says that the soul (including the intellect) and body are one as the wax and 
its shape are one.  The shape of the wax cannot be separated from the wax in any 187
way. Therefore the intellect in its existence cannot be separated from the body. The 
soul/body relationship is just an instantiation of a larger principle: “[N]o form is 
separate in existence from its matter. But the intellective soul is the form of its body. 
Therefore, it is not separate in its existence from matter.”  188
• If the possible intellect were a separate substance, it would be impossible for a 
human being to understand by means of it, as Aristotle says man does.  If one 189
substance performs an operation, then this operation cannot be attributed to another 
substance.   190
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definition only, or spatially as well) we have to inquire what differentiates this part, and 
how thinking can take place. . . . Thus that in the soul which is called thought (by thought 
I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real 
thing” (parenthetical items in orig.). 
 Quaestiones, 57. Aquinas clarifies: “For although one of two substances can be the 190
cause of operation in the other as principal agent in relation to its instrument, still the 
action of the principal agent is not one in number with the action of the instrument, for 
the action of the principal agent consists in moving the instrument while the action of the 
instrument consists in being moved by the principal agent and in moving something 
else.”
• If the possible intellect were a substance that is separate from this human being or 
that, then the possible intellect’s act of understanding could belong to either human 
being.  Thus, no human being at all would understand anything.  191 192
Aquinas says that Averroes tries to avoid the problem implied in the third argument by 
positing the “conjunction-theory.”  According to this theory the possible intellect is 193
“conjoined to man through the mediation of phantasms.” According to the Averroists,  194
Aristotle says that phantasms relate to the possible intellect as sensible objects relate to 
the senses or as colors relate to sight,  so an intelligible species exists in two ways: (1) 195
In the mode of intelligible being in the possible intellect; (2) In the mode of real being in 
the knower. Thus the intelligible species are in both the individual human and in the one 
possible intellect, but in different modes.  
Aquinas offers the following responses to the conjunction-theory: 
• Someone is not capable of knowing something simply because knowable species 
are present to him, but because he has a power of knowing.  196
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• The analogy with color and sight is mistaken, because the fact that a wall has colors 
“in it” does not mean that it has the power of seeing those colors.  Similarly, the 197
mere presence of phantasms is insufficient for understanding; a power is also 
required. 
• Intelligible species are understood only when they are abstracted from phantasms; 
the possible intellect has the intelligible species only insofar as the species have 
already been abstracted from phantasms and exist in the possible intellect.  Thus 198
intelligible species cannot be both in the phantasms and in the possible intellect.  199
And if intelligible species are present to individual humans only as phantasms, i.e., 
as only potentially understood, then it still could not be said that individual humans 
understand. 
• The conjunction-theory is wrong because of the nature of separate substances.  200
Separate substances have a high degree of perfection and thus cannot depend on 
material things for their own essential operations. Since the possible intellect is in 
potency to the species of sensible things, and its operation requires bodily 
phantasms, the possible intellect cannot be a separate substance.  201
From this Aquinas concludes that the possible intellect is a potency of the human soul, 
and offers a response to possible objections to the effect that the soul’s function as a form 
prevents any aspect of the soul from being separable: 
[A]lthough the human soul is a form united to a body, still it is united in such a 
way that it is not entirely contained by the body as if immersed in it, as are other 
material forms, but rather it surpasses the capability of all corporeal matter and 
because of the fact that its power exceeds corporeal matter, there is grounded in it 
the potential for intelligible objects, and this potency belongs to the possible 
intellect; however, insofar as the soul is united to its body, it possesses operations 
and powers in which the body shares, such as the powers of the nutritive and 
sensitive parts of the soul.   202
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creation (and the background for such views), see C.S. Lewis, The Discarded Image: An 
Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1964), 40-42, 56, 109, 71, 71-74, 135-136. 
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Aquinas concludes his own response to the question by saying that his view concords 
with that of Aristotle, because while the possible intellect is not grounded in a bodily 
organ, the possible intellect “is located in the essence of the human soul,” which is also 
the form of a human body.  203
In the ad contra section Aquinas offers further arguments against the separate 
possible intellect and further explanation of his own view of the possible intellect.  In 204
these arguments we find a number of emphases. (1) Aquinas stresses that the soul 
transcends the body, even though the soul is the form of the body.  Thus, the fact that 205
the soul is the act of an organic body should not be taken to mean that the body is the 
soul’s principle for all of its operations.  The possible intellect is the highest principle in 206
the soul.  (2) Universals are not the same as intelligible species.  Intelligible species 207 208
are those by which the intellect understands and not the object of intellectual 
understanding (the only exception occurs when the intellect reflects on its own 
understanding). Intelligible species received in the possible intellect from the active 
intellect are individuated because they inhere in the various possible intellects, but as 
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immaterial they are still the means by which we know universals.  (3) The fact that the 209
intellect abstracts universal forms from individuating material principles does not require 
that the intellect be universal, but only that it be immaterial.   210
(4) There is also an emphasis on the unity of substantial form. Of all the ad contra 
arguments, the one perhaps most instructive for purposes of comparison with Pecham has 
to do with the various aspects of the soul:  
The likeness which the Philosopher notes between geometrical figures and parts 
of the soul bear upon this point, that just as a quadrilateral possesses whatever a 
triangle has and something more, and as a pentagon has whatever a quadrilateral 
has, so the sensitive soul possesses whatever the nutritive soul does and the 
intellective soul possesses whatever belongs to the sensitive soul and more. It 
does not follow from this that the nutritive and sensitive differ essentially from 
the intellective, but rather that one of them includes the other.  211
Here we have a clear statement of Aquinas’s anti-pluralist position: the intellect includes 
the other forms, i.e., there is only one substantial form for the human being. And Aquinas 
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explains his position further as he comments on Aristotle’s statement that in the 
generation of a human being, the animal precedes the man:  212
Just as animal and human being are not conceived at one and the same time, so 
neither are animal and horse. . . . Consequently, the necessary meaning of the 
statement is not that there is in a human being one substantial principle, namely, 
the sensitive soul, by which he is an animal, and another principle, the intellective 
soul, by which he is human, since one cannot say that in a horse there are diverse 
principles by one of which the horse is an animal and by another of which it is a 
horse. Rather the statement means that in the embryo there first appear less 
perfect operations and afterwards more perfect operations appear, just as all 
generation involves a change from the imperfect to the perfect.  213
Aquinas does not here explain the ontology of the changes, but only says that the changes 
occur.   214
(5) A fifth emphasis in the ad contra section has to do with the soul’s difficulty in 
corporeal embodiment. In response to the claim that God could not have created the 
human soul as being connected with the problems of embodiment, Aquinas says that 
Origen is responsible for the view that souls were originally created without bodies and 
were later punished by embodiment.  But Origen was mistaken, Aquinas says, because 215
he followed Plato in believing that the soul is a complete species and is united to the body 
accidentally. Aquinas’s position is that “[I]t is no loss to a soul to be united to its body, 
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but rather the union perfects the soul in its nature.”  On this view embodiment as such 216
is not harmful to the soul, but the corruption of the body as punishment for sin is what is 
damaging. 
(6) A sixth emphasis is that the flesh’s lust against the spirit indicates the soul’s 
affinity for the body.  Aquinas takes “spirit” here to refer to “the superior part of the 217
soul by which a human being surpasses other animals,” thus distinguishing between soul 
and spirit.  The flesh can be said to lust in the sense that the parts of the soul that are 218
united to flesh desire things that please the flesh, and sometimes these desires are at war 
with the spirit. 
In other ad contra arguments of the second quaestio Aquinas provides greater detail 
about how the various psychological operations are integrated.  Two substantial units 219
that are “complete in their own species and nature” cannot unite to form a substantial 
unit.  The soul and body are not substances in this sense, because they are parts of 220
human nature. They can jointly become a substantial unit. And, the soul cannot be 
brought about from the potency of matter through motion or mutation, as are other forms 
that are immersed in matter.   221
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Aquinas’s Third Quaestio 
Aquinas’s third quaestio, similar to the second, is whether the possible intellect, or the 
intellective soul altogether, is one for all human beings.  In the ad contra section, we 222
find a statement that could serve as a summary for many of Aquinas’s arguments in this 
quaestio:  
A human being understands by his possible intellect: for in Book III of the De 
Anima it is said that the possible intellect is that by which the soul understands. 
Consequently, if the possible intellect were one in all human beings, it follows 
that whatever one human being understands, any other human being would 
understand, and this is obviously untrue.   223
Aquinas adds here a description of the two ways in which he conceptualizes the soul’s 
relationship to the body.  The soul relates to the body as form to matter and as mover to 224
instrument. “Now every form demands determinate matter and every mover requires 
determinate instruments. Therefore it is impossible that there be only one intellective soul 
in diverse human beings.”  (Aquinas admits that the soul moves the body, but not 225
through its existence in virtue of which it is united to the body as form. ) 226
Aquinas begins his response to the question by saying that if the possible intellect is 
separate from the body in its existence, then there can be only one intellect.  He then 227
introduces the principle which causes philosophers to posit the possible intellect: “[I]t is 
clear that the possible intellect is related to the perfections found in the sciences as a first 
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perfection is related to a second perfection, and that through the possible intellect we are 
potential knowers.”  This principle about perfections not only serves as the rationale for 228
positing the possible intellect, but also provides Aquinas with a basis for arguing that the 
possible intellect must be plural.  If a second perfection of humans is the state of 229
possessing scientific knowledge, and individual humans possess various degrees of 
scientific knowledge, then it is impossible that an identical first perfection (i.e., the 
potentiality for scientific knowledge) gave rise to such a diversity of perfections on the 
second level of perfection. Aquinas says that this is an application of the general principle 
that a subject cannot be both in act and in potency with respect to the same form. 
Aquinas here repeats some of the discussion about intelligible species from the 
second quaestio.  In the present quaestio Aquinas emphasizes that the diversity of 230
phantasms, used by the Averroists to account for the numerical difference in 
understanding among knowers, has no bearing on the number of perfections in the order 
of knowledge.  This is for two reasons: (1) Species are not intelligible unless they have 231
been abstracted from the phantasms and exist in the possible intellect.  (2) Habitual 232
scientific knowledge is not a subject of the sensitive soul, as the Averroist position 
implies.   233
!270
 Ibid.; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 412a.1-413a.10.228
 Quaestiones, 69. 229
 Ibid., 69-70. 230
 Ibid.231
 Ibid., 70. 232
 Ibid.233
Next, Aquinas introduces a lengthy argument about the relationship between the 
diversity among the objects of understanding and the number of intellects:  If for the 234
sake of argument we overlook the fact that a separately existing possible intellect denies 
knowledge to individual human beings, then we must still ask how the operation of 
understanding is multiplied given a single possible intellect for all individual knowers.  235
There are two ways to attempt to account for this multiplication without positing 
individual minds. The first is from the side of the objects toward which understanding is 
directed, and the second is from the point of view of time.  In other words, if we 236
acknowledge that understanding a horse is different from understanding a man, then we 
can think of the operation of the possible intellect as being multiplied according to the 
objects of understanding. Or, if we acknowledge that an act of understanding that occurs 
today is numerically different from an act of understanding that occurred yesterday, then 
we can think of the operation of the possible intellect as being multiplied according to 
intervals of time. Aquinas points out in response that a differentiation between knowers 
based on circumstantial principles external to the the knowers could actually prohibit the 
very operational multiplicity that was sought, for it fails to take into account the 
numerical diversity of multiple understandings at the same moment: “[I]f there are two 
human beings who understand one and the same thing, at one and the same time, it is 
necessary that their act of understanding be one and the same in number, and this is 
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clearly impossible.”  Aquinas acknowledges that the possible intellect could be alike—237
although numerically diverse—in diverse knowers, but denies that the possible intellect 
can be one and the same in all or for all knowers. “For one cause can move diverse agents 
to perform their operations; but it is utterly impossible that diverse agents should function 
formally in virtue of a single principle.”   238
 Next, Aquinas argues the Averroist doctrine is open to the same objections to which a 
Platonic doctrine of Ideas is subject.  If we take it that species of things are known 239
according to their essential operations, and that the essential operation of a human being 
is to reason and understand, then the intellect is that which puts a being in the human 
species. This principle cannot be the sensitive soul or one of its powers. If the intellectual 
principle is taken to be one for all human beings, like a separate substance, then all 
human beings would be one through a single, separate substance. To this claim Aquinas 
opposes his own view about how operational multiplication occurs: If something is 
multiplied according to a “common, essential feature,” then the common feature is 
multiplied numerically even though the species remains the same.  The human soul is, 240
by virtue of its essential capability to unite with the body, 
multiplied numerically and not specifically, just as this whiteness differs from 
another whiteness numerically because it belongs to this or to that subject of 
whiteness. Still the soul differs from other forms in this respect: that its existence 
does not depend upon the body; consequently neither does its individuated 
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existence depend upon its body. For insofar as some thing is one, it is undivided 
in itself and is distinct from other things.  241
With this Aquinas concludes his responsio.  
Aquinas makes clear in the ad contra section that he does not believe the soul’s 
individuation to be due to the possible intellect. Rather, individuation occurs “according 
to the multiplication of the substance of the soul whose power the possible intellect is.”  242
In other words, “[O]ne possible intellect is specifically like any other possible 
intellect.”  Aquinas believes that corporeal matter is the principle of individuation.  In 243 244
Aquinas’s replies ad contra we find additional arguments against the Averroists’ claims 
and explanations that support his own position: 
• Truth is the intellect’s conformity to a thing.  So, when diverse human beings 245
understand one thing, this is because their conceptions conform to the thing.  
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• A statement by Augustine, which Pecham also discusses, should be interpreted to 
mean that there are many souls, but each soul must be correlated to only one 
body.  246
• The possible intellect’s lack of understanding of itself does not prevent it from 
being multiplied according to diverse knowers, because the intellect in fact does 
come to a knowledge of itself through its own operation.   247
• The fact that the intellect is the site for species does not mean that there is only one 
intellect that is able to receive all species.  Senses can be called the “site of 248
species”, but this means something different than what we mean when we call the 
intellect the site of species, because the senses require an organ in order to receive 
species.  The senses, it will be remembered, provide phantasms with which the 249
intellect works.  
• The possible intellect can be said to operate everywhere because its operation 
potentially has to do with things that are everywhere, not because it is actually 
located everywhere.  250
• The intellect does not have matter as a part of itself, yet since the intellect is the 
form of a body, its essence involves a relation to its material body.  251
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 Ibid. Augustine says, “As to the number of souls, however,—seeing that you thought 246
this relevant to the problem in hand—I do not know what answer to give you. I would be 
more inclined to say that the question should not be brought up at all or at least that you 
should postpone it for the time being rather than that I should say that number and 
multitude have no connection with quantity, or that I am presently equal to the task of 
solving such an involved problem for you. For if I should tell you that there is only one 
soul, you will be at sea because of the fact that in one it is happy, in another unhappy; and 
one and the same thing cannot be both happy and unhappy at the same time. If I should 
say that it is one and many at the same time, you will smile; and I would not find it easy 
to make you suppress your smile. But if I say simply that it is many, I shall have to laugh 
at myself, and it will be harder for me to suffer my own disapprobation than yours” (The 
Greatness of the Soul, chapter 69; cf. Pecham, Quaestiones, 365-366. I covered Pecham’s 
discussion of this passage in the third chapter of the present study). 
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Aquinas’s Treatise on Human Nature 
I will give an exposé of those passages of the Treatise that are most relevant for a 
comparison between Aquinas and Pecham on the issue of Latin Averroism. The main 
discussion comes in Aquinas’s quaestiones 76 (“The Soul’s Union with the Body,” in 
eight articles) and 84 (“What Does the Soul Cognize Bodies Through?,” in eight articles).  
In quaestio 76.1, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is the intellective 
principle united to the body as its form?”  Aquinas makes a number arguments to show 252
that the intellect is the form of the body.  
First, Aquinas gives an argument based on classification.  A differentia is drawn 253
from the form of a thing. But the differentia that gives rise to the human being is 
“rational,” which is ascribed to a human being on account of the intellective principle. 
Therefore the intellective principle is the form of a human being.  
Second, Aquinas gives an argument based on an operational definition of form.  254
That through which a thing first operates is its form. For example, the body is healed 
through health, and so health is a form of the body. There are two steps in the argument to 
show that the intellect can be called the form of the body: (1) That through which the soul 
first knows is knowledge, so knowledge is a form of the soul. (2) That through which the 
body first lives is the soul, for the soul is the first thing through which we are nourished 
and carry out human functions. In turn, the intellect informs the soul, which is the 
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principle of the life of the body. Therefore the intellect can be called the form of the body 
by virtue of the soul’s broader relationship to the body.  
Third, Aquinas gives a reductio argument to the effect that any view of the intellect 
that prohibits its being the form of the body must explain how “this man thinks.”  255
Aquinas says that there are only three ways for an action to be attributed to something: 
(1) An action is attributed to something in respect of the thing’s whole self (e.g., the 
doctor, qua doctor, heals). But this is not the sense in which we say that the human 
Socrates thinks, because Socrates qua human also senses and does other things. (2) An 
action is attributed to something in respect of a thing’s part (e.g., one sees through one’s 
eyes). This is the sense in which we say that Socrates thinks, because he thinks using the 
soul which is somehow united to his body. (3) An action is attributed to something in 
respect of a thing’s actions (e.g., something white builds if the builder happens to be 
white). This is not the sense in which we say that the human Socrates thinks, because 
Socrates’ thinking is essentially predicated to him by virtue of the fact that he is a human 
being.  
The fourth argument is a direct answer to Averroes’ statement that the union of soul 
and body takes place through the intelligible species, and that these species have two 
subjects: the possible intellect, and the phantasms that exist in corporeal organs.  256
Aquinas says that this kind of connection via the intelligible species is insufficient to 
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justify calling an intellectual act Socrates’ act, because phantasms are to intellect just as 
colors are to sight.  
Others want to say that the intellect is united to the body as its mover.  But Aquinas 257
says that this approach is mistaken for five reasons:  258
• The intellect moves the body only through appetite, which presupposes intellectual 
operation (e.g., because Socrates thinks, he is accordingly moved by the 
intellect).  259
• Socrates is an essence composed of matter and form. If intellect is not his form, 
then it falls outside of his essence and could not move him.  Intellectual actions do 260
not pass from one thing to another as heat does.  261
• If the intellect moves Socrates as mover, then Socrates is merely the soul’s 
instrument, and this is contrary to Aristotle.   262
• Action that is attributed to the whole can still be attributed to a part, but if the 
intellect moves Socrates, then he is not unconditionally one thing. Rather, “this 
particular human being thinks because the intellective principle is his form.”   263
• The defining operation of the human being is to think. Thus, a human must obtain 
its species in accord with the principle of its operation.  
Still, the fact that the intellect is a form for matter rather than a mover does not restrict 
the intellect from being loftier than matter, dominant over it, and less immersed in it.  264
Aquinas lists three reasons for the the intellect’s prominent position: 
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• The intellective power is not the power of any corporeal organ, in the way that 
visual power is the actuality of the eye. The soul is in matter inasmuch as the soul to 
which the intellective power belongs is the form of the body.  
• The human soul is the ultimate in loftiness among forms.  
Having addressed the soul’s position among the forms, Aquinas argues against those 
who believe that the soul is composed of matter and form.  If someone believes that the 265
soul has matter, then he could not also maintain that the soul is the body’s form. Form is 
actuality, whereas matter is solely potential being, and so the actuality of the soul’s matter 
could not also be the actuality of the human body.  
At the end of the article, Aquinas says that the soul is suited to be united to a body, 
just as a lightweight body is suited to be up high.  And just as a light body remains light 266
even after it has been pulled down from its proper place, so the human soul continues in 
its existence even after it has been separated from its body, and maintains its natural 
inclination for embodiment. And, since the soul is the body’s form, the human body does 
not have existence apart from the soul.  267
In quaestio 76.2, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is the intellective 
principle numerically multiplied according to the number of bodies? Or is there a single 




 In quaestio 79.1 of the Treatise, Aquinas clarifies his position by saying that “the 267
intellect is one of the soul’s capacities and not the soul’s very essence. For the essence of 
the thing operating is the immediate basis of its operation only when that operation is its 
existence. For just as a capacity is related to its operation as to its actuality, so essence is 
related to existence. But only in God’s case is his intellective operation the same as his 
existence. Consequently, it is only in God’s case that his intellect is his essence; in 
created beings, the intellect is a capacity of the creature using it” (ibid., 78-79).  
 Ibid., 24-29. 268
First, Aquinas argues that it is impossible for all humans to share in the same intellect, 
whether one subscribes to Plato’s psychology or to Aristotle’s.  If Plato were correct in 269
saying that human beings essentially are their intellects, then Socrates and Plato could not 
share the same intellect.  On the other hand, Aristotle says that the intellect is a part or 270
capacity of the soul that is a single human being’s form; it is impossible that numerically 
different things share in a single form, just as it is impossible that they share in a single 
existence.  
Second, it is impossible for a single intellect to be united to all people no matter how 
one understands the connection.  Aquinas again uses an argument about agency and 271
instrumentality, but in this case with different illustrations.  If there were a principal 272
agent and two instruments, one could speak unconditionally of a single agent, but of 
several actions (e.g., a human touches different things with each hand). If there were a 
single instrument and different agents, then there would be several agents but a single 
action (e.g., many people pull a ship with one rope, or many see with one eye). But if 
there were a single principal agent and a single instrument, there would be a single agent 
and a single action (e.g., a blacksmith strikes with a single hammer). The intellect is 
principal among the various things that pertain to a human being (the other powers obey 
and serve the intellect). Thus, if there is a single intellect, then no matter how different 
the various instruments of the intellect are, there is still only one thinker.   273
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Third, different phantasms can produce various intellectual actions for the possible 
intellect, but phantasms cannot change the form of the possible intellect, because the 
possible intellect’s form comes through the intelligible species which are abstracted from 
the phantasms.  A single intellect abstracts only a single intelligible species from 274
different phantasms of the same kind (e.g., a single thinker abstracts a single intelligible 
species of stone from various phantasms of stones). Conversely, a common principle is 
distinguished and multiplied by individuating principles that come from matter. The 
species is abstracted from those material conditions and is then a likeness of the nature 
without the things that distinguish and multiply the nature.   275
In quaestio 76.3, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Does a body whose 
form is the intellective principle have any other soul?”  Aquinas’s response may be 276
divided into three parts. 
First, Aquinas contrasts what he takes to be Plato’s view of the soul with what he 
takes to be Aristotle’s, and this leads to a discussion about the number of forms in the 
single human being.  Plato posited multiple souls in the same body (i.e., the nutritive 277
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many people see the same color in virtue of different likenesses, and many intellects 
understand a single intellectual object). Still, it is the stone that is understood, and not the 
species of the stone. Otherwise our knowledge would not be about things in the world, 
but about intelligible species. Aquinas adds that a statement of Augustine’s, to which 
Pecham also refers (“if I were to say only that there are many human souls, I would laugh 
at myself” [Augustine, The Greatness of the Soul, chapter 69; cf. Pecham, Quaestiones, 
365-366]), means that it is not only the case that there are many souls. It is also the case 
that they were made one in their specific nature.
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soul in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, the cognitive in the brain), but Aristotle 
discredits this view on the basis that some animals continue to live after they are cut 
apart.  Aristotle leaves open the question of whether the intellect is separate only 278
conceptually from the soul’s other parts, or spatially as well.   279
Plato’s position could be upheld if the soul is united to the body only as its mover, for 
various movers can move the same object, especially if each mover moves different 
parts.  But if the soul is united to the body as its form, then it is still impossible for 280
several different souls to be in the same body. Aquinas brings up three arguments to 
support this claim:  (1) An animal with several souls would not be one thing 281
unconditionally.  A thing is one unconditionally through only the form by which that 282
thing has existence. If a thing has multiple forms, then a human would not be one thing 
unconditionally.  If there are different souls in the same body, then we must ask what 283
“contains” them. They cannot be united by the body’s unity, because the soul contains the 
body and not vice versa. (2) Things that are drawn from different forms are predicated in 
one of two ways, either accidentally (e.g., when we say that a white thing is sweet), or 
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 Ibid. Aquinas says that Aristotle uses this argument against Plato in Metaphysics, 283
1045a.14-20. Aristotle says: “What then is it that makes man one; why is he one and not 
many, e.g. animal—biped, especially if there are, as some say, an ideal animal and an 
ideal biped? Why are not those Ideas the ideal man, so that men would exist by 
participation not in man, nor in one Idea, but in two, animal and biped? And in general 
man would be not one but more than one thing, animal and biped.”
per se.  There are two types of per se predication.  Per se predication can occur where 284 285
the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject. For example, “animal” is 
predicated of “human being” because it is through the same form that something is an 
animal and through which it is a human being.  Or, per se predication can occur where 286
the subject is contained in the definition of the predicate. For example, a surface is a 
prerequisite for color. If something is said to be an animal because of one form and 
human being because of another form, then it would follow that either one of the forms 
could be predicated of the others only accidentally, or by the second type of per se 
predication, where one soul is a prerequisite for another.  (3) We find that one intense 287
operation of the soul impedes another.  This could not occur if the source of the actions 288
were not a single essence.  
Second, species and forms of things differ in terms of being more or less complete 
(e.g., human souls are more complete than plant souls).  There are also different levels 289
among the individual aspects of the soul, just as there are differences between species of 
shapes. The intellective soul contains virtually the sensory soul and nutritive soul, just as 
the pentagonal shape contains the tetragonal. 
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 For details concerning Aquinas’s view of the relationship between substantial form 287
and predication, see his quaestio 77.6 in the Treatise. 
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Third, the sensitive soul is made incorruptible not because it is sensitive, but rather by 
being intellective.  When a soul is merely sensory it is corruptible, but when it has the 290
intellective with the sensory it is incorruptible.  The composite is classified by genus 291
and species. A human being is corruptible just as other animals are.  Thus the 292
incorruptible aspect of the human being does not require that the human being be placed 
in a genus different from that of other animals.  After all, a human embryo first has a 293
soul that is merely sensitive. When a more complete soul arrives, one that is both sensory 
and intellective, the merely sensitive soul is diplaced. The intellective soul virtually 
contains whatever the sensory soul had. 
In quaestio 76.4, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is there any other 
substantial form in such a body?”  Aquinas’s response is in four parts.  294
First, if the soul were united to the body only as a mover, then it would be necessary 
to posit another substantial form in the human being.  A substantial form differs from an 295
accidental form in that an accidental form does not give being unconditionally but rather 
“being such.”   296
Second, if there were some other substantial form in matter prior to the intellect, 
through which the soul’s subject were actually existent, then the soul would not make a 
thing to be unconditionally.  Consequently the soul would not be a substantial form. 297
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Aquinas notes that there are various levels of perfection in matter, such as existing, 
living, sensing, and thinking, but maintains that the presence of the various perfections 
does not constitute the presence of various forms.  
Third, the intellective soul “brings about whatever it is that less perfect forms bring 
about in other things.”  298
Fourth, Aristotle says that the soul is the actuality of not just any body, but “of a 
physical body with organs ... potentially having life.”  The soul is included in that of 299
which it is said to be the actuality, in the same way that heat is said to be the actuality of 
what is hot.   300
In quaestio 76.5, Aquinas deals with the following question: “What sort of body 
should have the intellective principle as its form?”  Aquinas’s response is in four parts.  301
First, Aquinas says that matter exists for the sake of form.  Thus form must be the 302
reason why matter is as it is, and not vice versa.  
Second, the human intellect is the lowest of the intellectual substances and does not 
have knowledge of truth naturally given to it.  The intellect must accumulate such 303
knowledge from divisible things through sensory means. So, nature saw to it that the 
intellective soul had the power for sensation and a body with which to sense.  Touch is 304
the fundamental sense because all other senses are founded on touch. The organ of touch 
!284
 Ibid.298
 Ibid.; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 412b.5-6, 25. 299
 Treatise, 35.300
 Ibid., 37-39. 301
 Ibid., 37. 302
 Ibid., 37-38. 303
 Ibid., 38.304
is required as an intermediary between the contraries that touch apprehends (e.g., hot and 
cold, wet and dry, etc.). The more touch is of a balanced complexion, the better it can 
sense. Thus the soul needs a mixed body, and the human body above all other bodies 
allows the soul to sense best through touch. Still, because the intellect can grasp 
universals, it has power to apprehend an infinite number of things.  
Third, there are two conditions in matter.  One is selected because it is appropriate 305
to the form, and the other is selected due to the matter’s prior disposition.  For example, 306
a craftsman selects iron for the form of a saw because iron is suitable for cutting hard 
things. But the fact that the saw can become dull is due to the necessary corruptibility on 
the part of the matter. Likewise the intellective soul should have a body that has a 
balanced complexion, but because such a body is material, it is necessarily corruptible. 
The body is suited to the intellective soul not on account of the intellectual operation per 
se, but on account of the sensory power.  The balanced complexion of the body gives it 307
a kind of excellence that makes it similar to a celestial body.  
Fourth, although the intellective soul is one essence, nevertheless, due to its 
perfection it has multiple powers.  Hence, for its various operations it needs various 308
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In quaestio 76.6, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is the intellective 
principle united to such a body through the mediation of any accident?”  Aquinas’s 309
response is in three parts.  
First, if the soul were united to the body only as mover, then it would be necessary for 
there to be certain dispositions serving as intermediaries between the soul and its body.  310
On the soul’s side there would have to be a capacity through which it would move the 
body. On the body’s side there would have to be an aptitude of some sort through which 
the body would be movable by the soul.  
Second, Aquinas says that the soul does move the body, but not through its existence 
in virtue of which it is united to the body as form.  The soul moves the body through its 311
potential for producing movement, the actualization of which presupposes a body already 
actualized by soul. The soul is the part of the composite that produces motion due to its 
motive power, whereas the ensouled body is the part of the composite that is moved.  
Third, there cannot be any accidental disposition between form and matter.  Thus, 312
since the intellect is united to the body as substantial form, then there cannot be any 
accidental disposition between body and soul. There is a certain order in which matter is 
potentiality for all actualities, and in this order whatever is unconditionally first among 
actualities must be conceived of first in matter.  But the first among all actualities is 313
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existence.  For this reason we cannot conceive of matter as hot or extended before 314
conceiving of it as actually existing. This existence comes through its substantial from, 
which provides existence unconditionally. Thus no accidental dispositions exist in matter 
prior to the substantial form.  
In quaestio 76.7, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is the soul united to the 
body through the mediation of any other body?”  Aquinas’s response is in three parts.  315
First, Aquinas says that whatever moves something at a distance does so through 
much closer intermediaries.  So, he acknowledges that if the soul were united to the 316
body only as a mover, then it would be appropriate to say that other intermediary bodies 
intervene between the human soul and its body. But it is impossible for form to be united 
to matter through bodily mediation. A thing is one in just the way it is said to exist. But a 
form all by itself, because it is essentially actual, makes a thing actually exist. It does not 
provide existence through an intermediary. There is no agency that unites the form and 
matter, except for the agent that makes the matter to exist. 
Second, Aquinas mentions three views that posit material mediation between soul and 
body, and responds to one of them directly.  (1) Some Platonists, Aquinas says, thought 317
that the intellective soul has an incorruptible body that is naturally united to it, from 
which it is never separated, and through whose mediation it is united to the corruptible 
human body. (2) Others said that the soul is united to the body through the mediation of a 
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bodily spirit.  (3) Others held that the soul is united to the body through the mediation 318
of a material light made of quintessence. But this is impossible because light is not a 
body, and the unalterable quintessence enters bodies only virtually (not materially). 
Furthermore, the soul is immediately united to its body as form to matter.   319
Third, when the spirit is taken away from the body, then the union between the soul 
and body is gone.  This separation is not because spirit is an intermediary, but because 320
the disposition is removed by which the body is disposed for such a union.  Spirit can 321
be considered to be an intermediary only in the production of movement, because spirit is 
the first instrument of movement.  
In quaestio 76.8, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is the soul whole in 
each part of the body?”  Aquinas’s response is in four parts.  322
First, Aquinas says that if the soul were united to a body only as a mover, then one 
could say that the soul exists only in one part of the body, and that through that particular 
part, it moves the other parts.  But because the soul is united to the body as its form, 323
then the soul necessarily exists in the whole body and in each part of the body. The soul is 
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not one of the body’s accidental forms, but rather its substantial form.  A substantial 324
form perfects not only the whole, but each part. A form that does not give existence to the 
individual parts of the body is a form that is merely an accidental composition or ordering 
(e.g., the arrangement of the materials that make up a house). But the soul is both the 
form and actuality not only of the whole, but of each part. This is why Aristotle speaks 
only equivocally of an animal or human being once the soul has left the body, and the 
same equivocation characterizes talk of the hand, eye, flesh, and bones.  No part of the 325
body has its proper function once the soul has departed.  
Second, the soul is whole in each part of the body.  There are three ways of being 326
whole: (1) Some wholes can be divided into parts (e.g., a whole line or a whole body).  327
This is applicable to forms only accidentally (e.g., when whiteness can be whole in a 
whole object in just the same way in which it can be whole in a part of the original 
object; whiteness could be accidentally divided).  The soul is not a whole in this 328
quantitative sense. (2) Some wholes can be divided into the parts of account (rationis) 
and essence.  This understanding of wholeness applies to the soul as form.  (3) Some 329 330
wholes can be divided into parts based on powers or capacities.  This understanding of 331
wholeness is also applicable to the soul as form.  332
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Third, the soul is not whole in every part of the body with regard to each of its 
capacities (e.g., the soul is in the eye with regard to sight, and the soul is in the ear with 
regard to hearing).   333
Fourth, the soul is related to the whole body first and per se, and it is related to the 
particular parts of that body secondarily, in virtue of their being associated with the 
whole.    334
Quaestio 84 deals with the following question: “What does the soul cognize bodies 
through?” In quaestio 84.1, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Does the soul 
cognize bodies through intellect?” Aquinas’s response is in three parts. 
First, Aquinas discusses what he takes to be views of the Presocratics and Plato.  335
The earliest philosophers were materialists, believing that bodies are in a constant flux.  336
This meant that there could be no certainty. Plato, however, posited non-bodily Ideas. On 
Plato’s view, each particular sensible is what it is based on participation with an Idea. 
Sciences, therefore, pertain to the Ideas and not to sensible things. Aquinas presents two 
arguments to show that Plato’s view is false:  (1) Since the Ideas are immaterial and 337
unchangeable, we could know neither matter and motion nor demonstration through 
moving and material causes. Yet knowledge of such things is the foundation of natural 
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are not the substances we are attempting to know.  Even if we were to get to know the 338
Ideas, we would not know the sensible objects that we were trying to understand when 
we posited the Ideas. Plato recognized the need for humans to cognize universals, but he 
erred in thinking that the form of the thing cognized has to be in the knower in the way in 
which it is in the external thing cognized. The forms inhere in sensible things to various 
degrees (e.g., in one thing the whiteness is more intense, in another thing it is less 
intense). Species are received in the intellect immaterially and unchangeably; all species 
are received according to the mode of the recipient. The soul, “through intellect, cognizes 
bodies by means of a cognition that is immaterial, universal, and necessary.”  
Second, Aquinas explains the conclusion of the foregoing, saying that the intellect 
does cognize bodies, but not “through bodies”, nor through material and bodily 
likenesses, but through species that are immaterial and intelligible.  It should not be 339
said that the corporeal senses cognize only bodily things whereas the intellect cognizes 
only spiritual things, for then it would follow that God and the angels would not cognize 
bodily things.  Rather, it should be said that a higher power performs in a superior way 340
the operations of a lower power.  
Third, nothing prevents us from having unchangeable knowledge of changeable 
things.  For example, even though Socrates is not always sitting, it is unchangeably true 341
that when he is sitting, he stays in one place.  
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In quaestio 84.2, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Does the soul 
understand bodies through its essence or through species?”  Aquinas’s response is in 342
three parts.  
First, Aquinas addresses what he takes to be the views of the ancient philosophers up 
through the Platonists.  The earliest philosophers claimed that the soul cognizes bodies 343
through its essence.  They believed in the principle that “like is cognized by like,” and 344
further held that the form of the cognized thing is in the one cognizing in the same way 
that it is in the cognized thing.  They even thought that the material things that are 345
cognized must exist materially in the cognizer. This was consistent with their view that 
the soul has a material nature that is common to all things (e.g., fire is the principle of all 
things, and so the soul is made of fire; all things are combinations of the four elements, 
and so the soul is a combination of the four elements). In sum, cognition was considered 
to be a material process. Aquinas offers two arguments against this view: (1) Things that 
will be educed from a principle in matter exist in that principle now only potentially.  346
But a thing is cognized not insofar as it is in potentiality, but only insofar as it is in 
actuality.  The potentiality itself is cognized only through actuality. Thus one cannot 347
attribute material principles, which are associated with potentiality, to the intellect. (2) If 
a thing cognized has to exist materially in the cognizer, then material things existing 
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outside the soul would have cognition themselves.  Plato made an advance in that he 348
recognized that the intellective soul is immaterial and cognizes immaterially, however, he 
went too far in claiming that the forms of the cognized things subsist immaterially.  349
Second, Aquinas says that the nature of cognition is correlated inversely with the 
nature of materiality.  Things that receive forms only materially, such as plants, are in 350
no way cognitive. But the more immaterially that something has the form of the thing 
cognized, the more perfectly it cognizes. The intellect abstracts not only the species from 
the matter, but also the form without its matter and without its individual material 
conditions. This is unlike sense, which also takes on the form of the thing cognized 
without the matter, but along with the material conditions. Among the senses sight is the 
most cognitive, because it is the least material.  
Third, Aquinas says that if some intellect were to cognize all things through its 
essence, then its essence must have all things within itself immaterially.  But God is the 351
only essence that has all things within itself immaterially.  
In quaestio 84.3, Aquinas deals with the following question: “If the soul understands 
bodies through species, are the species of all intelligible things naturally innate in it?”  352
Aquinas’s response is in three parts.  
First, Aquinas says that the principle of an action is a form, so a thing must be related 
to its form in the same way that it is related to its action (e.g., if a thing is moved upward 
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because of being light, then what is only potentially lifted upward is only potentially 
light).  Thus a human is sometimes actually cognizant, and sometimes only potentially 353
cognizant. A cognitive soul can be brought into actuality in two ways: (1) In sensing, 
through the actions of the sensible things on the senses. (2) In understanding, through 
instruction or discovery. Sometimes that which actually has a form is unable to act in 
accord with that form. For example, something light may be impeded from being lifted 
upward (and the human being may be prevented from understanding).  
Second, Aquinas addresses what he takes to be Plato’s view, that the human intellect 
is naturally filled with all intelligible species but is impeded by the body.  Plato’s 354
position is incorrect for two reasons: (1) If the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, 
it is impossible that the soul would become so forgetful as to not know that it has such 
knowledge.  Nobody forgets the things that he naturally cognizes (e.g., that a whole is 355
greater than its part), and such forgetfulness is especially absurd if knowledge of all 
intelligible things is held to be natural to the soul.  (2) When one lacks a sense, one 356
lacks the knowledge of things that are apprehended by that sense (e.g., someone born 
blind has no knowledge of colors).  This would not be so if the soul already possessed 357
the concepts of all intelligible things. 
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Third, human knowers have understanding in common with the angels, but fall short 
of the eminence of angelic intellects just as lower bodies fall short of the existence of 
higher bodies.   358
In quaestio 84.4, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Do species emanate 
from certain separate immaterial forms, into the soul?”  Aquinas’s response is in three 359
parts.  
First, Aquinas addresses what he takes to be Plato’s position.  Plato posited the 360
Forms that subsist on their own without matter, and he said that the soul and material 
objects both participate in the Forms (the soul for cognition, and material objects for their 
existence).  Participation by the soul occurs through a likeness of the Idea in the mind 361
that is participating in the Form. Thus, just as Plato claimed that the sensible forms 
emanate from Ideas as likenesses of them, so he also claimed that the intelligible species 
in the human soul are likenesses of the Ideas from which they emanate. But, Aquinas 
says, it is contrary to the nature of sensible things to subsist without their matter, as 
Aristotle proves in a number of ways.  Furthermore, Aquinas says that Avicenna posited 362
not that the intelligible species of all sensible things subsist on their own without matter, 
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but that they preexist immaterially in the separated intellects.  From this intellect, the 363
intelligible species emanate into our souls, and sensible forms emanate into corporeal 
matter. There are two differences between Plato and Avicenna: (1) Plato said that the 
Forms subsist on their own, whereas Avicenna located them in an agent intelligence. (2) 
Avicenna held that intelligible species do not remain in an individual’s intellect after the 
intellect ceases to understand actually, but rather that the intellect must return again to 
receive the species anew. So Avicenna did not hold that the soul is naturally endowed 
with knowledge as Plato did.   364
Second, on any view where species come from separate immaterial forms, there is the 
problem of the body’s role in cognition.  A body seems necessary to the intellective soul 365
for its proper operation, which is to understand. After all, the body is for the sake of the 
soul. If the soul receives intelligible species solely through an influx from separate 
principles, then the soul would not need a body in order to understand. 
Next, Aquinas responds to two objections to his position about the body’s role:  (1) 366
Someone might say that a human soul needs the body because the senses somehow 
arouse the soul to consider the species it receives from the separate principles.  But this 367
is false because the intellect needs to be aroused only because the body is stupefied. 
Platonists go so far as to say that the soul is stupefied because of embodiment.  (2) 368
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Someone might say, in accord with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary because they 
arouse the soul to turn toward the agent intellect, from which the soul receives species.  369
But this is false because, if the soul’s nature were to understand through the species in the 
agent intellect, then the soul could sometimes turn toward the Intelligence through the 
soul’s own natural inclination. Or, the soul could receive from the Agent Intelligence 
species of sensibles belonging to a sense that the soul’s body does not have.  
Third, Aquinas says that the possible intellect is brought from potentiality to actuality 
through the agent intellect, which is a power that belongs to the individual’s soul.  The 370
possible intellect was not brought to actuality through some separated intellect serving as 
the proximate cause, although there could be a separate intellect serving as a remote 
cause. 
In quaestio 84.5, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Does our soul see all 
things that it understands in their eternal natures?”  Aquinas’s response is in three parts. 371
First, Aquinas responds to what he takes to be Plato’s position.  Plato posited the 372
separate Ideas and participation (as discussed above). But it is contrary to Christian belief 
that the forms of things should subsist on their own outside of things and without matter. 
So, Aquinas says that Augustine posited that the natures of all creatures exist in the divine 
mind.  In virtue of these natures, Augustine said, all things are formed and the human 373
soul has cognition of all things.  
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Second, Aquinas says that a thing is cognized in something in two ways:  (1) An 374
object is itself cognized, as someone sees in a mirror the things whose images are 
reflected in the mirror. In this sense, the soul cannot see all things in their eternal natures. 
However, blessed people can see God and see all things in God.  (2) An object is 375
cognized in something as in the source of the cognition.  For example, we say that 376
things are seen in the sun because the sun shines on them and allows us to see them. In 
this sense, the soul does cognize all things through participation in these eternal natures. 
The intellectual light that is in us participates in the uncreated light, in which the eternal 
natures are contained. 
Third, in order to cognize material things, we require intelligible species that are 
taken from things.  We do not have knowledge of material things solely through 377
participation in their eternal natures. Augustine rightly asked how these eternal natures 
could provide time-sensitive information about issues such as how many kinds of animals 
there are.  Augustine also said that not each and every rational soul is worthy of the 378
vision of eternal natures, but only those rational souls that are holy.   379
!298
 Treatise, 147-148.374
 Ibid., 148. 375
 Ibid.376
 Ibid.377
 See Augustine, On the Trinity, 4.16.378
 See Augustine, Eighty-three Different Questions, trans. David L. Mosher, Fathers of 379
the Church 70 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press), 46: “These reasons 
(rationes), as was said, may be called ideas, or forms, or species, or reasons; and while it 
is the privilege of many to name them what they wish, it is the privilege of very few to 
see them in their reality” (parenthetical item in orig.). 
In quaestio 84.6, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Does our soul acquire 
intelligible cognition from sensation?”  Aquinas’s response is a consideration of what 380
he takes to be the views of three prominent philosophers, the last of whom is Aristotle.  
First, Aquinas considers Democritus, who said that cognitions are caused solely by 
images that emanate from the bodies about which we are thinking.  He thought this 381
because he (and other ancient philosophers) did not differentiate intellect from sense.  
Second, Aquinas considers Plato, who said that the intellect is an immaterial power 
that does not use a body for its act.  Therefore Plato claimed that intellectual cognition 382
is not brought about by an impression from sensible things, but through the intellect’s 
participation in separate, intelligible Forms. On Plato’s view, the organs of sense are 
active in that they receive impressions from sensibles; this process rouses the soul to form 
in itself the species of sensible things.   383
Third, Aquinas considers Aristotle, who took a “middle route.”  Aristotle claimed 384
that the intellect differs from sense, and that sense’s operation is totally shared with the 
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body.  Sensing, on this view, is an act of the compound and not of the soul alone.  385 386
Thus Aristotle agreed with Democritus insofar as both said the operations of the sensory 
part are caused by the impression of a sensible on a sense (although they disagreed about 
whether this occurred due to emanation of atoms), but Aristotle claimed further that the 
intellect has an operation that it does not share with the body.  He posited the agent 387
intellect, which makes phantasms drawn from the senses actually intelligible by way of 
abstraction.  Therefore, the sensible cognition is “in a certain way the material of the 388
cause”, but not the whole and complete cause of intellectual cognition.  Humans also 389
require the light of the agent intellect, in which we unchangeably cognize the truth in 
changeable things, and distinguish the things themselves from the likenesses of things. 
The agent intellect is in some sense separate, at least from the possible intellect, because 
“that which acts is loftier than that which is acted upon.”  Similarly, there must be in the 390
power of imagination not only a passive capacity but also an active one, because there is 
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some operation of the human soul that forms various images of things by dividing and 
composing, even producing some images that are not drawn from the senses.  
In quaestio 84.7, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Does our soul need 
phantasms in order actually to understand?”  Aquinas’s answer is in four parts: 391
 First, Aquinas says that it is impossible for the human intellect, connected to a body 
that can be acted upon, to actually understand anything without turning toward 
phantasms.  The intellect’s actual understanding—not just producing knowledge anew, 392
but also using knowledge already acquired—requires an act of imagination and of the 
other powers. This is clear because when we try to understand something, we form 
phantasms by way of examples and examine the thing we are trying to understand. 
Similarly, when we are explaining something to someone, we propose examples.  
Second, a cognitive capacity is proportioned to what it cognizes.  An angelic 393
intellect, entirely separate from any body, has as its proper object an intelligible substance 
separate from body.  A human intellect, which is connected to the body, has as its 394
proper object a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. Through such natures the 
human intellect rises to cognize even some invisible things.  We apprehend particulars 395
through sense and imagination, but in order for the intellect to actually apprehend its 
proper object, it must turn toward phantasms to examine the universal nature existing in 
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the particular.  If the proper object of the human intellect were a separate form, then the 396
intellect would not need to turn toward phantasms.  
Third, the species preserved in the possible intellect exists there “dispositionally” 
when the intellect is not actually understanding.  In order for us to understand actually, 397
we must use those species appropriately for the things of which they are species, i.e., the 
natures existing in particulars.  
Fourth, we cognize God and incorporeal substances by making some comparison to 
sensible, corporeal things.  We cognize God as a cause, and through the methods of 398
exceeding and subtracting. We cognize the incorporeal substances only through 
subtracting or through some comparison to corporeal things. 
In quaestio 84.8, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is the intellect’s 
judgment impeded by an impediment to the sensory powers?”  Aquinas’s answer is in 399
two parts.  
First, Aquinas says that the intellect’s proper, proportionate object is the nature of the 
sensible object.  But no complete judgment about a thing can be rendered unless all that 400
pertains to that thing is cognized, and judgment is especially difficult if one fails to grasp 
“the terminus of the judgment” which requires the phantasm. The end of natural 
knowledge is to cognize the natures of the things that the senses perceive.  
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Second, all the things that we understand are cognized by the intellect’s making a 
comparison to natural, sensible things.  Therefore it is impossible for us to have 401
complete intellectual judgment when there is an obstruction to the senses through which 
we cognize sensible things.  For example, the senses are impeded in dreams because the 402
motion of vapors obstructs the senses. Some people even syllogize in dreams, but upon 
awakening they always find that they have made a mistake in reasoning.  
Conclusion 
An understanding of Aquinas’s anthropology is required for a comparison between 
his anthropology and that of Pecham. Therefore, in this chapter, I considered in detail 
three primary Aquinas texts on this subject, to facilitate the comparison that occupies the 
sixth chapter of the present study. In the following two chapters, I will interpret the 
material I have explicated in chapters two, three, and four, in order to support my thesis, 
i.e., that John Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original 
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PECHAM AND HIS SOURCES  !
In the three chapters prior to this, I have provided an explication of the relevant 
Pecham and Aquinas texts. Now I will begin to interpret what I have found in these 
texts in order to defend my thesis, the first part of which is that Pecham’s 
philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of 
Neoplatonic metaphysics. (The second part of the thesis is that Pecham’s 
anthropology is a significant alternative to that of Aquinas.) The present chapter will 
prove this first part of the thesis to be true, and in the final chapter I will prove the 
second part of my thesis.   1
As one reads Pecham’s Tractatus and his Quaestiones it becomes obvious that he 
is indebted to a number of philosophical and theological sources. In fact his explicit 
or implicit citation of sources in the Tractatus is so pervasive that the reader might be 
tempted to think that Pecham’s text is merely a hodgepodge of references to other 
literature, lacking in original aim or careful strategy. Prior to passing this judgment, 
the reader should look carefully to see if there is an objective that structures Pecham’s 
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 This chapter is organized into the following five parts:  1
1. How Does Pecham Organize His Sources?  
2. Pecham’s Limited Citation of the Fons Vitae  
3. A Reading of Pecham’s Tractatus in Comparison with the Fons Vitae 
4. How Does Pecham Marshal His Sources to Advance His Own Agenda? 
5. Objections to My Position Concerning the Avicebron/Gundissalinus Influence
use of sources. The following two questions must be asked: (1) How does Pecham 
organize his sources? (2) How does Pecham marshal these sources to advance his 
own agenda? Thankfully, answers to these questions yield the conclusion that, while 
Pecham’s project was conditioned by philosophical and theological presuppositions, it 
was also creative, distinctive, and oriented in a way that is (as will become clear in 
chapter six of the present study) almost totally different from the orientation of 
Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology.   
I agree with Hasse that Pecham is advocating an “Avicennized Augustinianism.”  2
I will argue that, while Pecham is concerned to show that his doctrine of matter and 
form is consonant with theological authority (Augustine) and wishes to defend this 
authority, he tries to accomplish these tasks with the help of philosophical authority: 
Aristotle, Avicenna, Avicebron, and Averroes. These are the major influences in the 
13th-century psychology. Given the framework provided by these theological and 
philosophical auctoritates, Pecham wishes to promote the tradition of Avicebron as it 
has been developed by both Dominicus Gundissalinus and Franciscan theologians. I 
will make explicit the extent of the Avicebronian influence in the Pecham texts in 
order to show that Pecham is extending the same metaphysical project we find in 
Avicebron’s Fons Vitae, “which presents a rigorously worked-out Neoplatonic 
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cosmology,”  as it applies to anthropology. The mediation of Avicebron’s philosophy 3
to the 13th century was accomplished by Dominicus Gundissalinus in his translation 
of the Fons Vitae and in his own works on the soul.  Pecham’s extension of the 4
Avicebron/Gundissalinus project is within the metaphysical schema outlined by 
Avicenna, Augustine, and Averroes, yet the Avicebron/Gundissalinus tradition cannot 
be regarded as a secondary source in Pecham’s Tractatus.  
Finally, I will challenge the position of two scholars who, in addressing 13th 
century psychology (and discussing Pecham in particular), have attempted to 
marginalize Avicebron’s influence. They suggest that “Avicebron’s influence on 
thirteenth-century Franciscans espousing the doctrine of spiritual matter has been 
significantly exaggerated”  and that the prominence of the doctrines of universal 5
hylomorphism and plurality of forms is due primarily to Augustine’s influence. I will 
argue that this alternative understanding is incorrect and leads to a significant 
misunderstanding of Pecham's project in the Tractatus. This project was, while 
indebted to Augustine, designed to advance an agenda inspired by other philosophical 
authorities including Avicebron. 
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Part 1: How Does Pecham Organize His Sources? 
Like other medieval writers, Pecham often takes positions without immediately 
explaining in detail what he means. A plausible reason for this is that Pecham 
presumes his readers have a level of familiarity with ongoing discussions. A tractatus 
is a cursus or a “run-through” of mature doctrines for a very educated audience of 
peers—older, middle-aged, and younger theologians; Pecham had this kind of 
audience at the papal studium. Given that Pecham was near to becoming Archbishop 
of Canterbury, one might read his Tractatus as a philosophical overview that also had 
a political component, i.e., to let his theologically educated contemporaries at the 
Papal Curia know where he stood on important issues.  
In the tradition that supports Pecham’s view of matter and form, there are 
basically two lines of influence. The first line is more remote from Pecham 
historically, and includes: Augustine, Avicenna, Avicebron, Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher 
of Clairvaux ), Alfred of Sareshel, Averroes, Gundissalinus, and Costa Ben Luca. 6
Among these, I will show the particularly significant influence of Avicebron, who is 
—along with his translator Dominicus Gundissalinus—largely responsible for the 
prominence of the doctrines of universal hylomorphism and the plurality of forms in 
the 13th century. The second line of influence is a Franciscan tradition that has 
already integrated Avicebronian motifs: Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, 
Bonaventure, and Roger Bacon. In the process of discussing Avicebron’s influence in 
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the paragraphs that follow, I will show that all of these thinkers influence Pecham’s 
philosophy. 
The Traditional View of Avicebron’s Influence 
The Jewish philosopher Solomon Ibn Gabirol (Avicebron; ca. 1021-1057) is  
well known in the history of philosophy for the doctrine that all things—
including soul and intellect—are comprised of matter and form. . . . and for 
his emphasis on Divine Will. Ibn Gabirol is moved first and foremost by the 
Neoplatonic theological sense that God’s reality infuses all things, and by the 
concomitant ethical and existential ideal of Neoplatonic Return—the notion 
that we must strive, through mind and deed, to reclaim our own truest being 
and likeness to our source.  7
James Weisheipl brings to our attention Avicebron’s influence over 13th-century 
Franciscans and shows that the Fons Vitae is a major source for source for five 
significant doctrines: (1) The primacy of God’s creative will; (2) universal 
composition of all created substances from universal matter and universal form; (3) 
the composition of all spiritual substances, including the human soul, of a spiritual 
matter, which is the subject of a spiritual form; (4) the possibility of many angels of 
the same species without corporeal matter, but not without spiritual matter; (5) the 
plurality of substantial forms in all created substances; and (6) the impossibility of 
forma corporeitatis being divested or corrupted in elemental changes.  The fact that 8
many scholars share Weisheipl’s basic position, i.e., that Avicebron and Gundissalinus 
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are the primary line of influence for these doctrines, leads me to call his position the 
“traditional” view.  9
As I will show in the following pages, Pecham’s Tractatus De Anima and other 
works support Weisheipl’s position, because Pecham provides an excellent example 
of the result of the Avicebron/Gundissalinus influence in the 13th century. Pecham 
advocates for some of the same major ideas of the Fons Vitae. I do not mean that 
Pecham’s doctrines are never traceable to authors other than Avicebron, but rather that 
the high number of Pechamian principles also finding expression in the tradition 
coming from Avicebron is suggestive of a strategy on Pecham’s part. 
Callus has argued that the doctrine of the plurality of forms was a novelty in the 
13th century, stemming from Avicebron and his translator Gundissalinus:  10
[T]he main true source from which the pluralist theory has come down to 
the Schoolmen is undoubtedly Avicebron. . . . As Gundissalinus in his De 
anima made known the unity thesis of Avicenna, so it was he too who in other 
treatises popularized Avicebron’s theory. In the De processione mundi we 
meet with the same description of matter and form as in Avicebron, whereas in 
the De unitate (wrongly attributed to Boethius) he reproduced almost verbatim 
Avicebron’s teaching on the various degrees of forms. By bringing these 
theories to the fore, Gundissalinus contributed considerably to the spread of an 
utterly un-Aristotelian notion of matter and form which is at the base of all 
pluralism. Again, by proclaiming that other Avicebronian tenet, that quicquid 
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intellectus dividit et resolvit in aliquid, compositum est ex his in quae 
resolvitur, he provided the pluralist with the fundamental principle on which 
their thesis stands.  11
This is not to say, of course, that the positions of Thomas Aquinas and Albertus 
Magnus were not also novelties.   12
Pecham and the Fons Vitae 
Pecham cites the Fons Vitae directly only once in his Quaestiones.  Before 13
considering the plausible explanations as to why Pecham did not cite Avicebron more 
frequently, notice that the one citation in the Quaestiones is hardly insignificant. 
Pecham finds support in the Fons Vitae for his view of the relationship between the 
rational soul and the body:  
“Perfectio enim creaturae acquiritur per actus nobiles. Sed actus quidam sunt 
nobiles ex arduitate, quidam vero ex difficultate vel utilitate. . . . Habet 
[anima] separate actus arduos ex natura; immo, sicut dicit auctor libri De fonte 
vitae: Anima est substantia incorporea intelligibilis illuminationum quae sunt 
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a primo ultima relatione percepta. . . . ut quae ultima est ordine naturae, posset 
supremum pertingere per meritum angelorum.”   14
The rational soul, Pecham continues, communicates “perfection” or “life” to the body, 
and the soul and body are perfected by being conjoined.  Pecham’s citation of the 15
Fons Vitae in the Quaestiones appears to also be a reference to the De Motu Cordis 
(although the whole idea in Pecham’s statement requires recourse to the Fons Vitae as 
well).   16
As I noted in the first chapter of the present study, Pecham's citations of the Fons 
Vitae in the Tractatus are actually references to the De Motu Cordis by Alfred of 
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 Quaestiones, 451. Evidently this is not a word-for-word quotation from the Fons Vitae. 14
However, Etzkorn has pointed to book 4, chapter 10 of the Fons Vitae, where we read: 
“[E]t omnino omnes substantiae, quo fuerint superiores, erunt magis collectiuae 
formarum et similiores materiae primae quae sustinet omnes formas, quam ceterae 
substantiae quae sunt infra eas: quia, cum consideraueris has proprietates in substantiis, et 
quod sunt magis fixae et certiores in substantia, quo fuerit superior et propinquior 
extremo superiori: tunc palam fiet tibi quod hae proprietates defluxae sunt et acquisitae a 
materia prima uniuersali, quae communis est omnibus substantiis et continens eas, et dat 
eis nomen suum et definitionem.—Et cum consideraueris etiam quod omnia multa 
appetunt uniri, patescet tibi per hoc quod materia quae omnia sustinet una est, scilicet 
quod partes multae non appeterent uniri, nisi totum quod eas continet et complectitur 
unum esset” (232).   
 Quaestiones: “Inclinatur igitur anima ad corpus his de causis, ut communicet corpori 15
perfectionem, scilicet imprimendo ei vitam; item, ut per exercitum quod extra corpus 
habere non potest, acquirat perfectionem suam. Appetitus igitur iste est principaliter 
essentiae, et ideo per inclinationem essentiae potentiae superiores pariter inclinantur cum 
sua radice, quamvis nulla potentia possit aliam attrahere, quia cuilibet praescriptus est 
modus suus naturalis, ut video quod propter cognitionem uniri appetat, cum limpidius 
cognoscat separata quam coniuncta corpori naturali. Sed praedicta non potest habere nisi 
in corpore” (451-452). 
 Quaestiones, 451: “Anima est substantia incorporea intelligibilis illuminationum quae 16
sunt a primo ultima relatione percepta”; cf. De Motu Cordis: “[S]ubstantia est incorporea, 
intellectiva, illuminationum quae a primo sunt ultima relatione perceptiva. . . .” (2).  
Sareshel.  I repeat here that it may be that Pecham was not mistaken about the 17
authorship of the De Motu Cordis; rather, he may have considered Alfred’s text to be 
a kind of fons vitae. The fact that Pecham cites the De Motu Cordis is significant not 
only because Alfred provides the basis of Pecham’s doctrine of life, as I made clear in 
the third chapter of the present study, but also for two additional reasons: (1) 
Pecham’s usage of the De Motu Cordis further confirms that Pecham is part of a 
particular tradition of philosophical anthropology, as Callus has noted:  
The most solid foundation of Alfred’s reputation was, however, the De Motu 
Cordis. About the middle of the thirteenth century, it was introduced into the 
curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Paris as a textbook for the last part of the 
‘scientia naturalis inferior’. . . . Moreover, Alfred’s definition of the soul soon 
gained general acceptance, and was quoted among the current definitions by 
Philip the Chancellor, John de la Rochelle, St. Albert the Great, Bartholomew the 
Englishman, and others. This wide reputation earned for Alfred in the pages of the 
Summa Philosophiae (generally but wrongly ascribed to Robert Grosseteste) a 
distinguished place among the philosophers.  18
!312
 Tractatus, 4-6, 8; ibid., “Vita est actus primus et aequalis. . . . vita est primus actus 17
formae” (4, 6); Pecham says that this point comes from the Fons Vitae, however the 
phrase is really in the De Motu Cordis (7, 8): “Vitam actu omibus aequaliter inesse 
necesse est, ceteras neutiquam. . . . Prima ergo et aequalis et continua est vita. Primus 
enim formae actus est. Est enim primus motus ex quieto sempiterno fluens.” 
 “Introduction of Aristotelian Learning,” 12, parenthetical item in orig.18
I will comment further on this tradition later in this chapter. (2) Pecham’s citation of 
the De Motu Cordis is significant because the philosophical principles that Pecham 
draws from the De Motu Cordis echo principles found in Avicebron.  19
Table 5.1. Pecham’s References to Alfred of Sareshel. 
Pecham Alfred of Sareshel Topic
Tractatus, 4 De Motu Cordis, 8 Life as the first act
Tractatus, 5 De Motu Cordis, 8 Life as an equal act 
throughout the lifespan
Tractatus, 5 De Motu Cordis, 8 The corruption 
accompanying old age
Tractatus, 6 De Motu Cordis, 6; cf. 
56-57
Animal and embryo are 
equally alive.
Tractatus, 6 De Motu Cordis, 7 Boy and old man are 
both alive.
Tractatus, 6 De Motu Cordis, 8 Life is the first act of 
form.
Tractatus, 7 De Motu Cordis, 7, 93 The continuous drive in 
living things
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 See Table 5.1; cf. Alfred of Sareshel, De Motu Cordis, 8: “Prima ergo et aequalis et 19
continua est vita. Primus enim formae actus est. Est enim primus motus ex quieto 
sempiterno fluens.” As far as I know there is no passage in the Fons Vitae that makes this 
point in as many words. However, the Fons Vitae is designed to give a hylomorphic 
account of all being—everything that has being, including every living thing, has its 
being due to form (see Fountain of Life, Jacob, 8). Pecham may not be originating a 
mistake in identifying the De Motu Cordis as the Fons Vitae; rather, it may be that the De 
Motu Cordis was actually known to Pecham as the Fons Vitae. 
Note that the last of these ideas for which Pecham cites the De Motu Cordis (as the 
Fons Vitae) in the Tractatus is basically the same idea for which he cites Avicebron’s 
Fons Vitae (apparently accurately) in the Quaestiones. The De Motu Cordis and the 
Fons Vitae complement one another in that both texts are about the ontological status 
of the human being and the source of its life, and both share dualist, emanationist, and 
illuminationist perspectives.  They are both in what can be called Fons Vitae 20
tradition or the Avicebron/Gundissalinus tradition. (In fact, the De Motu Cordis sees 
the heart as the biological fons vitae. )  21
The De Motu Cordis served Pecham’s purpose in the discussion of life for two 
reasons: (1) The De Motu Cordis was seen as an authoritative philosophical text on 
the human body and could thus lend credibility to Pecham’s positions;  and (2) The 22
De Motu Cordis has the specific distinctions between the various moments in the 
Tractatus, 8 De Motu Cordis, 2-3 The definition of the soul 
as an incorporeal, 
intellective substance of 
illuminations, which is 
from God
Pecham Alfred of Sareshel Topic
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 See Avicebron, Fons Vitae, e.g., 109-110, 144. 20
 “Cor vero fons innati caloris naturalisque principium ignito quodam fervore in 21
ustionem semper armatur, in sinistro maxime thalamo. In hoc continua est spiritus 
generatio” (De Motu Cordis, 22-23). The third chapter of the De Motu Cordis is titled 
Quod cor domicilium est vitae (12). 
 See Otte, “The Life and Writings of Alfredus Anglicus.” 22
biological life, which Pecham will use to further the plurality of forms doctrine as 
found in the Fons Vitae (I will discuss this later in the present chapter). 
Despite the fact that direct citations to Avicebron are few in Pecham, Pecham 
repeatedly cites Gundissalinus, the translator and conveyor of Avicebron’s thought.  23




Tractantes, 183 Gundissalinus, De 
Unitate et Uno, 6
Spiritual matter
Tractantes, 186 Gundissalinus, De 
Unitate et Uno, 5ff.
Spiritual matter
Quaestiones, 451 Avicebron, Fons Vitae, 
232
The definition of the 
soul, and the relationship 
between the rational soul 
and the body 
Quodlibeta, 209 Gundissalinus, De 
Unitate et Uno, 5ff.
Spiritual matter
Tractatus, 47  Gundissalinus, De 








Von Der Unsterblichkeit 
Der Seele (De 
Immoralitate Animae), 
per totum
Immortality of the soul 
(generally)
Tractatus, 50 Gundissalinus, De 
Immortalitate Animae, 
5-6, 35




 See Table 5.2; Tractatus, 47-51; Gundassalinus, De Unitate, PL 1075-1076; ibid., De 23
Immortalitate, 3, 5-6, 19, 26-27, 37-38.
Avicebron and Gundissalinus, alongside Augustine and Avicenna, are clearly 
important to Pecham. Many of his references to Gundissalinus come in the critical 
last two chapters of the Tractatus, which deal with the substance of the soul and the 
immortality of the soul. In Gundissalinus, Pecham finds support for the doctrines of 
spiritual matter, the immortality of the rational soul, the plurality of forms, and the 
primacy of the will, doctrines which are also present in the Fons Vitae (as will 
become clear shortly).  
Part 2: Pecham’s Limited Citation of the Fons Vitae 
Lest it be assumed that the scarcity of explicit Pechamian citations of the Fons 
Vitae means that Pecham was not implicitly promoting doctrines inspired by the Fons 
Vitae, four points must be borne in mind. I will argue for each of them in turn: (1) 
There are plausible explanations for why Pecham would have infrequently cited the 
Tractatus, 50 Gundissalinus, De 
Immortalitate Animae, 
19
The rational soul is the 
most noble of all forms. 
Tractatus, 50 Gundissalinus, De 
Immortalitate Animae, 3
 
If there is no eternal life, 
then no retribution of 
merits, and injustice 
would reign.
Tractatus, 51 Gundissalinus, De 
Immortalitate Animae, 
37-38
The end of man is 
conjunction with God 
through love. 
Tractatus, 51 Gundissalinus, De 
Immortalitate Animae, 
26-27






Fons Vitae explicitly, even though the text influenced him. (2) The scholarship on the 
subject of the philosophical background of the 13th century is practically unanimous 
in the conviction that Avicebron inspired two central doctrines that Pecham adopts in 
his anthropology, i.e., universal hylomorphism and the plurality of forms. (3) There 
are obvious philosophical commonalities between Pecham and other Franciscan 
writers who advocated for Avicebron’s ideas. Thus, in Pecham we find not only the 
direct influence of Avicebron/Gundissalinus, but also the indirect influence of the 
Fons Vitae tradition through prior Franciscan philosophers. (4) Albertus Magnus and 
Thomas Aquinas recognized Avicebron as a primary source of the doctrines of 
hylomorphism and plurality of forms, and treated Avicebron’s philosophy as a serious 
problem.  
(After discussing these four points, I will provide a reading of Pecham’s Tractatus 
in comparison with the Fons Vitae, particularly focusing on the critical third book of 
the Fons Vitae, the longest of its five books.  This reading yields a high number 24
similarities between the two works. ) 
Now, consider each of the four aforementioned points in turn.  
(1) The first reason why the scarcity of direct Pechamian citations of the Fons 
Vitae does not mean that Pecham was not influenced heavily by the Fons Vitae: There 
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 The third book of the Fons Vitae, on separate substances, has been translated by 24
Wedeck as The Fountain of Life. While I am considering primarily this portion of the 
Fons Vitae, I will reference passages from another English translation (also titled The 
Fountain of Life), by Jacob. Both Wedeck’s translation and Jacob’s are based on 
Baeumker’s edition of the Latin text (1995), which I also will cite throughout the present 
chapter. 
are plausible explanations for why Pecham would have infrequently cited the Fons 
Vitae explicitly, even though the text influenced him. It cannot be known with 
certainty why Pecham did not cite Avicebron more than he did, but Pecham is not 
alone in the oversight. Dales has observed that philosophers in the 13th century often  
“derived the doctrines of plurality of forms and universal hylomorphism from 
Avicebron, even while attributing them to Augustine.”  T.M. Rudavsky explains why 25
this was the case: 
Written in Arabic, [Avicebron’s work] has survived in a twelfth-century Latin 
translation, Fons Vitae, by John of Spain in collaboration with Dominicus 
Gundissalinus; the author’s name was given as “Avicebrol” or “Avicebron.” 
Latin Scholastics reading the Fons Vitae had no idea that this work was 
written by a Spanish Jew; the author was thought to be a Muslim. . . . [Fons 
Vitae] is unique among Jewish medieval works in that it contains virtually no 
references to any other Jewish texts, ideas, or sources: it is wholly lacking in 
Jewish content. Medieval readers thus had no reason to suspect that the author 
was the noted Jewish poet Ibn Gabirol. . . . his true identity concealed as a 
result of his efforts to systematize the basic principles of Jewish thought 
without recourse to religious dogma.   26
Given that Avicebron’s emanationism entails a cosmology that is distinct from the 
Catholic doctrine of creationism and might be read as implying that there is no 
substantial distinction between the first cause and the rest of the world, it is plausible 
that many medieval authors feared that direct citation of Avicebron would evoke 
charges of a pantheism. This is particularly reasonable to assume given that the works 
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 Ibid., 182. Elsewhere Dales adds: “The book Fons vitae by Solomon Bar Jehuda ibn 25
Gabirol, known to the Latins as Avicebron, exerted an influence on thirteenth century 
thought far beyond its evident merits” (ibid., 6); cf. Lewry, “Robert Kilwardby”: “in fact, 
the source [for the plurality of forms view] is the Fons Vitae ... by the Jewish 
Neoplatonist Solomon Ibn Gabirol. . . .” (260, bracketed item added).
 “Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” 250, 251, bracketed items added. 26
of Amalric of Bène and David of Dinant were condemned in the early 13th century 
because of pantheistic teachings.  In particular, David had apparently identified God 27
with the prime matter of the universe.  28
Direct citation of Avicebron would have been complicated by the fact that he was 
“[t]hought wrongly by centuries of Christian scholastics to be either a Christian 
defender of Augustine or a Muslim misreader of Aristotle.”  (Actually, Pecham also 29
finds support for the doctrine of spiritual matter in both Averroes and Augustine. )  30
Dales writes as follows about the medieval and contemporary transmission of the 
Fons Vitae:   
The doctrine of this work was known to virtually every Latin scholastic of 
the thirteenth century and was accepted, sometimes with modifications, by 
many. It is not clear how many actually read the Fons vitae itself; only five 
manuscripts of the work are extant. But most of its teaching was contained in 
the works of Gundissalinus, which were widely disseminated.   31
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 See Justo L. González, A History of Christian Thought Volume 2: From Augustine to 27
the Eve of the Reformation (Nashville: Abingdon, 2010), 189; cf. Antonio Perez Estevez, 
La Materia, de Avicena a la Escuela Franciscana: Avicena, Averroes, Tomas de Aquino, 
Buenaventura, Pecham, Marston, Olivo, Mediavilla, Duns Escoto (Maracaibo: Ediluz, 
1998), 225, 455.
 González, A History of Christian Thought, 189.28
 Pessin, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol.”29
 Quaestiones, 347: “Ad quintum dicendum quod non omnis materia est causa 30
corruptionis, sed illa quae est privationi subiecta, quod non est in materia caeli. Unde 
Commentator dicit caelum non habere materiam, quia non vocat materiam nisi privationi 
coniunctam. Non autem negat eas, [habere materiam] sicut nec caelum habere 
subiectum”; cf. ibid., 379: “Hoc igitur primum fundamentum multipliciter eliditur, tum 
quia, quamvis careat materia corporali privata, non tamen materia spirituali intelligibili. 
Unde Augustinus, Contra Manichaeum: ‘Deus dicitur de nihilo omnia fecisse, quia etiam 
si omnia formata et de ista materia formata sunt facta, haec ipsa tamen materia de nihilo 
facta est’. Et ipse etiam Commentator fatetur, quia habet aliquid simile materiae et aliquid 
simile formae”; Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 3. 
 The Problem of the Rational Soul, 7, emp. added; cf. Rudavsky, “Solomon Ibn 31
Gabirol,” 250. 
Yet even in cases where Melani (editor of Pecham’s Tractatus) claims that Pecham 
was clearly making reference to Gundissalinus, Pecham did not cite him by name, 
either.  While all of the reasons for Pecham’s failure to cite the Fons Vitae directly 32
may evade us, we may rest assured that Pecham is not singling out the Fons Vitae by 
intentionally avoiding direct references to it. (As we have seen, Pecham cites texts 
with various degrees of specificity, and even cites the Fons Vitae directly on one 
occasion.) Nor is Pecham’s failure to cite the Fons Vitae directly a strong indication 
that he was not influenced by the text either directly or indirectly. 
(2) The second reason why the scarcity of direct Pechamian citations of the Fons 
Vitae does not mean that Pecham was not influenced heavily by the Fons Vitae: The 
scholarship on the subject of the philosophical background of the 13th century is 
practically unanimous in the conviction that Avicebron inspired the doctrine of 
universal hylomorphism and thus also the plurality of forms. Callus, Knowles, Quinn, 
Theodore Crowley, Weisheipl, Lindberg, Dales, R. James Long, Antonio Perez 
Estevez, P. Osmund Lewry, Paul Vincent Spade, John Marenbon, and Magdalena 
Bieniak have addressed this subject and more or less attribute the doctrines to 
Avicebron, even if they admit that a minimal version of the doctrine is present in 
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 E.g., Tractatus, 3, 49, 50.  32
Augustine.  Weisheipl has shown that, while further work needs to be done to show 33
how the Fons Vitae was transmitted to Paris in the 13th century, the Fons Vitae was 
highly influential there.   34
Bieniak’s very recent work argues that the 13th-century doctrine she calls 
“material dispositions,” which implies that the body is formed in such a way as to be 
disposed to receive further forms, mainly derives from Avicebron.  Bieniak’s book is 35
based on a manuscript collection that testifies to  
the theological debates that took place in Paris during the first decades of the 
thirteenth century, at the very beginning of the reception of Aristotle’s libri 
naturales and Metaphysics on the one hand, and, on the other, of new Hebrew 
and Arabic philosophical sources, in particular Avicebron’s Fons vitae and 
Avicenna’s De anima.   36
Both of these works were translated by Gundissalinus.  
There are two notable exceptions to the traditional view of this issue (Weisheipl’s 
view) as I have just described it. I will address these exceptions in the final part of 
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 Callus, “Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford,”; ibid., “Gundissalinus’ De 33
Anima”; ibid., “Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form,” 269-270; ibid., The 
Condemnation of St Thomas at Oxford, 2, 19-21; Knowles, “Some Aspects. I,” 13; 
Weisheipl, “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 239-260; Spade, “Binarium 
Famosissimum”; Bieniak, The Soul-Body Problem, 128-130; Dales, The Problem of the 
Rational Soul, 3, 6-7; Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 219, 845; Crowley, Roger 
Bacon, 82-83; Lindberg, Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature, xlvi-xlix, liv; Long, 
“Roger Bacon on the Nature and Place of Angels,” 266; Lewry, “Robert Kilwardby,” 260; 
Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy, 178-179, 212, 231, 239; Estevez, La Materia, 438-430; 
cf. the discussion of Roger Bacon’s Avicebronian doctrine of matter in Pereira, “Materia 
naturalis”; However, Thomas of York and Gonsalvus of Spain ascribe universal 
hylomorphism to Augustine (see Wippel, “Essence and Existence,” 408).
 “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 240ff. 34
 Bieniak, The Soul-Body Problem, 130. 35
 Ibid., 1. 36
this chapter, after I have reviewed the evidence in support of my own view, i.e., that 
the Avicebron/Gundissalinus influence is not secondary in Pecham’s anthropology. 
(3) The third reason why the scarcity of direct Pechamian citations of the Fons 
Vitae does not mean that Pecham was not influenced heavily by the Fons Vitae: There 
are philosophical commonalities not only between Pecham and Augustine, but also 
between Pecham and a number of other writers who helped to shape the tradition of 
viewing form and matter in an Avicebronian fashion.  I mentioned above that there 37
are two strands of such writers, whom Pecham draws together in order to promote his 
own doctrine of form and matter. The first strand consists of authors who are more 
remote from Pecham: Augustine, Avicenna, Avicebron, Averroes, and also Pseudo-
Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux ), Alfred of Sareshel, Gundissalinus, and Costa Ben 38
Luca. Pecham references (either directly or indirectly) not only these writers, but also 
what I am categorizing as a second strand of influence for Pecham: four major 
Franciscan authors who are also associated with the Fons Vitae tradition and who are 
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 Melani writes about Pecham’s sources in the introduction to Pecham’s Tractatus: “Ex 37
Patribus, praeter Augustinum, et ex Scriptoribus ecclesiasticis Auctor De spiritu et anima, 
cui magna auctoritas confertur. . . . Boetius vero, cui false tribuitur liber De unitate et uno 
Gundissalino restitutus, bis nominatur. . . Deinde, Pecham ter citat librum, cui inscribitur 
Fons vitae, erronee tamen, quia doctrina respicit De motu cordis. Hic profecto error 
amanuensi non debetur, cum ita revera habeatur in aliis I. Pecham operibus. Error ergo 
forsitan erat in titulo vel in Incipit codicis, quo Doctor Ingeniosus usus est. . . . Relatio ad 
Gundissalini opus, cui titulus De immortalitate animae, in doctrinis de independentia 
animae a corpore, de immaterialitate intellectus in operationibus suis, de duplici faciei 
animae, de amore et in argumentis deductis ex impossibilitate corruptionis et 
annihilationis et ex fine, necnon in theoria colligantiae animae et corporis clare 
apparet” (xlii-xliii, xliv, xlv). The footnotes in Melani’s edition are very helpful for 
tracing the lines of influence for Pecham.
 See Melani, introduction, xlvii. 38
closer to Pecham chronologically: Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, 
Bonaventure, and Roger Bacon. It is impossible to provide here a detailed study of 
the textual connections between Pecham and each of these authors. However, in order 
to provide a sense of how Pecham is organizing his sources, I will now briefly review 
Pecham’s use of these auctoritates. 
I have already pointed out that Pecham cites Augustine in support of spiritual 
matter, and I will consider Augustine’s influence further after I have discussed the 
influence of other authors. For the moment, I will move on to discuss Avicenna. 
Pecham quotes directly from Avicenna extensively in the Tractatus (25 times 
according to my count, more than the quotations from any other author except 
Augustine). Drawing on a statement from Avicenna, Pecham explains that while a 
study of the soul may concern itself with broader metaphysical principles, it must 
ultimately address natural philosophy: 
Also Avicenna Naturalium Book 6: “The name of the soul is not imposed 
because it is substance, but because it is that which rules bodies and is 
concerned with them”. And on that account it receives the body in its 
definition, and therefore the treatise on the soul was about natural science.  39
Pecham’s selective usage of Avicenna is itself remarkable, since Avicenna was 
opposed to Pecham’s view of how the soul and body are united; instead of seeing the 
soul and body as specifically disposed for one another, Avicenna  
views the physical, corruptible body in all its parts, including the formal 
components, as irreconcilably other than the purely immaterial soul, such that 
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 Quaestiones, 381: “Et Avicenna VI Naturalium: ‘Nomen animae non imponitur ex hoc 39
quod est substantia, sed ex hoc quod regit corpora et refertur ad illa’. Et idcirco recipit 
corpus in sui definitione, et ideo tractatus de anima fuit de scientia naturali.” 
the latter cannot be an essential form of the former. Rather, the soul is an 
accidental relation to a particular body. . . . The soul is individuated by the 
particular nature of its designated body.   40
Pecham also cites Avicenna on the issue of hylomorphism and plurality of forms:   
• Therefore the soul is neither a body nor a corporeal form, but is spiritual 
substance, constituted from its own matter and form, just as Boethius 
teaches expressly, in the book De Unitate et uno. Further, Avicenna says, 
Metaphysics Book 9: “No evil follows unless this in whose essence 
something is in potency, and this occurs through matter”. Therefore every 
Angel and every rational soul is composed of matter and form.   41
• And I call matter and form “principles,” of which each has its essence. 
Whence Avicenna, Book 1 of the Physics, chapter 2: Form is an essence 
through itself, and esse is added on the esse which has hyle; privation truly 
does not add esse upon esse. This is Avicenna. Therefore form gives to 
matter its specific and complete esse, but it does not give to it esse of 
incomplete essence, since the essential principle is from something other 
than form.  42
Pecham also finds support in Avicenna for the view that the soul desires to govern the 
body: “Therefore the force of the soul perfects and moves the organ that is intimately 
united to it. . . . it suffers along with the body, to which is united intimately by 
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 Ivry, “Arabic and Islamic Psychology.”40
 Tractatus, 47-48: “[I]gitur anima neque est corpus neque forma corporalis, sed est 41
substantia spiritualis, ex materia et forma propria constituta, sicut expresse docet Boetius, 
in libro De unitate et uno. Item: Avicenna dicit, IX Metaphysicae: Non sequitur malum 
nisi hoc in cuius essentia aliquid est in potentia et hoc fit per materiam’. Igitur omnis 
Angelus et omnis anima rationalis componitur ex materia et forma”; cf. Avicenna, 
Metaphysics, 9.6.
 Quodilbeta, 176: “Et dico ‘principia’ materiam et formam, quarum utraque habet suum 42
esse. Unde Avicenna I Physicorum, cap. 2: ‘Forma est essentia per se ipsam, et est 
additum esse super esse, quod habet hyle; privatio vero non addit esse super esse.’ Haec 
Avicenna. Forma igitur dat materiae esse specificum et completum, sed non dat ei esse 
essentiae incompletae, cum sit principium essentialiter aliud a forma”; cf. Avicenna, 
Sufficientia, 1.2. (unedited [see note in Pecham, Quodlibeta, 176]). 
affection and by its desire to govern it, just as Avicenna says.”  I will discuss below 43
Avicenna’s extensive influence in Pecham’s conception of the faculties of the soul.  
Estevez’s recent work on theories of matter in the 13th century has a chapter on the 
doctrine of matter in Pecham’s Quodlibeta, and sheds light on the influence of Averroes 
on Pecham.  Estevez thinks that it is from Averroes that Pecham takes a strong view of 44
matter having its independent existence, at least in principle.  Indeed, Pecham cites 45
Averroes in support of the view that even non-corporeal being must have something 
similar to form and something similar to matter.  Estevez highlights the following 46
statements in Pecham’s Quodlibeta which supports the view that matter has its own 
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 Tractatus, 13: “Vis igitur animae organum, sibi intimae unitum, perficit et movet. . . . 43
corpori compatitur, cui intime est unita affectu et desiderio regendi ipsum, sicut dicit 
Avicenna”; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 1.3. 
 La Materia, 223-246. Concerning Roger Bacon’s theory of natural matter, which is 44
also nuanced, see Pereira, “Materia naturalis”. 
 Estevez, La Materia: “Juan Pecham, siguiendo a Buenaventura, va a continuar 45
abriendo un camino intermedio entre estos dos extremos. Ni la materia será la realidad 
suprema que se identifica con la Divinidad, como quiso David de Dinand, ni ese extraño 
residuo óntico tomista expresado en la casi incomprensible expresión de un no-ente que 
es en potencia” (227, emp. in orig.). 
 Quaestiones, 379: “Et ipse etiam Commentator fatetur, quia habet aliquid simile 46
materiae et aliquid simile formae. Sicut dicit: ‘Quemadmodum sensibile esse dividitur in 
formam et materiam, sic intelligibile esse oportet dividi in consimilia his duobus, scilicet 
[in] aliquid simile formae et [in] aliquid simile materiae. Et hoc necesse est in omni 
intelligentia quae intelligit aliud; et si non, et non esset multitudo in formis abstractis’. 
Haec verba eius. Est igitur immaterialis per exclusionem materiae transmutabilis. Sed 
habet aliquid simile ipsi materiae per quam est hoc, per quam est distinctio numeralis in 
substantiis separatis, ut ipse dicit. Amplius, ex hoc non sequitur quod intellectus sit ita 
penitus a materia absolutus quin sit perfectio materiae corporalis, sed quod essentialiter 
non dependit a materia”; cf. Averroes, Long Commentary, 326-327.
essence apart from the form to which it will be united, and so God could create matter 
essentially without form:   47
• Item, certum est quod materia est alia essentia quam forma, cum materia et 
forma sint duo principia essentialiter differentia. Deus autem omnia essentialiter 
diversa potest separare, cum eiusdem sit componere et dividere. Possit ergo, si 
vellet, facere materiam esse sine omni forma. Multoque magis est hoc possibile 
quam accidentia, quorum “esse est inesse”, esse sine subiecto.  48
• [P]lus esse essentialitatis habet materia, quae est substantia, quam accidentia.   49
• [M]ateria enim est causa omnium accidentium.  50
• [M]ateria est in potentia ad formam, et ista potentia materiae non fundatur in 
nihilo, sed in ipsa essentia materiae.  51
• Et illum actum essendi non habet a forma, sed a creante, sicut etiam habet 
essentiam, scilicet a Creatore: essentiae autem est esse sicut lucis lucere.  52
• [S]icut producit materiam de nihilo, non per formam - quam tamen conservat in 
esse completo mediante forma. . . .  53
• Materia enim habet duo genera partium, quia habet partes quantitativas quae 
sensibiliter dividuntur; et, circumscripta quantitate, habet partes substantiales. . . 
.  54
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 All of these quotations are from Pecham’s fourth Quodlibet (Romanum) which, like the 47
Tractatus, dates from his time at the papal studium (Etzkorn, introduction to Pecham, 
Quodlibeta, 25). As Estevez notes, Pecham believes that once matter has become formed 
as part of a genus, it would be impossible (short of a miracle) for the matter to remain 
without a form after a substantial change (236); cf. Pecham, Quodlibeta: “Quia subiectum 
transmutationis non est materia sola, sed aggregatum, ut dictum est, ex materia et potentia 
activa. Aliter enim essent formae omnes naturaliter ab extra. . . . impossibile videtur 
solam materiam manere” (159-160); “Igitur impossibile esset per naturam materiam stare 
sine forma et corpus sine anima, nisi per infinitam fieret Dei potentiam miraculose 
continentem materiam sine forma” (ibid., 256). 
 Quodlibeta, 175. 48
 Ibid.49
 Ibid., 174. 50
 Ibid., 176. 51
 Ibid.52
 Ibid., 175. 53
 Ibid., 209. 54
• Ergo differt materia secundum differentiam angelorum quantum ad partes suas 
substantiales, non dimensionales.  55
• [O]mne subiectum transmutationis est aliquid in actu, sed in potentia respectu 
ulterioris perfectionis. . . .   56
• Dicendum igitur quod anima rationalis non est forma corporis, secundum quod 
corpus est, immo praesupponit corporeitatem, cuius forma non corrumpitur per 
adventum animae, quia nullam habet cum ipsa corporeitatem.  57
• Si igitur corpus fuit formatum prius natura vel tempore quam infunderetur 
anima, ergo prius habebat materiam et formam.  58
Then, Estevez connects Averroes to Pecham’s teaching on matter by showing that 
Averroes transmits Avicebron’s doctrine of matter to the Franciscans:  
Tampoco la materia prima en Avicena puede existir sola sin forma alguna. . . . 
[L]a extensión de la materia a todo lo creado no es una acquisición de sólo Duns 
Escoto sino de toda la Escuela Franciscana, qua la hereda de Avicebrón a través 
de Avicena y de Averroes. . . . Estas expresiones bonaventurianas semejan recoger 
resonancias lejanas de Avicebrón llegadas a través del eco de Avicena y, sobre 
todo, de Averroes y que los franciscanos tratarán de ir matizando. La capacidad de 
la materia de recibir infinitas formas sucesivamente, de transformarse en formas y 
de extenderse, como sustrato, a todo el universo creado, puede implicar la 
amenaza o tendencia hacia un panteísmo materialista y monista de signo 
Avicebroniano, tal como ya había sucedido anteriormente en menor escala con 
Averroes y. . . .  59
Thus, as will become clear in the following chapter on Pecham and his controversy with 
Aquinas, Pecham will oppose Aquinas’s view of matter as a non-entity, based on the view 
that Franciscans have already held, i.e., that matter has an autonomous, substantial 
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 Ibid.55
 Ibid., 231. 56
 Ibid., 230. 57
 Ibid. 58
 La Materia, 436, 438, 439.59
existence apart from form.  Pecham will see it is as contradictory to think of matter as a 60
non-entity or a “nothing” that is nonetheless characterized by pure potentiality.  For 61
Pecham, matter must have some “real possibility” which is the result of its already having 
some being.  62
A number of times in the Tractatus, Pecham directly references Alcher of 
Clairvaux’s quasi-Augustinian tract De Spiritu et Anima. In this work Pecham finds 
support for his views that the separated soul has sensitive powers.  Pecham also cites 63
the De Spiritu et Anima to support the view that the soul has three potencies which do 
not represent three substances.  Similarly, Pecham finds in the De Spiritu et Anima 64
support for the view that the human being does not have three souls, but rather only 
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 Ibid., 444: “Ante esta posición tomista, considerada como excesivamente formalizante, 60
va a reaccionar la Escuela Franciscana. Bajo la influencia de Averroes, dota a la materia 
de algún tipo de ser autónomo, sustancial y distinto del ser de la forma.”
 Ibid., 226: “En el otro extremo encontramos la materia prima de Tomás de Aquino, 61
reducida a menos que una sombra, a un residuo óntico, en sí misma, en los confines del 
no-ente.”  
 Cf. ibid., 454. 62
 Tractatus, 15: “Sed anima a corpore separata non indiget hoc nuntio vel medio, sicut 63
expresse dicit Auctor libri De spiritu et anima, quod ‘anima secum trahit imaginativam, 
concupiscibilem et irascibilem’.” The precise quotation from the De Spiritu et Anima is: 
“Si vero distemperata et confusa fuerint, invita recedit anima, secum trahens omnia; 
sensum scilicet, imaginationem, rationem, intellectum, intelligentiam, 
concupiscibilitatem, et irascibilitatem: et ex his secundum merita afficitur ad 
delectationem, sive ad dolorem” (PL 40, 791). While Bacon and Pecham share a 
commitment to Neoplatonism, Bacon advocates against the use of the De Spiritu et 
Anima (see Hackett, "Roger Bacon”).
 Tractatus, 31: “Aliter tamen dicunt alii, quod scilicet anima rationalis a Deo creata, ista 64
tria in se includit sicut tres potentias et non sicut tres substantias, sicut expresse videtur 
dicere Auctor De spiritu et anima; cui suffragari videtur. . . .”; cf. De Spiritu et Anima, 
808: “Hanc triplicem vim animae, id est, sensualem, rationalem et intellectualem, 
philosophi partes vocaverunt, non integrales, sed virtuales; quia potentiae ejus sunt.” 
one soul with various potencies.  Pecham also quotes from the same chapter of the 65
De Spiritu et Anima in his Quaestiones De Anima, this time finding support for his 
position that the soul and body are inclined to one another.  66
Dominicus Gundissalinus is the translator of the Fons Vitae and of Avicenna, and 
a main disseminator of the doctrine of universal hylomorphism.  Pecham cites 67
Gundissalinus’ De Unitate et Uno to support the doctrine of universal 
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 Tractatus, 40: “Sequitur de intelligentia motiva, quae est voluntas rationalis, quam 65
quidam dividi non sinunt per concupiscibilem et irascibilem, pro eo quod haec ponuntur 
tantum a Philosopho in anima irrationali. Sed huic contrarium est quod dicitur in libro De 
anima et spiritu [sic], c. X: ‘Tota animae substantia in his tribus consistit plena atque 
perfecta: in rationabilitate, concupiscibilitate et irascibilitate, quasi quadam sua trinitate’. 
Et in eodem capitulo, dicit: ‘Potentiae animae sunt: rationabilitas, concupiscibilitas [et 
irascibilitas]’” (bracketed item in orig.); cf. De Spiritu et Anima: “Tota namque animae 
substantia in his tribus plena et perfecta consistit, id est, in rationalitate, concupiscibilitate 
et irascibilitate, quasi quadam sua trinitate; et tota haec trinitas est quaedam animae 
unitas, et ipsa anima. . . . Potentiae animae sunt, rationalitas, concupiscibilitas, et 
irascibilitas. . . .” (789, bracketed item in orig.). 
 Quaestiones, 390: “[C]oncedo, quoniam anima non immediate corpori unitur, sed sicut 66
dicit Augustinus, De spiritu et anima, 11 cap.: ‘Sunt quaedam similia, corporis supremum 
et spiritus infimum, in quibus sine naturarum confusione, personali unione coniungi 
possunt. Similia enim similibus gaudent. Itaque anima quae vere spiritus est, et caro quae 
est corpus in suis extremitatibus facile et convenienter uniuntur, id est in phantastico 
scientiae quod corpus non [est], sed simile corpori et sensualitati carnis quae vere spiritus 
est, quia sine anima fieri non potest’” (bracketed item in orig.); cf. De Spiritu et Anima, 
789: “Sunt etiam utriusque quaedam similia, corporis scilicet supremum, et spiritus 
infirmum, in quibus sine naturarum confusione, personali tamen unione facile connecti 
possunt. Similia enim similibus gaudent. Itaque anima quae vere spiritus est, et caro quae 
vere corpus est, in suis extremitatibus facile et convenienter uniuntur, id est, in 
phantastico animae, quod corpus non est, sed simile corpori; et sensualitate carnis quae 
fere spiritus est, quia sine anima fiei non potest”; Pecham, Quaestiones, 475. 
 See Crowley, Roger Bacon, 82; cf. Houser, “Dominicus Gundissalinus”; 67
Gundissalinus, The Procession of the World, trans. John A. Laumakis (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 2002), 20-21.
hylomorphism,  but attributes it to Boethius, as authors did in the 13th century. 68
Pecham references ideas that are found in Gundissalinus especially in the Tractatus’ 
chapter on the immortality of the soul, including the following points: First, the 
rational soul is not weakened by understanding and thus does not grow old and die as 
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 Tractatus, 47: “[E]rgo nulla talis potest movere corporaliter; igitur anima neque est 68
corpus neque forma corporalis, sed est substantia spiritualis, ex materia et forma propria 
constituta, sicut expresse docet Boetius [sic], in libro De unitate et unu”; cf. 
Gundissalinus, De Unitate, 1-11. Sullivan comments on Pecham’s use of the De Unitate 
and the De Spiritu et Anima of Alcher of Clairvaux (pseudo-Augustine): “In his 
Quaestiones tractantes de anima John Pecham’s position on spiritual matter is similar to 
that of St. Bonaventure. He takes several arguments positing matter in the human soul 
from authorities Bonaventure also used, especially De unitate et uno and pseudo-
Augustine, and gives abbreviated versions of several traditional arguments. The soul 
separated from the body can be moved, but everything that is per se moved (Pecham 
takes it for granted that the soul moves itself) is divided into something which is moved 
and something which moves, which, he claims, can only arise in a composite of matter 
and form. The soul must have matter because it contains possibility, and possibility is 
from matter. . . .” (“The Debate,” 142, parenthetical item in orig.). 
the body does.  Second, The rational soul is the most noble of all forms.69
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 Tractatus, 50: “Item virtus, quae operando non lassatur nec diminuitur per usum, agere 69
potest in infinitum. Sed capacitas intellects in recipiendo formas intelligibilis non 
diminuitur, nec vigor intelligendi minoratur, quia quanto plura intelligit, tanto plura vel 
melius intelligere potest”; Gundissalinus, De Immoralitate, 5-6, 35: “Amplius. Si essentia 
intellectus pendet ex corpore, debet, ut confortatio sequatur confortationem et debilitatio 
debilitationem. Nos autem e contrario totum uidemus, quia debilitatio corporis est in 
senectute et uigor uirtutis intellectiuae tunc maximus, et intellectus ex omnibus modis 
suis tunc fortissimus; ex quo manifeste apparet uirtutem intellectiuam in senectute 
iuuenescere. . . . Virtus autem intellectiua sua ipsa duratione proficit et inualescit, ut 
quanto fuerit diuturnior et antiquior, tanto sit ex omnibus modis suis fortior. Virtus igitur 
intellectiua immortalis est, et ipsam non solum non posse senescere duratione aut defectui 
approximare, immo de duratione ipsa eam iuuenescere et a defectu et morte amplius 
elongari manifestum est. . . . Amplius. Alia diuersitas,  quam supra diximus, est inter 
sensum et intellectum, quia, quanto aliqua fuerint magis sensibilia, tanto magis laedunt 
sensum; quanto autem uehementius intelligibilia, tanto magis delectant et confortant 
intellectum. Si igitur ab his passibilis est intellectus, non est nisi confortabilis et 
delectabilis ab illis. Amplius. Manifestum est, quia, quanto plura et maiora et pluries 
intelligit uirtus intellectiua, tanto est ad intelligendum expeditior, capacior et fortior; e 
contrario autem se habet in sensu. Palam ergo, quia non habet  finem in operatione sua; 
ultra finem enim nihil potest quaecunque uirtus. Omnis autem uirtus, quae non habet 
finem in operatione, non habet finem in tempore. Virtus ergo intellectiua non habet  
finem in tempore. Omnis enim uirtus infinitae operationis est infiniti temporis; infinita 
enim operatio non potest perfici in tempore finito. Si ergo uerum est, quod eius operationi 
non sit finis, ultra quem non extendatur—uerbi gratia, si aliquem numerum intellectorum 
aut aliquam magnitudinem eorum transire non potest—, quia igitur nullus est ei finis 
huiusmodi: manifestum est operationi ipsius non esse finem; quare multo fortius neque 
uirtuti. Si autem uirtus infinita est in operatione naturaliter, multo fortius et in duratione, 
sicut apparet in uirtute motiua, cui, si non esset terminus aut finis in operatione, hoc est in 
mouendo, nullo modo nec in essendo, nec in durando.”
 Third, if there were no eternal life, then there would be no retribution for merits, 70
and injustice would reign.  Gundissalinus supports Pecham’s point that man’s 71
highest good occurs through a loving conjunction with God (represented as providing 
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 Tractatus, 50: “[E]rgo multo fortius aliqua forma spiritualis corpus perficiens. Sed 70
omnium formarum nobilissima est anima rationalis”; cf. Gundissalinus, De 
Immortalitate, 19: “Amplius. Manifestum est uirtutem istam nobilem aut esse duarum 
facierum, quarum altera illuminabilis est desuper, a rebus scilicet nobilibus, 
incorporalibus, scilicet spoliatis a materia et ab appendiciis ipsius, altera illuminabilis a 
parte inferiori, uidelicet corporalium et sensibilium; aut eadem est uirtus et  eadem facies, 
sed liberum habens uertere se, in  quam partem uoluerit, et illuminari siue pingi siue 
inscribi, a quibus uoluerit. Ad utrumlibet autem se uertat, ad lumen suum et perfectionem 
suam se uertit. Sed a superiori est nobilior eius perfectio et lumen nobilius. . . . Palam 
igitur debet esse, quia uirtus ista nobilis non solum non pendet ex corpore, sed etiam 
obscuratur et impeditur ab ipso et applicatione sui ad illud.”
 Tractatus, 50: “Item, nihil est irrationabilius quam quod vitium sit liberius virtute. Sed 71
si non esset vita aeterna post istam, in qua esset retributio meritorum, liberior esset 
iniusta, quae nulli subiecta faceret quod vellet, ergo etc.”; Gundissalinus, De 
Immortalitate, 3: “Propter quod iustitiam creatoris et iudicium futurum radicem 
probationis immortalitatis animae humanae non nos primi sed ante nos alii posuerunt, si 
quidem, si anima humana post uitam istam non uiueret, uane hic et frustra deo seruiretur, 
cum in uita ista dei cultus et religio plurimum sui tormentum habeat et afflictionem, et 
post uitam istam nulla ist futura eius remuneratio, quia neque uita est animae humanae 
post uitam istam. Secundum hoc utilius etiam esset animae humanae negare deum 
omnino et omni uanitati et uoluptati se prostituere, quam sancte ac iuste uiuere et 
creatorem debita honorificentia et deuotione colere. Si enim curat deus cultores et 
ueneratores suos, ubi eius potentia, cum nec in uita ista propter hoc sit eis nisi deterius, 
nec in alia sit eis melius, cum alia non sit futura post istam? Si autem non curat, ubi 
sapientia eius aut bonitas? Aut enim ignorare, aut non amare uidebitur amatores suos et 
ueneratores; quorum alterum destruit eius sapientiam, alterum uero bonitatem. Haec est 
igitur radix, per quam conati sumus aliquando ostendere animae humanae uitam esse post 
istam. Alia radix erat nobis ipsa dei iustitia, qua posita necesse est futurum esse iudicium, 
quoniam in hac uita nec mali recipiunt, quod merentur, nec boni, quia et malis hic bene 
est et bonis male. Vbi [sic] ergo iustitia dei, cum utrique contraria meritis suis recipiant in 
hac uita, si post uitam istam non est iudicium, quod utique non est, si non uita est post 
istam?” 
a fonte uitae).  Pecham expands upon an argument from Gundissalinus to support the 72
view that the soul is immortal.   73
It is well known that Avicebron’s doctrine of universal hylomorphism “reached 
the Schools through Gundissalinus’ De Anima.”  Yet Callus has shown that in the De 74
Anima of Gundissalinus, there is the influence of not only Avicebron but also 
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 Tractatus, 51: “Item, finis hominis est coniunctio immediata cum Deo incommutabili; 72
haec autem coniunctio est per amorem. Igitur cum contrarium contrariae sint causae, sicut 
coniunctio non est nisi per amorem Summi Boni, sic nec separatio nisi per Summi Boni 
odium. Sed, si anima in esse deficeret etiam amando Ipsum Bonum, Ipsum perdere 
posset. Sed hoc est impossibile. Ergo impossibile est animam rationalem in essendo 
deficere”; cf. Gundissalinus, De Immortalitate, 37-38: “Et hoc etiam necesse est ipsam 
esse immortalem. Si enim quies eius et perfectio ultima in ipsa uita, immo in ipso fonte 
uitae est, ubi non appropinquat mors neque defectio ulla: manifestum est mentem 
humanum illuc naturaliter tendere et quiescere, ubi est uitae indefectibilis continuitas et 
nulla morti uel defectioni accessibilitas. . . . omnes cogitationes eius, omnes affectiones in 
se collegerit et in se traxerit: totaliter illi uiuet et totaliter ex illo. Quod exemplo naturalis 
amoris euidenter apparet, ubi mens amantissimi patris totaliter uiuit filio, et totaliter 
cogitationes et affectiones omnes et operationes etiam forinsecas amor rapit in filium. . . . 
quoniam uita in apprehensionibus et affectionibus totaliter consistit.”
 Tractatus, 51: “Item, si anima esse amitteret, aut per mutationem, quae est corruptio 73
naturalis, aut per mutationem, quae est corruptio in nihilum. Primum non potest esse nisi 
dubous modis: aut quia anima corrupitur per corruptionem sui subiecti, aut per 
corruptionem sui in se. Primum istorum duorum est impossibile, quia, sicut probatum est, 
anima rationalis non dependet a corpore nec operando nec essendo. Secundum similiter 
est impossibile, quia anima rationalis non componitur ex contrariis nec habet contrarium, 
nec naturam, quae sit transmutationis subiectum”; cf. Gundissalinus, De Immortalitate, 
26-27: “Omne destructibile non est destructibile nisi uno modorum istorum: uidelicet aut 
diuisione formae suae a materia sua—quod non potest esse nisi aut forma manente, sicut 
ponimus in homine, qui morte, quae est diuisio formae suae a materia, id est animae a 
corpore, ita destruitur, quod manet eius forma, hoc est anima ipsa secundum quod nos 
ponimus; aut destruitur diuisione formae a materia forma ipsa destructa, quae destructio 
proprie uocatur corruptio—; aut destruitur diuisione partium suarum integralium, 
quemadmodum domus, cum partes eius ab inuicem separantur, id est ligna et lapides; aut 
destruitur destructa sustinentis essentia; aut distruitur subtractione causae suae, 
quemadmodum si dissipato utre uinum deficiat aut destruatur et corpore destructo 
destruantur ea, quae in eo sunt, aut sole sublato destruatur dies. . . .”
 Callus, “Gundissalinus’ De Anima,” 341-342. 74
Avicenna, for in this work Gundissalinus surprisingly also supports the unity of the 
soul and not the plurality of forms.  In other works, however, Gundissalinus affirms 75
the doctrine of plurality of forms and the unity of the soul.   76
Pecham had access to the treatise De Differentia Animae et Spiritus of Costa Ben 
Luca (864-923).  Callus writes about the influence of this work: 77
There were, however, other factors which helped to strengthen the 
pluralist theory. Not least among these was the De differentia spiritus et 
animae [sic] of Costa-ben-Luca, the Constabulinus of the schools. The short 
treatise exerted no little influence on medieval physiological and 
psychological thought. From it Gundissalinus in his De anima borrowed 
Plato’s and Aristotle’s definitions of the soul. It helped … to posit an 
intermediary uniting the soul to the body. The soul is united to the body by 
means of a corporeal ‘spirit,’ which, inasmuch as it comes forth from the 
heart, produces life, breath, and beating of the pulse; as proceeding from the 
brain, it causes sensation and movement. Further, Costa-ben-Luca holds that 
the three powers of the soul, the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational, are 
forms and genera of soul, and may at choice be called animae.  78
Pecham's view of the soul differs in some specifics from that of Costa Ben Luca, who 
writes prior to Avicenna and Averroes, but nonetheless Pecham references the second 
chapter of De Differentia Animae et Spiritus in support of the view that the will is an 
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 See ibid., 338-355.75
 Ibid., 352-355; cf. Gundissalinus, De Processione Mundi: “Forma uero prima est 76
substantia constituens essentiam omnium formarum” (30); ibid., De Unitate et Uno: 
“Quia igitur materia in supremis formata est forma intelligentiae, deinde forma rationalis 
animae, postea vero forma sensibilis animae, deinde inferius forma animae vegetatbilis, 
deinde forma naturae, ad ultimum autem in infimis forma corporis: hoc non accidit ex 
diversitate virtutis agentis, sed ex aptitudine materiae suscipientis” (8).      
 See Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 5-6. John Blund is the first master we 77
know of who wrote a treatise on the soul; on the significance of this work see Hasse, 
Avicenna’s De Anima, 18; Dunne, “Introduction to the New Edition”.
 “Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form,” 272. 78
organic power insofar as the intellect and cogitation is accomplished through the 
spirit in bodily organs.  79
In developing his Neoplatonic view of form and matter, Pecham references (either 
directly or indirectly) not only these writers, but also four major Franciscan authors 
who are also associated with the Fons Vitae tradition and whom I will now directly 
cite in connection with Pecham: Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, 
Bonaventure, and Roger Bacon. While Pecham is not discussing hylomorphism or the 
plurality of forms in each reference to these authors, the sheer abundance of the 
references (i.e., on most pages of the Tractatus) shows that Pecham is immersed in 
the tradition that is characterized by universal hylmorophism. Here, I will briefly 
consider each of these authors in turn, and how Pecham uses them.   
It will be remembered from the first chapter of the present study that Alexander of 
Hales was highly influential in the Franciscan order after already being an established 
theologian at Paris. He taught in the Faculty of Arts at Paris and then in the Faculty of 
Theology in the first half of the 13th century.  Pecham contrasts the Christian purity 80
of Alexander’s teaching with the teaching of those who were introducing 
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 Quaestiones, 206: “Item, voluntas est vis organica; ergo potest iuvari per caelum ut 79
organa. Prima probatur: quia dicitur in libro De differentia spiritus et animae: quia 
intellectus et cogitatio fit per spiritum qui est in ventriculo”; cf. Costa Ben Luca, De 
Differentia Animae et Spiritus, 126: “Intellectus vero et cogitatio et providentia et 
cognitio fit per spiritum, qui est in ventriculo. . . .”
 See Walter H. Principe, The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth 80
Century, 4 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1975), 2:13; cf. 
Philotheus Boehner, “The System of Metaphysics of Alexander of Hales,” Franciscan 
Studies 5 (1942): 366-414.
“novelties.”  Alexander’s view of hylomorphism has been thought to be essentially a 81
restatement of what Augustine says in the Commentary on Genesis.  But when 82
Pecham makes his most explicit statement of the plurality of forms view, he 
references Alexander of Hales rather than Augustine: 
Sed formarum quaedam sunt quae substentatae in esse non indigent alio, 
sicut animae humanae, vel ita sunt principia vitae ut etiam vivant a corpore 
separatae; aliae autem sunt quae, in materia quam vivificant, recipiunt 
fundamentum exsistendi et ipsis rependunt complementum vivendi, “in quibus 
pro certo idem est vivere et vitaem tribuere alteri”, quia simul cum corpore 
moriuntur et oriuntur a principiis corporis.  83
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 “Quae sit ergo solidior et sanior doctrina, vel filiorum Beati Francisci, sanctae scilicet 81
memoriae fratris Alexandri, ac fratris Bonaventurae et consimilium, qui in suis tractatibus 
ab omni calumnia alienis sanctis et philosophis innituntur; vel illa novella quasi tota 
contraria, quae quicquid docet Augustinus de regulis aeternis et luce incommutabili, de 
potentiis animae, de rationibus seminalibus inditis materiae et consimilibus innumeris, 
destruat pro viribus et enervat pugnas verborum inferens toti mundo? Videant antiqui in 
quibus est sapientia, videat et corrigat Deus coeli” (Registrum, 3:901).
 Cullen, “Alexander of Hales,” A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 107. 82
 Tractatus, 7; cf. Alexander, Summa, 2:669: “Quia igitur appetitus vitam non facit in 83
actu, nisi perficiatur, in quibusdam vero non est completus de se, sed aliquo indiget 
exteriori ut perficiatur, in eis vitam non facit in actu, nisi ei quo indiget coniungatur. Et 
haec est ratio quare substantia simplex corpori unitur, ut videlicet appetitus suo 
desiderabili coniungatur et sic in actu vigeat et vita in ea perficiatur. Si enim completus 
esset in se eius appetitus, nunquam corpori essentialiter uniretur. Per appetitum ergo 
corpori unitur et inseparabiliter se tenet, nisi sit defectus ex parte corporis, et ut per hoc 
suo actui coniungatur et vita perficiatur; per appetitum etiam variis motibus movet 
corpus, ut etiam ipsum perficiat et ipsa perficiatur. Et haec est ratio colligationis animae 
cum corpore, quamvis haec ratio colligationis multiplex sit et differens in diversis: in 
quibusdam enim maior, in aliis vero minor reperitur vis colligationis. In quibusdam enim 
quodam modo idem est vivere et vitam alii tribuere.” 
When Pecham discusses the option of calling the various powers of the soul 
“substances,” he evidently references a discussion in Alexander of Hales.  In this 84
connection, Bieniak has said that, of the many authors she surveys, “only Avicebron 
clearly maintains the plurality of substances in the soul.”  Melani, the editor of 85
Pecham’s Tractatus, also thinks that Pecham has a text of Alexander’s in mind when 
discussing the “purified intellect” that is prepared to receive revelations.   86
The early 13th-century Paris philosopher and theologian John of La Rochelle, 
whose Summa De Anima is regarded as the first Franciscan scholastic textbook of 
psychology,  develops the substantial unibility theory (which I will discuss in 87
connection with Bonaventure below), and uses the terms “form” and “perfection” 
interchangeably.  This can be seen as a prelude to Pecham’s usage of those terms. 88
Pecham often uses principles from John of La Rochelle to support his own positions 
in the Tractatus, particularly in the important discussion of simplicity: “Quia igitur 
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 Tractatus, 30: “Anima igitur dividitur prima divisione per vegetativam sensitivam et 84
intellectivam, quae, secundum quod sunt in corporibus diversarum specierum, planum est 
quod sunt diversae substantiae. Sed in anima, ubi tres concurrunt, dubium est apud 
sapientes”; cf. Alexander, Summa, 2:682: “Circa hanc materiam diversi diversa sentiunt. 
Quidam enim dicunt quod embrio vivit ante organizationem et habet animam vegetativam 
et sensitivam ante infusionem animae rationalis, innitentes verbo Philosophi supra dicto; 
et isti ponunt hominem habere tres animas vel saltem tres substantias animae.”
 The Soul-Body Problem, 134. 85
 Tractatus, 45-46: “Ad interpretationem non descendunt, elevatum tamen desiderium 86
ducunt non secum sed post se purificatum intellectum et fiunt huius animae revelationes, 
nec solae degustantur et soleates”; cf. Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae 
(Quaracchi: College of St. Bonaventure, 1960), which includes the quaestio De raptu 
Pauli and its discussion of Secundum quam potentiam animae raptus fuit Paulus 
(1349-1350). 
 Brady, “John of La Rochelle,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 4:282. 87
 Bieniak, The Soul-Body Problem, 35-36, 44-45.88
virtutis actus est influere et movere, necesse est virtutem simplicem, non parvitate, 
sed communicabili unitate, mobili sibi proportionali in ratione moventis, perficiendo 
influentis, uniri posse, ut tota sit anima in toto et qualibet eius parte.”  Pecham also 89
may find in John of La Rochelle a principle supporting the view that, if there is an 
incorruptible corporeal form perfecting corporeal matter, there must also be an 
incorruptible spiritual form perfecting spiritual matter.  There are other 90
commonalities between Pecham and John of La Rochelle, on such matters as the 
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 Tractatus, 29; cf. John of La Rochelle, Summa De Anima, 1.40, de modo unionis. E.g., 89
“Ex anima autem et corpore fit unum secundum substanciam, quod est homo. . . . 
quaeritur si idem est modus unionis quo unitur anima uegetabilis corporibus plantarum, et 
ille quo unitur anima sensibilis corporibus animalium, et anima racionalis corporibus 
hominum. Et cum unio anime racionalis ad corpus humanum sit separabilis, ita quod 
possit anima manere separata post unionem, aliorum uero unio non est separabilis. . . .” 
 Tractatus, 50: “Item, si aliqua forma corporalis, perficiens materiam corcorporalem 90
[sic], est incorruptible, ergo multo fortius aliqua forma spiritualis corpus perficiens”; cf. 
John of La Rochelle, Summa De Anima, 1.42. E.g., “Respondeo. Modus essendi anime in 
corpore est secundum triplicem comparacionem: una est, que est perfectionis ad 
perfectum. . . . Quedam uero perfectiones sunt, que sunt ita perfectiones tocius quod 
nullius partis et talis perfectio est anima secundum omnem sui differenciam, scilicet 
uegetabilis, sensibilis, racionalis. Unde quelibet planta ita est planta quod non aliqua pars 
eius; ita eciam est de quolibet animali et homine.” 
 Tractatus, 20: “Duplicem enim pono intelligentiam agentem, increatam et 91
creatam. . . .”; cf. John of La Rochelle, Summa De Anima, 2.116-117. 
twofold agent intellect,  the independence of the intellectual operation from the 91
body,  the work of angels in human knowledge,  and the sensitive soul.   92 93 94
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 Tractatus, 25: “Et cum, secundum Avicennam, VI Naturalium, intellectus in operibus 92
suis non indigeat organo, nisi sicut nauta indiget navi tantum donec perveniatur ad 
portum, sic secundum ipsum intellectus non indiget organis nisi in acquirendo 
scientiam”; cf. John of La Rochelle, Summa De Anima, 1.43: “Dicto de esse anime in 
unione ad corpus, et quantum ad esse in corpore, dicendum est de esse ipsius post 
separacionem eiusdem a corpore; de quo querenda sunt quattuor: primo de immortalitate, 
secundo de passibilitate, tercio de loco, quarto de motu.”
 Tractatus, 27-28: “Unde in somniis fiunt frequenter revelationes, Deo inspirante in 93
spiratum, inspirante in phantasmatibus per angelicum ministerium ordinate demonstrante 
hoc”; cf. John of La Rochelle, Summa De Anima, 2.116: “Quia, sicut dicit beatus 
Dionysius, manifestatores sunt angeli omnes; et eciam ad ipsos pertinent reuelaciones, ut 
patet ex Apocalypsi et Daniele. Sed constans est quod huiusmodi manifestacio non sit 
uirtutis sensitiue, que est per angelos; fit ergo uirtute intellectiua, sed non nisi per 
irradiacionem. . . . Non erit ergo diuina intelligencia intellectus agens respectu anime. Sed 
cum proporcio sit lucis intelligencia angelice ad uisum intellectus humani, et in 
proporcionali luce est uidere, erit igitur intelligencia angelica intellectus agens respectu 
intellectus humani possibilis.”
 Tractatus, 33, 34. In this chapter (part two, chapter 10) Pecham follows the structure 94
presented by John of La Rochelle in Summa De Anima, 2.85: “Consequenter est dicere de 
ui sensibili que subdiuiditur primo per cognitiuam et motiuam. Et cognitiua siue 
apprehensiua duplex est. . . .”; ibid., 2.87: “Apprehensiua uero exterior muliplicatur per 
quinque, scilicet per uirtutem uisiuam, auditiuam, olfactiuam, gustatiuam, tactiuam, 
secundum quas sunt quinque sensus. . . .”; ibid., 2.103: “Dicto de uiribus sensitiuis 
apprehensiuis, dicendum est de motiuis. Virtus autem motiua sensibilis est duobus modis: 
nam quedam est motiua modo naturali, quedam uero modo animali; et motiuam 
sensibilem modo naturali dico que nec mouet secundum apprehensionem, nec est 
subiecta imperio racionis, qualis est uirtus uitalis siue pulsatiua. Est autem hec uis in 
corde sicut in organo; et est uis per inspiracionem et respiracionem, principium existens 
contemperancie caloris cordis et corporis.” 
In Pecham’s critical statement about the defense of Augustinian doctrines, he 
mentions Bonaventure alongside Alexander of Hales.  Although Pecham 95
infrequently cites Bonaventure directly, one can see connections between Pecham, 
Bacon, and Bonaventure particularly concerning the connection between the rational 
soul and the body, the individuation of the human person, and spiritual matter. And 
according to Bonaventure, the rational soul’s principle of unibility or disposition (or 
appetite) for union with body (along with the body’s own unibility) facilitates 
individuation: “[U]nibility explains how the immaterial human soul is one substance 
with its body, just as a form is one substance with its matter.”  The same could be 96
said about Pecham’s view of the connection between soul and body. It also is 
plausible that Pecham adopted his account of individuation along the lines of 
Bonaventure’s view. I will address these issues further in a later section of the present 
chapter.  
Roger Bacon heavily influenced Pecham, as has already been seen in the context 
of natural philosophy (see chapter three of the present study). Lindberg has placed the 
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 “Quae sit ergo solidior et sanior doctrina, vel filiorum Beati Francisci, sanctae scilicet 95
memoriae fratris Alexandri, ac fratris Bonaventurae et consimilium, qui in suis tractatibus 
ab omni calumnia alienis sanctis et philosophis innituntur; vel illa novella quasi tota 
contraria, quae quicquid docet Augustinus de regulis aeternis et luce incommutabili, de 
potentiis animae, de rationibus seminalibus inditis materiae et consimilibus innumeris, 
destruat pro viribus et enervat pugnas verborum inferens toti mundo? Videant antiqui in 
quibus est sapientia, videat et corrigat Deus coeli” (Registrum, 3:901).
 Osborne, “Unibilitas,” 229; cf. Bonaventure: “[U]nibilitas sive aptitudo uniendi cum 96
corpore non est animae accidentalis, sed est ipsi animae essentialis, et ita non potest ab ea 
separari vel circumscribi, salva ipsius natura” (In Sententiarum, 3.5.2.3). For a review of 
Bacon’s theory of individuation, see Hackett, “Roger Bacon (b. ca. 1214/20; d. 1292),” 
Individuation in Scholasticism, 117-140.
Fons Vitae in the background of Bacon’s philosophy of nature.  And, as Crowley has 97
observed, Bacon was very reliant on the Fons Vitae tradition for his own doctrine of 
hylomorphism:  
If we are to judge by the early writings of Roger Bacon, the influence of 
the doctrines of the Fons Vitae must have made itself strongly felt in the 
faculty of arts at Paris in the first half of the thirteenth century. Bacon is a 
staunch supporter of universal hylomorphism. To determine to what extent his 
teaching was influenced by Avicebron and Gundissalinus, it is necessary to 
sketch the arguments he brings forward in support of his thesis. . . . 
Gundissalinus it was who first introduced universal hylomorphism in an 
attempt to associate Aristotelianism and Arabic neo-Platonism in explaining in 
a manner acceptable to Christians the origin of things. But behind the De 
Processione Mundi of Gundissalinus, there is the Fons Vitae of Avicebron. . . . 
The authors that contributed most to the foundation of Bacon’s theory were 
Aristotle, Avicebron and Gundissalinus. There is no trace of any appeal to the 
authority of St. Augustine, though Bacon’s conception of the potentia activa 
in matter does not differ greatly from the rationes seminales theory of the 
Augustinians.  98
Furthermore, Jeremiah Hackett has recently argued that the abundance of similarities 
between Bacon and Pecham justifies speaking of a Bacon-Pecham research program, 
although he also notes that there are differences between Bacon and Pecham.  99
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 Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature: “We must concentrate our attention … on that 97
aspect of the medieval philosophy of light that would be seized by Bacon and made a  
pillar of his new science—namely, the Plotinian doctrine of emanation. . . . [I]f we look 
for the doctrine of emanation in sources that were eventually translated into Latin and in 
forms that might have influenced Bacon’s De multiplicatione specierum, another work 
stands out—the Fons vitae of the Spanish Jew (who wrote in Arabic) Avicebron. . . . 
Bacon’s Aristotelianism was heavily Neoplatonized—and, of course, modified according 
to the necessities of Christian theology. Among the doctrines that Bacon took from the 
Neoplatonic tradition were the divine illumination of the intellect, universal 
hylomorphism, the plurality of forms (properly qualified), and the separability of the 
soul” (xlii, xlvi, liv, parenthetical items in orig.). 
 Crowley, Roger Bacon, 82, 90, 199.98
 “Illumination, Agent Intellect and Intelligible Species in Roger Bacon and John 99
Pecham: At the Origins of Neo-Augustinianism,” Proceedings of the Hannover Medieval 
Philosophy Symposium 2011 (forthcoming).
Before leaving this point about Pecham’s influences, it should be noted that Philip 
the Chancellor is the immediate channel through which speculation about 
intermediate elements between the rational soul and the body came to the Franciscans 
in the late 13th century.  While Pecham does not cite Philip directly, Pecham does 100
discuss in some depth topics which which Philip also dealt —in particular the topic 101
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 See Bieniak, The Soul-Body Problem, 119.100
 Tractatus, 26-27: “Quare autem imaginatio disturbetur vel impediatur, ratio est propter 101
multitudinem humorum in pueris et vaporum in dormientibus, quoniam talis fluxibilitas 
nihil habet fixum, immo et virtutes animales in spiritibus operantur sed etiam spiritus sunt 
vehicula virtutum animalium ut docet Avicenna. Sed quia diversis virtutibus diversi 
debenter spiritus et quanto virtus nobilior, tanto spiritus, cuius vehiculum est, subtilior. 
Non autem omnes spiritus semper unirentur, sed varie, secundum diversitatem corporis 
quantum ad complexionem et dispositionem necesse est virtutes sensibiles per illum 
motum humorum et impedimentum spirituum interscindi vel per laesionem principalis 
organi, sicut in quibusdam phreneticis. . . . Igitur, sicut anima rationalis aliquam requirit 
dispositionem, mediante qua in corpore subsistat, licet a corpore non dependeat, sic cum 
amplius sit operari quam esse, aliquam requirit dispositionem in corpore, quae suae 
operationi subministret; quod esse non potest nisi ex motu eius quod est in corporibus 
summum nobilissimorum spirituum; non quod spiritus sint operationis intelligentiae 
vehiculum. sed [sic] in corpore comportionatum, ut sicut anima unitur corpori 
nobilissimo, sic operetur in corpore nobilissime disposito. Sic, igitur, patet qualiter ratio 
per indispositionem impeditur”; Quaestiones, 323-324; cf. Bieniak, The Soul-Body 
Problem, 119-120; Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy, 28. 
of the so-called animal spirits and the forma corporeitatis.  This is important 102
because Philip was himself aware of the Fons Vitae.  103
(4) The fourth reason why the scarcity of direct Pechamian citations of the Fons 
Vitae does not mean that Pecham was not influenced heavily by the Fons Vitae: 
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 Philip the Chancellor, Philippi Cancellarii Summa de bono, ed. Nicolas Wicki, 2 vols. 102
(Berne: Francke, 1985), 1:284, 286-287: “[A]nima secundum quid unitur per modum 
forme, secundum quid per modum substantie; utrique enim est proportionalis. Quod 
autem opponitur quod forma uniter se ipsa, quare anima se ipsa, secundum hoc dicendum 
est quod sunt quedam forme prime, quedam ultime, quedam medie. Prime forme cum 
prime sint, absque medio materie coniunguntur, ut est corporeitas. Ultime forme per 
medium coniunguntur, et quia ultime non sunt media neque dispositiones materiales ad 
aliarum coniunctionem. Ultima autem forma naturalium est anima. Medie autem et per 
medium coniunguntur quandoque et quandoque sunt media et quasi materiales 
dispositiones; verbi gratia potentia sensibilis per medium coniungitur suo subiecto, 
scilicet mediante ut dispositione materiali potentia vegetabili; et hoc quando est ultima 
perfectio. Quandoque autem ipsa eadem in nobiliori subiecto est medium et quasi 
dispositio materialis, scilicet comparatione anime intellective. . . . licet sit ut forma, non 
tamen per se corpori necesse est coniungi. . . . Item, ex parte corporis similiter 
inveniuntur dipositiones, que habent convenientiam cum anima rationali. Est enim 
quoddam corpus simplex, incorruptibile, et quoddam simplex et corruptibile. Simplex et 
incorruptibile corpus superceleste, quod numquam ab huiusmodi operatione seu 
generatione separatur. . . . Corpus vero simplex et corruptibile elementum. Exiguntur ergo 
ad coniunctionem anime rationalis cum corpore anima sensibilis et anima vegetabilis et 
iterum spiritus, qui est a natura corporis superioris, et calor elementalis. Sciendum autem 
quod spiritus triplex est. Est enim quidam animalis, et hic est in cerebro; et est spiritus 
vitalis, et hic est in corde; et iterum spiritus / naturalis, et hic est in epate. Et cum sint 
huiusmodi spiritus, ut dictum est iam, a natura corporis supercelestis, quemadmodum 
corpus superceleste continue movetur, sic et per virtutem spirituum in istis membris 
principalibus est motus indeficiens et continuus.” 
 “Philip the Chancellor’s Summa de Bono reveals the steadily-growing penetration into 103
the West of the philosophy particularly of Aristotle and Avicenna. Although Avicenna is 
not named, he is an important influence and indeed probably the main channel for 
Philip’s knowledge of Aristotle; however, Philip also knew Aristotle directly and he quite 
regularly quotes or refers to most of the Stagirite’s works. The Chancellor appears to have 
had some acquaintance, whether directly or indirectly, with the thought of Avicebron and 
of the Liber de Causis; Averroes, too, is mentioned at least three times. . . .” (Principe, 
The Theology of the Hypostatic Union, 4:25); cf. Leo W. Keeler, Ex Summa Philippi 
Cancellarii Quaestiones de Anima, Series Scholastica 20 (Münster: Ashendorff, 1937). 
Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas recognized Avicebron as a primary source of 
the doctrines of hylomorphism and plurality of forms, and thus saw Avicebron’s 
philosophy as a serious problem. Albertus Magnus wrote in opposition to the Fons 
Vitae a number of times.  For example, in Albertus Magnus’ discussion of the errors 104
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 “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 248ff.; cf. Albertus, De Causis, in 104
Opera Omnia, ed. Winfrid Fauser (Aschendorff, 1993), 1.1.5-6. There are two chapters, 
titled De opinione Avicebron in libro Fontis vitae and De improbatione opinionis 
Avicebron, containing an extended argument against Avicebron; see also Metaphisica 
Libros I-V, Opera Omnia Alberti Magni, ed. Bernhard Geyer (Aschendorff, 1960), 
3.2.10: “Non ignoro autem Avicebron in Libro Fontis Vitae istam videri solvere 
quaestionem dicendo [quod] ea quae principia sunt et elementa, sicut forma et materia 
prima, quidem esse eadem omnium proxima aut non esse eadem. Et primam quidem 
materiam vocat, in qua primae inveniuntur materialis principii proprietates, quae sunt 
sustinere, recipere, substare, fundamentum esse sive fundare, individuare, participare et 
huiusmodi, et hanc dicit eandem esse tam corporalium quam spiritualium et tam 
corruptibilium quam incorruptibilium. Proximam autem esse determinatam forma 
substantiali secundum gradus ipsius, qui sunt esse, vivere, sentire et intelligere, et 
determinatam cum forma substantiali aptitudine per tres diametros orthogonaliter se 
secantes, et hanc secundum suos gradus esse materiam corporum omnium. Et 
determinatam tertio loco per qualitates primas activas et passivas, et hanc secundum suos 
gradus dicit esse physicorum transmutabilium materiam. Quid autem istam materiae 
faciat diversitatem, non dicit. Similiter intendit dicere de principio et elemento, quod est 
forma. Hoc enim lumen est intelligentiae, sicut saepissime diximus. Et gradus accipimus 
secundum lumen intelligentiae purum, et secundum lumen intelligentiae, virtuti corporis, 
quod eius instrumentum est, permixtum. Et tunc secundum gradus illius diversificatur. 
Quoniam si virtus corporis non determinatur nisi situ, erit forma corporis, et si 
determinatur etiam qualitate, efficitur forma physici transmutabilis. Et sic unam primam 
formam ponit in omnibus, et fere tendit hoc ad positionem Platonis. . . . Opinio autem 
Aristotelis est, quod principium movens idem sit, et cum motus sit actus moventis primi 
et instrumentum, et motor moveat ad formam, quam habet in seipso, quod forma, quae est 
in materia potentia” (bracketed item in orig.).   
of Platonizing Stoic philosophers in his Metaphysica, he singles out the “strange 
position” of Avicebron concerning being.  Weisheipl writes on this issue: 105
Neither Albertus Magnus nor Thomas Aquinas could find anything 
favorable to say about Avicebron’s Fons vitae, although clearly both had read 
the entire Latin translation. . . . Albertus Magnus, who seems to have made a 
progressive study of the work from his Parisian days in the mid-1240s until 
his paraphrase of De causis (before 1271), found the entire work too 
“fallacious,” “improbable,” and “ridiculous” to have been written by any 
serious philosopher at all, but a huge joke perpetrated by undergraduates on an 
unsuspecting public.  106
As Weisheipl notes, the particular focus on Avicebron by Albertus shows that the 
doctrine of the Fons Vitae was a real problem for Albertus and his contemporaries.  107
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 Albertus, Metaphysica Libros VI-XIII, ed. Geyer (Aschendorff, 1964), 11.2.15: “Patet 105
autem in hoc error libri Avicebron, qui ponit omne illud quod recipit formam, materiam 
existere et materiam esse materiam a potentia recipiendi formam. Materiam autem 
minoris et artioris potentiae effici per formarum receptionem et eam quae recipit formam, 
quae est intellectualitas, non esse tam amplae receptionis sicut prius, et ideo 
intelligentiam dicit esse non tot et talium formarum receptivam sicut materiam, habere 
tamen intelligentiam materiam sicut subiectum sui, a quo si abstrahatur vel removeatur 
forma intellectualitatis, dicit relinqui materiam primam. Et iste est error ex maxima 
philosophiae ignorantia proveniens, quia si intelligentia dicit materiam, tunc non potest 
probari, quod aliqua substantia secundum esse sit a materia separata.” 
 “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 248-249, parenthetical item in orig. 106
 Ibid., 257-258.107
In Albertus’ commentary on the Liber De Causis, he makes an extended argument 
against Avicebron’s position.   108
As C.M.J. Vansteenkiste has pointed out, Aquinas references Avicebron no fewer 
than 20 times.  In Aquinas’s Treatise on Separate Substances, he devotes four 109
chapters to refuting Avicebron’s positions about matter.  Aquinas saw Avicebron as 110
a proponent of the Platonist dualism which he opposed: “Avicebron maintained in the 
book, The Source of Life, that no body is active, but that the power of spiritual 
substance, passing through bodies, does the actions, which seem to be done by 
bodies.”  Here are samples of Aquinas’s writing against Avicebron concerning the 111
plurality of forms: 
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 De Causis, 1.1.5 is titled De opinione Avicebron in libro Fontis vitae, and 1.1.6 is 108
titled De improbatione opinionis Avicebron. In 1.1.6, Albertus gives five rationes 
potissime for the falsity of Avicebron’s view: (1) “[Q]uia imperfecta est. Non enim dicit, 
unde ortum habeat materia, quae quamvis per generationem et corruptionem non 
producatur in esse, tamen aliquo modo habet esse et sic vel erit principium vel ex 
principio”; (2) “[Q]uod prima materia incompletissima est omnium materiarum eo quod 
potentia est ad omnia nihil actu existens”; (3) “[Q]uod intelligi non potest, quod potentia 
exiens ad actum sine motu perveniat ad ipsum, cum ‘motus non sit nisi actus existentis in 
potentia’”; (4) “[Q]uod id quod plus et quoad plura est in potentia, non uno motu sed 
pluribus paticipat bonitatem primi”; (5) “[Q]uod contra omnem philosophiam est, quod 
dicit primum agere voluntate.” 
 “Autori Arabi e Giudei nell’opera di San Tommaso,” Angelicum 37 (1960): 356-365.109
 Ed. and trans. Francis J. Lescoe (West Hartford: Saint Joseph College, 1963), 56-82.  110
 Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Vernon J. Bourke, University of Notre Dame Press ed. 111
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 3.69. It is a question as to whether 
the Fons Vitae teaches this, but one can see how Aquinas might have thought that it does 
(Fons Vitae, 40: “Omnis auctor, excepto primo auctore, in suo opere indiget subiecto 
quod sit susceptibile suae actionis. infra uero hanc substantiam non est substantia quae sit 
receptibilis suae actionis, quia haec substantia est ultimum esse et eius finis infimus, et 
est quasi centrum ad ceteras substantias intelligibiles.—Et etiam, quia quantitas quae 
circumdat hanc substantiam est causa uetans eam ne agat.”)
• “Some say that matter exists in every created substance and that the matter of all 
things is alike. The originator of this position seems to be Avicebron, who wrote 
the Liber fontis vitae, which many people follow.”  112
• In Aquinas’s A Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, in the chapter on “How 
substantial forms actualize beings,” Aquinas writes: “On this basis we can 
eliminate Avicebron’s position in his book The Fountain of Life. He claimed that 
parallel to the order of genera and species is an order of multiple substantial 
forms in one and the same thing—e.g., that in this particular human being is one 
form through which he is a substance, another through which he is a body, a 
third through which he is a living body, and so forth. But, in keeping with the 
above discussion, we must say that it is one and the same substantial form 
through which this particular thing is an individual or a substance and also 
through which it is a body, a living body, and so forth.”  113
• An objection in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae says, “Further, every agent except 
the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. But ‘there 
is no substance below the corporeal substance which can be receptive of the 
latter’s action, since it belongs to the lowest degree in beings.’ Therefore 
corporeal substance is not active.” Aquinas is quoting, more or less verbatim, 
from Avicebron here.  114
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 In Quattuor Libros Sententiarum, S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia 1 (Stuttgart: Bad 112
Cannstatt, 1980), 2.3.1.1: “Quidam enim dicunt quod “in omni substantia creata est 
materia, et quia omnium est materia una; et hujus positionis auctor videtur avicebron, qui 
fecit librum fontis vitae, quem multi sequuntur”; translation by Weisheipl, “Albertus 
Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 254. 
 Trans. Robert Pasnau (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 124. 113
 Summa Theologiae, 1.115.1; cf. Avicebron, Fons Vitae, 40: “Omnis auctor, excepto 114
primo auctore, in suo opere indiget subiecto quod sit susceptibile suae actionis. infra uero 
hanc substantiam non est substantia quae sit receptibilis suae actionis, quia haec 
substantia est ultimum esse et eius finis infimus, et est quasi centrum ad ceteras 
substantias intelligibiles.—Et etiam, quia quantitas quae circumdat hanc substantiam est 
causa uetans eam ne agat.”
Quotations such as these, which occur often in Aquinas’s work, show that Aquinas 
considered Avicebron as a prominent influence during the age of pluralists such as 
Pecham.   115
Part 3: A Reading of Pecham’s Tractatus in Comparison with the Fons Vitae 
A reading of Pecham’s Tractatus in comparison with the Fons Vitae yields a high 
number of similarities between the two works.  
Avicebron discusses at length the causal hierarchy whereby the plurality of forms 
operate upon one another: 
Now the simple substance [e.g., the soul] is the cause of the compound 
substance. Therefore all the designs and the figures that appear in the 
compound substance are impressed [inflictum] therein by the simple 
substance. Then to this proposition I add. . . . All that is impressed [inflictum] 
by one thing in another thing exists in the thing that impresses it.   116
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 See Vansteenkiste, “Autori Arabi,” 357-358: E.g., “Unde patet falsam esse opinionem 115
quam tradit Avicebron in libro fontis vitae, ‘quod in materia est ordo formarum, ita quod 
primo materiae advenit forma secundum quam est substantia, et postea alia secundum 
quam est corpus, et postea alia secundum quam est animatum corpus, et sic de aliis” (In 
librum Aristotelis De generation et corruptione, Commentaria in Aristotelem et Alios, S. 
Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia 4 (Stuttgart: Bad Cannstatt, 1980), 1.10); “Nisi forte 
dicatur secundum positionem libri fontis vitae, “esse unam primam formam, et sic in 
materia primo inductam fore formam corporalem communem, et postmodum formas 
speciales distinctas. Sed hanc positionem Avicenna improbat. . . .” (In Quattuor Libros 
Sententiarum, 2.12.1.4)” (parenthetical items in orig.). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 50, bracketed items added; cf. Fons Vitae: “[E]t substantia 116
simplex causa est compositae. ergo quicquid lineamentorum et figurarum apparet in 
substantia composita, inflictum est a substantia simplici. deinde huic addam hanc: 
quicquid inflictum est ab aliquo in aliud, est in in infligente illud” (121-122). 
Avicebron explains that it is the form that does the impressing  and gives some 117
detail about how the impression (impressionem ) works: The motions associated 118
with each aspect of the soul (vegetative, sensitive, and rational) are due to the 
impressions of forms and in fact come from one another hierarchically, the rational 
soul being the source for the rest of the forms in the human being.   119
Form itself is diffused among all those things that exist, on Avicebron’s view. 
Lindberg has described this process:  
All substances emanate their forms in imitation of the First Author. This 
emanation, Avicebron argues, does not involve flow of the substance’s 
essence, but simply of is force (vis) or ray (radius). . . . And he insists that 
whatever ‘emanates from something is the image of the thing from which it 
emanates.’  
Avicebron’s chief concern is with emanation from simple substances, and 
within that context he argues repeatedly that emanation is from superior to 
inferior: ‘so every simple substance extends its ray and its light and spreads 
them on that which is inferior.  120
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 Ibid., 53; cf. Fons Vitae: “Dicam quod proprietates substantiae simplicis et 117
impressiones sunt in forma quae sustinetur in substantia composita” (124). “Every effect 
is composed in relation to its cause. And if the corporeal forms are the effects of spiritual 
forms, it is necessary that they should be compound. Now they are compound. Therefore 
they are the effects of spiritual forms” (Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 46); cf. Fons Vitae: 
“Omne causatum compositum est comparatione suae causae. sed si formae corporales 
fuerint causatae ex formis spiritualibus, debet ut sint compositae. sed compositae sunt. 
ergo causatae sunt ex formis spiritualibus” (118).
 Pecham uses impressionem, whereas Avicebron uses inflictum. I do not believe that 118
Pecham intends to convey a different idea, because infligo can carry the idea of 
“imposing upon” (Charlton Lewis, et al., A Latin Dictionary Founded on Andrews’ 
Edition of Freund’s Latin Dictionary, rev. ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956]), 
which is the concept Pecham conveys in the context. 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 105-107. Avicebron also says that the form that all things 119
share is the form of being (Fountain of Life, 97). To my knowledge Pecham does not 
discuss a form of being as such, but a form such as this could fit within his anthropology.
 Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature, xlvii-xlviii (parenthetical items in orig.); cf. 120
Avicebron, Fons Vitae, 106-108, 110, 136. 
While the First Author is characterized by no form, every intermediary between the 
First Author and the human does have a form, and the human being itself must have a 
plurality of forms because of its involvement with corporeal matter.  “The forms are 121
simple. Now the simple is anterior to the compound. Therefore the forms are anterior 
to that which is composed of them.”  The human being, the result of the diffusion of 122
form, has a high degree of imperfection.  Since both Pecham and Avicebron use 123
sunlight as a metaphor for emanation,  perhaps the best way to conceptualize this is 124
by thinking of the diffusion and weakening of light the more distant it is from its 
source: “[T]he essences of each of these substances are finite and limited ... their rays 
emanate from them and cross their boundaries and their limits. . . . Just as that, from 
the sun, is diffused in the air. . . .  Similarly, Pecham says that the divine light is 125
most simple and is most remote from human cognition (although it is the cause of 
human cognition).  Pessin explains:  126
[A]s part of the great chain of being, any given existent is saturated through 
with the reality of the hypostases Soul and Intellect: in this sense, each 
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 See Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 47-48. 121
 Ibid., 47; cf. Fons Vitae: “Formae sunt simplices. et simplex prius est composito. ergo 122
formae priores sunt his quae componuntur ex eis” (119).  
 “Formae corporales quae sunt infusae in substantia, unitae sunt cum illa. et omnia 123
unita singula non habent tantum uirtutis et perfectionis, quantum forma simplex per se. 
ergo forma quae est infusa in substantia non est uirtute tanta et perfectione, quanta est 
forma simplex per se” (Fons Vitae, 119). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 36, 49; cf. Fons Vitae: “[E]t in hoc accipe exemplum a sole 124
qui se non fecit effluentem per se, necdantem radios suos nisi propter hanc causam quod 
cadit sub prima influxione et oboedit illi” (108); Pecham, Quaestiones, 383.
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 120; cf. ibid., 36, 41; Fons Vitae: “essentiae uniuscuiusque 125
harum substantiarum finitae sunt et terminatae ... radii earum fluunt ab illis et excedunt 
terminos suos et limites. . . . sicut lumen quod effluit a sole in aerem. . . . (196).”
 Quaestiones, 399. 126
existent has a number of essences, corresponding to the various layers (for Ibn 
Gabirol, “form+matter” spiritual simples) in the great chain of being.  127
The chain of being in Avicebron includes an indefinitely long progression of form-
matter composites, the matter of which can be grouped into the following categories, 
proceeding from most to least simple: general corporeal matter, general celestial 
matter, general natural matter, particular natural matter, individual matter, and first or 
prime matter (each is spiritually specified by its form).  The form-matter composites 128
in the chain of being include intellect, soul, celestial bodies, terrestrial bodies, etc.  129
According to Avicebron, simple substances communicate themselves to other 
substances. A whole substance (consisting of form and matter) confers its form to 
another substance (consisting of form and matter) which is in the mode of receiving 
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 “Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” parenthetical item in orig.127
 Rudavsky, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” 251; cf. Avicebron, Fountain of Life, Jacob, 30-32. 128
The concept of matter is complicated also in Roger Bacon, as a forthcoming study on 
matter in Bacon’s Communia naturalium by Michela Pereira will demonstrate (“Materia 
naturalis”). For the later Bacon, “(1) Matter is the subject of action as when we say that 
wood is the matter for the action of the carpenter. (2) In the proper sense of the term, 
matter is that which, with form, constitutes the composite, as in the case of every created 
substance. (3) Matter is the subject of generation and corruption and has the property of 
being an incomplete and imperfect thing in potency to being a complete thing. (4) Matter 
is the subject of alteration since it receives contrary accidents. (5) Matter can be 
considered as an individual in relation to the universal, the latter being founded in its 
individual as in a material principle. (6) Matter is the name for that which is gross, as 
when we say that earth has more matter than fire” (Hackett, “Roger Bacon,” parenthetical 
items in orig.). 
 See Pessin, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol”; Avicebron, Fons Vitae, 27ff.; Weisheipl, 129
“Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 251. 
form.  Eventually the spiritual substances extend themselves in the extreme and 130
corporeality results. Thus the heavens are an example of “substance which supports 
the categories”.  A substance which supports the nine categories is at “the end of 131
things” or at the extreme of emanation from the First Author.  It is “a species with 132
differences, properties, and accidents. . . . [T]he substance that supports the categories 
differs from other species comprised in the same genus.”  133
Like Avicebron, Pecham sees a process of causal emanation that results in the soul 
impressing itself onto matter.  Pecham’s doctrine may be also read as an adaptation 134
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 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 13; cf. Fons Vitae: “[Sed] Quicquid est quod totum recipit 130
aliquid aliud ex alio sine medio alio ab ipso, ipsum est receptibilius illius quam si illud 
reciperet cum aliquo medio” (85, bracketed item in orig.); ibid., 12: “[N]ostra intentio fuit 
speculari de materia uniuersali et forma uniuersali, dicendum nobis est quod id quod est 
compositum ex materia et forma diuiditur in duo, quorum unum est substantia corporea 
composita, aliud substantia spiritualis simplex. . . .”
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 118; cf. Fons Vitae: “[E]t sicut anima uniuersalis non 131
coniungitur corporibus nisi per medium caeli quod est medium inter corporalia et 
spiritualia: similter manifestatur per hoc etiam quod inter substantiam sustinentem 
praedicamenta et factorem primum sunt substantiae mediae” (194). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 2-3; cf. Fons Vitae: “[E]t substantia quae sustinet nouem 132
praedicamenta est ultimo rerum” (75). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 5; cf. Fons Vitae: “Substantia quae sustinet praedicamenta 133
est species cum differentiis, propriis et accidentibus. . . . substantia quae sustinet 
praedicamenta differt ab alia specie contenta sub eodem genere communi utrisque” (77).  
 Tractatus, 4; Quaestiones, 349: “Ad decimum quartum dicendum quod est forma 134
corporis per essentiam ut imprimentem, essentiae ut impressam”; ibid., 410: “Ad 
octavum dicendum quod lux divina est omnium forma exemplaris et quasi efficiens 
imprimens omnibus suam similitudinem, sicut sigillum imprimit formam suam cerae”; cf. 
Fountain of Life, Wedeck: “Do you not see that the correlations that I point out to you or 
the opposition that there is between the forms of the compound substance and the forms 
of the simple substance prove that the forms of the compound substance emanate from 
the forms of the simple substance?” (71); cf. Fons Vitae: “[N]onne enim uides ex his 
secundariis quae dixi tibi, id est ex oppositione quae est inter formas substantiae 
compositae et formas substantiae simplicis, significari quod formae substantiae 
compositae defluxae sunt a formis substantiae simplicis?” (144). 
of Roger Bacon’s species doctrine in the De Multiplicatione Specierum, where 
‘species’ “denotes the likeness of any object, emanating from the object. . . . it is the 
force or power by which any object acts on its surroundings.”  Pecham discusses at 135
length the first act of form which is a kind of force (vigor) toward the completion of 
the substance’s potential.  Concerning the human being in particular, Pecham adds 136
that the body, and especially its blood, constitute a disposition toward the 
impression.   137
Avicebron and Gundissalinus also use the language of force (vis) to describe 
emanation of form:  “The emanation comes from the impulsion: and the impulsion 138
comes from the force. . . . all the more necessary ... that the spiritual substance, which 
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 Lindberg, introduction to Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature, lv.135
 Tractatus, 6ff., e.g., “Ad huius intelligentiam considera, quia sicut dicit Auctor Fontis 136
vitae: vita est primus actus formae. Certum est quod non cuiuscumque formae, sed illius 
quae ex se ordinabilis est et potest perficere ad sui complementum. Actus enim formae 
elementaris vita non est, quoniam nec supra formam elementarem aliquid est, quod 
requiratur ad speciem elementi, nec infra aliquid quod speciei sufficiat, sed in rebus 
viventibus vigor est continuus et ex vigore oriens appetitus excitans et promovens rem 
viventem ad consequendum sui complementum. Vita igitur est, sicut bene dicunt quidam: 
‘Actualitas vigoris a Creator inditi creaturis, per quem ad sui complementum efficaciter 
ordinatur et ipso obtento in eo quietantur’” (6-7). 
 Tractatus, 4: “In corpore autem dispositio ad hanc impressionem fit et calore et 137
humore, qui in sanguine regnant. . . .”
 Pecham and Avicebron use two different Latin words, but either can be translated 138
“force” (see Lewis, Latin Dictionary). The context suggests that this identical translation 
is suitable; a case can be made that Pecham’s argument in the first two chapters of the 
Tractatus would have been better served by Avicebron’s word. 
is exempt from all quantity, should emanate its essence and its force and its light.”  139
It is plausible that Pecham identifies a substance’s life force with the force of the 
emanation it has received from a higher substance, given that Pecham says the life of 
the soul “overflows” into the body.  Pecham also relates emanation to knowledge, 140
saying that there are purely intellectual impressions whereby knowledge is conveyed 
from God or a spiritual intermediary onto the human mind.  This idea could easily 141
have been based on a principle in Avicebron, namely that knowledge occurs by the 
uniting of one form with another in the soul, without corporeal matter: “The 
intelligence and the soul conceive knowledge from the forms of things. . . . [T]heir 
knowledge of the forms of things is due to the union of their form with the forms of 
things. . . . forms are in [the soul] without their matter.”  If knowledge is accounted 142
for as a form-to-form relationship, then it is perfectly reasonable to think of forms as 
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 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 38; cf. Fons Vitae: “Effluxio est ex impulsu; impulsus 139
autem ex ui. . . . quanto magis necessarium est secundum hanc considerationem ut 
substantia spiritualis, quae immunis est a quantitate. sit effluens suam essentiam et 
uirtutem et lumen suum” (109, 110); Gundissalinus, De Processione Mundi: “Primaria 
causa est cause efficiens, quoniam ui propria mouet. . . .” (17). Gundissalinus also uses 
“virtus” and “potentiae,” which Laumakis translates as “power” in The Procession of the 
World, 46; cf. De Processione Mundi: “Omnis uero motus est in opere eius, 
quemadmodum uirtus in auctore quidem semper eas componens et resoluens. . . . 
Quamuis autem indiuisibilia sint opera trinitatis, tamen creatio materia ex quaomnia, 
potentiae, creatio uero formae, per quam omnia, sapientiae, coniunctio uero utriusque 
connexioni congrue attribuitur, ut etiam in primis suis operibus signaculum trinitatis 
inueniatur” (18-19, 48). 
 Tractatus, 4.140
 Ibid., 28. 141
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 61, bracketed item added; cf. Fons Vitae: “Intelligentia et 142
anima concipiunt scientiam ex formis rerum. . . . scientia earum de formis rerum est ex 
unitione suarum formarum cum formis rerum. . . . Res sensibilis sunt in anima 
simpliciter, hoc est, quia formae earum sunt in illa sine suis materiis. similiter formae 
rerum sunt in intelligentia simplicius et communiori esse” (133). 
being contributed from an immaterial source. Pecham refers to God and to God’s 
eternal light as the separate agent intellect; the rays that come from God make it 
possible for humans to know.   143
Universal hylomorphism is based on the Aristotelian idea that matter is the 
principle of continuity in change. As seen in earlier chapters of the present study, 
Pecham takes the position that any changeable substance must have a material 
component, even if its matter is spiritual rather than corporeal, as in the case of the 
separated substances; Bonaventure takes the same position.  Universal 144
hylomorphism is discussed in some detail in the Fons Vitae, and in connection with 
the universal form and the universal matter. Thus there is no question that the First 
Author actually produced something analogous to “prime matter,” but this is not 
Aristotelian prime matter.  The second book of the Fons Vitae deals with the 145
“universal material substance.”  146
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 See Marrone, The Light. Volume One, 178-179. 143
 See Cullen, Bonaventure, 44-45. 144
 Pessin, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol”: “[W]e need to keep in mind that whatever Ibn Gabirol 145
is talking about is not best thought of as Aristotelian prime matter (which is what many 
readers undoubtedly overtly or covertly think of when they hear the term ‘prime 
matter’ ... ). First of all, Ibn Gabirol's pure matter is part of an overtly Neoplatonic world-
view which, contra Aristotle, privileges spiritual/intelligible substances over sensible/
corporeal reality, and which, contra Aristotle and Plato, emphasizes the emanation of the 
sensible realm from the spiritual realm. Further emphasizing that we are not talking of 
Aristotelian prime matter is the fact that Ibn Gabirol's use of the Arabic term al-‘unsur 
(literally ‘the element,’ and translated by the 13th century Hebrew editor as 
“yesôd” [foundation]) expressly mirrors a Ps. Empedoclean tradition of a spiritual matter 
(called al-‘unsur) immediately outside of God. For these reasons, it is important to avoid 
Aristotelian resonances when constructing Ibn Gabirol's ontology, and as such, one ought 
use the term First Matter over ‘prime matter’” (parenthetical items in orig., emp. added).
 Fountain of Life, Jacob, 27ff. 146
If the particular form borne by the particular matter subsists in the 
substance of the particular soul divested of the matter that it bears, it is also 
necessary that the universal form borne by the universal matter, that is, the 
form borne by the compound substance, should be borne by the substance of 
the universal soul divested of the universal matter, that is, of the compound 
substance that bears it. The same assertion must be made of the forms of the 
universal soul borne by the substance that is superior to it, until the primal 
substance is reached that bears all things: for the case of the universal form is 
the same as the particular form.  
If everything has a spiritual matter and a spiritual form, it is necessary that 
they should exist in everything: and if they exist in everything it is necessary 
that there should be in each corporeal substance a spiritual matter and in each 
corporeal form a spiritual form. . . . The corporeal forms emanate from the 
spiritual forms.   147
Avicebron explains that universal form and matter are the exclusive products of 
divine creation and that universal matter is the recipient of the action of universal 
form:  
[I]t is necessary that the universal form, made by this power, should also act 
by itself. It is therefore a maker and an agent. Similarly it is also necessary 
that the first universal matter should receive the action by itself. . . . The 
universal form acts necessarily.   148
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 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 63; cf. ibid., 71, 127-128; Fons Vitae: “Si forma particularis 147
sustentata in materia particulari fuerit subsistens in substantia animae particularis 
exspoliata a materia quae eam sustinet, debet etiam ut forma uniuersalis quae sustinetur 
in materia uniuersali, scilicet forma quae sustinetur in substantia composita, sit sustentata 
in substantia animae uniuersalis exspoliata a materia uniuersali, hoc est substantia 
composita quae eam sustinet. similter dicendum est de formis animae uniuersalis quae 
sustinetur in alia substantia quae est altior illa, donec perueniatur ad substantiam primam 
quae omnia sustnet; quia si forma particularis sic est, etiam forma uniuersalis similter 
erit. Si omni est materia spiritualis et foma spiritualis, debet ut haec inueniantur in omni; 
et si fuerint inuenta in omni, debet ut sit in unaquaque substantia corporali materia 
spiritualis, et in unaquaque forma corporali forma spiritualis. . . .  Formae corporales 
defluxae sunt a spiritualibus formis. . . .” (135, 136).
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 35; cf. Fons Vitae: “[N]ecesse est ut forma uniuersalis facta 148
ab hac uirtute sit etiam agens per se. ergo erit factor et actor. similiter etiam est necesse ut 
materia uniuersalis prima sit receptibilis actionis per se. . . . Forma uniuersalis agens est 
necessario” (106, 107).
All of the particular instances of form and matter are emanations from the universal 
form and matter, and the entire system is maintained by the “First Author”.  As will 149
become obvious from what follows, it is essential when reading the writings of those 
who subscribe to universal hylomorphism to consider to what the terms “form” and 
“matter” refer, because there are a number of options, and context must be the 
primary guide.  
Form may refer to the forma corporeitatis, and there is also a connection between 
Pecham and Avicebron concerning this issue. In his introduction to the Fountain of 
Life, Theodore E. James writes, “Unlike Avicenna and later Christian universal 
hylomorphists [Avicebron] does not speak of a form of corporeity but only a ‘matter 
of corporeity’; corporeity or quantity is the basic corporeal form.”  Thus form 150
would be best understood to be a structuring principle, and indeed Jacob translates 
forma as “structure” in various usages.  It is clear why matter must be formed, on 151
Avicebron’s view: other than the “First Author,” nothing that exists is formless; the 
emanation of each created thing implies that the form is impressed on the next thing 
in the chain of being.   152
Pecham clearly subscribes to universal hylomorphism and consequently to the 
doctrine that there is a forma corporeitatis in matter (and thus in the formed human 
body).  Pecham believes that, in principle, God could create matter without any 153
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 See Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 35-36.149
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, vii, bracketed item added; cf. Fountain of Life, Jacob, 28. 150
 E.g., Fountain of Life, 27. 151
 See Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 19.152
 “Some Aspects. I,” 13; cf. Pecham, Quaestiones, 323. 153
form whatsoever.  However, Pecham says that nothing created is truly one,  and 154 155
that the soul is  
neither a body nor a corporeal form, but is a spiritual substance,  constituted 
from its own matter and form. . . . “No evil follows unless this is in whose 
essence something is in potency, and this occurs through matter.” Therefore 
every Angel and every rational soul is composed of matter and form.  156
Pecham says in the Tractatus that since there is a corporeal form that perfects the 
material body, then there must also be a spiritual form (i.e., the rational soul) that 
perfects the spiritual body.  Furthermore, in stating that there is a kind of matter that 157
is not subject to corruption, Pecham is likely making a passing reference to 
!358
 See Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy, 180-182; cf. Pecham, Quodlibeta: “Item, certum 154
est quod materia est alia essentia quam forma, cum materia et forma sint duo principia 
essentialiter differentia. Deus autem omnia essentialiter diversa potest separare, cum 
eiusdem sit componere et dividere. Posset ergo, si vellet, facere materiam esse sine omni 
forma. Multoque magis est hoc possibile quam accidentia, quorum ‘esse est inesse’, esse 
sine subiecto. Ratio autem quare potest facere accidentia sine subiecto est quia accidentia 
plus dependent a Deo, qui est causa prima, quam a subiecto, quod est eorum causa 
secunda” (175); Quaestiones: “Aut ut intelligatur materia per se divisibilis secundum 
quod intelligitur abstracta ab omni forma secundum considerationem 
metaphysicam” (325). 
 Quaestiones, 364: “[Q]uod haec unitas sufficit creaturae qua aliquis componitur ex 155
diversis principiis, nullum autem creatum st vere et perfecte unum, sicut patet ex 
Augustino in pluribus locis.” 
 Tractatus, 47-48: “[A]nima neque est corpus neque forma corporalis, sed est 156
substantia spiritualis, ex materia et forma propria constituta. . . . Non sequitur malum nisi 
hoc in cuius essentia aliquid est in potentia et hoc fit per materiam’. Igitur omnis Angelus 
et omnis rationalis componitur ex materia et forma.” 
 50: “[S]i aliqua forma corporalis, perficiens materiam corcorporalem [sic], est 157
incorruptibilis, ergo multo fortius aliqua forma spiritualis corpus perficiens. Sed omnium 
formarum nobilissima est anima rationalis”; Bonaventure had said the same thing (see 
Cullen, Bonaventure, 54; Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 126). 
Avicebron’s larger system of form/matter relationships, which is radically different 
from Aristotle's view of form and matter.   158
Not all matter is a cause of corruption, but that which is the subject of 
privation, which is not in the matter of heaven. Whence the Commentator says 
that heaven does not have matter, since he does not call something matter 
unless there is a connection to privation. But he does not deny those, [to have 
matter]. . . .   159
Pecham's statements about form and matter in isolation may seem ad hoc or without 
clear direction, but far less so if we suppose that Pecham has Avicebron's larger 
Neoplatonic worldview in the background. His agreement is made explicit in the 
Summa De Ente et Essentia: “[J]ust as this matter and this form constitute this 
substance, so matter and form constitute substance. . . .”  160
Spiritual matter (and prime matter in particular) is explained at greater length in 
Avicebron than in Pecham, and Pecham is using the conception of spiritual matter 
that we find in the Fons Vitae. In Avicebron, just as forms are in a hierarchy, the types 
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 Pessin notes that Pecham's view of prime matter is that it is “‘…per se existens, unius 158
essentiae, sustinens diversitatem, dans omnibus essentiam suam et nomen’ (‘…existent in 
and of itself, of a single essence, sustaining diversity, and giving to everything its essence 
and name’; Fons Vitae 1.10, p. 13, lines 15–17). And, in similar manner we learn at the 
very close of the Fons Vitae that it is: ‘…substantia existens per se, sustentatrix 
diversitatis, una numero; et…est substantia receptibilis omnium formarum’ (‘…a 
substance existent in and of itself, the sustainer of diversity, one in number; …it is a 
substance receptive to all forms’; Fons Vitae 5.22, p. 298, lines 13–7. . . .” (“Solomon Ibn 
Gabirol”).
 Quaestiones, 347: “[N]on omnis materia est causa corruptionis, sed illa quae est 159
privationi subiecta, quod non est in materia caeli. Unde Commentator dicit caelum non 
habere materiam, quia non vocat materiam nisi privationi coniunctam. Non autem negat 
eas, [habere materiam]” (bracketed item in orig.). 
 Delorme, “La Summa,” 68: “[S]icut haec materia et haec forma contituunt hanc 160
substantiam, sic materia et forma constituunt substantiam. . . .”
of matter are ordered in a hierarchy.  Matter is the principle of the possibility for the 161
impression of a different form: “[T]he substance is subject and receptivity, and before 
the existence of the form in it, it had only the possibility of receiving it from 
something else.”  Everything that is created, including corporeal substances, has a 162
spiritual matter and a spiritual form.  163
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 Rudavsky, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” 251; cf. Theodore E. James, introduction to 161
Fountain of Life: “The particular method is to inspect natural sensibles both universal and 
particular and you will find matter and form. To the four modes of matter: artificial-
particular matter, natural-particular matter, natural-universal matter and celestial matter, 
there correspond four grades of forms. Sensible body is known or perceived by the 
sensible qualities adhering in it. This sensible body is understood in terms of substance 
when viewed with the forms; when conceived as receptive of these forms it is designated 
as matter or hyle” (viii). Viewing Avicebron’s discussion in this way may be a way to 
solve contradictions that Rudavsky sees in the text: “On the question of how form and 
matter are interrelated Ibn Gabirol presents two alternative answers. On the one hand, he 
argues that form and matter are differentiated only according to one’s perspective; both 
are aspects of simple substance. On the other hand, he emphasizes the complete 
opposition between matter and form, suggesting that they possess mutually exclusive 
properties which render impossible a reduction of one to the other. . . . Reflecting the 
discrepancies in his account of matter and form, Ibn Gabirol’s discussion of creation is 
also inconsistent. He argues in some places that matter was created bereft of form, for 
which it yearns. In other contexts, he asserts that matter subsists not even for an instant 
without form” (“Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” 251). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 67; cf. Fons Vitae: “[S]ed omnino substantia iam erat 162
subiecta et recipiens, et ante esse formam in ea non habebat nisi possibilitatem recipiendi 
eam ab alio” (140). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 63; cf. Fons Vitae: “Si omni est materia spiritualis et forma 163
spiritualis, debet ut haec inueniantur in omni; et si fuerint inuenta in omni, debet ut sit in 
unaquaque substantia corporali materia spiritualis, et in unaquaque forma corporali forma 
spiritualis” (135). 
Pecham does not go this far, but like Bonaventure, William of Baglione, and 
Roger Bacon,  he believes that the rational soul has a kind of matter, although it is 164
spiritual matter:  
[A]lthough [the possible intellect] lacks corporeal matter, it does not however 
lack spiritual, intelligible matter. Whence Augustine, On Genesis Against the 
Manichees: “It is said that God has made everything from nothing, since also 
if everything formed were formed from this formed matter, nevertheless this 
matter is made from nothing.” And also the Commentator himself confesses, 
because it has something similar of matter and something similar of form. 
Like this he says: “For just as sensible being is divided into form and matter, 
so too intelligible being must be divided into things closely similar to these 
two, namely, into something similar to form and into something similar to 
matter. This is necessarily in every intelligence that understands something 
else. And if it were not, then there would be no multiplicity in abstracted 
forms”. These are his words. 
Therefore it is immaterial through the exclusion of changeable matter. But 
it has something similar to matter itself through which it is this thing, and 
through which there is a numerical distinction in separated substances, as he 
says himself. Moreover, from this it does not follow that the intellect is 
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 See Bacon, Communium Naturalium: “[E]go teneo pro certo quod anima est 164
composita ex materia et forma sicut angeli. . . . Cum ergo anima racionalis sit ultimum 
complementum embrionis humani quod est compositum, oportet quod hec anima sit 
composita, ut ejus forma perficiat formam embrionis, et ejus materia compleat materiam 
embrionis” (291, 293); cf. Hackett, “Roger Bacon”: “In both early and later works, Bacon 
objects to the idea that matter is one in number in all things. The background to this issue 
arises from Franciscan discussions at Paris on the nature of the unity of matter. Bacon 
holds that matter ‘is not numerically one, but in itself and from itself it is numerically 
distinct in numerically different beings.’ Still, he does not object to some unity of matter. 
For example, matter as potentiality is the original source of the being of contingent 
things. This is the non-being of the creature in contrast with the being of the Creator. 
Thus, Bacon will speak of the matter of both corporeal and spiritual beings, and hence of 
‘spiritual matter,’ a concept that Aquinas found to be contradictory.” 
already so thoroughly separated from matter that it cannot be the perfection of 
corporeal matter, but that it does not depend essentially on matter.   165
Another major passage from Pecham on spiritual matter is in quaestio 15 of the fourth 
Quodlibet, a discussion about whether angels have matter. Here Pecham introduces 
three grades of essences: 
Just as there are three grades of sciences there are three grades of essences. 
For the physician considers natural essences and the sensible, material subject to 
contrariety and quantity. But mathematics (considers) subjects of quantity but not 
of contrariety, and therefore he considers intelligible and imaginable matter. But 
the metaphysician considers essences subtracted from contrariety and magnitude, 
and consequently matter intelligible and not completely imaginable. But to his 
speculation pertains the consideration of the separate substances, which have 
intelligible matter by the third mode and not imaginable. But I concede, advised 
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 Quaestiones, 379: “Hoc igitur primum fundamentum multipliciter eliditur, tum quia, 165
quamvis careat materia corporali privata, non tamen materia spirituali intelligibili. Unde 
Augustinus, Contra Manichaeum: ‘Deus dicitur de nihilo omnia fecisse, quia etiam si 
omnia formata et de ista materia formata sunt facta, haec ipsa tamen materia de nihilo 
facta est’. Et ipse etiam Commentator fatetur, quia habet aliquid simile materiae et aliquid 
simile formae. Sicut dicit: ‘Quemadmodum sensibile esse dividitur in formam et 
materiam, sic intelligibile esse oportet dividi in consimilia his duobus, scilicet [in] aliquid 
simile formae et [in] aliquid simile materiae. Et hoc necesse est in omni intelligentia quae 
intelligit aliud; et si non, et non esset multitudo in formis abstractis’. Haec verba eius. Est 
igitur immaterialis per exclusionem materiae transmutabilis. Sed habet aliquid simile ipsi 
materiae per quam est hoc, per quam est distinctio numeralis in substantiis separatis, ut 
ipse dicit. Amplius, ex hoc non sequitur quod intellectus sit ita penitus a materia 
absolutus quin sit perfectio materiae corporalis, sed quod essentialiter non dependit a 
materia” (bracketed item in orig.); cf. Averroes, Long Commentary, 326-327; Dales, The 
Problem of the Rational Soul, 128; Hackett, “Roger Bacon.” 
by the reasons and because the authorities of many saints say this, and especially 
Boethius, (in) the book De unitate et uno. . . .   166
Pecham’s 25th quaestio in his commentary on the first book of Peter Lombard’s 
Sentences is titled Quaeritur de simplicitate animae rationalis: utrum sit composita 
ex materia et forma.  In this quaestio Pecham again cites Gundissalinus’ De Unitate 167
et Uno for support for the view that there is matter in the soul.  Pecham says that the 168
separated soul can also be moved, and that it has a motive part and a part that is 
moved; this is possible only if the soul is composed of matter and form, because 
possibility comes from matter.  Matter need have no relation to quantity per se, but 169
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 Quodlibeta, 208-209: “Iuxta gradus scientiarum tres sunt gradus essentiarum. 166
Quoniam physica considerat essentias naturales et materiam sensibilem subiectam 
contrarietati et quantitati. Mathematica autem considerat essentias mathematicas 
subiectas quantitati sed non contrarietati, et ideo considerat materiam intelligibilem et 
imaginabilem. Metaphysicus autem considerat essentias subtractas a contrarietate et 
magnitudine, et materiam per consequens intelligibilem et non complete imaginabilem. 
Ad eius autem speculationem pertinet consideratio de substantiis separatis, quae habent 
materiam intelligibilem tertio modo et non imaginabilem. Quod concedo propter rationes 
praedictas et quia multae auctoritates Sanctorum hoc dicunt et praecipue Boethius, libro 
De unitate et uno, ut intuenti patet”; cf. Gundissalinus, De Unitate et Uno: “[I]deo creatae 
unitati accidit multiplicitas et diversitas et mutabilitas; ita ut in quadam materia sit habens 
principium et finem, in quadam vero principium et non finem, quia in quibusdam 
subiacet permutationi et corruptioni, in quibusdam permutationi sed non corruptioni. In 
quibus enim materia est subtilis, simplex, remota a contrarietate et separatione, parificatur 
ei unitas et unitur cum ea sic, ut haec et illa. . . . Sed quia unitas subsistens in materia 
intelligentiae est unitas simplicitatis, ideo necessario unitas subsistens in materia animae, 
quia infra eam est. . . .” (5-6).
 Tractantes, 183. 167
 Ibid., 183-184: “Boethius in libro: De Unitate et Uno, dicit quod ‘unitas subsistens in 168
materia intelligentiae est unitas simplicitatis. Unitas subsistens in materia animae, quae 
infra eam est, crescit et multiplicatur’. Unde expresse dicit materiam in intelligentia et in 
anima”; cf. Gundissalinus, De Unitate et Uno, 6. 
 Tractantes, 184: “Sed omne per se motum dividitur in duo, quorum unum est motum 169
primum et reliquum movens. Sed hoc non est nisi compositum ex materia et forma. Ergo 
etc.”   
only to the possibility for alteration: “[T]he metaphysician considers essences 
subtracted from contrariety and magnitude, and consequently matter intelligible and 
not completely imaginable.”  Pecham also associates matter with possibility: “Item 170
possibilitas est a materia. Anima est possibilis et variatur. Ergo habet materiam.”  In 171
the 27th quaestio of the commentary on the Sentences, Pecham makes clear that the 
spiritual substances have a kind of matter, but not the kind of matter that is subject to 
transmutation.  This marks a difference between what we may call “prime matter,” a 172
created essence as the ground of possibility for taking on forms, and matter that has 
already become informed to some degree. I will say more about this distinction in the 
following chapter.  
Because Pecham thinks that every creature has form and matter, he also thinks the 
rational soul itself has its own substantial being and is willing to label the body and 
the rational soul (and even other aspects of the human being) substances.   
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 Quodlibeta, 209: “Metaphysicus autem considerat essentias subtractas a contrarietate 170
et magnitudine, et materiam per consequens intelligibilem et non complete 
imaginabilem” (this translation is by Sullivan, “The Debate,” 146).
 Tractantes, 184. 171
 “Ad primam quaestionem intelligendum quod dicunt quidam animam non componi ex 172
materia et forma, quia universaliter secundum Boethium substantia spiritualis nulli 
materia innititur fundamento. Dicunt tamen eam conponi ex quiditate et esse, et quo est et 
quod est. Sed frustra Boethio innituntur, quia ipse a substantiis spiritualibus excludit 
tantum materiam quae potest esse subiectum transmutationis. Alias sibi a parte 
contradiceret in libro De Unitate et Uno” (ibid., 186); cf. Gundissalinus, De Unitate et 
Uno, 5ff. This discussion indicates a difference between what we may call “prime 
matter,” a created essence as the ground of possibility for taking on forms, and matter that 
has already become informed to some degree. I will say more about this distinction in the 
following chapter. 
Therefore the soul is divided in the first division by the vegetative, 
sensitive, and intellective, which, according to that they are in the bodies of 
diverse species, obviously they are diverse substances.  
But in the soul, where the three come together, there is doubt among the 
wise. For certain ones, most of all the philosophantes, say that in man [the 
vegetative], sensitive, and intellective are three diverse substances, but 
nevertheless they are one soul, just as matter and form are diverse natures and 
nevertheless make one nature or rather one composite substance and one 
complete substance, just as according to some people many lights in the 
medium are more lights, but one act of the medium.   173
This wide usage of “substance” is mirrored in Avicebron. On Avicebron’s 
emanationist view, spiritual substance permeates all of being.  On the high end of 174
the spectrum are the “simple substances,” those that are not united to corporeal 
matter: “But the simple substance, like the soul and the intelligence, is more worthy 
of the name of substance than the substance that supports the categories.”  175
Avicebron says that the simple substances are “more subtle” than compound 
substances:  
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 Tractatus, 30: “Anima igitur dividitur prima divisione per vegetativam, sensitivam et 173
intellectivam, quae, secundum quod sunt in corporibus diversarum specierum, planum est 
quod sunt diversae substantiae. Sed in anima, ubi tres concurrunt, dubium est apud 
sapientes. Quidam enim, maxime philosophantes, dicunt quod in homine [vegetativa], 
sensitiva et intellectiva sunt tres diversae substantiae, sed tamen sunt una anima, sicut 
materia et forma sunt diversae naturae et tamen faciunt unam naturam vel magis unam 
substantiam compositam et substantiam unam completam, sicut secundum quosdam plura 
lumina in medio sunt plura lumina, sed unus actus medii” (bracketed item in orig.). For a 
discussion of the meaning of “philosophantes,” see Gilson, “Les ‘Philosophantes’.”
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 49; cf. Fons Vitae: “Substantia spiritualis non est 174
terminabilis essentia, quia non est quanta, nec finita. et quod non fuerit terminabilis 
essentia, eius essentia extenditur et est in omni loco” (120-121). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 19; cf. Fons Vitae: “sed substantia simplex, ut anima et 175
intelligentia, dignior est ad intentionem substantialitatis quam substantia quae sustinet 
praedicamenta” (91).
• “Now everything that has every form must be anterior to that which has only 
some forms and is more subtle than it.”   176
• “If the substance that supports the categories is the immediate object of the 
action of the First Author, there is no other substance more subtle than it and 
anterior to it. But the substance of the intelligence is anterior to it and is 
more subtle than it. Therefore it is not the immediate object of the action of 
the First Author.”  177
• “When we study the cause of the emanation of substances from each other, 
we shall find still other causes for this phenomenon. One of these is that the 
form is more subtle than the matter. And since the subtle penetrates and 
traverses that which is before it and opposes it, it follows necessarily that the 
form penetrates and traverses all that is before it and opposes it.”  178
The opposite of subtlety, on Avicebron’s view, is density; the more dense a being is, 
the more perceptible it is to the senses.  However, while density makes a being’s 179
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 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 27; cf. Fons Vitae: “et omne quod sustinet omnem formam, 176
necessarium est ut sit prius et subtilius quam id quod sustinet aliquas formarum” (98). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 28; cf. Fons Vitae: “Si substantia quae sustinet 177
praedicamenta est patiens a primo factore sine medio, non erit aliqua substantia subtilior 
et prior ea. sed substantia intelligentiae est prior ea et subtilior ea. ergo ipsa non est 
patiens a primo factore sine medio” (99). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 36; cf. Fons Vitae: “Et cum considerauerimus causam quae 178
fecit necesse ut aliae ex substantiis influerent aliis, inueniemus huius rei alias causas 
praeter has. Quarum alia est, quia forma subtilior est quam materia. et quia subtile 
penetrans est et pertransiens per id quod est sibi obstans et oppositum, ideo necesse est ut 
forma penetret et pertranseat per omne quod obstat sibi et est oppositum” (108). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 127; cf. Fons Vitae: “Et sicut uisus, quo magis penetrauerit 179
colorem et pertigerit ad figuram et quantitatem et substantiam, obscurius fiet ei esse et 
occultius propter subtilitatem suam, et quo magis redierit et exierit a substantia ad 
quantitatem et a quantitate ad figuram et a figura ad colorem, manifestius fiet ei esse 
propter crassitudinem suam: similter quo magis penetrauerit intellectus id quod est post 
substantiam quae sustinet praedicamenta, scilicet substantias spirituales, donec perueniat 
ad materiam primam quae est contra substantiam, obscurius fiet ei esse et occultius 
propter suam subtilitatem; et e contrario, quo magis redierit a materia et exierit ad 
propinquiorem ex substantiis, declarabitur esse et manifestabitur propter suam 
crassitudinem. et hoc exemplum quod tibi proposui faciliorem faciet tibi cognitionem 
ordinis substantiarum spiritualium secundum gradus earum” (203-204).
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 127. 180
qualities sensible, it hides the perceptibility of being itself.  Being is correlated with 180
subtlety.  
Pecham uses the language of subtlety as well. In addition to referring to air and 
fire as being more or less subtle,  Pecham says that “the soul sets in motion the 181
strength of sensing through the more subtle body.”  For Pecham, substances can 182
penetrate one another according to how subtle they are, just as in Avicebron. Pecham 
says, “But since for diverse powers there must be diverse spirits and the nobler a 
power is, the more subtle is the spirit of which it is the vehicle.”  The language of 183
nobility also comes up in Roger Marston’s grades theory, which he may have learned 
from Pecham.  184
Even though Pecham is willing to call the various forms of the human being 
“substances” in a sense, he still wishes to claim that matter and the various forms 
make the human being to be one simple substance.  “[T]ruly the soul, insofar as it is 185
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 Avicebron also refers to the subtlety of air through which the visual power unites with 181
its external objects, to illustrate how the animal spirit serves as the intermediary through 
which the human body receives the rational soul (Fons Vitae, 194; cf. Fountain of Life, 
Wedeck, 118)
 Tractatus, 34: “[S]ic distinguuntur ut in oculis dicatur vigere ignea vis, in auditu aer 182
subtilissimus, in olfatu aer fumosus. . . . Et licet diversitati organorum aptetur diversitas 
elementorum, ignis tamen omnia penetrat, ut motum in eis faciat, per subtilius enim 
corpus agitat anima vigorem sentiendi.”
 Ibid., 26-27: “Sed quia diversis virtutibus diversi debentur spiritus et quanto virtus 183
nobilior, tanto spiritus, cuius vehiculum est, subtilior.”
 Etzkorn, “The Grades of the Form According to Roger Marston OFM,” 184
Franziskanische Studien 44 (1962): 443-444. I will say more about this point below.
 Tractantes, 184: “Sed quia [anima] ex simplicitate habet, ut una existens possit se toti 185
corpori communicare, quaeritur an sit in qualibet parte corporis tota” (bracketed item in 
orig.). 
a spirit, has a certain being, but incomplete and inclined to another, to the constitution 
of a third thing. Whence just as the soul is not numerically the same as the man, so 
neither is its being the same numerically as the being of man.”  Clearly Pecham 186
does not think the doctrine of the plurality of form harms the unity and singularity of 
the human being, but he must address how something could be added to a simple 
thing in order to make it complete. It seems that Pecham has a notion of immaterial 
addition such that adding immaterial conceptual parts to an immaterial object has no 
effect on its simplicity. Thus Pecham thinks that it would be impossible to add 
multiple corporeal forms, but there is no problem adding multiple incorporeal 
forms.   187
A possible solution is in the grades theory. In the Tractatus Pecham speaks 
explicitly about a plurality of forms. However, in his Quodlibeta Quatuor Pecham 
briefly presents a refinement of the plurality view, whereby the various forms are not 
considered as each being a substantial form but rather as being grades of one 
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 Tractatus, 187: “Ad secundum dicendum quod vere anima, inquantum spiritus est, 186
habet esse quoddam, sed incompletum et ad aliud inclinatum, ad tertium scilicet 
constituendum. Unde sicut anima non ponit in numerum cum homine, ita nec esse eius 
cum esse hominis.”
 It should be noted that Pecham may have at some point developed the view according 187
to which there are grades of a single substantial form (see Etzkorn, “The Grades of the 
Form”).  
substantial form.  This move is apparently designed to allow Pecham to agree (in a 188
way) with Aristotle’s view that there is but one substantial form. Pecham elaborates 
little about this position.  Unfortunately Pecham’s treatise on the “grades” theory, 189
De Gradibus Formarum, has been lost,  but the view is discussed by later 190
Franciscans.  There is uncertainty as to who was first to espouse the grades theory; 191
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 Pecham, Quodlibeta, 198-199, 230-231: “Dicendum igitur quod sicut coniunctio 188
principiorum—materiae et formae—dat esse, eorumdem indivisio dat unum esse: ‘unum 
enim est ens quod non dividitur’. Ex prima autem coniunctione formae cum materia 
causatur unitas, scilicet ex coniunctione formae primae substantialis cum materia prima, 
quia ‘simul est substantia et haec substantia’. Et ideo superveniens mutatio formarum 
naturalium in esse physico circa substantiam non mutat identitatem numeralem 
substantiae vel corporis per se, quia vivum et mortuum nihil faciunt ad essentiam 
corporeitatis, quamvis mutent esse specificum generis naturalis infimi et quorumdam 
subalternorum. Sub transmutatione enim simul manent materia, potentia et forma prima 
substantialis, quia sola materia non est subiectum. . . . Dicendum igitur quod anima 
rationalis non est forma corporis, secundum quod corpus est, immo praesupponit 
corporeitatem, cuius forma non corrumpitur per adventum animae, quia nullam habet 
cum ipsa corporeitatem. Praeterea, corporeitas supponitur in definitione animae, quae est 
‘actus corporis organici physici potentia vitam habentis’ ... [D]icendum quod in corpore 
hominis, secundum quod corpus est, omnes formae quattuor elementorum reductae sunt 
in unam formam mixti; non cuiuscumque mixtionis, sed illius quae est propria 
complexionis humanae. Unde nulla est ibi forma elementaris quantum ad formarum 
simplicitatem. Unde sunt in homine formae plures gradatim ordinatae ad unam ultimam 
perfectionem, et ideo formatum est unum.” 
 The grades view was criticized on the basis that “nulla forma recipit magis et minus,” 189
a phrase taken from Aristotle (Metaphysics, 1044a.10-12; cf. Aquinas, Treatise, 36; ibid., 
Summa Theologiae, 1.2.52.1.; cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IV, ed. Gordon A. Wilson 
and Girard J. Etzkorn, Henrici De Gandavo Opera Omnia 8 [Leuven: Leuven University 
Press, 2011], 242-292, esp. 242 for references to various discussions of this issue; Giles 
of Lessines, De Unitate Formae, ed. M. DeWulf, Les Philosophes de Moyen âge, 
Première Série, Tome 1 [Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université, 
1902], 97). I do not know of a passage where Pecham explicitly discusses this argument, 
but it would seem that his general arguments about complex simplicity (which I discuss 
below) would be the basis of a Pechamian response. 
 See Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 280; Etzkorn, “John Pecham,” A Companion, 385; 190
“John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 79; cf. F.M. Powicke, The Medieval Books of Merton College 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1931), 214. 
 Marston, Quodlibeta, 2.22; Etzkorn, “The Grades of the Form.”191
if Pecham’s student Roger Marston  was expounding Pecham’s theory, then Pecham 192
was possibly the first to propose it.  In the following chapter of the present study, I 193
will discuss in more detail the implications of the grades theory and the likelihood 
that Pecham actually subscribes to it. However, because Pecham’s Tractatus provides 
his general plurality view and does not obviously promote the grades view, I will 
focus here on the general view as opposed to the grades refinement. 
So, for purposes of the present chapter, the problem of “complex simplicity” 
remains. Not surprisingly, the basic idea behind Pecham’s solution to the problem of 
complexity seems to appear already in Avicebron. Pecham might well be abbreviating 
a longer discussion of the relation between simplicity and multiplicity in the Fons 
Vitae: 
• “One is the root of the multiple. The simple substance is one. Therefore the 
simple substance is the root of the multiple. The forms that are borne by the 
compound substance are a multitude. Therefore the simple substance is the 
root of the forms that are borne by the compound substances.”   194
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 Wilson, “Roger Marston,” A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 626. 192
 The origins of the grades view is a complicated issue. Etzkorn says of Marston’s 193
writing on the grades view: “As far as we know, this is the first version of the grades 
theory—as distinct from the plurality and unicity of forms theories—which has survived. 
Richard of Mediavilla’s theory is almost certainly posterior and Pecham gives only a hint 
of the grades’ [sic] theory. Still we cannot absolutely fix Marston’s as the first grades 
theory in the Middle Ages because—if Hocedez’ chronology is correct—Giles of Rome 
wrote his Contra Gradus Formarum before Easter of 1278 and this latter date is so close 
to the period of Marston’s Quodlibeta that a definite determination cannot be given until 
a comparative study of the Augustinian and Franciscan friars’ works is made” (“The 
Grades of the Form,” 418; cf. Edgar Hocedez, Richard de Middleton. Sa vie, ses oeuvres, 
sa doctrine [Louvain:1925], 465-467; Etzkorn, “Franciscan Quodlibeta,” 1:146). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 50-51; cf. Fons Vitae: “Vnum [sic] est radix multiplicitatis. 194
substantia simplex est unum. ergo substantia simplex est radix multiplicitatis. formae 
quae sustinentur in substantia composita multae sunt. ergo substantia simplex radix est 
formarum quae sustinentur in substantia composita” (122-123). 
• “Quantity is multitude. Now multitude is composed of units. Therefore 
quantity is composed of units. Now units are composed of simple unity. 
Now simple unity is in the simple substance. Therefore quantity is 
composed of the unity of the simple substance. The unity in the simple 
substance is a simple accident. Now the compound accident is composed of 
the simple accident. Therefore the compound accident is composed of the 
unity of the simple substance.”   195
• “[J]ust as the forms of sensible things are in the substance of the universal 
soul simply, that is, divested of their matter, so there is no reason to be 
surprised that these forms are plunged into the universal simple substance 
superior to this substance, or the substance of the intelligence, for the forms 
of all things are in the substance of the intelligence in a more universal and 
more simple manner. The forms that are in a superior substance are more 
united and do not occupy place. Inversely, those that are in the inferior 
substance are more dispersed and occupy place: the cause of this is the unity 
of the essence of the corporeal substance: and this occurs only through the 
union of the essences of the simple substances and the diffusion of the 
essence of the corporeal substance.”  196
Multiplicity flows from the simple substances themselves, and compound substances 
retain the simplicity that has been impressed upon them by the simple substances. 
Avicebron pictures simplicity as being like an object that can be handed from one 
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 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 52; cf. Fons Vitae: “Quantitas est multitudo. et multitudo 195
composita est ex unis. ergo quantitas composita est ex unis. una autem composita sunt ex 
uno simplici. ergo quantitas composita est ex uno simplici. unum autem simplex est in 
substantia simplici. ergo quantitas composita est ex uno substantiae simplicis. unum in 
substantia simplici est accidens simplex. et accidens compositum compositum est ex 
accidente simplici. ergo accidens compositum compositum est ex uno substantiae 
simplicis” (124). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 69-70; cf. Fons Vitae: “[S]icut formae rerum sensibilium 196
sunt in substantia animae uniuersalis simpliciter, id exspoliatae a suis materiis, similiter 
etiam non uideatur extranea immersio harum formarum in substantia simplici uniuersali 
quae est superior hac substantia, scilicet substantia intelligentiae, uidelicet quia formae 
omnium rerum sunt in substantia intelligentiae communius et simplicius. formae enim 
quae fuerint in substantia altiori, erunt unitiores et locum non occupabunt; et e contrario, 
quae fuerint in substantia inferiori, erunt dispersiores et occupabunt locum; et hoc non 
euenit nisi ex unitione essentiarum substantiarum simplicium et diffusione essentiae 
substantiae corporalis” (142). 
substance to another. Thus, no matter how many forms the soul has, there is just the 
simplicity that has been transferred, and no matter how many forms the individual 
human being has, he is still just one human being.  The key emanationist principle, 197
again reflected in the Fons Vitae, is that “the numerous forms are in the essence of the 
simple substance,” the rational soul.  198
Similarly Pecham does not conceive of the addition of the rational form to the 
body’s other forms to be like the addition of some matter to some other matter.  In 199
fact, Pecham maintains that the rational soul can be called the form of the human 
being.  In this way Pecham wishes to avoid having matter informed in conflicting 200
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 Consider also that Pecham explains in the Tractatus (28-29) that there are two kinds of 197
simplicity: One kind of simplicity is that of a small point, e.g., the result of imagining a 
simple thing. But Pecham says there is also “intellectual simplicity” or simplicity in the 
abstract, which does not connote smallness but a “communicable unity” (unitatem 
communicabilem). It is in this second sense of simplicity that the human mind holds a 
simple when the intellect “abstracts its intelligible from measurement and position.”
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 83; cf. Fons Vitae: “[F]ormae multae sunt inuentae in 198
essentia substantiae simplicis” (156). I will discuss the individuation of the human being 
further, below.
 Quaestiones, 329; cf. Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 127-128. In fact, 199
Pecham emphasizes that the soul is only theoretically divided due to the division of 
bodily activities (Quaestiones, 327). 
 Quaestiones, 357. 200
 Douie says that Pecham does not regard the rational soul as the substantial form of the 201
body, but rather thinks that the soul is united to the body “by means of the sensitive and 
nutritive forms. . . .” (Archbishop Pecham, 23). It is not obvious what this kind of 
connection between soul and body is supposed to involve. A weaker assertion along these 
lines would be that the rational soul uses corporeal organs to sense, an Augustinian 
principle that Pecham echoes in the Tractatus (15). A stronger assertion would be that the 
intellect is no more the substantial form than the vegetative or sensitive powers. Pecham 
would deny this stronger claim. In the following chapter of the present study, I will 
discuss the sense(s) in which Pecham thinks the rational soul is the form of the human 
body.
ways.  I will discuss Pecham’s view of “complex simplicity” further in the next 201
chapter.  
Pecham's brief discussion of “animal spirits” finds a fuller explanation in 
Avicebron. Pecham says that in the body there are various humors that carry the 
spirits, which are in turn the vehicles of the animal powers.  In context, the 202
“powers” to which Pecham refers are evidently associated with the sensible soul. It is 
plausible that Pecham had in mind Avicebron's discussion of animal spirits as the 
intermediaries between the soul and body, because Avicebron says that the animal 
power “flows from the rational faculty, whose abode is in the brain, in the sinews and 
the muscles—for this power penetrates and spreads in all parts of the body, while in 
itself the substance of the soul does not spread and does not extend.”  The animal 203
spirits function as the vehicle of the emanation of the rational soul’s power 
throughout the body, supporting Pecham’s principle that the sensitive soul is rational 
from one perspective. Again, from Avicebron: “[T]he human body receives the action 
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 Tractatus, 26-27.202
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 120; cf. Fons Vitae: “[V]is animalis effluit a uirtute 203
rationali, cuius sedes est cerebrum. in neruos et lacertos, quia haec uirtus est penetrans et 
diffusa per omnes partes corporis, et substantia animae in se non est diffusa neque 
extensa. . . .” (196). 
of the rational soul through the intermediary of the animal spirit, as man receives 
intelligence through the intermediary of the rational soul. . . .”  The animal spirits 204
serve as the link between the intellect and the operation of the body that Pecham 
wants as he calls the soul the form of the body.   205
Pecham's discussion of love in the sixth chapter of the Tractatus appears to have 
its background in the Fons Vitae. Pessin writes on this point: 
Ibn Gabirol emphasizes the central motion of desire at the core of the 
universe. This can be seen throughout the Fons Vitae in the dual reminders 
that (1) all things have matter at their core, and (2) matter's own reality 
consists essentially in desire (viz. a desiring-after-form). These two simple 
ideas lead to a much more arresting insight, viz. inasmuch as all things are 
grounded in matter, and inasmuch as matter is a marker of desire, it follows 
that all reality is grounded in desire. Desire—in the guise of matter—is in this 
sense a central principle of Ibn Gabirol's universe.  206
Avicebron repeatedly uses terminology reflecting a metaphor of human relationship 
for the form-matter conjunction: “[I]t is the nature of the form to unite with the 
matter, when the matter is ready to receive it. Now all that unites with something that 
is ready to receive it gives itself to this thing and also gives its form.”  And,  207
[W]henever the form of a thing emanates from this thing, this form is reflected 
by the contrary thing that receives it. Therefore the form of the spiritual 
substance is reflected by the contrary thing that receives it. . . . every form 
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 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 118; cf. Fons Vitae: “[C]orpus humanum non recipit 204
actionem animae rationalis nisi per medium spiritus animalis, et sicut non recipit homo 
intelligentiam nisi per medium animae rationalis. . . .” (194).
 See Quaestiones, 333. 205
 “Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” parenthetical item in orig.206
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 36-37; cf. Fons Vitae: “Et etiam, quia de natura formae est 207
ut uniatur materiae, cum parata fuerit materia recipere eam. et omne quod unitur alii quod 
paratum est ad recipiendum illud, attribuit se illi et formam suam” (108).
reflected by the contrary thing that receives it penetrates the thing that 
receives it and envelops it, if its substance is a subtle substance.  208
Pecham’s discussion of love is more vivid in its metaphorical portrayal of the form-
matter relationship, but the same basic idea from the Fons Vitae is portrayed in 
Pecham’s Tractatus: “So therefore love is life and life coming together ... a unitive 
power and consequently the transformative and assimilative, for all things that are 
inclined are governed by love and ordered. . . .”  For Pecham, love is the “vital 209
desire” (amor vitale) which is “specified by the life of the soul” (specificatur a vita 
animae).  Pecham’s statement that inclination is the result of love could be based on 210
a number of passages in the Fons Vitae that discuss the mutual inclination of form 
and matter for one another. For example,  
What the action is, is this, that a thing gives its form to another thing when 
both things are apt for this. Now as to how, there is either a conjunction 
without an intermediary, or a conjunction with an intermediary, or there is a 
change and diminution of the form of the agent; or, on the contrary, there is no 
diminution of the quality of the agent; or there is an impression of the power 
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 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 48; cf. Fons Vitae: “[E]t omne a quo fluit forma eius, ipsa 208
forma reuerberatur ab opposito quod est receptibile illius. ergo forma spiritualis 
substantiae reuerberatur ab opposito quod est receptibile illius. . . . quaecumque forma 
reuerberatur a suo receptibili, ipsa forma penetrans est suum receptibile et circumdans, 
quando sua substantia fuerit substantia subtilis” (120). 
 Tractatus, 22: “Sic igitur amor est vita et vita copulans ... vis unitiva et per consequens 209
vis transformativa et assimilativa, omnia enim quae inclinata sunt ab amore imperantur et 
ad amatum consequendum vel perfruendum ordinantur. . . .”
 Ibid.210
of the agent upon the passive thing beyond time; or there is an opinion or an 
imagination, like the loved object on the lover.  211
While not every aspect of Pecham’s discussion of love in the sixth chapter of the 
Tractatus is obviously present in the Fons Vitae, nevertheless the metaphor of a 
relationship between two human beings is applied in both the Fons Vitae and the 
Tractatus.  
I have already noted that the coming together of form and matter results in a third 
nature, according to Pecham.  The individuation of human persons has a particular 212
kind of explanation in the Neoplatonic framework in which Pecham is working. 
Pecham’s position according to which form and matter both participate in the 
individuation of a substance is adapted from Avicebron, Avicenna, and 
Averroes. Michael B. Sullivan writes on Pecham’s view of individuation:  
The soul must have matter because it contains possibility, and possibility is 
from matter; individuation is from matter and the soul is individual. The soul 
cannot be individuated by the matter of the body, since its individuality 
remains even when it is separated from the body.   213
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 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 34-35; cf. Fons Vitae: “Quid sit esse huius actionis, hoc est, 211
rem dare formam suam alii rei ab ipsa, quando unaquaeque earum coaptatur ad hoc. — 
Quomodo autem est, quia aut est secundum coniunctionem sine medio, aut secundum 
coniunctionem cum medio; aut est cum commutatione formae agentis et diminutione, aut 
e contrario, scilicet  sine aliqua diminutione qualitatis agentis; aut cum impressione 
uirtutis agentis in rem patientem sine tempore, aut erit secundum opinionem uel 
existimationem, sicut actio rei amatae in amantem” (106).
 See Pecham, Tractatus, 187; Quaestiones, 446.212
 “The Debate,” 142; cf. Pecham, Tractantes: “Item possibilitas est a materia. Anima est 213
possibilis et variatur. Ergo habet materiam. . . . Item individuatio est a materia. Sed anima 
a corpore separata est vere individuata. Ergo etc. . . . Si dicas quod individuatur per 
materiam corporis, cui unitur, contra: Ergo separata a causa individuationis non 
remaneret individua” (184). 
This interpretation of Pecham’s view of individuation overlooks a number of things 
that Pecham says elsewhere about the role of form in individuation in addition to 
matter’s role. Pecham cites Avicenna as an authority for his view that “the 
complement of individuation is from form.”  And, Pecham’s illustration about 214
emanation is particularly helpful here:  
[T]he species are totally diverse numerically, just as two rays from the sun, 
and they come together as one individual comes together with another of the 
same species. Whence it differs totally in singular being and totally comes 
together in the similitude of species, just as in Peter and Paul who come 
together in species or in substance of common species and differ in individual 
substance.  215
Each ray that comes from the sun, although similar to other rays due to a common 
source, has its own being. Similarly each form has its own being; assuming that 
Pecham means to follow Avicebron on this point, we can also say that it is by 
emanating that forms actually give rise to matter (at least insofar as it is the matter of 
a particular substance). Thus it is misleading to simply say that Pecham thinks matter 
alone causes individuation. 
Furthermore, Pecham responds to one objection in the Quaestiones by saying that 
each rational soul is substantially inclined to a particular body.  
[T]he appropriation of the rational soul is simply to the human body which is 
of the most noble and most equal combination, and is united to it substantially 
as substantial form. But that this soul is appropriated to that body is because 
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 Quaestiones, 381; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 1.1.214
 Quaestiones, 384: “[S]pecies sunt totaliter numero diversae, sicut duo radii a sole, et 215
conveniunt sicut unum individuum convenit cum alio eiusdem speciei. Unde totaliter 
differt in singulari esse et totaliter convenit in speciei similitudine, sicut est in Petro et 
Paulo qui conveniunt in specie vel in substantia communi speciei et differunt in 
substantia individuali.” 
of any difference of combination. Which difference, if it consists in accidents, 
yet that soul is not accidentally of this body insofar as as the rational soul is 
substantially inclined to the body.  216
Pecham is concerned to show that, even though a particular intellectual soul can be 
appropriated to a particular body because of the presence of the right combination of 
bodily accidents, the conjunction between the particular soul and the particular body 
is not accidental.  
The discussion of individuation to this point shows up the possibility that Pecham 
is contradictory, saying the individuation is from matter on the one hand, and from 
form on the other hand. Granted that Pecham could have expressed his position more 
clearly, it is plausible (as I noted above) that Pecham adopted his account of 
individuation along the lines of Bacon and Bonaventure’s view. According to 
Bonaventure’s position, the rational soul’s principle of unibility or disposition (or 
appetite) for union with body, along with the body’s own unibility, facilitates 
individuation: “[U]nibility explains how the immaterial human soul is one substance 
with its body, just as a form is one substance with its matter.”  Thomas M. Osborne 217
argues that even though Bonaventure believes that the soul and body are united and 
make a third substance, Bonaventure cannot be called a strong dualist because the 
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 Quaestiones, 389: “[A]ppropriatio animae rationalis est simpliciter ad corpus 216
humanum quod est nobilissimae et aequalissimae complexionis, et ei unitur 
substantialiter ut forma substantialis. Quod autem haec anima illi corpori approprietur, est 
propter aliquam differentiam complexionis. Quae differentia, [et]si in accidentibus 
consistat, non tamen anima ista est huius corporis accidentaliter [unita], quia 
substantialiter in quantum anima rationalis ad corpus inclinatur” (bracketed items in 
orig., emp. added).
 Osborne, “Unibilitas,” 229.217
principle of unibility allows for the rational soul to be called the single substantial 
form of the body; the soul perfects a particular body:  218
Bonaventure in the Collations on the Hexaëmeron and elsewhere does not 
argue for a plurality of substantial forms in physical bodies, although this 
position was held by some thinkers later in the thirteenth century. However, 
Bonaventure does state that there have to be in composite substances 
dispositions which can become forms when the substantial form of the 
composite decays.  
A human soul cannot unite itself with dirt or water; instead, there must be 
an embryo which is ready to receive the soul. The substantial form of the 
embryo is replaced by the rational soul, although the form in some sense 
remains as a disposition. . . . Considered by itself, the body is a substance only 
in the very loose sense that it has some sort of structure which is generated 
before it is united to the soul and then takes some time to decay once it has 
been separated from the soul. Strictly speaking, it is one substance with the 
soul. When the body and soul are considered separately from each other, then 
they are not spoken of as substances in the full sense.   219
For Bonaventure, the person comes to be as a result of the combination of a particular 
body and a particular soul which are suited for one another specifically.  220
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 Ibid., 242. 218
 Ibid., 240. 219
 See ibid., 246-249. 220
As in Bonaventure, Pecham thinks that soul gives the act of being to the human 
body, and the body gives the act of existing (i.e., in place and time).  For both 221
Bacon and Pecham matter is not in itself a non-entity, nor is it pure potentiality; 
instead it has incomplete actual being in the seminal reasons.  Pecham says form 222
seeks its matter, and that the soul is united not just to any kind of organic body, but 
specifically to the human body.  Therefore, the rational soul requires its own 223
disposition through which it subsists in the body, and this disposition “ministers to its 
operation.”  We are not told exactly what the “ministration” involves, but we know 224
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 See Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 180-181; Osborne, “Unibilitas,” 240-241; cf. 221
Pecham, Quaestiones, 387-388, 449, 451; Bonaventure, Sententiarum, 2.3.1.2.3: “Ideo 
est tertia positio … quod individuatio consurgit ex actuali coniunctione materiae cum 
forma, ex qua coniunctione unum sibi appropriat alterum … Si tamen quaeras, a quo 
veniat principaliter; dicendum quod individum est ‘hoc aliquid’. Quod sic ‘hoc’, 
principalius habet a materia, ratione cuius forma habet positionem in loco et tempore. 
Quod sit ‘aliquid’, habet a forma. Individuum enim habet esse, habet etiam existere. 
Existere dat materia formae, sed essendi actum dat forma materiae.—Individuatio igitur 
in creaturis consurgit ex duplici principio. Personalis autem discretio dicit singularitatem 
et dignitatem. In quantum dicit singularitatem, hoc dicit ex ipsa coniunctione 
principiorum, ex quibus resultat ipsum ‘quod est’. Sed dignitatem dicit principaliter 
ratione formae; et sic patet, unde sit personalis discretio originaliter, in creaturis 
loquendo, sive in hominibus sive in angelis.”
 See Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 111: “According to Bonaventure, matter is a 222
being (ens) in potency to substantial forms which distinguish it through their acts. . . . 
Existing with an imperfect form, the original matter of corporeal things was actually one 
and had incomplete being (esse) from its form. . . . For Bonaventure, then, matter could 
never be purely passive: as the existing principle and foundation of the being (esse) of 
substantial forms, matter has always been both active and passive through its seminal 
reasons, which are its active potencies. They dispose matter to receive the being of 
substantial forms,” (parenthetical items in orig.); cf. Bonaventure, In Sententiarum, 
1.1.3.2.: “[D]icendum, quod appetitus materiae ordinatur ad formam tanquam ad 
perfectionem substantialem, ex qua et materia fit unum; et ideo necesse est, formam esse 
eiusdem generis cum materia, nec est omnino supra materiam.”
 Quaestiones, 377; Tractatus, 27.223
 Tractatus, 27: “ ... suae operationi subministret.”224
that it occurs because the intellect “strives to be illuminated by the sensible 
mediation,”  and Pecham immediately describes the requisite bodily conditions for 225
the life of the human person. This disposition consists of those conditions that make it 
possible for the soul to be united to the “most nobly disposed body.”   226
While Pecham’s view of unibility is similar to Bonaventure’s view, it differs in 
some important respects. If Bonaventure believed that there is but one form in man 
(and Osborne argues that this is, in fact, Bonaventure’s position ), then Pecham 227
disagrees with him, as is obvious from the discussion of Pecham’s plurality view in 
the third chapter of the present study. It seems that, for Bonaventure, forms such as 
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 Quaestiones, 380: “ ... appetit naturaliter mediantibus sensibus illustrari. . . .”225
 Tractatus, 27: “ ... ut sicut anima unitur corpori nobilissimo. . . .”226
 “Unibilitas,” 238ff. There in an ongoing discussion in the literature about whether 227
Bonaventure subscribes to the plurality view. Étienne Gilson, Anton C. Pegis, Cullen, and 
Spade think that Bonaventure believed in a plurality of substantial forms, whereas Quinn 
thinks that Bonaventure believed in the unity of form (see Cullen, Bonaventure, 48ff; 
Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 315-316, 887; Gilson, The Philosophy of St. 
Bonaventure [Paterson: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1965], 253; cf. Pegis, St. Thomas and 
the Problem of the Soul, 39; Spade, “Binarium Famosissimum”). A corollary to the unity 
of form is that a corpse does not retain its identity as the body belonging to the particular 
individual who has died after his death. This is particularly problematic in assessing the 
status of the dead body of Christ during its three days in the tomb prior to the 
resurrection. Bonaventure says that Christ’s dead body retained its identity through 
special divine intervention (see Osborne, “Unibilitas,” 241). I will discuss briefly the 
possible answers to this problem (including Pecham’s) in the following chapter of the 
present study. Oddly, Bonaventure has a different solution in the cases of other dead 
bodies: “If somebody makes a stew out of his neighbor and digests the flesh, which 
person will have this flesh at the general resurrection? Bonaventure argues that God will 
preserve the flesh secundum speciem so that it will not be divided among two persons. If 
one person eats another, then he could conceivably be nourished by the person’s flesh 
‘secundum materiam’ or even ‘secundum speciem.’ In either case, at the resurrection that 
flesh will rise again in the one to whom it first belonged. Again, this point emphasizes the 
importance of the rational soul as the substantial form of a particular body. If the soul 
were only incidentally connected to a body, then this difficulty would not 
arise” (Osborne, “Unibilitas,” 242).
the forma corporeitatis are subsumed under the intellect (the one substantial form for 
man) and changed into dispositions. Pecham says nothing about a change from form 
to disposition. Rather, the first two chapters of his Tractatus appear to argue that the 
fully formed human being really has a plurality of forms, not a single form plus a 
number of dispositions that were formerly substantial forms. Thus, Pecham would say 
that the body is formally or substantially disposed for the reception of the rational 
soul. Still, like Bonaventure, Pecham does wish to say that the intellect is the form of 
the body;  and like Bonaventure (and Avicenna ), Pecham thinks of the intellect as 228 229
both the perfection and the mover of the body.  This is no more than what 230
Avicebron says in the Fons Vitae.  However, when Pecham says that the intellect is 231
the form of the body, he evidently means this at least in the senses that (1) the body is 
inclined to receive the intellect; and (2) the human activities function in order to 
facilitate the particularly human function, intellection. Pecham refers to the vegetative 
soul and sensitive soul even though he also thinks of each as a different aspect of one 
soul.  Pecham even goes so far as to say, in a chapter called “On the potencies of the 232
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 Quaestiones, 349: “[D]icendum quod est forma corporis per essentiam ut 228
imprimentem, essentiae ut impressam.”
 Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West, 2. 229
 Quaestiones, 376-377; cf. ibid. 342, 359.230
 E.g., Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 47-48. Matter can be said to determine the degree of 231
perfection that pertains to the form that is involved in the compound: “Omnis forma 
sustentata in materia diuersificatur in claritate et perfectione secundum diuersitatem 
materiae quae eam recipit in claritate et perfectione” (Fons Vitae, 119).
 E.g., Tractatus, 7, 33. This is reflective of the Augustinian tradition of not 232
distinguishing between the soul and its powers. Augustine sees the unity of the soul’s 
powers as a reflection of the unity of the Trinity (see Alexander Gerken, “Identity and 
Freedom: Bonaventure’s Position and Method,” Greyfriars 4, no. 3 (1974): 115; cf. 
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy [New York: Continuum, 2003], 2:237).
soul” (De potentiis animae) that the “soul ... is divided ... by the vegetative, sensitive, 
and intellective. . . .”   233
As I indicated, a unibility view such as that of Pecham or Bonaventure readily 
finds support in the Fons Vitae, where Avicebron says that individuation occurs as a 
result of the form’s impression in matter. Each simple substance, such as a human 
soul, is individuated by its own form; corporeal matter (already formed in itself) is 
responsible for the multiplication of form (in some sense, presumably in space and 
time) and evidently contributes some accidents specific to the individual. Consider 
the following statements from the Fons Vitae: 
• “Either the simple substance has a form that is peculiar to it, or it has not. 
Now it is impossible that it should not have a form peculiar to it for it would 
not exist. In fact, the existence of a thing is always due to the form. 
Furthermore, if the simple substance had no form peculiar to it, it would not 
be a species different from the others. For every difference comes from the 
form. Furthermore, it would not perceive any form, for it is by its form that 
it perceives the forms.”  234
• “The simple substance distinguishes its subject from another subject. 
Similarly the form distinguishes the compound substance from another 
substance.”   235
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 Tractatus, 30: “Anima igitur dividitur prima divisione per vegetativam, sensitivam et 233
intellectivam. . . .”
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 94; cf. Fons Vitae: “Substantia simplex aut habet propriam 234
sibi formam, aut non habet propriam sibi formam. Non est autem possibile ut non habeat 
propriam sibi formam, quia non haberet esse. omne enim esse rei ex forma est. Et etiam, 
quia si substantia simplex non haberet formam sibi propriam, non esset species differens 
ab alia. omnis enim differentia non est nisi per formam. Et etiam non esset possibile ut 
apprehenderet formam aliquam ex formis, quia non apprehendit formas nisi per suam 
formam” (168-169). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 53; cf. Fons Vitae: “[S]ubstantia simplex discernit 235
subiectum suum ab alio; similiter et forma discernit substantiam compositam ab 
alia” (125). 
• “The multiplication of the form is due to the matter. Now there is no 
[corporeal] matter in the simple substance. Therefore the forms in the simple 
substance do not multiply themselves. Therefore they unite in it.”  236
• “The substance of the intelligence perceives being in all beings, that is, the 
unifying simple form, or the genera and the species, while the substance of 
the soul perceives the non-being, that is, the differences, the properties, and 
the accidents that the senses attain.”  237
Presumably, the multiplication of the form (multiplicatio formae) refers to the 
multiplication of the simple form in the corporeal world via reproduction.  Pecham 238
adds that the subtlety of the soul is relevant for individuation: “[A]s the Master (Peter 
Lombard) teaches, Sentences ... ‘in essence, one is more subtle than others’, ... if it is, 
there can be a grade of being in the souls of substantial things, and consequently 
diversity in the bodies of substantial things but inside the limits of species.”   239
In addition to focusing on how emanation functions in individual humans’ coming 
to know, Pecham and Avicebron also think that emanation functions in the human’s 
being and existence. Avicebron’s model of emanation, in which energies, rays, 
essences, and substances all emanate in various ways, serves Pecham's anthropology 
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 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 83, bracketed item added; cf. Fons Vitae: “Multiplicatio 236
formae est ex materia. et in substantia simplici non est materia. ergo in substantia simplici 
non sunt formae multiplicantes se. ergo sunt in ea unientes se” (156). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 97; cf. Fons Vitae: “[S]ubstantia intelligentiae apprehendit 237
esse in omnibus rebus, scilicet formam unientem simplicem, id est genera et species, et 
substantia animae apprehendit non-esse, id est differentias, propria, accidentia, quae 
attinguntur sensibus” (172). 
 This is similar to the teaching of Roger Bacon in the De Multiplicatione Specierum 238
(Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature). 
 Quaestiones, 389-390 (parenthetical item added): “[S]i velimus dicere quod gradus sit 239
in animabus rationabilibus intra speciem, ut docet Magister, II Sententiarum dist. 32 cap. 
ultimo diceret quod ‘in essentia, alia aliis est subtilior’, si inquam ita est, potest esse 
gradus in animabus substantialis, et consequenter in corporibus substantialis diversitas 
sed intra terminos speciei”; cf. Lombard, IV Sent., 2.32.8. 
well. Avicebron says: “The form of the simple substance emanates necessarily. Now 
all that emanates necessarily unites with the thing that is before it. . . . The simple 
substance contains the compound substance.”  Simple forms have energies that 240
necessarily emanate, and when these energies unite with a compound substance, the 
result is that a compound substance has sensible forms.  This process makes clear 241
Avicebron’s distinction between simple forms that are borne by simple substances, 
and the forms of compound substances: The simple substances have being apart from 
corporeal matter, whereas the forms of the compound arise as a result of a union with 
matter.   242
Pecham appreciates that, as Avicebron says,  the emanationist perspective 243
requires that both being and existence must ultimately be the result of form, although 
without matter nothing would exist other than God and change would be impossible. 
Pecham’s view that the life of the soul “overflows” into the life of the body clearly 
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 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 55; cf. Fons Vitae: “Forma substantiae simplicis fluit 240
necessario. et omne quod fluit necessario, unitur rei quae sibi est opposita. . . . Substantia 
simplex continet substantiam compositam” (127). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 68. 241
 Ibid., 68-69. A more immediate predecessor to Pecham’s natural philosophy is Roger 242
Bacon, who also subscribes to the tradition of Neoplatonist emanationist cosmology of 
which the Fons Vitae is an important part (see Lindberg, introduction to Roger Bacon’s 
Philosophy of Nature, xxxv-liii). Lindberg writes about Bacon’s inheritance of this 
tradition: There is no mystery about the sources of Bacon’s philosophy. He knew the 
entire Aristotelian corpus, and himself lectured on a number of Aristotelian books at the 
University of Paris. He doubtless knew his Augustine well; commented on the Liber de 
causis; and was influenced by Avicebron’s Fons vitae, directly and perhaps also through 
Dominicus Gundissalinus. . . . Bacon cites Avicebron’s Fons vitae in his Questions on 
Aristotle’s Physics, his Questions on the Metaphysics, and his Questions on De 
causis” (ibid., liv). 
 See Fountain of Life, Jacob, 244-246.243
marks his emanationist perspective.  In the Quaestiones Pecham says that the body 244
has being (at least insofar as it is the body of a human being) because of the flowing 
in of the soul.  A personal and eternal emanation is borne in the soul due to the 245
wisdom that stretches from God to man.  The soul, qua form, gives being to the 246
matter and existence to the human person.  This is because the human soul is 247
sustained in being even when separate from the body.  Obviously matter has its own 248
function in the existence of the human being, and Pecham does not rule this out in the 
Quaestiones, but he emphasizes repeatedly that a simple, spiritual substance has an 
existence that is “more communicable”: 
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 Tractatus, 4: “... vita animae in vitam corporis redundat. . . .”244
 Quaestiones, 351; cf. ibid., 387, 390, 440; Quodilbeta, 176: “Et dico ‘principia’ 245
materiam et formam, quarum utraque habet suum esse. Unde Avicenna I Physicorum, 
cap. 2: ‘Forma est essentia per se ipsam, et est additum esse super esse, quod habet hyle; 
privatio vero non addit esse super esse.’ Haec Avicenna. Forma igitur dat materiae esse 
specificum et completum, sed non dat ei esse essentiae incompletae, cum sit principium 
essentialiter aliud a forma”; cf. Avicenna, Sufficientia, 1.2. (unedited [see note in Pecham, 
Quodlibeta, 176]); Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 94; cf. Fons Vitae: “Substantia simplex aut 
habet propriam sibi formam, aut non habet propriam sibi formam. Non est autem 
possibile ut non habeat propriam sibi formam, quia non haberet esse. omne enim esse rei 
ex forma est. Et etiam, quia si substantia simplex non haberet formam sibi propriam, non 
esset species differens ab alia. omnis enim differentia non est nisi per formam. Et etiam 
non esset possibile ut apprehenderet formam aliquam ex formis, quia non apprehendit 
formas nisi per suam formam” (168-169). 
 Tractatus, 9-10: “ ... ut sicut cum nascitur in anima cuiuscumque rei scientia sequitur, 246
quia laetitia de cognitione parta fit repraesentatio [et] distinctio personalis et aeternarum 
emanationum sic in plenitudine scientiae praetendatur quaedam plenitudo aeternae et 
perfectae sapientiae, sua origine comitante” (bracketed item in orig.). 
 Ibid., 49; Quaestiones, 387. The existence of the rational soul itself is the direct result 247
of divine creation (ibid., 319-320), even though all being and existence is due ultimately 
to divine causality (ibid., 404-405). 
 Tractatus, 7, 16-17; Quaestiones, 379. 248
• “The more simple something is, the more it is of communicable existence. . . 
. [T]he spirit is of more communicable existence than the body.”  249
• “[T]he spiritual things are of greater power and of more communicable 
existence than the corporeal.”  250
• “ ... according to the saying of the Damascene about the angel who is more 
in communicating existence as it is simple.”  251
The soul overflows into the body by virtue of a multiplication of its power.  Pecham 252
pictures reproduction as the overflowing of the vegetative power in man.   253
Avicebron’s view about the receptivity of a whole could support Pecham’s 
insistence that the soul is everywhere in the body.  Avicebron says, “[W]henever a 254
thing is divided into another, the nature of the whole exists in each of its parts. Now 
the units are parts of the multiple. Therefore the nature of the multiple exists in each 
of the units.”  This could well serve as the theoretical background for background 255
for Bonaventure’s principle that the soul moves the body through the vegetative 
power fundamentally and therefore the soul perfects the whole of the body and all of 
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 Quaestiones, 371: “[Q]uanto aliquid est simplicius, tanto aliquid est 249
communicabilioris exsistentiae. . . . communicabilioris exsistentiae est spiritus quam 
corpus.”
 Ibid., 394: “Sed maioris sunt virtutis et exsistentiae communicabilioris spiritualia 250
quam corporalia.”
 Ibid., 381: “Amplius, non potest simul esse in diversis, dicente Damasceno de angelo 251
qui est tanto communicatioris exsistentiae quanto simplicioris.”
 Ibid., 447, a statement in one of the contra arguments: “Amplius, virtus supernaturalis 252
in anima separata stat in ipsa, in [non]-separata redundat in corpus. Ergo per omnia virtus 
eius [magis] multiplicatur quando coniungitur quam quando separatur, et ita per 
consequens minus est intensa et valida ad operationes suas” (bracketed item in orig.). 
 Tractatus, 31-32. 253
 See Avicebron, Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 13-14; cf. Tractatus, 29. 254
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 51; cf. Fons Vitae: “[E]t quicquid diuiditur in aliquid, 255
natura totius est in singuils partibus eius. et una partes sunt multitudinis. ergo natura 
multitudinis est in singulis unis. et formae quae sustinentur in substantia composita sunt 
multitudo” (123). 
its parts.  Pecham’s view as presented in the first two chapters of the Tractatus is 256
that the act of the soul in the body as form is more fundamental than the working of 
the vegetative soul. Furthermore, Pecham’s own discussion of this point of the soul’s 
connection to every part of the body differs from Bonaventure’s explanation:  
Nevertheless [the soul] has a plurality of virtual parts, which are like parts 
of it. But from the simplicity of its substance it has the property that it 
communicates itself as a whole to any random part of the body. . . . 
[I]ntellectual simplicity does not denote smallness, but communicable unity.  257
Here, Pecham distinguishes between intellectual simplicity and imaginary 
simplicity.  One kind of simplicity is that of a small point, e.g., the result of 258
imagining a simple thing. But Pecham says there is also “intellectual simplicity” or 
simplicity in the abstract, which does not connote smallness but a “communicable 
unity” (unitatem communicabilem). It is in this second sense of simplicity that the 
human mind holds a simple when the intellect “abstracts its intelligible from 
measurement and position.”  259
Pecham's view of the particular corporeal substance as compared to particular 
intellectual substance appears to correspond with Avicebron's view. Corporeal matter 
is associated with non-being in Avicebron’s cosmology.  Body is dense rather than 260
subtle and thus it cannot penetrate anything else, so it is at one extremity of being: 
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 Osborne, “Unibilitas,” 244. 256
 Tractatus, 29: “Habet tamen partium virtualium pluralitatem, quae quasi partes eius 257
sunt. Ex simplicitate autem suae substantiae habet ut totam se cuilibet parti corporis 
communicet. . . . Simplicitas intellectualis non dicit parvitatem, sed unitatem 
communicabilem.”
 Ibid.258
 Ibid., 28: “... intellectus suum intelligible abstahit a dimensione et situ.” 259
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 97; cf. Fons Vitae: “[S]ubstantia animae apprehendit non-260
esse, id est differentias, propria, accidentia, quae attinguntur sensibus” (172). 
• “[A]lthough we have found that the corporeal substance is prevented from 
communicating itself on account of the thickness of the quantity and its 
obscurity, yet the quantity communicates its shadow to the bodies that are 
before it, so that, when it meets a luminous body, it gives it its form. . . .”  261
• “[Y]ou will understand the pettiness of the sensible in relation to the 
grandeur of the intelligible. And the spiritual substances will stand ready 
within your reach: set before you, you will see them envelop and dominate 
you, and it will seem to you that your own essence becomes one with these 
substances. And presently you will think that you are some part of these 
substances, on account of your connection with the corporeal substance. 
Then again you will think that you are the entirety of these substances and 
that there is no difference between them and yourself, on account of the 
union of your essence with their essences and the conjunction of your form 
with their forms.”   262
Pecham says similar things by way of comparing the sensible to the intelligible. The 
rational soul acquires its perfection partly from above and partly from below, and 
does not depend on the body for its essence.  The seventh chapter of the Tractatus 263
deals with “How the soul is bound by the ineptitude of the body.”  In particular, 264
imbalance in the various humors can affect the animal spirits and impair the 
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 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 38; cf. Fons Vitae: “Et etiam quia, cum nos inuenerimus 261
substantiam corpoream prohibitam ad conferendum se propter crassitudinem quantitatis 
et tenebrositatem eius, [et] tamen quantitas confert umbram suam corporibus quae 
opposita sunt, adeo quod, cum inuenerit corpus lucidum, dat ei formam suam. . . .” (110, 
bracketed item in orig.). 
 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 128; cf. Fons Vitae: “[I]ntelleges minoritatem sensibilis 262
secundum magnitudinem intelligibils. et tunc substantiae spirituales ponentur ad manus 
tuas; et positas ante occulos tuos considerabis eas comprehendentes te et superiores te, et 
uidebis essentiam tuam tamquam tu sis ipsae substantiae. et aliquando putabis quod sis 
aliqua pars illarum, propter ligationem tuam cum substantia corporali: et aliquando 
putabis quod sis omnes illae, et quod non est differentia inter te et illas, propter unitionem 
tuae essentiae cum essentiis earum et propter adiunctionem tuae formae cum formis 
earum” (204-205). 
 Quaestiones, 379-380. 263
 Tractatus, 25: “Qualiter anima ex corporis ineptitudine ligatur.” 264
intellect.  Corporeality is the natural product of the soul’s emanation and yet a 265
hindrance to the intellect. Pecham says that the soul is “hurt because of the 
conjunction with the corrupted body, as if weakened. . . .”  Only a wise person can 266
control the “sensible concupiscibles” that are common to the beasts.  Furthermore, 267
Pecham thinks that a person is more likely to receive intellectual impressions from 
God or spiritual intermediaries if his senses are impeded.  268
Finally, Avicebron sees human knowledge as a conjoining to God conceived as 
active intellect—not the 10th and lowest of the separate intellects as in Avicenna.  269
The conjoining is the conclusion of an ascent to the higher world. And, like 
Avicebron, Pecham sees the potential for a kind of mystical ascent that is associated 
with understanding:  
But let me take of little by little the tunic of the phantasms, let me take off, let 
me uncover [the veil] of sensible scales; let me see, the Lord leading me, my 
more secret places, and I will drive the flock of my thoughts to the hidden 
desert if perhaps the consoler of my soul would appear to me.   270
For Pecham as for Avicebron, God is active intellect and the human knows by 
connecting with God (I will discuss below how this occurs) rather than with the 
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 Ibid., 26-27. 265
 Ibid., 23: “ ... ex coniunctione cum corpore corrupto laesa est anima, tamquam 266
enervata. . . .”
 Ibid., 24: “ ... scilicet concupiscentia vel concupiscibilitas sensibilis, ubi etiam sunt 267
quatuor affectiones praedictae modo sensibili, quae etiam bestiis sunt communes. . . .”
 Ibid., 28. 268
 Pessin, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol”; cf. Avicebron, Fountain of Life, Jacob, 297-298.269
 Tractatus, 3: “Sed exuam pauxillum tunicam phantasmatum, exuam, detegam 270
[velamen] sensualium squamarum; perspiciam, duce Domino, secretiora mea et ad 
interiora deserti cogitationum mearum gregem minabo si forte appareat mihi consolator 
animae meae” (bracketed item in orig.).
lowest of the separate intelligences.  Thus Pecham only partially accepts Avicenna’s 271
view of the active intellect.  And, as in the Fons Vitae, the aspects concerning 272
mystical ascent are at the periphery of Pecham’s discussion; the description of 
contemplative activity is but a necessary corollary of the metaphysical and 
epistemological arguments that take center stage.  273
Thus far in the present chapter, I have shown that Avicebron’s influence on 
Pecham is not secondary. Rather, Pecham is advancing a tradition that has been 
transmitted from Avicebron through Gundissalinus and others. However, Avicebron is 
by no means the only major influence in Pecham’s thought. In the next part of the 
chapter, I will discuss how Pecham uses various sources to advance his own agenda. 
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 See ibid., 9-11, 20.271
 See Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West, 206. Obviously, a Christian who 272
accepts Avicenna’s view of the active intellect would have to explain how a trinitarian, 
creator God could be identified with Avicenna’s active intellect, “which is only the last 
intelligence that emanates (indirectly) from the primary cause” (ibid., 211, parenthetical 
item in orig.). It should be noted that “Avicenna is often quoted as stating the proposition 
‘intellectum agentem esse separatum’, which does not appear in his translated works. An 
important factor is Avicenna’s analogy of the sun (Aristotle had compared the activating 
intellect to light). It not only served as a link to Augustine’s comparison of God with the 
sun, it also implied Avicenna’s conviction of the separateness of the active 
intellect” (ibid., 222, parenthetical item in orig.). Clearly, Pecham associates with 
Avicenna the doctrine of the separate agent intellect illuminating the human mind: “Item, 
Avicenna, VI Naturalium: Intelligentia in effectu dat formas intelligibiles, ‘cuius operatio 
est ad animas nostras, sicut apparitio [solis] ad visus nostros’” (Quaestiones, 393, 
bracketed item in orig.). 
 Marrone says of Pecham and Matthew of Aquasparta, “[W]hile neither Pecham nor 273
Matthew venture far from the architectonics of [Bonaventure’s] conceptual scheme, each 
managed to perfect his theory at critical points by explicitly articulating its connection 
with those aspects of the doctrine of divine illumination affirming mind’s direct access to 
divinity. As a consequence, both also evidenced less interest in the mystical way and paid 
less attention to the contemplative dynamic transforming mind so as to see God” (The 
Light. Volume One, 222, bracketed item added). 
In so doing, I will show that Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a 
distinctive, original synthesis of Neoplatonic metaphysics.  
Part 4: How Does Pecham Marshal His Sources to Advance His Own Agenda? 
As I mentioned above, Pecham wants to show, in true scholastic manner, that his 
project is consistent with all the great philosophers: Aristotle, Augustine, Avicenna, 
Avicebron, and Averroes. That is, Pecham wants to show his audience that he is being 
consistent with the best results of theology and of philosophy.  Pecham quotes from 274
Aristotle (called Philosophus) 22 times in the Tractatus, and 26 times from 
Augustine. If Pecham perceives a conflict between what philosophical authorities 
teach and what theological authorities teach, then he gives precedence to theological 
authority. For example, Pecham reports that Avicenna has concupiscibility and 
irascibility residing only in the sensitive soul, but that the author of the De Spiritu et 
Anima (Alcher of Clairvaux) is correct to place those principles in the rational soul as 
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 E.g., Quaestiones, 382: Pecham says that Avicenna errs because his position entails 274
that the intellect is not the perfection of man. Such a position is contrary to the 
“definitions of both the philosophers and the saints” (“definitionibus tam philosophorum 
quam sanctorum”). 
well.  This suggests that Pecham’s approach to anthropology is not to simply repeat 275
what he finds in the philosophers, but to interpret their works in a general Augustinian 
theological context; to show as far as possible how their works support theological 
convictions. Indeed, that is what the previous section illustrated. 
Now, having discussed Pecham’s relationship with the tradition coming from 
Avicebron/Gundissalinus in greater detail, it is possible to say with more precision 
how he uses this tradition to advance his own project. The Pecham texts I have 
studied show that he has a broadly Neoplatonic metaphysical background that is 
particularly conditioned by the tradition from Avicebron/Gundissalinus. Therefore it 
is plausible that Pecham views his project as an opportunity to answer the following 
question: “Given that Avicebron, Gundissalinus, and Avicenna are right about 
metaphysics, what kind of natural philosophy and epistemology account best for how 
things are?” Broadly speaking, in addition to his own original thinking on the subject, 
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 Tractatus, 15, 33-34, 45. This is a critical aspect of Pecham’s doctrine of the rational 275
will: “Sequitur de intelligentia motiva, quae est voluntas rationalis, quam quidam dividi 
non sinunt per concupiscibilem et irascibilem, pro eo quod haec ponuntur tantum a 
Philosopho in anima irrationali. Sed huic contrarium est quod dicitur in libro De anima et 
spiritu. . . . Amplius, ira, quae est passio irascibilis et ceterae huiusmodi passiones, quae 
sunt in anima, non sunt tantum secundum partem sensibilem, sed secundum partem 
rationalem, cum sint etiam in daemonibus. . . .” (ibid., 40; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 432b.
5-433a.8). Another reference to Aristotle comes in the discussion about why the rational 
will must be self-moving: “Rursus, definitio Anselmi dicentis: voluntatem esse 
instrumentum se ipsum movens, similiter et illa Platonis, quia anima est numerus se 
ipsum movens, videntur habere calumniam quia nihil videtur posse se ipsum movere, 
dicente Philosopho, IV Physicorum: ‘Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur’. . . . Sed 
sciendum quod una est vita animae et radix essentiae. . . . Si tamen placet voluntatem 
seipsam movere, dici potest hoc ipsam per hoc habere [sic] quia reflectitur supra se et est 
terminus actus proprii; et movet in ratione imperantis et movetur ut imperata. Electio 
etiam movet et affectio movetur” (ibid., 43-44; cf. Quaestiones, 381). 
Pecham uses three tools to answer the question. The first is Avicenna’s account of the 
human person, cognition, and psychology which Pecham uses to explain how the 
various aspects of the soul’s function in relation to one another. Pecham’s second tool 
is a set of Aristotelian principles that he takes to be valid limitations on any 
anthropology or epistemology. Pecham’s third tool is a divine illumination theory, 
which has a long tradition going back at least to Augustine. I will discuss in turn each 
of these aspects of Pecham’s strategy. 
Avicenna’s Influence 
First, consider Pecham’s use of Avicenna’s account of the human person and 
cognition. Sometimes when Pecham cites Avicenna in the Tractatus, he does so in 
order to support positions that are central to the Fons Vitae or at least present in that 
book (an obvious example is Pecham’s attribution of statements about humors and 
animal spirits to Avicenna).  Here, I will briefly discuss some of these instances 276
where Pecham uses principles drawn from his reading of Avicenna in order to extend 
the project of the Fons Vitae.  
In a fascinating combination of diverse principles and sources, Pecham discusses 
how the soul senses by using the corporeal organs:  
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 Tractatus, 26-27. Further examples: “[N]ec enim anima est vita corporis, sed eius 276
impressio et emanatio, ut dicit Avicenna, VI Naturalium” (ibid., 4); “Unde Avicenna: 
‘Obligatio animae cum corpore est propter hoc ut perficiatur intellectus contemplativus et 
sanctificetur et mundetur’” (ibid., 8); “Et cum, secundum Avicennam, VI Naturalium, 
intellectus in operibus suis non indigeat organo, nisi sicut nauta indiget navi tantum 
donec perveniatur ad portum, sic secundum ipsum intellectus non indiget organis nisi in 
acquirendo scientiam” (ibid., 25); “Item, Avicenna dicit, IX Metaphysicae: ‘Non sequitur 
malum nisi hoc in cuius essentia aliquid est in potentia et hoc fit per materiam’. Igitur 
omnis Angelus et omnis anima rationalis componitur ex materia et forma” (ibid., 47-48).
Therefore the force of the soul perfects and moves the organ that is 
intimately united to it; and therefore in natural perlustration it is necessary to 
avert the soul [to] all changes made in the organ and for the soul to transform 
itself by a natural connection into their likeness, and proportionally it changes 
itself according to the body, for just as Aristotle says, “Sense is in potency to 
all sensibles”, not because it suffers with the body, but because it suffers along 
with the body, to which it is united intimately by affection and by its desire to 
govern it, just as Avicenna says.  277
For Pecham, Avicenna and Aristotle can be used in combination to explain what 
happens when humans come to know, given that Avicebron is right about the soul/
body relationship. In a similar statement, Pecham cites Avicenna in support of the 
view that the soul and body are bound together (colligatio) in both cognition and 
motion.  When Pecham adopted Avicenna’s internal and external faculties in order 278
to explain how the soul functions (as I discussed in the first chapter of the present 
study), he was adopting a significant modification of the Aristotelian tradition.  279
Pecham says that it is impossible to understand how the rational soul’s corporeal 
embodiment impedes its activity without understanding what Avicenna says about the 
human being’s intellectual powers.  Like other scholastics, Pecham adapted 280
Avicenna’s theory of the “four intellects,” accepting it completely in the Tractatus and 
adding to it both the Aristotelian division between speculative and practical intellects 
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 Ibid., 13: “Vis igitur animae organum, sibi intimae unitum, perficit et movet; et ideo 277
naturali perlustratione necesse est animam advertere omnes mutationes factas in organo et 
naturali colligatione in illius similitudinem se transformare, et proportionaliter corpori se 
immutat, quia sicut dicit Aristoteles ‘Sensus est in potentia ad omnia sensibilia’, non a 
corpore patitur, sed corpori compatitur, cui intime est unita affectu et desiderio regendi 
ipsum, sicut dicit Avicenna” (bracketed item added). 
 Ibid., 13-14.278
 Ivry, “Arabic and Islamic Psychology.”279
 Tractatus, 25.280
and divine illuminationism, adapted from Augustine.  And, Pecham adds a 281
discussion about Avicenna’s view of dreams in order to show how bodily conditions 
can affect the soul's reception of emanations.   282
Pecham cites Avicenna for support of the view that the radiation of forms on the 
intellect comes from the agent intellect.  Here Pecham takes an idea that is central 283
to Avicebron, that of emanating forms, and uses an Avicennian concept to explain 
how it works. The Avicennian agent intellect is emanative, “functioning much as the 
sun, illuminating both subject and object of intellection, and is present at every 
stage. . . .”  Further, Pecham seems to agree with Avicenna that some people have 284
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 Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West, 223; cf. Pecham, Tractatus, 38-39; 281
Deborah Black,“Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological 
Dimensions,” Dialogue 32 (1993): 219-58. “Avicenna distinguishes four different states 
of the human intellect, which are not different faculties of the soul, but different phases of 
intellection: three potential intellects, called material, in habitu, in effectu, and one 
actually thinking intellect, the “acquired intellect” (al-'aql al-mustafâd, intellectus 
adeptus). The first potential intellect is pure potentiality to know anything; the second 
potential intellect knows axioms such as “The whole is bigger than the part”; the third has 
already acquired conclusions through syllogistic reasoning and the intuition of middle 
terms, but does not consider them at the moment; the “acquired intellect” comes about 
when the human intellect connects with the active intellect (De anima I.5). This theory 
exerted a profound influence on scholastic intellect theory, especially in the period from 
Dominicus Gundisalvi to Albertus Magnus. The scholastics inherited from Avicenna the 
principal idea that the activity of the human intellect can be differentiated into different 
phases of gradual development and into different acts of syllogistic reasoning (Hasse 
1999 and 2000, 191–200)” (Hasse, “Influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy,” 
parenthetical items in orig.).
 Tractatus, 36. 282
 Ibid., 20. 283
 Ivry, “Arabic and Islamic Psychology.”284
immediate, intuitive knowledge due to a gift from the agent intellect.  Yet Pecham 285
identifies God as the agent intellect, and adds the individualized agent intellect that is 
the seat of abstraction, basing this addition on his reading of Augustine.   286
Aristotle’s Influence 
Now consider the second tool Pecham uses to develop his Neoplatonic 
anthropology: a set of limiting Aristotelian assumptions. Now, Pecham is not 
adopting Aristotle’s psychology to the same degree that he adopts Avicenna’s 
psychology, and Pecham’s conclusions about the soul are at odds with Aristotle’s De 
Anima in many ways. Yet Pecham sees himself as being in general agreement with 
Aristotelian psychology in large measure.  
Therefore the body and soul, when they are defined through one another, are 
not two separate things. Whence the Philosopher: Everyone who posits that 
the soul and body are two different things, it obligates him to say what is the 
cause of the connection of the soul with the body. But who says that the soul 
is the perfection of the body, and the body does not subsist without the soul, 
they are not with him two different things, nor does this question arise with 
him also.   287
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 Tractatus, 20; cf. Ivry, “Arabic and Islamic Psychology”: “While most people require 285
preliminary training of the senses to prepare their souls for intellectual cognition, which 
the Agent Intellect automatically grants, some few individuals with prodigious intuitions 
can ... grasp intelligible concepts and propositions immediately. . . . Prophets have this 
sense to an extreme degree, receiving emanations of all, or nearly all, of the intelligible 
forms in the Agent Intellect.” For Pecham’s related comment about knowledge in cases of 
prophecy, see Quaestiones, 377. 
 Tractatus, 20. 286
 Quaestiones, 380: “Ergo corpus et anima, cum definiuntur per alterutrum, non sunt 287
duo diversa. Unde Philosophus: Omnis qui ponit quod anima et corpus sunt duo diversa, 
convenit ei dicere quae sit causa ligamenti animae cum corpore. Qui autem dicit quod 
anima est perfectio corporis, et corpus non subsistit sine anima, non sunt apud ipsum duo 
diversa, nec accidit apud ipsum haec quoque quaestio.”
Repeatedly Pecham takes positions based on what he thinks “The Philosopher” 
says.  I will not mention each of these cases here, but I will mention some of that 288
are most critical to Pecham’s overall psychology and to debates of the 13th century.  
Perhaps the most important principle that Pecham takes from his reading of 
Aristotle is that “the powers which pertain to reason are streamed in to no organ ... the 
intellect is the act of no part of the body. But all powers, which are under the intellect, 
are applied by the organs.”  This statement serves at least two purposes for Pecham. 289
(1) It reflects a distinction between intellect and body which governs the discussion of 
the Tractatus. Despite all the ways in which the intellect relates to the body, there is 
this one way in which the intellect must be kept separate from the body: Thinking is 
not the act of any part of the body, because the power of the intellect cannot possibly 
come from any of the organs. (2) The statement sets the stage for Pecham’s discussion 
of the soul’s potencies. At the beginning of the following chapter of the Tractatus, 
Pecham points to Aristotle’s statement that the intellect is the only part of the human 
being that “enters from outside: and even those skilled in divine letters hold this.”  290
The intellect could come from outside only if it had an operation that did not require 
the use of a bodily organ. The intellect’s extrinsic source is not only fundamental to 
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 E.g., Tractatus, 11, 13. 288
 Tractatus, 30: “Vires autem, quae ad rationem pertinet, nulli organo influuntur, et hoc 289
est quod dicit Philosophus, quod intellectus nullius partis corporis est actus. Omnes 
autem vires, quae sunt sub intellectu, organis applicantur.” 
 Ibid., 31: “[S]olus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco; et hanc etiam tenent in litteris 290
divinis periti.”
Pecham’s dualism, but also sets the stage for the 13th-century debates about 
monopsychism.  291
Another guiding principle that Pecham takes from his reading of Aristotle is the 
position that the particular person thinks, i.e., the human person with his individuated 
intellect and body is the seat of thought: 
Further, I suppose according to the Philosopher that the man understands, and 
that to understand is of the composite. Therefore some part of the essential 
man elicits an operation in understanding. But no sensitive power reaches into 
the intellectual operation which is totally immaterial and without an organ. 
Nor does it attain the proper object of the intellect which is purely abstract. 
Therefore unless the intellect is a true part of the man, man by no means 
understands.   292
Pecham thinks that his view of the relationship between the sensitive soul and the 
rational soul is consonant with his reading of Aristotle. Pecham says that the sensible 
soul is perfected by corporeal forms received incorporeally, because Aristotle says 
that “sense can receive species without matter.”  And Pecham says that “in man 293
sensitive cognition is an intellectual principle, just as is obvious from the 
Philosopher,”and so the good of the body has to be “lifted” to a superior level by the 
intellectual principle.  Pecham posits that the separate agent intellect is the same 294
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 See Pecham, Quaestiones, 320, 328, 432, 440.291
 Ibid., 376: “Item, suppono secundum Philosophum quod homo intelligit, et quod 292
intelligere est coniuncti. Ergo aliqua pars hominis essentialis elicit operationem in 
intelligendo. Sed nulla vis sensitiva attingit operationem intellectualem quae est omnino 
immaterialis et sine organo. Nec attingit proprium obiectum intellectus quod est pure 
abstractum. Ergo nisi intellectus sit vere pars hominis, homo nullatenus intelligit” (cf. 
ibid., 382; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 408b.12-15). 
 Tractatus, 8: “Anima autem sensibilis perficitur corporalibus formis incorporaliter 293
receptis. ‘Sensus enim est susceptivus specierum sine materia’ secundum Philosophum.”
 Ibid.: “In homine enim sensitiva cognitio principium est intellectuale, sicut patet ex 294
Philosopho.” 
agent about which Aristotle speaks in his works: “It is impossible that the agent 
intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is part of the soul when it is, just as he 
says: ‘Separated, neither mixed nor passible, and it is action in itself. And knowledge 
in act and is also identical to it.’”  Pecham finds support for his theory of vision (a 295
blend of intromission and extramission) in his reading of Aristotle, even though 
Pecham concludes that Aristotle denies extramission.   296
Pecham shows a willingness to adapt what Aristotle says in a different branch of 
philosophy and apply it to psychology. For example, the movement of a mover of one 
of the crystalline spheres illustrates how the soul relates to bodily pain.  And 297
Pecham says that because Aristotle says that two bodies cannot be in the same place, 
and it is just as unreasonable that an infinity of bodies could be in the same place, 
then it is impossible for one mind to receive an infinity of species.   298
Finally, Pecham relies on his reading of Aristotle’s view of universals and 
particulars to refute the Averroistic views about how the intellect is informed about 
universals.  An Averroistic argument to which Pecham responds is that there can be 299
no singulars in the intellect because everything that is received in the intellect is 
abstracted from individuating conditions.  Pecham’s response is that the universal 300
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 Quaestiones, 402: “Impossibile est intellectum agentem, de quo loquitur Philosophus, 295
esse partem animae cum sit, ut ipse dicit: ‘Abstractus, non mixtus neque passibilis, et est 
in sua substantia actio. Et scientia in actu atque [eadem] est cum re’” (bracketed item in 
orig.).
 Tractatus, 18.296
 Ibid., 13. 297
 Quaestiones, 375; cf. Aristotle, Physics, 213b.18-22.298
 Quaestiones, 385-386. 299
 Ibid., 367-368. 300
itself is not in the intellect, but rather a similitude of the universal, and he cites 
Aristotle in support of this position.   301
Augustine’s Influence 
Third, consider how Pecham modifies the account based on the Fons Vitae by 
appealing to his reading of Augustine. Avicebron says that emanation is involved in 
human knowledge.  To explain how this emanation works, Pecham relies on his 302
reading of Augustine, as Marrone describes: 
By the time John Pecham composed his Commentary on the Sentences, the 
notion of divine illumination in normal cognition of truth was so familiar that 
he could answer the question: Whether God is the cognitive means for all 
certain understanding? by launching immediately into discussion of how God 
served this function, confident that his audience readily accepted the fact that 
he did.  303
Pecham was not unoriginal in his use of Augustinian principles. While is is beyond 
the scope of the present study to develop in detail Pecham’s theory of knowledge, 
consider that Marrone has traced the development of illuminationist thought in 
Pecham’s work and has drawn the following conclusions: 
• Pecham believes that all knowledge depends on an illumination from God. 
Everything that man knows he perceives with assistance from the uncreated 
light. Sensation is an occasion for knowledge, but the cause of knowledge is 
the uncreated light.  Sensation does not directly produce intelligible 304
species. Rather, the mind forms intelligible species.  305
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 Ibid., 387; cf. Posterior Analytics, 100a.6-8. Pecham responds to two further 301
arguments that are brief developments of the argument mentioned here (see Quaestiones, 
368, 386); for exposition of these arguments, see the second chapter of the present study. 
 See Passin, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol”; Fountain of Life, Jacob, 296-298.302
 The Light. Volume One, 130.303
 The Light. Volume One, 130; cf. Pecham, Tractatus, 10, 17. 304
 The Light. Volume One, 165-166; cf. Pecham, Quodlibeta, 10. 305
• Pecham thinks it is not enough to say that God created man with the natural 
capacity to know, but rather it must be said that God intervenes further. That 
is, Pecham thinks that God must be given not only an efficient role in 
illuminating the human mind, but also a formal role.  306
• Pecham thinks that the agent intellect which illuminates the human mind is 
not a created intelligence, but God himself, or the eternal light of God that 
reaches the human mind. Technically, impressed, intelligible species are 
God’s mechanism for granting knowledge to man independent of man’s 
observation of the world.   307
• Pecham refined illumination theory by suggesting a plurality of ways in 
which God logically could serve as the means of cognition: (1) Something 
could be the means of knowing and himself an object of knowledge. (2) 
Something could be the means of knowing and not an object. Pecham’s 
position is that divine light functions in the second way.    308
• Pecham thinks that human certitude about the truth or falsity of complex 
propositions requires reference not only to cognitive species, but also 
additional reference to eternal and divine reasons; the human mind has to 
“touch” (attingit) the divine light in some way that does not require making 
God the object of the mind.   309
• Pecham thinks that man can be said to know God, but only in the following 
senses: (1) Man has an intellective memory of innate impressions from God, 
of transcendentals and the proposition that God is. (2) Man has direct access 
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 The Light. Volume One, 130, 138-140; cf. Pecham, Quodlibeta, 183-184; Tractatus, 306
136. This point must be tempered by what Pecham says about intermediaries and his 
illustration of coming to know via rays from the sun (Tractatus, 12; Quaestiones, 384). 
 The Light. Volume One, 172-175, 179, 231; Pecham, Tractatus, 39; Quaestiones, 307
395-396, 399, 415, 430, 432. Pecham also posits a created agent intellect as an active 
principle in the human mind (Tractatus, 20; Quaestiones, 343, 402-403). 
 The Light. Volume One, 142-143; cf. Pecham, Quodlibeta, 185. Marrone notes that 308
Matthew of Aquasparta distinguishes his account of how God functions as an object from 
Pecham’s account, and this on the basis of an analogy between God’s light and solar light 
(The Light. Volume One, 145). However, the Pecham passage that Marrone cites includes 
the very analogy with solar light (Quodlibeta, 185). Thus, while Matthew explicitly 
mentions three ways in which God could function as object and Pecham finds only two 
ways, it is not obvious that Pecham failed to notice a principle that Matthew did notice.
 The Light. Volume One, 149-151, 189; cf. Pecham, Quaestiones, 394, 403, 441; 309
Tractatus, 20-21, 40, 135; Tractantes, 221. Pecham’s picture of human knowledge 
involves both the mind touching the light of God, and the light of God touching the 
human mind (Tractatus, 7).
to the divine reasons, but realizes that he perceives all things through God 
only upon reflection. (3) Man knows universal concepts that are true of 
objects in the world and, by participation and analogy, true of God himself. 
(4) Pious souls redeemed by faith have a kind of mental vision that is 
unavailable to others.  310
Beyond what I have already discussed about illumination, as far as I know, Pecham 
never explains in detail how God functions as guarantor of truth. Illumination is 
pervasive in the sense that there is never any knowledge that occurs totally apart from 
God’s activity.  However, in the Tractatus Pecham seems to say that the soul has 311
inherently some basic truths of logic and does not need special illumination (beyond 
that involved in the creation of the rational soul) to grasp them immediately; 
apparently such illumination is necessary in order to know complex truth.  Pecham 312
argues that the mind knows noncomplex “first impressions” innately and seems to 
indicate that these impressions, also known as the regulas luci aeternae, give the 
human mind access to the divine reasons.  Illumination subsequent to the infusion 313
of the first impressions is necessary because the human mind cannot focus on two 
objects at once.  Additionally, in the Quaestiones we find that the material aspect of 314
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 The Light. Volume One, 224-232; cf. Pecham, Tractantes, 173, 197; Quaestiones, 433; 310
Quodlibeta, 153; Tractatus, 135-136. Pecham describes another way of coming to know 
God that seems to be connected to greater familiarity with scripture and greater 
conformity to the Christian lifestyle (Quaestiones, 384, 390).
 Pecham, Quodlibeta, 151; Quaestiones, 383; Tractatus, 11-12.  311
 Tractatus, 20; cf. Quaestiones, 397, 408, 415-416; Marrone, The Light. Volume One, 312
149-150. 
 Tractantes, 197; cf. Quodlibeta, 153; cf. Marrone, The Light. Volume One, 224. 313
 Tractatus, 20; cf. Marrone, The Light. Volume One, 151. 314
the cognition of a proposition is provided by the operation of the intellect, whereas 
the formal aspect is provided by eternal light.  315
If we take into account Pecham’s insistence that all things are known in the divine 
light and that certitude is gained through the intuitions that God has impressed, then 
we have some indication of how the process of certification by divine reasons works, 
and it is more natural than we might have expected.  Given that Pecham is working 316
late in his career with a framework of emanation inspired by the tradition from 
Avicebron and Gundissalinus, then Marrone’s summarization of Pecham’s view of 
knowledge of God and by God is not surprising.  Furthermore, Marrone points out 317
that “in the intellectual climate of the 1260s and 1270s, the problem was how to set 
Augustine’s insight into concrete and critical form suitable to the demands of 
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 409; cf. Marrone, The Light. Volume One, 150. Marrone suggests that there is a 315
conflict between Pecham’s accounts of knowledge in the Tractatus and in the 
Quaestiones (The Light. Volume One, 151; cf. the two previous footnotes). In the 
Tractatus Pecham says that human knowledge of true propositions is possible only by 
representing terms in the mind of God, where all forms can be seen in divine simplicity. 
Pecham allegedly argues “precisely to the contrary” in the Quaestiones, i.e., that the 
human mind can naturally cognize propositions and know their truth. Marrone also 
suggests that this apparent contradiction can be resolved by what Pecham says in his third 
Quodlibet: “Inde enim veritas lucet incomplexorum, inde veritas et evidentia 
complexorum. Incomplexorum, dico, saltem quantum ad primas intentiones quae sunt 
‘unum’, ‘verum’, ‘bonum’” (Quodlibeta, 153). If this is the solution, then Pecham’s 
position is that God’s light illuminates in a different way depending on the level of 
cognition. Another possibility is that Pecham’s view evolved over time, and that the 
Tractatus reflects his mature position. 
 Marrone, The Light. Volume One, 229; cf. Pecham, Quaestiones, 394; Augustine, On 316
the Trinity, 9.6.
 The Light. Volume One, 229: “All the strands of Pecham’s theory of first intentions 317
and of his view on knowledge of God may well have been bound up in a seamless fabric 
of divine illumination.”
scholastic science.”  Pecham is an example of a philosopher who sets about to solve 318
the problem by locating the various aspects of human cognition in the various areas of 
the brain according to a reading of Avicenna.  319
It is not only in connection with epistemology that we find Pecham adapting 
principles of Avicebron according to his religious commitments. For example, 
Pecham cites Avicenna in support of the idea that the rational soul is connected to the 
body so that the intellect can be perfected, sanctified, and cleansed.  These ideas are 320
taken immediately from Avicenna and might have been taken from the Fons Vitae.  321
Yet, Pecham’s conception of the purification of the intellect involves a specifically 
theological understanding of cleansing by way of “return” to the spiritual realm. 
Pecham does not directly explain why the intellect would need to be sanctified and 
cleansed, but presumably this has to do with coming to learn divine truth by 
reasoning based on the observation of external, sensible reality. Pecham argues that 
this is one process whereby one accesses divine truth, by discussing what Augustine 
has to say on the subject:  
[T]he soul, running to and fro through portrayed species according to its 
highest end, touches the reasons of the same parts in eternal light and there 
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 The Light. Volume One, 134. 318
 See, e.g., Tractantes, 197. 319
 Tractatus, 8; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 1.5; Quaestiones, 380. 320
 Rudavsky says that the Fons Vitae “has several basic themes:. . . . to return to the 321
world of spirit, the soul must purify itself of the pollutions of this base world” (“Solomon 
Ibn Gabirol,” 251); Fons Vitae: “Perueniendi ad hanc scientiam duo sunt modi. unus est 
per scientiam de uoluntate secundum quod infusa est in totam materiam et formam; et 
secundus per sicentiam de uoluntate comprehendentem materiam et formam, quae est 
uirtus altissima, secundum quod cum nihilo materiae et formae est commixta” (338). 
discerns the unchanging truth of the utterable and from there draws up the 
truth, just as Augustine says, On the Trinity. . . .   322
And, when Pecham arrives at the discussion of the immortality of the soul (the last 
chapter of the Tractatus), he relies on Augustine but not at all on Avicenna, even 
though Avicennian principles would also lead one to the soul’s immortality.  323
I have now shown that Pecham is advancing a tradition that has been transmitted 
from Avicebron through Gundissalinus and others, and how he uses various other 
sources to advance his own agenda. Therefore, I have shown that Pecham’s 
philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of 
Neoplatonic metaphysics. In the final part of this chapter, I will respond to two 
objections to what I have said so far. 
Part 5: Objections to My Position Concerning the                                     
Avicebron/Gundissalinus Influence 
Two scholars have argued against the traditional view which I have defended in 
the specific case of Pecham, i.e., that the Avicebron/Gundissalinus tradition is the 
primary source for the doctrine of universal hylomorphism, and hence for the 
corresponding doctrine of the plurality of forms. Roberto Zavalloni (1951) and 
Michael B. Sullivan, in his dissertation (2010), have downplayed the influence of 
Avicebron in the 13th century Franciscan school, arguing that the doctrine of spiritual 
matter is traceable to to Plotinus, Augustine, and Avicenna, and merely finds 
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 Tractatus, 20: “Anima igitur, per species effigiatas discurrens secundum apicem sui, 322
rationes earundem partium in luce aeterna attingit et ibi veritatem enuntiabilis immobilem 
cernit et inde veritatem haurit, sicut dicit Augustinus, De Trinitate. . . .”
 Jon McGinnis, “Avicenna (Ibn Sina),” 70-71.323
secondary expression in Avicebron.  According to Sullivan, “Avicebron’s influence 324
on thirteenth-century Franciscans espousing spiritual matter has been significantly 
exaggerated. . . .”  And Zavalloni says that “Where the hylomorphic composition of 325
all created beings is concerned, the influence of Avicebron is incontestable, but it is 
neither exclusive, nor even preponderant; that of Saint Augustine ... seems more 
direct and more decisive than that of Avicebron.”   326
Before responding to Sullivan’s arguments directly, I must admit that Zavalloni 
and Sullivan are correct in saying that Augustine is the central figure in 13th-century 
theology. Dales has pointed out that Pecham himself attributes the doctrine of 
universal hylomorphism to Augustine: “Universal hylomorphism can be grafted onto 
Aristotelian thought, as it was by Roger Bacon and Matthew of Aquasparta, or onto 
Augustine’s, as it was by Pecham and many others.”  Indeed, Pecham grafts the 327
doctrine of spiritual matter onto Augustine and Averroes in the Quaestiones.  
Hoc igitur primum fundamentum multipliciter eliditur, tum quia, quamvis 
careat materia corporali privata, non tamen materia spirituali intelligibili. 
Unde Augustinus, Contra Manichaeum: “Deus dicitur de nihilo omnia fecisse, 
quia etiam si omnia formata et de ista materia formata sunt facta, haec ipsa 
tamen materia de nihilo facta est”. Et ipse etiam Commentator fatetur, quia 
habet aliquid simile materiae et aliquid simile formae. Sicut dicit: 
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 Zavalloni, Richard De Mediavilla; Sullivan, “The Debate.”324
 “The Debate,” 22. 325
 Richard de Mediavilla, 422: “Comment aprécier l’influence d’Avicebron chez les 326
scolastiques du XIIIe siècle, notamment chez les penseurs franciscains? M. Gilson la 
croit ‘profond et durable’. Elle nous semble, au contraire, plutôt secondaire. En ce qui 
concerne la composition hylémorphique de tous les êtres créés, l’influence d’Avicebron 
est incontestable, mais elle n’est ni exclusive, ni même prépondérante; celle de saint 
Augustin—nous le verrons dans le cas de Thomas d’York—semble plus directe et plus 
décisive que celle d’Avicebron.” 
 The Problem of the Rational Soul, 3.327
“Quemadmodum sensibile esse dividitur in formam et materiam, sic 
intelligibile esse oportet dividi in consimilia his duobus, scilicet [in] aliquid 
simile formae et [in] aliquid simile materiae. Et hoc necesse est in omni 
intelligentia quae intelligit aliud; et si non, et non esset multitudo in formis 
abstractis”. Haec verba eius.  328
As I discussed in the first chapter of the present study, it is not unusual for Pecham 
and other medieval writers to look for support in Augustine. Ironically, Aquinas cites 
Augustine in opposition to the doctrine of spiritual matter in the soul: “On the 
contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7, 8, 9) proves that the soul was made neither of 
corporeal matter nor of spiritual matter.”  And it must be borne in mind that Pecham 329
takes Augustine as the major theological authority in general. One statement of 
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 379, bracketed items in orig.; cf. Augustine, On Genesis: A Refutation of the 328
Manichees, 1.6.10: “And that is why we are dead right in believing that God made all 
things from nothing, because even though everything that has form was made from this 
material, this material itself all the same was made from absolutely nothing.”
 Summa Theologiae, 1.75.5; cf. Augustine, Literal Meaning of Genesis: “As for that 329
spiritual material, however, if there was any from which the soul would be made, or if 
there is any from which souls are still being made, what precisely was it? What name, 
what specific nature, what function does it hold among created things? Is it alive, or not? 
If it is, how does it act? What does it contribute to the effectiveness of the whole? Does it 
live a happy, blessed life, or a miserable one, or neither? Does it quicken anything? Or is 
it unoccupied with any of this, and resting idly in some hidden place of the universe 
without conscious sensation or vital movement? If, you see, it was not yet any sort of life 
at all, how could it be the material, neither bodily nor alive, for life yet to be in the 
future? So this is plainly untrue, or excessively obscure. If on the other hand it was 
already living a life neither blessed nor miserable, how could it be rational? But if that 
material became rational at the moment when the nature of the human soul was made 
from it, then non-rational life was the material of the rational, that is of the human, soul. 
So what was the difference, then, between that and a merely animal soul? Or was it 
already potentially rational, not yet entirely so? After all, we see how the infant soul, 
already of course the soul of a human being, has not yet begun to use reason, and yet we 
already call it a rational soul; so why should we not suppose that in that material from 
which it was made even sentient activity was stilled, just as in this infant soul, which is 
certainly that of a human being already, rational activity is stilled for the time 
being?” (7.7; cf. ibid., 7.8-9). 
Pecham’s, which I already noted in the present study, shows the allegiance to 
Augustine among the Neo-Augustinians of the 13th century:  
Which doctrine is more solid and more sound, the doctrine of the sons of St. 
Francis, namely of Friar Alexander [of Hales] of happy memory, of Friar 
Bonaventure and others like him, who rely on the Fathers and the 
philosophers in treatises secure against any reproach, or that very recent and 
almost entirely contrary doctrine, which fills the entire world with wordy 
quarrels, weakening and destroying with all its strength what Augustine 
teaches concerning the eternal rules and the unchangeable light, the faculties 
of the soul, the seminal reasons included in matter and innumerable questions 
of the same kind? Let the Ancients be the judges, since in them is wisdom! Let 
the God of heaven be judge, and may he remedy it!  330
Despite the Franciscans’ stated allegiance to Augustine, the suggestion that Augustine 
is the primary influence on their doctrines of universal hylomorphism and plurality of 
forms is misleading. He may have been the motivator, but the detailed theory comes 
from Avicebron. The present study cannot address Avicebron’s influence on the 13th-
century Franciscans as a whole, but the textual evidence from Pecham himself 
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 Registrum, 3:901, translation by Weisheipl (“Albertus Magnus and Universal 330
Hylomorphism,” 241, bracketed item in orig.); cf. Gilson, “Pourquoi Saint Thomas a 
Critiqué Saint Augustin.” 
supports the traditional view (Weisheipl’s view).  Weisheipl argues that, while the 331
doctrines Pecham mentions seem to be clearly Augustinian, Pecham’s actual doctrines 
represent deviations from Augustine, and where these deviations concern the primacy 
of the divine will, hylomorphism, and the plurality of forms, the doctrines are largely 
traceable to the tradition coming from the Fons Vitae.  I have supported Weisheipl’s 332
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 Bieniak has responded directly to Zavalloni: “In his study on the doctrine of the 331
plurality of forms in the individual, Roberto Zavalloni thoroughly examines the question 
of the main source of inspiration for [Philip the Chancellor’s] theory of intermediaries. 
According to Zavalloni, the traditional thesis that this doctrine is inspired by Avicebron’s 
Fons vitae, is not correct: rather the main source of our theory seems to be contained in 
Avicenna’s De anima. . . . Undoubtedly Avicenna played an important role for the 
anthropology of the first half of the thirteenth century, including the theory of 
intermediaries. . . . . [T]he idea that the soul is united with a body which is already 
prepared for the union is present in Philip’s thought and certainly derives from Avicenna. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Avicebron’s influence should be diminished. 
Actually, thanks to the complete edition of the Summa de bono [we know the doctrine of 
the Fons Vitae came to Philip] also indirectly, that is through a short anonymous treatise 
entitled De potentiis animae et obiectis. According to the text’s editor, the treatise was 
employed by Philip in the Summa. . . . Undoubtedly, the anonymous author knew 
Avicebron’s work very well: indeed, the latter is mentioned quite often, and always using 
the title Liber de materia et forma. The strong influence exerted by the Jewish 
philosopher is visible above all in the case of the theory of the intermediary elements. 
For, according to Avicebron, in man there exists a hierarchy of forms connecting 
intelligence and body. Just as in the Summa de bono lower forms play the role of material 
dispositions in regard to higher forms, so in the Fons vitae lower forms play the role of 
matter in regard to higher forms, which, in their turn, operate in the lower forms. Among 
Avicebron’s intermediary forms, there are, on the one hand, the vegetative soul operating 
in the body and resembling the body thanks to its consistency (‘crassitudo’), and, on the 
other, the sensitive soul operating in the vegetative soul and resembling the rational soul 
thanks to its subtlety. The same hierarchy is adopted by the anonymous author of De 
potentiis animae et obiectis. The sensitive soul resembles the rational soul because it 
performs a cognitive function and is incorporeal, whereas the vegetative soul is 
incorporeal but performs no functions of a cognitive kind. Besides the sensitive and 
vegetative powers, between soul and body there are also two corporeal intermediaries, i.e. 
the ‘spirit’ and the ‘virtus elementaris’” (The Soul-Body Problem, 127-128, bracketed 
items added, parenthetical item in orig.).
 “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 245ff.332
conclusion by underscoring the critical role of Avicebronian doctrines in various 
Franciscans who influenced Pecham (Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, 
Bonaventure, Roger Bacon,), and by at least noting the following connections 
between Pecham and Avicebron’s Fons Vitae: 
• There is causal hierarchy whereby a plurality of forms operate upon one 
another via an emanation of force; emanation functions in the human’s being 
and existence. The soul, qua form, gives being to corporeal matter (at least 
insofar as it is the body of a human being) and existence to the human 
person. 
• Knowledge is also transferred from above via emanation. Knowledge is a 
conjoining to God as the active intellect.  
• There is a form of corporeity, or a basic structuring principle in all matter. 
Form and matter are both ordered in a correlative hierarchy such that the 
rational soul can be called the form of the human being, although the human 
being has additional forms.  
• There is a kind of matter that is not subject to decay, and this is the matter 
that characterizes the rational soul and the angel.  
• Various aspects of the human being can be called “substance,” because 
“substance” (i.e., form and matter) permeates all of being.  
• The substances that are higher on the spectrum of being are simpler, nobler 
subtler; the intellect is hindered by the body. 
• A complex substance can nonetheless be simple, depending on the 
perspective from which it is considered. 
• Animal spirits are the vehicles of the emanation of the rational soul’s powers 
throughout the body.  
• Desire is responsible for form-matter conjunction, and thus desire is central 
to the being of the human individual, or the “third nature” that results from 
the combination of soul and body.  
• Form and matter both participate in the individuation of a substance. 
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If the commonalities I have found between Pecham and Avicebron are distinct from 
and substantially greater than those between Pecham and Augustine (or even as strong 
as those between Pecham and Augustine) then we are safe in concluding that a Fons 
Vitae tradition influenced Pecham and was, while inspired by certain ideas in 
Augustine, a phenomenon that by the 13th century was distinct from Augustine’s 
teaching. And, as will become clear in the following paragraphs, the similarities 
between Pecham and Avicebron on the subject of form and matter are much greater 
than such similarities between Pecham and Augustine.  
I will now respond directly to the arguments of Sullivan and Zavalloni. First, a 
point of clarification: Sullivan is correct that “Plotinus, as the father of Neoplatonism, 
looms behind both Augustine and Avicebron.”  But Sullivan goes on to say that the 333
medievals had no opportunity to read from Plotinus, whereas they did read from 
Avicebron.  This is technically incorrect, given that the medievals had access to the 334
Theology of Aristotle, which was in large part an Arabic translation of Plotinus.   335
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 “The Debate,” 9. 333
 Ibid.334
 “In the ninth century, Plotinus was translated into Arabic. Long sections of this 335
translation went under the title Theology of Aristotle. The attribution of the work to 
Aristotle helped the text to become an influential source of Neoplatonic ideas in the 
Arabic-speaking world. But the Arabic Plotinus materials are important not only as a 
conduit for Plotinus' ideas; they also differ on numerous points from their ultimate 
source. Thus the Theology, along with other texts derived from the Arabic version of 
Plotinus, in fact constitute an interpretation of Plotinus' thought, and not just a translation. 
The Theology in turn becomes the chief text conveying Plotinian ideas to the Arabic-
speaking tradition” (Adamson, “The Theology of Aristotle”; cf. Paul Henry and Hans-
Rudolf Schwyzer, eds., Plotini Opera, Tomus II: Enneades IV-V [Paris: Desclée de 
Brouwer, 1959]).
Now, consider Sullivan’s downplaying of Avicebron’s influence. Sullivan has 
suggested that Weisheipl overstates his case for Avicebron’s influence concerning 
hylomorphism for the following reasons: (1) Avicebron rarely or never speaks of the 
forma corporeitatis.  I admit this, but Avicebron does imply that there is such a 336
form. Theodore James writes: 
Unlike Avicenna and later Christian universal hylomorphists [Avicebron] does 
not speak of a form of corporeity but only a “matter of corporeity”; corporeity 
or quantity is the basic corporeal form. “Forma quantitatis cum coniungitur 
materiae inferiori constituit speciem corporis et eam ducit ad esse.” (II.8) The 
composite corporeal substance is either the corporeal matter supporting the 
forms of qualities by means of quantity (Tract I) or spiritual matter which 
sustains the corporeal form (Tract II).  337
It is superficial to claim that Avicebron has nothing to say about the forma 
corporeitatis simply because he does not use the precise, technical term. 
(2) Sullivan says that Gundissalinus’ De Unitate et Uno was also very influential, 
and so Avicebron’s influence was more remote and “grandfatherly.” This argument is 
misleading because it fails to take two things into account: First, the De Unitate itself 
is a conduit of Avicebron’s ideas, so it is odd to attempt to minimize Avicebron’s 
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 Sullivan, “The Debate,” 26.336
 Introduction to Fountain of Life, Wedeck, vii, parenthetical items in orig. “Tracts” here 337
refers to what I have been calling the books of the Fons Vitae (they total five). Cf. 
Fountain of Life, Jacob: “And just as the structure of reason underlies all structures and 
all are sustained in it, so does that of quantity support all structures of physical 
substantiality and its contingencies, while their existence is within it” (41); Fons Vitae: 
“[E]t sicut forma intelligentiae sustinet omnes formas et omnes formae sustinentur in illa, 
similiter forma quantitatis sustinet omnes formas corporis et eius accidentia et habent 
esse in illa” (38). 
 See De Unitate et Uno, 1-11.338
influence on the basis that the De Unitate was influential.  Weisheipl writes on this 338
point:  
Gundisalvi’s treatise De Unitate et uno circulated for some cenuturies in the 
Latin West under the name of Boethius ... although Aquinas rejected it as 
spurious. . . . While the treatise appears somewhat Boethian in its explanation 
of the various senses in which unitas can be said of God and creatures being 
taken singly or in aggregates, it utilizes material drawn from both Avicenna 
and Avicebron, as the critical edition clearly shows.   339
The De Unitate is a brief work, but in it we find a clear statement of the doctrine of 
spiritual matter: “Omne enim esse ex forma est, in creatis scilicet. Sed nullum esse ex 
forma est, nisi cum forma materiae unita est.”  The second reason why Sullivan’s 340
argument is misleading is that Gundissalinus had not only one but four distinct works 
that carried Avicebron’s influence: The De Unitate et Uno; the treatise De Anima; De 
Immortalitate Animae; De Processione Mundi.  Gundissalinus’ De Anima was 341
particularly influential and is clearly Avicebronian in terms of its hylomorphism.  342
The question relevant to Sullivan’s work is whether a comparable number of 
commonalities can be found between Pecham and Augustine concerning spiritual 
matter and hylomorphism. I cannot review all of the Augustine texts in detail, but I 
can briefly mention the texts that Sullivan marshals in support of his conclusion, and 
show that it is implausible to suppose that Pecham’s hylmorphism is more the result 
of a reading of Augustine than of Avicebron.  
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 De Unitate et Uno, 1.340
 The authenticity of the De Immortalitate Animae has been questioned (Houser, 341
“Dominicus Gundissalinus,” 247-248). 
 See Callus, “Gundissalinus’ De Anima,” 338-355.342
The first two passages are from the Confessions:  
Have you not yourself taught this soul which confesses to you, Lord, have you 
not taught me that before you imparted form and distinction to that formless 
matter there was nothing—no color, no shape, no body, no spirit? Yet not 
nothing at all, no, not that either, for there was some kind of formlessness with 
no differentiation.”   343
And, 
But for my own part, Lord, if I am to confess to you with tongue and pen 
all that you have taught me about this primal matter, in earlier days I heard it 
mentioned but failed to understand what it was, when people who were 
equally devoid of understanding told me about it, and I pictured it to myself 
under innumerable forms of all kinds, which is to say that I was not thinking 
of it as it truly was at all. My mind passed in review disgusting, hideous 
forms, distortions of the natural order, certainly, but forms nonetheless. I 
dubbed “formless” not something that really lacked all form, but which had a 
kind of form from which, if it were to appear, my gaze would turn away as 
from something weird and grotesque, and liable to upset weak human 
sensibility very badly. But what I thus imagined was not formless in the sense 
that it lacked all form, but formless only by comparison with things of fairer 
form; and clear thinking was beginning to convince me that I must eliminate 
the last vestiges of form entirely if I wished to gain a notion of what true 
formlessness would be. And this I could not do. I would have found it easier 
to deem anything that entirely lacked form non-existent, than to conceive of 
something midway between form and nothingness, neither formed existence 
nor nothingness, formless and all but non-existent.  
Hence my intellect gave up asking questions of my imagination, filled as 
this was with pictures of formed corporeal things which it could shuffle and 
vary at will; and I turned my attention to the bodily things themselves, and 
more carefully examined their mutability. They cease to be what they formerly 
were, and begin to be what they were not, and I came to suspect that this 
transition from one form to another involves passing through formlessness, 
rather than through absolute non-being; but I was anxious to know, and not 
merely suspect.  
So, as I was saying, if my voice and my pen are to confess to you 
everything that you have disentangled for me concerning this problem, how 
many of my readers will have enough stamina to take it in? Still, that is no 
reason for my heart to withhold honor from you, or to stop singing your 
praises for all that it understands but cannot record here. The mutability of 
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mutable things itself gives them their potential to receive all those forms into 
which mutable things can be changed. And what is this mutability? A soul? A 
body? The form of a soul or of a body? No; I would call it “a nothing-
something” or “an is-that-is-not,” if such expressions were allowed. And yet it 
must have some kind of being, to be capable of receiving those visible and 
organized forms.  344
Sullivan cites three more passages from the Confessions. In the first of these, 
Augustine says that the substance from which God created the heaven and Earth were 
formless, but here Augustine does not directly say that there was spiritual matter.  In 345
the second passage, however, Augustine does label the “darkness louring over the 
abyss” as “spiritual matter before its impetuous flux was restrained and it was 
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 12.19: “True it is, Lord, that you made heaven and earth. And it is true that your 345
Wisdom, in whom you made all things, is the Beginning. It is also true that this visible 
world consists of the great regions we call heaven and earth, and that these names, 
“heaven” and “earth,” can be used as a brief, compendious phrase to connote all the 
natural things made and created within them. Again, it is true that every changeable thing 
suggests to us the notion of a certain formlessness, whereby that creature can receive 
form, or can be changed and transformed into something else. It is true that any being 
which holds fast to immutable form with such constancy that, though changeable in itself, 
it does not change, is not subject to variations of time. It is also true that formlessness, 
which is close to nothingness, cannot experience any passage of time either. It is true that 
a substance from which something else is made can by a certain convention of speech be 
given proleptically the name of the thing which is to issue from it: hence the formless 
matter from which heaven and earth were made could have been called “heaven and 
earth.” It is true that, out of all formed creatures, nothing is nearer to formlessness than 
earth and the deep. It is true that you, from whom all things come, made not only what is 
created and formed, but also matter with the potential to be created and formed. It is true 
that anything which is formed from what is unformed is formless first, and then formed”; 
cf. Literal Meaning of Genesis, 5.5, Sullivan, “The Debate,” 18. 
illumined by wisdom.”  In this passage Augustine comes closest to the Franciscan 346
idea of spiritual matter, because he discusses mutability in connection with the primal 
matter and says that there are “visible” and “invisible” things that have “formless 
matter.” However, the discussion of mutability is brief and imprecise, remaining 
focused on the matter from which God made the heaven and Earth.  
Here is Sullivan’s final passage from the Confessions: 
Anyone so minded might advance yet another opinion, namely that when 
we read In the beginning God made heaven and earth, the words do not refer 
to invisible and visible natures already perfect and formed, but to the still 
unformed seeds of things, the matter capable of being formed and created, 
because in it were potentially present, though mingled confusedly, and not yet 
distinguished by qualities and forms, all those things which are now 
distributed in their various ranks, the spiritual and the corporeal creation 
which we now call, respectively, heaven and earth.  347
Then Sullivan cites a number of passages from Augustine’s Literal Meaning of 
Genesis which discuss an interrelationship between matter and mutability, and 
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 12.17: “Another view again is that both invisible and visible nature are quite 346
appropriately styled heaven and earth, and that under these two names is comprised the 
entire universe which God made in his Wisdom, that is, in the Beginning. According to 
this opinion the terms heaven and earth are used by anticipation to indicate the still 
formless matter which is common to all things, both invisible and visible; this usage is 
justified because all these creatures were made not from God’s own substance but out of 
nothing; they are not Being-Itself like God and a certain mutability is inherent in all of 
them, whether they abide, as does the eternal house of God, or suffer change, as do the 
human soul and body. From this primal matter, still formless but undoubtedly capable of 
receiving form, heaven and earth were to be made, that is, both invisible and visible 
creation in their formed state. Under this double name, however, are included both the 
invisible and unorganized earth and the darkness louring [sic] over the abyss, but with 
this distinction: the invisible and unorganized earth is understood to be corporeal matter 
before it received the distinguishing qualities of form, while the darkness lowering over 
the deep stands for spiritual matter before its impetuous flux was retrained and it was 
illumined by wisdom. So runs the theory: what are we to make of it?” (emp. in orig.). 
 Ibid.347
speculate about the possibility that just as the matter of earth supports its various 
corporeal properties, so the soul could have its own spiritual matter to support its 
properties.  Yet none of these passages come close to yielding in full the 348
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 E.g., Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1.1: “Or was it the unformed basic material of both 348
kinds that was called heaven and earth; namely, spiritual life as it can be in itself without 
having turned to the creator—it is by so turning, you see, that it is formed and perfected, 
while if it does not so turn it is formless, deformed; and bodily being, if it can be 
understood as lacking every kind of bodily quality, which is manifested in material that 
has been formed, when there are already various kinds of bodies, perceptible either by 
sight or by any of the body’s senses?”; cf. ibid., 1.9: “If, however, light, which was the 
first thing of which it was said that it should be made, and then it was made, is also to be 
taken as holding the first place in creation, then it is itself that intellectual, intelligent life, 
which would be in a formlessly fluid state unless it turned to the creator to be 
enlightened”; ibid., 5.5: “And so it was in the order of causes, not of time, that the first 
thing to be made was formless and formable material, both spiritual and corporeal, from 
which would be made whatever had to be made. . . .”; ibid., 1.14: “It is, after all, obvious 
(that everything changeable is given form or shape out of something lacking form or 
shape)” (parenthetical item in orig.) ; ibid., 7.6: “If the soul, you see, were something 
unchangeable, we ought not to be inquiring in any way at all about its quasi-material; but 
as it is, its changeableness is obvious enough through its sometimes being rendered 
misshapen by vices and errors, sometimes being put into proper shape by virtues and the 
teaching of truth, but all within the nature it has of being soul. In the same way flesh, in 
its own nature which it has of being flesh, is both embellished with health and disfigured 
by diseases and wounds. But just as this, apart from being already flesh and in that nature 
ranking high as being beautiful or low as being misshapen, also had some material, that is 
to say earth, from which to be made in order to be entirely flesh; in the same way too, 
possibly, before being made in the actual nature which is called soul, whose beauty and 
misshapenness consist respectively in virtue and vice, could have had some appropriate 
spiritual material which was not yet soul, just as earth, from which flesh was made, was 
already something, though it was not flesh”; ibid., 7.27: “So then it is futile to ask from 
what sort of material the soul might have been made, if one can rightly understand it to 
have been made in those first works of creation, when the day was made. Just as those 
things, after all, were made out of nothing, so too this soul among them. But if there was 
also some formable material, both bodily and spiritual, this too, however, set up by none 
other but God. which [sic] indeed came before its formation, not in time but in origin, as 
the voice does with the song, what can be a more fitting assumption than that the soul 
was made from spiritual material?”
implications of the doctrine of spiritual matter as discussed by Pecham and others in 
the context described above.  
I conclude that Sullivan is correct to say that Augustine had an influence on views 
of matter in the 13th century, but Sullivan’s view must be qualified in the following 
ways: While Augustine does associate mutability with matter as Pecham and others 
will do, it is only with Avicebron and Dominicus Gundissalinus that the implications 
of spiritual matter are developed fully, and it is clear that the Fons Vitae was heavily 
influential in the propagation of the doctrines of universal hylomorphism and the 
plurality of forms. In short, Augustine does not have a fully worked-out doctrine of 
universal matter and form as the Franciscans do. Add to this the fact that Pecham 
clearly inherits both the Avicebron/Gundissalinus and Franciscan traditions, and the 
only reasonable conclusion is that, while Pecham wanted to defend the views of 
Augustine, he intended to do it with the help of the philosophers, especially Avicenna, 
Averroes, and Avicebron.  
Sullivan was basically arguing for the view taken by Roberto Zavalloni in his 
work on the plurality of forms.  Zavalloni admits that the common interpretation of 349
the 13th century is that of Gilson, who says that Avicebron had a “profound and 
durable” influence.  In the course of describing the history of the plurality view, 350
Zavolloni reviews the texts of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas that show the 
influence of the Fons Vitae, and discusses briefly the influence of Gundissalinus in 
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 Richard De Mediavilla.349
 Ibid., 422, cf. Gilson, La philosophi au moyen age (Paris: Payot, 1947), 370.  350
his De Anima.  Then, however, Zavalloni turns to Augustine’s position and 351
determines that Augustine is the primary source for the doctrines, whereas the 
philosophers are secondary.   352
In Zavalloni’s section on the Jewish and Arabic sources of the theory of the 
plurality theory he mentions only two, and with little comment: Alcher of Clairvaux’s 
De Spiritu et Anima and Gundissalinus’ De Anima.  The latter work, as Callus has 353
pointed out, is noted as being the work of Gundissalinus’ that does not espouse the 
plurality of forms  whereas other works of Gundissalinus, ignored by Zavalloni 354
here, do support the plurality of forms.   355
Then, Zavalloni reviews the works of those in the later medieval period who 
associate the plurality view with Augustine in some way, and the list includes some of 
those I have already mentioned in this study: Thomas of York, Alexander of Hales, 
Eudes Rigaud, Richard of Middleton, Bonaventure, Robert Grosseteste, Thomas 
Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, and Roger Marston.  Zavalloni is surely correct that 356
authors cited Augustine in support of the doctrine of plurality of forms, but this point 
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 “Gundissalinus’ De Anima”; cf. Gundissalinus, De Processioni Mundi; De Unitate et 354
Uno. 
 Callus, “Gundissalinus’ De Anima,” 353-355; cf. Gundissalinus, De Processione 355
Mundi: “Forma uero prima est substantia constituens essentiam omnium formarum” (30); 
ibid., De Unitate et Uno: “Quia igitur materia in supremis formata est forma 
intelligentiae, deinde forma rationalis animae, postea vero forma sensibilis animae, 
deinde inferius forma animae vegetatbilis, deinde forma naturae, ad ultimum autem in 
infimis forma corporis: hoc non accidit ex diversitate virtutis agentis, se ex aptitudine 
materiae suscipientis” (8).      
 Richard De Mediavilla, 430-456.356
must be qualified by bearing five points in mind: (1) As I have shown, and as 
Zavalloni himself notes, Aquinas and Albertus Magnus also expressed concerned 
opposition to the doctrines found in Avicebron. (2) In describing how Richard of 
Middleton establishes the doctrine of the plurality of forms, Zavalloni shows that 
Richard uses the reasons of the theologians and philosophers.  Similarly, in 357
describing the development of the doctrine of the plurality of forms, Zavalloni 
discusses at length the problem of the interpretation of Aristotle, thus showing that the 
doctrine of plurality of forms as it was received by the 13th-century thinkers 
represented a complex of received theological and philosophical traditions.  (3) 358
Medieval authors such as Pecham sought to find the support of Augustine’s 
theological authority for any number of doctrines, but the fact that they sought his 
authority for such doctrines proves neither that Augustine had the most complete or 
relevant account of those doctrines. (4) Medieval authors would have been concerned 
that an endorsement of the Fons Vitae would have been interpreted as an endorsement 
of pantheism akin to that promoted by David of Dinant,  insofar as the Fons Vitae’s 359
emanationism is distinct from the creation doctrine of Christianity. Thus, it would 
have been natural for Latin authors to utilize even vague expressions of the doctrines 
that can be found in Augustine rather than citing the Fons Vitae directly. (5) There is 
evidence, as I showed above, that Franciscan authors were greatly indebted to the 
Avicebron/Gundissalinus tradition for providing a way of developing in detail the 
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doctrines of universal hylomorphism and the plurality of forms which are present in 
Augustine only in an embryonic form.  
Finally, Zavalloni is incorrect in his claim that Vital du Four was the first (around 
1290-1295) to allude to Avicebron directly in defense of any position, for Pecham 
already does so in his Quaestiones in the 1260s.   360
Conclusion 
My thesis for this dissertation has two parts. The first part is that John Pecham’s 
philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of 
Neoplatonic metaphysics. The second part is that Pecham’s anthropology is a 
significant alternative to that of Aquinas.  
After explicating the relevant works of Pecham and Aquinas in the first four 
chapters, the present chapter has demonstrated the truth of the first part of my overall 
dissertation thesis. For, while the Fons Vitae and the works of Avicenna and Averroes 
were both widely influential in the 13th century, Pecham and Roger Bacon are unique 
in their adaptation of the Neoplatonic vision of the soul presented in Avicebron’s text 
to a wider natural philosophy via Avicenna, Averroes, and others. Admittedly, other 
authors adopted universal hylomorphism and a version of the doctrine of the plurality 
of forms; Paul Vincent Spade makes a partial list of the authors who subscribed to 
versions of these two doctrines (often called the binarium famosissimum or “most 
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Quaestiones, 451. 
 Spade, “Binarium Famosissimum.”361
famous pair” ), including Gundissalinus, Thomas of York, and Richard of 361
Middleton.   362
To show in detail how Pecham differs from every philosopher who espoused the 
binarium famosissimum would require a separate study, although it is not difficult to 
show that there are significant differences between Pecham and various others such 
that Pecham cannot be simply grouped with the others. For example, while Pecham 
was probably influenced by Thomas of York, and they share many positions (both 
draw extensively from the Fons Vitae),  there are also significant differences 363
between the two philosophers. For example, Pecham’s doctrine of life in the Tractatus 
goes beyond what Thomas says; Pecham applied his psychology to the debate with 
Averroes, thus bringing to light nuances in his thought. And, while Gundissalinus 
undoubtedly influenced Pecham and many others by transmitting Avicebron’s and 
Avicenna’s thought,  Gundissalinus’ model of the rational soul is different from that 364
of Pecham.  Gundissalinus posits two powers of the rational soul according to 365
Avicenna’s “two faces” model, whereas Pecham makes only vague reference to the 
“two faces” in the Tractatus and develops the psychological hierarchy in much 
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 See Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy, 56-112. 363
 See Houser, “Dominicus Gundissalinus,” 247-248. These is controversy as to how 364
influential Gudinssalinus’ own De Anima was (Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin 
West, 16-17). 
 See Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 14-15. 365
greater detail.  Pecham seems to have influenced Richard of Middleton’s position 366
on the plurality of forms, and there are other similarities between the two 
philosophers.  Again, however, Richard has a view of matter that differs importantly 367
from Pecham’s view. Richard has a conception of matter as a purely passive principle 
that nevertheless contains the same form potentially and then actually, whereas 
Pecham views matter as the principle of potentiality and corporeal matter as already 
actually informed by the forma corporeitatis via the seminal reasons.  And, there 368
are striking differences between Richard’s view of divine illumination and that of 
Pecham.  The present chapter has also shown significant differences between 369
Pecham and Bonaventure, who was head of the Franciscan order during Pecham’s 
time in Paris.  370
Now, having defended the first part of my thesis, I will compare Pecham and 
Aquinas in order to demonstrate that the second part of my thesis is true. 
!!!!!!
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CONCLUSION - PECHAM AND AQUINAS 
This chapter is designed to prove that the second part of my thesis is true, i.e., to 
show that Pecham's philosophical anthropology is a significant alternative to that of 
Aquinas. It will argue that Pecham’s philosophy merits this high rank by comparing his 
position to that of Aquinas and will advocate three things: (1) Pecham’s position is not 
subject to some objections that are problematic for Aquinas’s position; (2) that Pecham 
and Aquinas are both dualists in some sense; and (3) Pecham has philosophical 
arguments in the controversy with Averroism that are interesting independent of their 
value to theology. 
Here is how I will carry out this task: First, I will compare the results of my study of 
Pecham and Aquinas. In doing so, I will briefly discuss five opinions which Pecham and 
Aquinas share: (1) Individual human souls are created ex nihilo; (2) The soul is in some 
sense the form of the human body; (3) Each individual human has his own agent intellect; 
(4) Humans have understanding truly by means of the divine light; (5) Monopsychism is 
wrong, i.e., opposed to the greater philosophers and Christian teaching. Having shown 
these similarities between Pecham and Aquinas, I will then discuss how the thinkers 
differ in two major areas: (1) Focus on the concept of life; (2) Plurality of forms. As I 
discuss these differences I will adjudicate them to some degree, showing both that 
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Pecham’s view is more internally consistent and explanatory than that of Aquinas, and 
that Pecham and Aquinas cannot be divided conveniently along dualist/non-dualist lines.  
Finally, I will highlight the philosophical significance of Pecham’s work. I will do so 
by first revisiting the controversy with Latin Averroism in order to cite examples of 
Pecham’s philosophical arguments that deserve attention independent of any controversy 
with Aquinas. Then, I will discuss Pecham’s philosophical motivation for adopting the 
plurality of forms position: Pecham believes that there are certain unacceptable 
consequences that follow from Aquinas's metaphysical starting point, but which do not 
follow from his own starting point. These consequences are of theological and 
philosophical significance, and so I will briefly review them. 
Similarities 
It is to be expected that Pecham and Aquinas agree about many issues, because they 
share a number of moral and religious commitments. In order to avoid overstating their 
disagreement, it is helpful to consider instances of agreement and at least the surface-
level compatibility of their anthropologies. Here, I can just briefly state some of these 
instances, postponing or omitting discussion of underlying issues about which Pecham 
and Aquinas may disagree.  
First, Aquinas and Pecham agree that God creates individual rational souls ex nihilo 
and infuses them into particular bodies. This is the topic of Pecham’s first quaestio.  1
Here, Pecham argues that the soul, being unchangeable, cannot be passed along from 
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 Quaestiones, 315-330; cf. ibid., 378.1
parents to children.  On Pecham’s view, a soul cannot be split off from another soul; a 2
soul is not like a candle’s flame that can be passed from one candle to another.  
Aquinas also argues that individual souls are created ex nihilo and infused. Robert 
Pasnau explains:  
Because [Aquinas] takes this rational soul to be something nonphysical, he argues 
that it cannot be generated by purely biological means, through sexual 
reproduction. The basis for this last claim is quite straightforward: “It is 
impossible for the active power in matter to extend its action to producing an 
immaterial effect”.   3
According to both Aquinas and Pecham, the body generated by the embryo’s parents is 
prepared for and receives the rational soul, but is also a formed body itself. Furthermore, 
Pecham and Aquinas both occasionally use words such as “soul,” “rational soul,” and 
“intellect” interchangeably, and the reader must allow the context to determine what 
aspect of the human person is meant.  4
Second, Aquinas and Pecham agree that the soul is the form of the body in some 
sense. (They disagree about what this means, as I will discuss below.) In the Quaestiones 
Pecham says that the soul is the form of the body: “[The soul] is the form of the body 
essentially as imprinted ... of essence.”  Pecham also says that the rational soul is a 5
simple form which cannot be multiplied.  Aquinas argues strongly and repeatedly, in the 6




 Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 109; cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1.118.2.3
 E.g., Aquinas, Treatise, 18; Pecham, Quaestiones, 320.4
 Quaestiones, 349: “Ad decimum quartum dicendum quod est forma corporis per 5
essentiam ut imprimentem, essentiae ut impressam.” 
 Quaestiones, 363. 6
Third, Pecham and Aquinas agree that, in some sense, each individual human has his/
her own agent intellect.  (Pecham is unlike Bacon in affirming an immanent agent 7
intellect,  and perhaps this is due to Pecham’s dialogue with Aquinas.) The Franciscans 8
thought they could find evidence for the agent intellect in Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5.  But, 9
adapting Avicenna’s teaching  to an Augustinian and Aristotelian framework, the 10
Franciscans identified the agent intellect with the divine light itself. Pecham’s student 
Roger Marston, for example, says: 
It is necessary to posit in our mind, beyond the phantasms or abstracted species, 
something by which we to some degree attain the unchanging truths. I believe this 
to be no different than the influence of the eternal light. . . . For the eternal light, 
irradiating the human mind, makes a certain active impression on it, from which a 
certain passive impression is left in it, which is the formal principle of cognizing 
the unchanging truths.  11
It is easy to see how Marston could have learned this doctrine from Pecham, who also 
identifies the agent intellect with the uncreated, eternal light of which Augustine speaks: 
“[T]hat light of which Augustine speaks, is the eternal uncreated light; which is not the 
perfection of the superior reason unless as the object. And that uncreated light is the 
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 Aquinas, Treatise, 84-89; Pecham, Quaestiones, 343, 403. However, in Aquinas's 7
Quaestiones, he says that the possible intellect is the highest principle in the human being 
(60). 
 See Hackett, “Roger Bacon”; ibid., “Illumination, Agent Intellect and Intelligible 8
Species.”
 Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 3-10.9
 See McGinnis, “Avicenna,” 67. 10
 Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima, ed. College of St. Bonaventure (Florence: College 11
of St. Bonaventure, 1932), 263. The translation is by Pasnau, “Divine Illumination,” 
Stanford University, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/illumination/ (2011); cf. Armand 
Maurer, Medieval Philosophy, 2nd ed., Étienne Gilson Series 4 (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Medieval Studies, 1982), 96.
separated agent intellect.”  Pecham takes both Aristotle and Augustine to be saying that 12
the agent intellect is not individualized in each person, and says that the divine light 
(God) is the agent intellect.  Yet Pecham has a two-fold doctrine of the agent intellect: 13
On the one hand Pecham thinks that the agent intellect is God, and on the other hand he 
thinks that there is a created agent intellect.  14
The fifth article of Aquinas’s 84th quaestio addresses the question, “Is the agent 
intellect part of the soul?,” and the responsio is in the affirmative.  On Aquinas’s view, 15
God is a superior, separate intellect which contains the divine ideas, but not the agent 
intellect wherein reside the abstracted intelligibles in the mind of a particular human 
being.  
Fourth, Aquinas and Pecham both teach (although in different senses) that humans 
cognize things truly in the illumination of divine light, i.e., in their eternal natures, 
exemplars, or reasons.  In the Tractatus, Pecham illustrates his broadly applied 16
exemplarist thinking by saying that the soul “may assimilate itself to the eternal 
exemplar, in which all are united or by life, all represented most simply, all united most 
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 Quaestiones, 415: “[L]umen illud, de quo Augustinius loquitur, est lumen aeternum 12
increatum; quod non est rationis superioris perfectio nisi sicut obiectum. Et istud lumen 
increatum est intellectus agens separatus”; see ibid., 395-396; cf. Dales, The Problem of 
the Rational Soul, 129-130.
 Quaestiones, 402.13
 Pecham, Tractatus, 20: “Duplicem enim pono intelligentiam agentem, increatam et 14
creatam, . . .”; see Spruit, Species Intelligibilis, 202-204; Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 23; 
cf. Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 26-27;  Zdzisław Kuksewicz, “The Potential 
and the Agent Intellect,” The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 598.
 Treatise, 84-87. 15
 Aquinas, Treatise, 147-148; cf. Pecham, Quaestiones, 409. 16
perfectly, so also it might imitate the highest exemplar by representing it. . . .”  This 17
approach continues in the Quaestiones, where Pecham connects the truth of any 
statement to eternal reasons.  In his 11th quaestio, Pecham says that even separated souls 18
cognize every substance in the exemplars, and in a way that is more expedient than the 
method of cognition which is characteristic of souls while embodied in the present life.  19
Pecham discusses his view of the connection between exemplars and the divine light in 
the sixth quaestio: “[D]ivine light is the form of every exemplar and in a way imprinting 
its similitude on all things, just as the seal imprints form on its wax. Nevertheless it is not 
the form of something inhering just like the seal’s vestige in wax.”  Pecham says that it 20
is by eternal light that the soul “discerns the unchanging truth of the utterable and from 
there draws up the truth.”   21
Pecham clearly thinks that divine light confirms beliefs, but he also seems to think 
that the divine light actually confers information upon the human mind via the exemplars. 
Consider the following statements from Pecham:  
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 9: “ … assimiletur aeterno exemplari, in quo sunt omnia unita vel vita, omnia 17
simplicissime repraesentata, omnia perfectissime adunata, sic et ipsa summum exemplar 
imitetur repraesentando ipsum. . . .”
 Quaestiones, 409.18
 Ibid., 444.19
 Ibid., 410: “[L]ux divina est omnium forma exemplaris et quasi efficiens imprimens 20
omnibus suam similitudinem, sicut sigillum imprimit formam suam cerae. Non tamen est 
alicuius forma inhaerens sicut vestigium sigilli in cera.”
 Tractatus, 20: “ ... veritatem enuntiabilis immobilem cernit et inde veritatem 21
haurit. . . .”
• “... cognition of which descends from the Father of lights on the intellect, caused by 
the superior power in the intellect, whence only God can illuminate the soul.”  22
• “But the rational soul, marked by the image of God, is less efficaciously ordered 
from the principles of nature to the same illuminations [i.e., the same illumination 
that the angels enjoy] ... so that divine brightness, diffused over all creatures, by 
which it is touching in the mind delicately and through which it sees and cognizes 
whatever it understands, moves in many ways. . . .”  23
• “The soul is the incorporeal, intelligible substance of illuminations which are from 
the first perceived relation to the law.”  24
On Pecham’s view, angels remove impediments to cognition, order the phantasms, and 
minister to the intellect so that the divine light can shine in.  25
Aquinas deals with illumination theory in his 84th quaestio. Aquinas’s explanation of 
how the intellect cognizes things in the divine light is based on the same model that 
explains how the soul has sensible knowledge of things upon which the sun shines.  We 26
say that things are seen in the sun because the sun shines on them and allows us to see 
them. This represents a more restricted role for illumination in human knowledge than 
Pecham presents, yet both include illumninationism in their epistemologies. Unlike 
Pecham, Aquinas does not allow that humans have direct access to the exemplars.   27
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 Ibid., 12: “quorum cognitio a Patre luminum descendit super intellectum, a virtute 22
superiori causatur in intellectum, unde solus Deus potest sic animam illuminare” (emp. 
added). 
 Ibid., 7-8: “Anima autem rationalis insignita Dei imagine ad easdem illuminationes 23
minus efficaciter ex naturalibus principiis ordinatur ... ut divina claritas, respersa super 
omnes creaturas, a qua in mente tangitur tenuiter et per quam videt et cognoscit quidquid 
intelligit, moveat multiplicter. . . .”
 Quaestiones, 451: “Anima est substantia incorporea intelligibilis illuminationum quae 24




Fifth, Aquinas and Pecham are agreed that monopsychism stands in opposition to 
central tenets of Christianity and to the positions of the greater philosophers, especially 
Augustine and Aristotle. And, when they address such opposition, Pecham and Aquinas 
are very similar in their criticism. Aquinas quickly dispenses with these issues at the 
beginning of his Against the Averroists: 
There is no need to show that the foregoing position [that there is but one 
intellect] is erroneous because repugnant to Christian faith; a moment’s reflection 
makes this clear to anyone. Take away from men diversity of intellect, which 
alone among the soul’s parts seems incorruptible and immortal, and it follows that 
nothing of the souls of men would remain after death except a unique intellectual 
substance, with the result that reward and punishment and their difference 
disappear.  28
Pecham makes similar statements. He says that monopsychism requires that man is not 
defined by reason, and so cannot perform natural, rational choice (electionem naturalem 
rationalem).  Therefore, man cannot be rewarded for his right choices and punished for 29
his wrong choices. Under these circumstances, Pecham says, injustice becomes better 
than justice.  
Difference: Focus on the Concept of Life 
Pecham orients his discussion of the soul around the concept of life in a way that 
Aquinas does not. This is not to say that Aquinas thinks of the soul as unrelated to life. In 
quaestio 75.1 of Aquinas’s Quaestiones De Anima, he provides a definition of the soul 
that involves the concept of life.  Aquinas says that the soul is  30
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 19, bracketed item added.28
 Pecham, Quaestiones, 382-383. 29
 Treatise, 2-4.30
the first principle of life in the things that are alive around us. For we say that 
living things are animate, whereas inanimate things are those without life. Now 
life is displayed above all by two functions: cognition and movement. But the 
ancient philosophers, unable to transcend their imaginations, claimed that the 
principle behind these functions is a body. They said that the only things that exist 
are bodies, and that what is not a body is nothing. And, in keeping with this 
doctrine, they said that the soul is a body. . . . [T]he soul, which is the first 
principle of life, is not a body, but the actuality of a body. And this is so in just the 
way that heat, which is the principle of heating, is not a body, but a certain 
actuality of a body.    31
For Aquinas, every soul has at least the nutritive capacity:  
[J]ust as a quadrilateral possesses whatever a triangle has and something more, 
and as a pentagon has whatever a quadrilateral has, so the sensitive soul possesses 
whatever the nutritive soul does and the intellective soul possesses whatever 
belongs to the sensitive soul and more.”  32
Thus on Aquinas’s view, the nutritive soul represents the minimal level of ensoulment. 
For Pecham, however, the fundamental act of soul is more difficult to explain. At the 
beginning of the Tractatus Pecham follows Avicenna to sharply distinguish between the 
life of the soul and the life of the body.  Pecham’s development of the concept of life in 33
the Tractatus represents his most extensive discussion of biological teleology as it is 
associated with the soul.  
In the first seven chapters of the Tractatus, Pecham discusses the operation of the 
soul. He covers the various “acts” associated with living things, and decides that the first 
act of life cannot be vegetation, sensation, or apprehension, because life itself is required 
for all of these.  Pecham concludes that the first act of life is for a thing to be in force, or 34
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 Ibid., 3. 31
 Aquinas, Quaestiones, 61. 32
 Tractatus, 4.33
 Ibid., 4-6.34
to strive toward perfection efficaciously, or to persist in being itself.  He says that this is 35
the act of the vital form. “Exciting the drive itself immediately follows the perfectible 
desire to pursuing perfection and this general desire is in all living things, prior to 
understanding. . . .”  Pecham takes his view to be a development of a principle from the 36
De Motu Cordis.  Whereas Aristotle more or less says that the nutritive power is 37
fundamental to life, Pecham wants to find a principle that is ontologically (although not 
necessarily temporally ) prior. As I will discuss below, the concept of life is also central 38
to Pecham’s account of how the various substantial forms in the human being cooperate. 
Difference: Plurality of Forms 
In this section, I will first discuss briefly the history of the plurality debate which led 
to the controversy between Aquinas and Pecham. Second, I will argue that, as some  
modern-day Aquinas scholars have noted, Aquinas’s allegedly non-dualist account of 
human nature is not without its difficulties. Third, I will point out difficulties with various 
modern-day Thomist responses to the problems with Aquinas’s account of substantial 
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 Ibid., 8.35
 Ibid.: “Ipsum vigorem immediate consequitur desiderium excitans perfectibile ad 36
perfectionem consequendam et hoc generale desiderium est in omni vivente, prius 
apprehensione. . . .”; as noted previously, this is a reference to Alfred of Sareshel.
 See ibid.37
 As far as I know, in neither Pecham’s plurality view nor in Marston's plurality view is 38
there a clear statement about the timeline at which the various forms (or grades of form) 
are educed from matter. However, it is clear that both Pecham and Marston are intent 
upon preserving the unity of the individual substance through the process of generation. 
Marston does say that all the grades are simultaneously subordinated to the specific form. 
As Etzkorn explains: “Consequently, the process of generation does not take place by 
way of the succession of mutually exclusive grades or forms. In the composite already 
constituted as an individual of the species, the grades and the specific form co-exist in a 
simultaneous hierarchy, in a relationship of essential subordination” (“The Grades of the 
Form,” 447). 
form in the human being, arguing that Pecham’s dualist account, which includes the 
plurality view, may be more explanatory than Aquinas’s own unity position. Finally, I 
will argue that the plurality debate represents not a merely semantic difference between 
Pecham and Aquinas, as has been suggested; significant metaphysical and theological 
points are at issue.  
Knowles says that the debate concerning plurality of forms seems to have been the 
“precise point at issue between Aquinas and Pecham”.  In 1286, Pecham condemns the 39
unicity of form as stated in this article: “That in man there is only one substantial form, 
namely, the rational soul, and no other substantial form. From this opinion seem to follow 
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 “Some Aspects. I,” 12; cf. Callus, The Condemnation of St Thomas at Oxford, 16: 39
“Archbishop John Pecham at the metropolitan visitation of the University on October 
29th, 1284, in order to short-circuit all evasion, renewed the prohibition issued seven 
years previously by his predecessor [Kilwardby]; but, for the sake of peace, he added that 
as a concession he would consider whether any of the thirty theses might be tolerated in 
the schools. Until then, the prohibitions should be maintained under the same penalties as 
before. Nevertheless, one particular thesis should be most strictly proscribed, namely, the 
execrable error of those who posited one single form in man, ‘unum vero illorum 
expresse notavimus articulum, quorundam dicentium, in homine esse tantummodo 
formam unam.’ Without significant emphasis he roundly asserted that, in addition to 
countless other absurdities, it follows from this theory that Christ’s body was not one and 
the same before and after death; that the relics of the saints venerated in Rome and all 
over Christendom did not in reality appertain to their own bodies born of their mothers, 
but would be new entities born of the imagination, for it is in fact impossible to preserve 
the identity of the body without the permanence of a general or special form” (bracketed 
item added); cf. Pecham, Registrum, 3:841.
all the aforementioned heresies.”  A number of related events preceded the 1286 40
condemnation.  (Some have misapplied the words of Roger Marston and have suggested 41
that: “[I]n the presence of brother Thomas Aquinas, of brother John of Pecham, and of 
about twenty-four other doctors” the Thomist doctrine of the unicity of form “was 
solemnly excommunicated as contrary to the teaching of the Saints, particularly of 
Augustine and Anselm.”  In reality, however, Marston does not say that the dispute was 42
about Thomas or the unicity of form, but rather a Peronis Cantor was the one who 
recanted. ) In 1284, Pecham famously renewed Kilwardby’s 1277 decree proscribing a 43
number of Thomist doctrines, and explicitly condemned the doctrine of the unicity of 
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 Registrum, 3:923. I am using Wippel’s translation (“Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 40
140) of this text: “quod in homine est tantum una forma, scilicet anima rationalis, et nulla 
alia forma substantialis; ex qua opinione sequi videntur omnes haereses supradictae.” The 
“aforementioned heresies” have to do with the identity of the dead body of Christ in the 
tomb, a subject to which I will return later in the present chapter. Pecham’s attitude 
toward these heresies can be seen in the beginning of the same letter: “… infrascriptos 
errores, quos de novo audierat in sua provincia suscitatos, tanquam haereses declaravit, et 
pronunciavit esse damnatos, in scriptis proferens sub hac forma” (ibid., 921). 
 Wilson, “Henry of Ghent and John Peckham’s Condemnation.”41
 Gordon Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries 42
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), 228; cf. Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 15-16. 
 Marston, Quaestiones: “Dicunt ergo quod, si Verbum ‘importet relationem realem’, 43
dicitur tantum notionaliter; si vero relationem rationis, ut quando essentia intelligit se et 
quaelibet  persona intelligit se et aliam per essentiam, sic est Verbum essentiale et 
commune. Ego tamen praesens fui Parisius et corporeis auribus audivi, quando incepit 
Cantor de Perona, assistente magistro Girardo de Abbatisvilla praesentibus fratre Thoma 
de Aquino et fratre Ioanne de Pecham et aliis Doctoribus sacrae theologiae usque ad 
XXIIII vel circiter, ubi haec opinio fuit excommunicata solemniter tamquam contraria 
Sanctorum assertionibus et doctrinae, et praecipue Augustini et Anselmi, ut patuit in 
opponendo” (116-117). 
 See Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 8.44
form.  It was also in 1284 that Pecham wrote a letter that mentions Aquinas as a 44
representative of the unity view.  And finally,  45
in 1286, at a meeting in London of Bishops and Abbots, Pecham himself 
condemned the unity of substantial form repeatedly and in much stronger terms, 
directing it in particular against a young Dominican at Oxford, Richard Knapwell. 
Knapwell had continued to defend Aquinas’ position on this point (at least as he 
understood it), and had twice written in defense of Thomas and of the orthodoxy 
of his position. . . . Pecham also excommunicated Richard and thereby ended his 
academic career.  46
Pecham was also opposed by the Thomist William Hothum, who appealed Pecham’s 
condemnation of Knapwell.    47
At the time of the controversy between Aquinas and Pecham, the debate over 
pluralism had been going on for perhaps almost 75 years, although it was more heated at 
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 “Causam vero opinionum bonae memoriae fratris Thomae de Aquino, quas fratres ipsi 45
opiniones sui ordinis esse dicunt, qua tamen in nostra praesentia subjecit idem reverendus 
frater theologorum arbitrio Parisiensium magistrorum” (Pecham, Registrum, 3:866); cf. 
Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 138. 
 Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 139, parenthetical item in orig.; cf. Kelley, 46
introduction to Knapwell, Quaestio, 9-44.  
 Hinnebusch, Early English Friars, 387-388. 47
Paris than at Oxford.  Unicity of form was not found in Étienne Tempier’s 48
Condemnation of 1277, even though a number of Thomist positions were condemned; 
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 Callus says on this point: “In the thirteenth century perhaps no other problem aroused 48
such heated controversy as the question of plurality of forms. The origin of the debate is, 
however, still somewhat obscure. Dom O. Lottin, O.S.B., in an extremely suggestive 
study, published in this same periodical, threw much needed light on the beginning of the 
controversy in the Paris schools. He found the earliest accounts of it in Roland of 
Cremona, the first Dominican master in Paris (1229-1230), and in Philip the Chancellor’s 
Summa de Bono (1228-1236). Two facts are established beyond doubt by Dom Lottin: (a) 
the Chancellor’s approach to the question exercised a wide influence upon the 
theologians of the first half of the century; (b) the pluralist view was not so current and 
familiar, at least in Paris, as often has been asserted. On the contrary, the leading masters, 
Philip the Chancellor and William of Auvergne, among the Seculars, Roland of Cremona 
and Hugh of St. Cher among the Dominicans, John de la Rochelle and the Summa of 
Alexander of Hales among the Franciscans, all accepted the thesis of unity of soul and 
substance in man. One would like to know who were those pluralists, the quidam with 
whom Roland of Cremona, Philip the Chancellor, William of Auvergne and the other 
masters contended, and how the Schoolmen came into contact with this problem for the 
first time. . . . In Philip the Chancellor’s Summa de Bono the problem is formulated in 
such as way as to show that it was not a fresh one, but rather that by this time it was fully 
discussed in the schools. We have here the statement of the question clearly delineated, 
and both opinions put forward with their arguments for and against fitly marshalled [sic]. 
Accordingly, although no name has been definitely established in connection with this 
doctrine before 1228 at the earliest, there is still such a mass of hitherto unexplored 
manuscripts that it would surely be rash to state that nothing, previous to that date, could 
possibly come to light” (“Two Early Oxford Masters on the Problem of Plurality of 
Forms,” Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie 42, no. 63 (1939): 411-412, parenthetical 
items in orig.); cf. Lottin, “La pluralité des formes substantielles avant Saint Thomas 
d'Aquin. Quelques documents nouveaux,” Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie 34, no. 
36 (1932): 449-467; Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 20.
this was probably because the unity position was already known at Paris.  Opposition to 49
the unicity position developed gradually, and Pecham was an important figure in that his 
positions may be seen as the culmination of this development.  And, as I noted in 50
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 Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 37; cf. “Condemnation of 219 Propositions,” trans. Ernest 49
L. Fortin and Peter D. O’Neill, Medieval Political Philosophy, ed. Ralph Lerner and 
Muhsin Mahdi (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 335-354. Henry of Ghent 
describes a meeting of all theology masters at Paris, of whom all except two opposed the 
unity position: “Loquendo autem de damnatione per sententiam magistrorum, scio, quia 
interfui, quod iam 10 annis elapsis, magistri omnes theologiae tam non regentes actu 
quam regentes, qui habui potuerunt Parisius simul congregati ad examinandos quosdam 
articulos de mandato domini Stephani episcopi parisiensis et domini Simonis legati, qui 
postmodum fuit papa Martinus, inter quos articulos erat ille, quod in homine non erat 
forma substantialis nisi anima rationalis, omnes unanimiter uno ore, duobus exceptis, 
dixerunt quod dicere in homine non esse formam nisi animam rationalem falsum 
erat. . . .” (Quodlibet X, ed. R. Macken, Henrici De Gandavo Opera Omnia 14 [Leiden: 
Brill, 1981], 127).  
 See Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy, 83-85, 149-150; ibid., 186-187: “Before the 50
introduction of Aristotle’s works other than the logical treatises, Scholastics, as a whole, 
supporting Plato and Augustine, regarded body and soul as two independent entities 
extrinsically united to constitute man. After that introduction, this theory was either 
superseded by the Aristotelian conception of the relation between the body and the soul 
as one of matter and form, the body as matter having no reality apart from the soul as 
form, or was modified to express the opinion that, although they may be related as matter 
to form, both body and soul have a reality independent of each other, the soul because it 
alone is created and immortal, the body because matter as well as form has its own entity. 
The first position, which adopted Aristotle unconditionally, is usually held to have been 
originally proclaimed by St. Thomas, but Pecham, writing to the Chancellor and 
University of Oxford in December 1284 and to certain cardinals in January 1285, 
mentions it as one of the erroneous opinions maintained at Oxford in spite of the fact that 
it had been condemned by Kilwardby. This, of course, does not necessarily contradict the 
assumption that St. Thomas originated the theory and that later it spread to the Oxford 
Dominicans; indeed, Pecham, in the same letters, particularly connects the theory with 
‘frater Thomas sanctae memorie de Aquino’. However, … even before 1248 the Oxford 
pluralists were opposed by the supporters of one single form for each composite. The 
pluralists most probably included Grosseteste, Adam Marsh, and Thomas of York, but 
their theory does not appear in its elaborated version until Bacon's day and certainly not 
in its developed version until Pecham, under opposition from St. Thomas, was led to 
consider its implications. If we return now to Pecham's interpretation of the relation 
between body and soul we shall see the theory of the pluralists in its fundamental form.  
chapter five, Aquinas saw in Avicebron, not in the Franciscans themselves, the roots of 
the Franciscan position on substantial form.  51
Daniel A. Callus explains concisely how one might reach either side of the 
disagreement between Aquinas and Pecham: 
If with Aristotle one holds (i) that prime matter is a completely passive 
potency without any actuality of its own whatsoever; (ii) that privation is the 
disappearance of the previous form, and, consequently, has not part at all in the 
composition of the substance; and (iii) that substantial form is absolutely the first 
determining principle, which makes the thing to be what it is, the only root of 
actuality, unity, and perfection of the thing; then, consistent with his stated 
principles, the conclusion forced on us is that in one and the same individual there 
can be but one single substantial form: other forms, that come after the first, are 
simply accidental and not substantial forms. Since the thing is already constituted 
in its own being, they cannot give substantial being, but exclusively accidental or 
qualified being; they do not confer upon the concrete thing its own definite and 
specific kind of being, e.g., man, but only a qualified or relative state of being, for 
example, of being fair or dark, big or small, and the like.  
On the other hand, if one contends (i) that primary matter is not absolutely 
passive and potential, but possesses in itself some actuality, no matter how 
incomplete or imperfect it may be: an incohatio formae, or any active power; (ii) 
that privation does not mean the complete disappearance of the previous form, so 
that matter is not stripped of all precedent forms in the process of becoming; or 
(iii) that substantial form either meets with some actuality in prime matter or does 
not determine the composite wholly or entirely, but only partially; from all this it 
will necessarily follow that there are in one and the same individual plurality of 
forms.  52
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 E.g., Aquinas, A Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, 124; ibid., Summa Theologiae, 51
1.115.1.
 “The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form,” The Thomist 24:258; cf. Aquinas, 52
Treatise, 10-13.
As became clear in the fifth chapter of the present study, the pluralist position is derived 
from Avicebron and Gundissalinus and to some degree from the hylomorphism of the 
Jewish commentators,  and was developed by Philip the Chancellor.  53 54
Aquinas’s Dualism 
Aquinas’s mature position is that there is one, unified, structuring principle for each 
substance. John F. Wippel has provided a helpful review of the Aquinas texts on this 
topic.  In a recent article, Carlos B. Bazán discusses the tension involved in a position 55
that tries to accommodate Aristotelian hylomorphism concerning the human subject and 
the intellect’s subsistence apart from the body.  Bazán comments on Aquinas’s choice to 56
follow Aristotle’s hylomorphism : “When in his Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas 57
rejected the conception of the soul as a complete intellectual substance and adopted 
Aristotelian hylomorphism as the best philosophical account of human nature he also 
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 “Some Aspects. I,” 13; cf. T.M. Rudavsky, Maimonides (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 53
2010), 85-86.
 See Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 20-27.54
 “Aquinas and the Unity,” 117-128. In addition to the texts I brought up in the preceding 55
chapter of the present study, Wippel refers his readers to the following Aquinas texts for 
coverage of the issue (among others): Commentary on the Sentences, in Selected 
Writings, ed. and trans. Ralph McInerny (New York: Penguin, 1998), 2.12.1.4; In 
Quattuor Libros Sententiarum, 2.18.1.2; Quaestio Disputata De Veritate, S. Thomae 
Aquinatis Opera Omnia 3, 13.4; 16.1; On Truth, trans. James V. McGlynn (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1994), 2.13.4; 2.16.1; Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. James F. Anderson, 
2:164-177, 203-210; Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Charles J. O’Neil, 4:303-304; 
Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, 117-127; Quaestiones, 124-135, 145-153; 
Quaestiones Quodlibetales, ed. Raymund Spiazzi (Italy: Marietti, 1956), 12.6.
 “A Body for the Human Soul,” Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought, 243-278.56
 I illustrated this choice of Aquinas’s in chapter four of the present study.57
decided to follow the principles that we have just reviewed.”  Aquinas says that the 58
rational soul is the single, substantial form that actualizes matter.  Therefore, on 59
Aquinas’s view,  
[T]he corporeality of human beings, as long as we consider it to be a substantial 
determination, is not granted to the composite by a substantial form of corporeality 
distinct from the soul and prior to the soul (à la Pinocchio), but by the rational soul 
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 “A Body,” 248. The principles “just reviewed” that Bazán outlines as characteristic of 58
Aristotle’s view include the following: (1) Matter and form are correlative principles 
which do not exist by themselves, but only by their relation to each other within the 
structure of the composite substance which is the real subject of being. (Matter and form 
are introduced only to explain generation and corruption, not to posit matter and form as 
independently existing substances.) (2) Form is the principle of actuality that grants all 
the essential determinations of the composite. (3) Matter is the potential subject that 
supports the forms that succeed each other throughout the natural process of generations 
and corruptions, giving individuation to the form and continuity to the process (although 
Aquinas argues that the difference in prime matter and determinate differences, together, 
make up the principle that individuates two numerically different members of a kind [See 
Jeffrey E. Brower, “Matter, Form, and Individuation,” The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, 
ed. Davies and Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 96-99]). (4) There is 
“movement” when matter acquires one form instead of another. Movement is the act of 
what is in potency as long as it is in potency. As long as the new form has not been 
acquired, there is movement, but as soon as the change of dispositions in matter is 
achieved, the composite of matter and old form corrupts, the composite of matter and the 
new form is generated and the movement ends. (When the form actualizes matter, 
movement ends.) (5) Generation is conceived as the modification of dispositions in 
matter by an external agent. Such modification is guided by the final cause of the process. 
None of this is meant to suggest that Pecham does not also express his anthropology in 
Aristotelian terms (albeit totally transformed). Pecham operates with these terms in his 
own way, as has become obvious.
 “The soul shares with corporeal matter the existence in which it subsists: from that 59
matter and from the intellective soul, one thing comes about. This occurs in such a way 
that the existence that belongs to the whole composite also belongs to the soul itself, 
something that does not occur in the case of other forms, which are not subsistent. And 
for this reason the human soul continues in its existence after the body is destroyed, 
whereas other forms do not” (Treatise, 24); cf. ibid., Against the Averroists, 37; Kenny, 
Aquinas on Mind, 152. 
itself, the only substantial form of the human composite and the only cause of all its 
substantial determinations.  60
This is in marked contrast to Pecham, who does posit the form of corporeity (forma 
corporeitatis) that characterizes all corporeal matter.  As has already become obvious in 61
the discussion of Pecham’s debt to Avicebron in the previous chapter, Pecham has a 
stronger concept of matter than Aquinas does. For Pecham, corporeal matter has an active 
potency due to the seminal reasons that are constitutive of the forma corporeitatis.  
Bazán goes on to show how Aquinas develops the argument that the makeup of the 
corruptible human body is actually for the benefit of the soul. Bazán outlines Aquinas’s 
seven steps in the development of this argument:  62
• Matter is for the benefit of form.   63
• The union between soul and body is necessitated by the fact that the soul is last 
in the hierarchy of realities of intellectual nature.  Unlike the angels who have 64
innate ideas, the soul is in potency to intelligible species and must acquire them 
by the mediation of sense powers.  
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 Bazán, “A Body,” 252, bracketed items added, parenthetical item in orig. Note that 60
Aquinas also treats corporeality as a form. Kenny has pointed out that, for Aquinas, 
“Being material or corporeal is, in fact, like any other property, a form” (Aquinas on 
Mind, 138). It is just that for the Franciscan pluralist, the form of corporeity is a 
substantial form (see ibid., 152). I will discuss further implications of believing in a 
substantial forma corporeitatis below. 
 See Knowles, “Some Aspects. I,” 13. Pecham says in the Tractatus that there is a 61
corporeal form that perfects the material body, and a “stronger” spiritual form that 
perfects the spiritual body (50). Bonaventure says the same thing (see Cullen, 
Bonaventure, 54). Wippel describes the forma corporeitatis as follows: “[A] second kind 
of substantial form in corporeal entities. . . . Thus in the case of a living thing, this form 
of corporeity would make the matter-form composite a body or corporeal substance, and 
a second substantial form—a soul—would be added to make it a living 
substance” (“Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 120). 
 “A Body,” 264-276.62
 Ibid., 264; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 415b.10-15; Aquinas, Quaestiones, 114-115.63
 Bazán, “A Body,” 265-266; cf. Aquinas, Treatise, 205-207; ibid., Quaestiones, 115. 64
• If the reason why the soul joins the body is because it needs to acquire the 
intelligible species from sensible things by means of sensation, it is necessary 
that the body to which the soul is united be very well equipped for the 
acquisition of sensible data from which intelligible species can be abstracted.   65
• The sense of touch is the foundation of sense activity.   66
• There are particular conditions that a body must meet in order to be the most 
suitable organ for the sense of touch.   67
• The reciprocity between matter and form facilitates a picture of Nature as 
proceeding gradually from simple elements, combining them until it achieves 
the most perfect mode of blending, which is found in the human body. The 
body’s perfectly balanced constitution makes it the suitable correlate of the 
human soul. The soul can sense most effectively because of the organization of 
the body’s parts.   68
• The body suitable for the human soul is one that is composed of contrary 
elements, and that makes it naturally corruptible.   69
The position that the corruptible body is for the benefit of the soul as the body’s form 
presents an obvious problem for Aquinas’s position that the human soul is naturally 
incorruptible.  So, Aquinas has to discuss the immortality of the soul in theological 70
terms. Aquinas says:  
[D]eath and dissolution are natural to human beings by reason of a necessity of 
matter, but immortality would befit them by reason of the form’s nature. And yet 
natural sources do not suffice to provide immortality. Rather, a natural disposition 
for it indeed befits human beings by reason of their soul, and supernatural power 
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 Bazán, “ Body,” 266-267; cf. Aquinas, Quaestiones, 115.65
 Bazán, “A Body,” 267-268; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 413b.2-5; Aquinas, Commentary 66
on Aristotle’s De Anima, 138-139, 422-423; Quaestiones, 115; Treatise, 38. 
 Bazán, “A Body,” 268-270; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 421a.19; Aquinas, Quaestiones, 67
116; Treatise, 12.
 Bazán, “A Body,” 270-271; cf. Aquinas, Quaestiones, 20. 68
 Bazán, “A Body,” 272-276; cf. Aquinas, Quaestiones, 116-117. 69
 It has been suggested that the biological works of Aristotle may be more welcoming to 70
a commentator wishing to develop the idea of a separable soul (see David Ross, 
introduction to Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. and trans. John Warrington [West Yorkshire: 
Pomona, 2008]), xxvi).
fulfills it. . . . And death and dissolution are contrary to our nature insofar as 
immortality is natural for us.  71
 Aquinas elsewhere argues that the earthly body as constituted now cannot function as a 
celestial body.  (Yet elsewhere, Aquinas makes it clear that the immortality of the soul is 72
not supposed to be a truth of revelation, but a truth that is derived from the proper 
philosophical understanding of the human substance. ) 73
There are several ways to respond to a discussion like Bazán’s. First, someone might 
respond by saying that Aquinas’s strategy works as Bazán has interpreted it. In other 
words, Aquinas’s doctrine of the soul’s immortality is simply separate from his natural 
anthropology, and Aquinas can rightly add God’s supernatural imposition of immortality 
onto a natural Aristotelian view of the human person. But this strategy does not seem 
promising, for two reasons. (1) Anton C. Pegis has argued that Aquinas views the soul 
and body as both initially naturally immortal; death occurs only accidentally as a result of 
sin.  Thus, the separation of the soul from the body is a state for the soul that is actually 74
against the soul’s nature. Thus there would be a conflict between Aquinas’s natural 
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 On Evil, ed. Davies, trans. Richard Regan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 71
quaestio 5; cf. Bazán, “A Body,” 272-276. 
 “The body of a human being could not be a simple body nor a celestial body because if 72
it were, the organs of the senses and especially the organ of the sense of touch would be 
incapable of being affected by their sensible objects; nor can the human body be a simple 
elementary body because contraries exist in act in an element” (Quaestiones, 120). 
 See Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas: “Not being a body capable of perishing 73
(as the biological human organism is), and yet being subsistent, the human soul cannot 
perish. For Aquinas, that by virtue of which I understand and think is not the sort of thing 
which can die as bodies can do” (215, parenthetical item in orig.); cf. Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae, 1.75.6; ibid., Treatise, 5-6.
 “The Separated Soul and Its Nature in St. Thomas,” St. Thomas Aquinas (1274-1974), 74
1:131-158; cf. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 4.79. 
anthropology and his theological principles. (2) On some occasions when Aquinas is not 
discussing death in particular, he affirms clearly that the soul and body are two different 
kinds of things. For example, Aquinas says that “the soul is the first principle of life,” 
unlike secondary principles of vital action, such as the eye.  And Aquinas admits that 75
this principle of life cannot be the body or a part of the body; the soul is an incorporeal 
reality whereas the body is a corporeal reality.  Thus it would be difficult to develop an 76
account that would be consistent with Aquinas’s theological principles and yet maintain 
the soul’s connection to a naturally mortal body as its one substantial form. 
A second response is that of Eleonore Stump, who admits that Aquinas is some kind 
of dualist: “Aquinas seems clearly in the dualist camp somewhere since he thinks that 
there is an immaterial and subsistent constituent to the subject of cognitive function.”  77
Stump argues that Aquinas’s dualist account is both coherent and non-Cartesian, on the 
basis that Aquinas thinks of the soul as a configured form itself while it also is 
configuring the body.  
For Aquinas, the metaphysical world is ordered in such a way that at the top of the 
metaphysical hierarchy there are forms — God and the angels — which are 
configured but which aren’t configurational constituents of anything else. These 
forms are configured but non-configuring. Near the bottom of the hierarchy are 
forms that configure matter but don’t exist as configured things in their own right. 
The form of an amethyst is like this. Such forms are configuring but non-
configured. And in the middle are human souls, the amphibians of this 
metaphysical world, occupying a niche in both the material and the spiritual 
realm. Like the angels, the human soul is itself configured; but like the forms of 
other material things, the human soul has the ability to configure matter. 
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 Treatise, 3. 75
 Ibid., 2-4. 76
 “Non-Cartesian Substance and Materialism without Reductionism,” Faith and 77
Philosophy 12:505-531.
Consequently, in the transition from configuring mater to not configuring matter, 
the human soul doesn’t undergo any radical metaphysical transformation or 
category switching. . . .  78
The metaphor of configuration is questionable, since it carries a geometrical connotation 
that may be misleading in discussions of non-geometrical principles and beings.  
Stump acknowledges that her interpretation of Aquinas’s position view brings with it 
the worry that Aquinas has slipped into the Platonic dualism that he is so concerned to 
reject, or that Aquinas has raised in his own position all the problems that pertain to 
Cartesian dualism.  Stump says that there is really no problem, for two reasons: (1) 79
Aquinas maintains that the soul is not a substance in its own right; and, (2) the soul is not 
an integral part of a human being in the same way that a roof is an integral part of a 
house.  Concerning (1), Stump’s assessment of Aquinas’s position should be more 80
cautious. While Stump cites passages where Aquinas argues that the soul is not a 
substance,  in the fourth chapter of the present study I noted two passages in the 81
Quaestiones De Anima (ca. 1269) where Aquinas indicates that the soul is, in fact, a 
substance.  I do not wish to adjudicate this matter here, but merely to note that the issue 82
may be less clear than it seems in Stump’s presentation. Yet even if we grant that Stump’s 
interpretation of Aquinas’s view is correct, her response does not help, because what 
should count as a substance is precisely what is at question. Concerning (2), we can ask 
why a soul is not like a roof. Stump’s example of a protein that is “configured” yet 
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 Ibid., 514-515. 78
 See ibid., 517. 79
 Ibid., 517-518. 80
 Summa Theologiae, 1.75.4; Summa Contra Gentiles, 2.51, 2.69.2; cf. Quaestiones, 62. 81
 46-47, where Aquinas argues that the soul is an entity in the genus of substance; 37-38, 82
where Aquinas includes the intellective soul among the intellectual substances. 
regulates gene expression is designed to help her readers see how the soul functions as a 
“configuring configured” without functioning like a roof.  But Stump’s protein example, 83
by her own tacit admission,  is a case where a structured material substance determines a 84
particular combination of other structured material substances, much as if I—as a 
structured substance—were to rearrange the positions of some flowers in the garden. I 
cannot see a correlation between protein and intellect that serves Stump's purpose any 
more than I can see such a correlation between gardener and intellect. 
Similar to Stump’s response is that of Paul Hoffman, who, says that “Aquinas, like 
Descartes, is a subject dualist. He believes that the human soul is a spiritual, incorporeal 
subject that is capable of subsisting apart from the body.”  Hoffman’s explanation for the 85
unique relationship between the human soul and body is different from Stump’s 
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 “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism,” 517-518; cf. ibid., 508. 83
 Ibid. 508: “[C]onsider the protein called ‘CAT/Enhancer-Binding Protein’ (C/EBP), 84
one of the proteins known to play an important role in regulating gene expression. In its 
active form, the molecule is a dimer with an alpha helix coil. On Aquinas’ way of 
thinking about material objects, the form of C/EBP is the configuration of the dimer, 
including the alpha helix coil; and the dimer subunits constitute the matter. Of course, 
each dimer subunit is itself a composite. The form of the subunit is the configuration of 
its amino acids, in which, for example in one region every seventh spot must be occupied 
by leucine; and the amino acids composing the subunit are its matter. Amino acids 
themselves are also clearly composites, however. The matter of an amino acid such as 
leucine is the carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen of which it is composed, and the 
form is the way that material is combined. . . . In this example, we have been considering 
only what Aquinas would call ‘substantial forms’. These are the forms in virtue of which 
a material composite is a member of the species to which it belongs. Natural material 
objects belong to a particular natural kind in virtue of the substantial form they have; and 
all material objects have the essence they have, or are what they are essentially, in virtue 
of their substantial form. The soul is the substantial form of a human being, the form in 
virtue of which the matter informed by it (that is, the matter-form composite) constitutes 
a living human body” (parenthetical items in orig.).
 “Thomas Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being,” The Philosophical Review 85
99, no. 1 (1990): 76-77.
explanation, because Hoffman posits that corporeality and materiality are matters of 
degree for Aquinas.  But Hoffman’s discussion does not alleviate the problems with 86
Stump’s account. (Anyway, Hoffman uses his psychological model to support his own 
account of the immaterial reception of sensible forms, and not to defend Aquinas’s 
psychology in particular.) If Stump and Hoffman are correct in suggesting that Aquinas is 
a dualist, then he can no longer be considered, as he is by many moderns, to be a pioneer 
of non-dualism in the medieval period.  
A third response to arguments like Bazán’s is Kenny’s response. Kenny upholds 
Aquinas’s Aristotelian hylomorphism while arguing that Aquinas fails to prove from 
natural philosophy that the intellect can subsist separate from the body.  Kenny points 87
out that Aquinas uses “form” to mean both (1) the principle (roughly Aristotle’s formal 
cause) that makes a thing what it is, such as a rational animal and (2) the principle 
(roughly Aristotle’s efficient cause) that causally moves a thing or makes a living thing 
alive, and in the case of the soul it is difficult to combine these two ideas.  Indeed, an 88
objection in the Summa Theologiae argues the point:  
That which has existence on its own is not united to the body as its form. For a 
form is that by which a thing exists, and so the existence that belongs to a form 
does not belong to it in its own right. But the intellective principle has existence in 
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 Ibid., 83. Pecham may not allow for the immaterial reception of sensible forms; instead 86
he apparently adopts Roger Bacon’s theory of corporeal species (see Pecham, Tractatus, 
9-10). 
 Aquinas on Mind, 143. 87
 Ibid., 149. Aquinas ascribes to Plato the view that the soul is an efficient cause (see 88
Davies, The Thought, 211-212; cf. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 2.57). Pecham 
agrees that the rational soul moves the body in the context of nature, even though the 
rational soul also has a function outside the natural order (Quaestiones, 328; Tractatus, 
25). 
its own right, and it is subsistent. . . . Therefore it is not united to the body as its 
form.   89
As Kenny observes, Aquinas’s response does not meet this objection. Here is Aquinas’s 
response:  
The soul shares with corporeal matter the existence in which it subsists: from that 
matter and from the intellective soul, one thing comes about. This occurs in such a 
way that the existence that belongs to the whole composite also belongs to the 
soul itself, something that does not occur in the case of other forms, which are not 
subsistent.   90
In other words, Aquinas is saying: 
(1) The soul has being apart from the body (even if this is not taken to imply the 
pre-existence of the soul, as in a reading of Platonism ). 91
(2) The soul gives being to the human body.  
(3) The compound of soul and body is the being of the soul.  
(1) and (2), at least on a surface reading, are incompatible with (3). Now, Aquinas argues 
that the soul can survive the death of the body on the basis that the soul has a function 
that is separate from any bodily explanation.  Yet when Aquinas is faced with the 92
objection that it is essential for a form to be united to its matter, he does not respond 
directly to the argument.   93
Pecham’s Dualism 
Pecham is a dualist right from the beginning of the Quaestiones, where he says the 
genus and difference of the human being are partly natural and partly supernatural.  94
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 Ibid., 24.90
 Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, 150.91
 Treatise, 5-6; cf. Davies, The Thought, 211.92
 Treatise, 24.93
 Quaestiones, 329; cf. 319.94
Pecham explicitly calls the human being an aggregate.  He says, “Therefore as far as the 95
incorruptible exceeds the corruptible, by so much the rational soul exceeds the 
sensible.”  Yet as I argued in the previous chapter, Pecham is not necessarily a strong 96
dualist, or substance dualist, such that he thinks the soul and body accidentally come 
together to make a mere aggregate along the lines of a pile of stones. 
Therefore the body and soul, when they are defined through one another, are not 
two separate things. Whence the Philosopher: Everyone who posits that the soul 
and body are two different things, it obligates him to say what is the cause of the 
connection of the soul with the body. But who says that the soul is the perfection 
of the body, and the body does not subsist without the soul, they are not with him 
two different things, nor does this question arise with him also.  97
Pecham maintains that the soul and the body come together due to their natures in order 
to make one human being. 
We know that Pecham believed in some version of the plurality of forms.  If Pecham 98
believed in the grades theory that I briefly described in the last chapter, then it is easy to 
show how that he was not a strong dualist. Unfortunately Pecham’s treatise on the 
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 Pecham, Quaestiones, 326. Aquinas explicitly denies that the human being is an 95
aggregate (Summa Contra Gentiles, 2.56).
 Tractatus, 49: “Ergo quantum excedit incorruptibile corruptibile, tantum excedit anima 96
rationalis animam sensitivam.” 
 Quaestiones, 380: “Ergo corpus et anima, cum definiuntur per alterutrum, non sunt duo 97
diversa. Unde Philosophus: Omnis qui ponit quod anima et corpus sunt duo diversa, 
convenit ei dicere quae sit causa ligamenti animae cum corpore. Qui autem dicit quod 
anima est perfectio corporis, et corpus non subsistit sine anima, non sunt apud ipsum duo 
diversa, nec accidit apud ipsum haec quoque quaestio.”
 E.g., ibid., 7: “Rursus, quia formarum vitalium qua vigore vitae ad complementum sunt 98
ordinatae, quaedam ordinatur ad complementum pure spirituale, quaedam ad 
complementum pure corporale, quaedam utroque modo”; Quodlibeta, 256: “Quia licet 
anima rationalis sit forma immaterialis, tamen complet omnes formas materiales et 
perficit eas, ut esse et operari possint operationes consonas speciei.”
“grades” theory, De Gradibus Formarum, has been lost.  Still, if we assume that Pecham 99
believed in a grades theory that resembles the theory of his student Roger Marston, as is 
indicated by Pecham’s Quodlibeta, it is clear that he thought that the plurality position 
did not imply a strong dualism.  In fact, the grades view implies that there is never 100
actually a plurality of forms, and thus never more than one form to complement the 
matter. Rather there are only grades of a single substantial form, which has in matter a 
potency proper to itself. The forma corporeitatis in matter  
becomes the grade of corporeity when disengaged from another form and 
subsumed by the form of water. The form of water becomes a grade when 
subsumed by the form of the mixture. The form of the mixture becomes a grade 
when subsumed by the form of life. The form of life becomes a grade when 
subsumed by the form of animal. Finally the form of animal becomes a grade 
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 See Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 280; Etzkorn, “John Pecham,” A Companion, 385; 99
ibid., “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 79; cf. Powicke, The Medieval Books, 214. 
 Pecham, Quodlibeta, 198-199, 230-231: “Dicendum igitur quod sicut coniunctio 100
principiorum—materiae et formae scilicet—dat esse, eorumdem indivisio dat unum esse: 
‘unum enim est ens quod non dividitur’. Ex prima autem coniunctione formae cum 
materia causatur unitas, scilicet ex coniunctione formae primae substantialis cum materia 
prima, quia ‘simul est substantia et haec substantia’. Et ideo superveniens mutatio 
formarum naturalium in esse physico circa substantiam non mutat identitatem numeralem 
substantiae vel corporis per se, quia vivum et mortuum nihil faciunt ad essentiam 
corporeitatis, quamvis mutent esse specificum generis naturalis infimi et quorumdam 
subalternorum. Sub transmutatione enim simul manent materia, potentia et forma prima 
substantialis, quia sola materia non est subiectum. . . . Dicendum igitur quod anima 
rationalis non est forma corporis, secundum quod corpus est, immo praesupponit 
corporeitatem, cuius forma non corrumpitur per adventum animae, quia nullam habet 
cum ipsa corporeitatem. Praeterea, corporeitas supponitur in definitione animae, quae est 
‘actus corporis organici physici potentia vitam habentis’ . . . . [D]icendum quod in 
corpore hominis, secundum quod corpus est, omnes formae quattuor elementorum 
reductae sunt in unam formam mixti; non cuiuscumque mixtionis, sed illius quae est 
propria complexionis humanae. Unde nulla est ibi forma elementaris quantum ad 
formarum simplicitatem. Unde sunt in homine formae plures gradatim ordinatae ad unam 
ultimam perfectionem, et ideo formatum est unum”; see Etzkorn, “The Grades of the 
Form.”
when subsumed by the complete specific form of horse. . . . [M]atter receives its 
diversification and variety only through the medium of form.  101
On the grades view all of the grades of form are in the forma corporeitatis potentially, 
i.e., in the seminal reasons, and are drawn out by an extrinsic agent.  Now, Pecham’s 102
view as presented in the Tractatus does not include the same exact forms as are found in 
Marston’s account; Pecham’s view is instead adapted to the faculty psychology of 
Avicenna, but the pattern is the same. Furthermore, Pecham does not have the details of 
the relationship between matter and the grades of form worked out in the detail of 
Marston’s conception of the various kinds of potencies in matter.   103
It is plausible that Pecham intended his view of the seminal reasons  to be 104
complemented by the grades view along the lines of Marston’s theory, especially given 
other similarities between Pecham’s philosophy and that of Marston (e.g., the active 
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potency in matter; the possibility of God’s creation of prime matter due to matter having 
a separate essence from that of form; the intellect as a perfection). And yet, even if it we 
were to conclude that it is impossible to know precisely the content of Pecham's grades 
view, it can still be shown that Pecham is no more a substance dualist than Aquinas is. 
Neither Pecham nor Aquinas thinks that the human person is a purely simple thing; 
corporeality and complex physical and psychological powers must also be taken into 
account. Pecham says that since the body and soul are defined through one another, they 
are not two separate things; the soul may be considered the essential perfection of the 
human body.  Therefore Pecham is not a Cartesian substance dualist. For Pecham, the 105
soul’s and body’s coming together as a result of mutual inclination produces a “third 
nature” (tertia natura).  And, while maintaining that the human being is one nature, 106
Pecham thinks it is an aggregated nature, and the aggregate is what is dissolved upon 
death.  107
Soul, Form, and Matter 
Bonaventure and Pecham are both convinced that all substances (even spiritual 
substances) have a formal component and a material component. In the 12th of the 
Quaestiones, Pecham says that the soul has an intrinsically material part and that the soul 
has this part for as long as it is perfecting something extrinsic to itself.  But Pecham 108
here also shows his independence of thought: The separated soul has a different kind of 
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matter from the matter that belongs to the soul when it is united to the corporeal body; 
this is what makes the separated soul more suitable for understanding.  Pecham adds to 109
this the position of Avicenna, who says that the soul cannot be perfect unless separated 
from the corporeal body.   110
Kenny has summarized well how this universal hylomorphism may apply to the 
human soul: 
Is the notion of spiritual matter absurd, involving a contradiction in terms, like 
the notion of a square circle? No doubt it is, if one thinks of extension and 
tangibility as the essential elements of matter. But those who believed in spiritual 
matter insisted that matter is essentially potentiality: matter is the ability to have 
properties and to undergo change. The soul can have properties, such as 
knowledge and virtue, and it can undergo change, passing, for example, from 
ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue. Therefore it must contain matter, 
the potentiality for change.  111
Now, Aquinas rejects spiritual matter because it conflicts with his own view that the soul 
is a pure, simple form. Consider, however, how the concept of spiritual matter may solve 
a potential difficulty for Aquinas’ account. Stump notices this, in fact, as she discusses 
her view that Aquinas thinks of the soul as a configurational state of the body: 
[A]t this point, we may think that Aquinas’ account can’t accommodate the claim 
that souls persist and engage in mental acts after the death of the body. . . . [I]f the 
separated soul is an essentially configurational state, what is it a state of? Aquinas 
isn’t a universal hylomorphist; he doesn’t think that there is a sort of ghostly 
ectoplasm that can be configured by the forms of immaterial things, such as souls 
or angels.  112
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Stump misses the point that Pecham’s spiritual matter is not any kind of extended, 
tangible “thing,” even in principle, but is rather the principle of potentiality.  Every 113
created thing has a material aspect, but not necessarily a body. In fact, Pecham explicitly 
argues that angels are not corporeal beings.  Sullivan, whose recent doctoral thesis deals 114
with the spiritual matter doctrine among the Franciscans, has summarized Pecham’s 
position as set forth in the Quaestiones De Beatitudine (included in Spettmann’s edition 
called Quaestiones Tractantes De Anima):  
In his Quaestiones tractantes de anima John Pecham’s position on spiritual 
matter is similar to that of St. Bonaventure. He takes several arguments positing 
matter in the human soul from authorities Bonaventure also used, especially De 
unitate et uno (by Gundissalinus) and pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux, 
author of De Spiritu et Anima), and gives abbreviated versions of several 
traditional arguments. The soul separated from the body can be moved, but 
everything that is per se moved (Pecham takes it for granted that the soul moves 
itself) is divided into something which is moved and something which moves, 
which, he claims, can only arise in a composite of matter and form. The soul must 
have matter because it contains possibility, and possibility is from matter. . . .  115
Sullivan points out that Pecham’s argument in quaestio 27 is based on the principle that 
everything that belongs to the genus of substance must be composed of the first principles 
of matter and form, and Pecham says that substantiality is more universal than the 
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distinction between corporeal and spiritual.  Thus spiritual things must have matter and 116
form.  
Since matter’s own form is ontologically prior to the soul’s conjunction with the 
body, there is a plurality of forms involved in the one unified human being. Thus, 
precisely speaking, soul is not equated with the human being’s substantial form on 
Pecham’s account. Yet there is a sense in which the soul is the form of the body for 
Pecham. One statement of Pecham’s pluralist position comes in the Tractatus, in the 
discussion of the immortality of the soul (a theme which Pecham also discusses at length 
in his Quaestiones): “Further, if any corporeal form, perfecting corporeal matter, is 
incorruptible, therefore much more some spiritual form perfecting the body. But the 
rational soul is the most noble of all forms.”  In the fifth quaestio, Pecham says that the 117
intellect could be taken to be an immaterial form in one of three ways:   118
(1) The intellect could be an immaterial form in the sense that it does not share in 
matter at all, but Pecham disagrees with this on the grounds of his universal 
hylomorphism.  
(2) The intellect could be an immaterial form because it is not the perfection of 
corporeal matter, but Pecham takes this to be false and heretical on the basis 
that the intellect gives being to corporeal matter first and is the substantial 
form for a being. 
(3) The intellect could be an immaterial form in that it does not operate by bodily 
mediation. 
Pecham says that the third way is correct, but in bringing up the second possibility 
Pecham makes a clarification, saying that the intellect is the substantial form and 
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perfection of matter. Referring back to the grades view, it can be said that if the intellect 
is the specific form which constitutes the individual in a species, the the incomplete 
forms or grades of the form still provide perfections for the previous, lesser forms.  I 119
will discuss the issue of perfection in more detail in the next section.  
Pecham does not take the plurality of forms to be a problem for the soul’s simplicity 
or for the singularity of the human person. Earlier in the Tractatus, Pecham comments on 
the plurality of forms: 
But the sensible soul is perfected by corporeal forms received incorporeally. . . . 
In order to understand the meaning of this consider, since as the author of The 
Fount of Life says: Life is the first act of form. This is certainly not about any old 
form, but that which is structurable from itself and can complete its own 
fulfillment. For the act of the elementary form is not life, nor is anything above 
the elementary form, that would be required for the species of the element, nor 
anything below that would suffice for the species, but in living things there is a 
continuous drive and from this drive there is a desire arising, exciting and moving 
the living thing to the perfecting of its fulfillment. . . . Again, since some of the 
vital forms are ordered by the drive of life toward fulfillment, some are ordered to 
purely spiritual fulfillment, some to purely corporeal fulfillment, some to both 
ways. Accordingly the force of the vegetative soul strives to purely corporeal 
perfections by nourishing, growing, and multiplying. . . . Truly the first 
substances, separate from matter, have purely spiritual fulfillment, namely 
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illuminations descending from the Principal by which they are fulfilled and 
perfected, born to extend to those in the serenity of celestial clarity.  120
Thus, in addition to the vital force or form of life itself, there are no fewer than four 
forms (or grades of form) that are involved in the human being: (1) the forma 
corporeitatis; (2) the nutritive form; (3) the sensitive form; and (4) the intellectual 
form.  Each form is correlated to its own matter, although in the cases of the nutritive 121
and sensitive forms the correlated matter is numerically the same, and only in abstraction 
do we find a numerically different matter for the forma corporeitatis. Notice that 
“soul” (anima) and “form” (forma) are used sometimes interchangeably here. Pecham’s 
idea is that the addition of the rational form to the vegetative and sensitive forms 
completes the soul’s simplicity. The completion of the soul’s simplicity, which I 
discussed in the previous chapter, is not the kind of completion that results from a 
combination of contraries. Pecham regularly discusses the vegetative and sensitive 
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“souls” or “powers,” so that the same numerical soul has a number of potencies and 
properties. Of course, the soul is complex in the sense that, before one has an accurate 
picture of a pluralist soul, one must have a number of concepts in mind. Yet Pecham 
thinks there is a sense in which the soul remains a simple thing.  
Admittedly, a difficulty in interpreting Pecham is that he sometimes speaks of various 
substances in the human being, and at other times of various forms. Does this fact 
indicate that Pecham holds contradictory positions, or is he merely using loose, colloquial 
language to say the same thing? Douie says that Pecham takes one position about 
substance in the Quaestiones De Anima and another in the Tractatus.  In reality, 122
however, Pecham uses substantia in various ways throughout the Quaestiones De Anima, 
and so the context must determine if he is using the term in the same way he uses it in the 
Tractatus. 
• Substantia may refer to the matter of the body of a newly ensouled embryo’s 
parent.  123
• Substantia may refer to simple, non-composite, divine substance.   124
• Substantia may refer to “this thing,” a composite of matter and form, e.g., a man.  125
• Substantia may refer to the rational soul (or the substance of the rational soul) that 
is united to the human body and can be separated.  Similarly, substantia may refer 126
to the substance of the possible intellect in particular.  127
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• Substantia may refer to the sensitive or vegetative soul, e.g., of a brute.  128
• Substantia may refer to a separated substance.  129
• Substantia may refer to the set of characteristics essential for a species or a kind.   130
Generally speaking, the context of Pecham’s usage of substantia must determine how the 
word is to be understood. 
To deal with Douie's point, however, it must be asked if Pecham refers (in the 
Quaestiones De Anima) to the vegetative and sensitive aspects of the soul as substances 
in their own right? In reviewing the 96 usages of substantia in the Quaestiones, it seems 
to me that although Pecham’s dualist position requires there to be multiple forms in the 
one human being (itself a third nature, or “substance”),  Pecham does not insist (when 131
stating his own views) that the vegetative and sensitive forms are themselves substantiae. 
In fact, he emphasizes that diverse potencies can be in a single substance,  and notes 132
that others (e.g., Gennadius, the philosophantes), have said that the sensitive and 
intellective souls are two substances.  In this context, however, Pecham cites the very 133
same biblical passage that he evidently cites in the Tractatus (Exodus 21:22-25) and 
allows that the sensitive soul (not the nutritive) be called a substance in addition to the 
intellect. But Pecham is clearly more concerned in this passage that we avoid the position 
that there are two souls in one man than he is about whether we call the different forms 
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substantiae.  In the corresponding Tractatus passage Pecham clearly says that 134
vegetative, sensitive, and intellective are three substantiae.  Therefore I am inclined to 135
say that there are not two conflicting Pechamian constructions in the two works at 
hand.  And, while Wippel is certainly correct to say that the issue of plurality of forms 136
is closely related to the issue of plurality of souls,  these two issues are not one and the 137
same problem for Pecham.  138
Forms as Perfections 
As I have said, Pecham’s concept of perfection exhibits the pluralist account of how 
the forms relate to one another. In the Tractatus Pecham provides a breakdown of the 
various forms, all of which contribute to the soul’s first act of life.  Some are ordered to 139
nutrition, some to sensible perception, some to rationality, and some to all three acts. 
Clearly, all of these are united by their involvement in life.  We can assume then, that 140
every form strives for its own particular perfection in service of the person’s life.  And, 141
given the discussions of life in the present study, it can be assumed that life does not 
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simply refer to biological existence, but the actualization of human potential overall. So 
one account of the relation between the forms has to do with their united purpose.  In 142
Roger Marston’s grades view, which was probably influenced by Pecham’s position, 
“These incomplete forms or grades do not therefore constitute a being in act, but merely 
perfect and ennoble matter in greater or lesser degrees.”  Each higher form in the 143
hierarchy perfects the form which is beneath it, and in this way the entire substance is 
actualized by the specific form (intellect, in the case of the human being).  
Yet to have an account suggesting that the various substantial forms “work together” 
is not to know anything about how they work together, or why one would wish to posit 
that each form (or grade of form) is perfected by the next, as Pecham does. In fact, he 
does not provide a very detailed account of this interaction, but there is a clue about what 
he thinks: Pecham gives an example when he discusses the perfection of the eye in 
chapter 4 of the Tractatus.  The eye is necessary for apprehension, but the question of 144
apprehension is properly about the soul and not about the eye.  The intellect transforms 145
itself in receiving forms that are derived from perceptions that the eye has helped to 
produce. The rational soul is the form that allows the sensitive soul, the previous form, to 
complete its function. Thus, the sensitive soul’s function cannot be understood without 
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reference to the intellect. Once the sense data has been abstracted by the intellect, the 
sensitive soul (like the bodily eye) is no longer involved in the production of 
knowledge.   146
Contemporary Discussion 
There have been at least two modern-day Thomist responses to the debate between 
Aquinas and Pecham on the plurality issue. Some clearly support Aquinas’s position, and 
see it as the only plausible one, even if it does not solve the problem of immortality. For 
example, Kenny says, “If there were some other substantial form pre-existing in matter 
when the intellectual soul was joined to the body, then the soul would merely be 
introducing an accidental change into the body, and not giving it existence as the kind of 
thing it is.”  In response, consider that while Pecham thinks that it is possible for the 147
intellect and the body informed by the forma corporeitatis to exist separately, it does not 
follow that the introduction of the intellect is accidental from the perspective of the whole 
human being.  In fact, if the intellect is not infused, the substance we know as the 148
human being never exists at all. The conjunction of soul and body may be considered 
accidental from some larger perspective, but it is essential to the human being for soul 
and body to be united.   149
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Another contemporary Thomist response is that of Robert Pasnau, who says that the 
problem between Pecham and Aquinas is philosophically uninteresting: 
[W]e should look beyond the Aristotelian terminology and consider exactly what 
it is that the two sides disagree on. It is not at all easy to say. After all, Aquinas 
and his critics agree on analyzing human nature in terms of potentiality and 
actuality; they agree that the soul provides the actuality; they agree that the 
rational component of the soul is nonphysical; they agree that the sensory 
component (somehow) involves physical organs. Aquinas does believe that the 
rational soul corrupts all prior forms, whereas Pecham and others believe that the 
rational soul perfects these prior forms. Yet once we see that corruption does not 
actually mean destruction, but more like reconstitution within a different 
substance, it remains unclear what this difference really amounts to. . . .  
What seems to be in question is how forms, or actualities, are to be 
individuated. This, I am inclined to say, is not a deep metaphysical question. . . .  
Different accounts are compatible with the same metaphysical situation: that a 
human being is composed of various sorts of actuality, interrelated in complex 
ways.   150
Pasnau rightfully acknowledges the difficulty of the debate and carefully outlines 
Aquinas’s arguments, but does not present arguments from Pecham (or any other 
pluralist) in detail.  Thus Pasnau has not shown that Aquinas’s view is as reasonable as 151
Pecham’s view.  
Pasnau is incorrect in implying that the only point at issue between Aquinas and 
Pecham is “how forms or actualities are to be individuated,” or that the two theologians 
differ on an insignificant, merely “grammatical” issue.  Aquinas and Pecham have 152
different schemes whereby the human actualities are individuated, and differences 
between the two schemes (1) were of deep significance to Aquinas and Pecham in their 
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day; (2) entail significant philosophical and theological consequences. I will treat these 
two points in turn.  
The first point, that the differences between Pecham and Aquinas on the issue of  
substantial form were of deep significance to both thinkers, becomes especially clear 
when one considers that a modern Thomist, Denys Turner, says that Aquinas organized 
his attack on the Averroists with a view toward preserving the philosophical basis for his 
opposition to thinkers such as Pecham:  
The Latin Averroists were, Thomas thought, teaching a version of Aristotle’s De 
anima which, if a correct interpretation, played straight into the hands of the 
Augustinian-Platonist opponents of Thomas’ Aristotelianism. Their conviction 
that Aristotle’s account of the soul was theologically threatening was confirmed 
by the version of De anima promoted by the Averroist philosophers. Thus was 
Thomas’s Aristotelian philosophy of mind doubly threatened: if the Averroists 
were in fact correct in their interpretation of Aristotle, then Thomas had no one on 
whom to rely for his alternative account of soul, no stick with which to beat the 
Augustinian-Platonists. What is worse, if the philosophers were to be believed in 
their interpretation of Aristotle, then Aristotle became a stick with which his 
theological colleagues could beat Thomas as a heretic.  153
Furthermore, Pecham obviously considered the problem to be very significant and 
thought that its solution had serious consequences. One imagines that the controversy 
would have been quickly resolved or entirely ignored if a simple grammatical adjustment 
could have solved it. Pecham was far from being the only one involved in the 
controversy: 
[M]any opponents of the unicity of substantial form in human beings were also 
defenders of universal hylomorphism. . . . Such thinkers as Roger Bacon, John 
Pecham, William de la Mare and, after Aquinas’ time, Richard of Middleton, and 
still later, Gonsalvus of Spain, come to mind, not to mention Thomas’ earlier 
contemporary, Bonaventure. Closely associated with this position was the view 
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that some minimum degree of actuality must be assigned to prime matter in and of 
itself. This position was defended even by some who rejected matter-form 
composition in spirits, such as Henry of Ghent.  154
Having shown that Pecham’s and Aquinas’s positions were not taken to be merely 
grammatical differences, I am now in a position to show why this was the case: The unity 
and pluralist views entail significant philosophical and theological consequences.  
First, since Pecham’s plurality of forms view is an integral part of a Neoplatonic 
metaphysics that includes particular views of matter and form (as I discussed in the 
previous chapter of the present study), what is at stake is nothing short of an entire 
system accounting for practically all of physical and spiritual reality. As Bieniak says, 
[T]he debate concerning the presence of principles between the rational soul and 
the body is particular to the thirteenth century. The roots of this debate, however, 
are very deep and cannot be confined to the Middle Ages. The doctrine of the 
intermediary principles must be viewed in the broader context of the Neoplatonist 
cosmology. It is a system in which all ontological distance is filled with principles 
partly sharing in the nature of the higher being and partly the nature of the lower 
being.  155
Little wonder that Pecham and others in the “Neo-Augustinian” movement considered 
the plurality issue significant. 
Second, Pecham thinks the full perfection of man is neither nutritive nor sensitive, but 
intellectual. So, he thinks that the nutritive and sensitive aspects must have their own 
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 Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 133. Henry of Ghent, like Pecham, 154
“opposed the ‘unicity theory’ of the number of human substantial forms. . . . by 1286 
Peckham maintained a pluralism of substantial forms, and Henry maintained a 
dymorphism of human substantial forms. For Henry there are two human substantial 
forms, the rational soul which is infused by God, and the form of corporeity, educed from 
the potency of matter by the human parents. Both thinkers, though, had by 1286 
vigorously opposed the unicity theory found in Thomas Aquinas and his 
defenders” (Wilson, “Henry of Ghent and John Peckham’s Condemnation,” 261-263).
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distinct, subservient perfections. In the Contra section of the fifth quaestio, Pecham 
discusses the perfection of the human being through the intellectual act. 
Further, about the rational soul: It is united either as perfection and form, or 
only as mover. If as perfection, it must be multiplied according to the 
multiplication of matter, because form seeks matter for itself, nor is it possible for 
just any soul to enter just any body. If it is united according to the fact that it is a 
mover, the same must be, because the Philosopher investigates number of movers, 
according to the number of motions, as is clear from the Philosopher in Book 
11.  156
Here, Pecham says that the rational soul can be united to a man either as his perfection or 
as a mover (Pecham thinks the rational soul is both, and that it has to be multiplied 
according to the number of persons).  If we take it that Pecham thinks of “substantial 157
form” as specifying a “perfection” or “completion,” then Pecham is simply saying that 
the intellect is the highest of the substantial forms and has the highest degree of 
perfection. Pecham takes the following positions concerning perfections: 
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 Quaestiones, 377: “Item, anima rationalis: aut unitur sicut perfectio et forma, aut sicut 156
motor tantum. Si sicut perfectio, oportet necessario quod multiplicetur secundum 
multiplicationem materiae, quia forma appetit sibi materiam, nec possibile est quamlibet 
animam quodlibet corpus ingredi. Si unitur secundum quod motor, idem oportet, quoniam 
Philosophus secundum numerum motuum investigat numerum motorum, ut ex 
Philosopho patet in XI”; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1071b.3-1072a.18. 
 Ibid.: “ … necessario quod multiplicetur secundum multiplicationem 157
materiae. . . .” (377; cf. 342, 359).
• The rational soul is the perfection of the body, and Pecham draws evidence for 
this position from his reading of Aristotle and Augustine.  The rational soul is 158
designed to perfect the whole. (This suggests that the body is a kind of support 
system to allow the intellect to perform its function.)  159
• Two souls are two perfections. There cannot be two perfections for one person. 
Therefore, each person has only one soul.  160
• The intellect itself can be perfected.  That is, the perfection of man is the 161
consideration of truth and the development of beatitude by the created agent 
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 Ibid., 380: “Unde Avicenna, VI Naturalium: ‘Obligatio autem cum corpore est propter 158
hoc ut perficiatur intellectus comtemplativus et sanctificetur et mundetur’. Haec 
Avicenna. . . .  Anima enim rationalis, quia plus habet de potentia et possibilitate quam 
spiritus separati, quamvis separata aptior sit ad intelligendum quam coniuncta secundum 
statum miseriae. non tamen quam in corpore optime disposito, sicut erit in gloria. Item 
secundum vires inferiores habet inclinationem ad corpus et appetit naturaliter 
mediantibus sensibus illustrari, propter quod in definitionem animae cadit corpus, sicut 
patet ex Philosopho. Sicut etiam Augustinus dicit De quantitate animae quod anima est 
‘substantia quaedam, rationis particeps, regiminis corpori accomodata’”; cf. ibid., 382, 
375; Tractatus, 8.
 Tractatus, 9: “Habet enim anima desiderium naturale cognoscendi omnia, ut perfectio 159
universi, quae exterius est materialiter, sit in ipsa suo modo spiritualiter, ut sic assimiletur 
aeterno exemplari, in quo sunt omnia unita vel vita, omnia simplicissime repraesentata, 
omnia perfectissime adunata, sic et ipsa summum exemplar imitetur repraesentando 
ipsum, non solum in gradu suae essentiae sed in plenitudine scientiae omnia 
complectendo, et quae etra ipsam sunt materialiter in ipsa sint spiritualiter et acquiratur ei 
plenitudo essendi. . . .” 
 Quaestiones, 354: “Item, duo motores aeque primi non possunt esse respectu eiusdem 160
mobilis. Item, nec duo spiritus simul in eodem corpore; ergo multo magis duae animae, 
quae sunt formae propriae et perfectiones, non possunt esse in eodem corpore.” 
 Tractatus, 8: “Et quia vigor, qui est vita animae, ad perfectionem non sufficit 161
consequendam nisi corporis adiutorio subnixa, dico, nisi aliter vel naturaliter una virtute 
ipsam essentiae simplicitatem comitante, radicata in intimis essentiae, ad perfectionem 
corporis inclinatur, ut mediante corpore sibi perfectio requiratur, non a corpore, sed 
ministrante corpore.” Pecham describes the perfection of the soul in a nuanced way in 
chapter 11 of the Tractatus, drawing on Aristotle, Avicenna, and Augustine as he develops 
his own view. 
intellect; only intellect (assisted by grace) has such potentiality.  Pecham 162
qualifies this potentiality by saying that until the judgment, the soul is always 
short of true perfection.   163
In the last of these positions, we see perhaps more clearly than at any point why it was 
such a serious issue for Pecham to combine the plurality of forms with the singularity of 
the soul. Every human potency has its own perfection. If the perfection of one man is 
exclusively a function of his “highest” aspect, the intellect, then the vegetative and 
sensitive aspects simply cannot be man’s highest perfection. They are thus relegated to 
the category of subservient forms. They are not independent souls, but they do have less 
exalted perfections.  Pecham goes into far greater detail in his taxonomy of the intellect, 164
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 Quaestiones, 343: “Tertio, ex ratione desiderii naturalis, quia appetit beatitudinem. 162
Beatitudo autem consistit in perfectione animae ex pulchritudine veritatis et bonitatis vel 
iocunditatis, ut dicunt etiam philosophi; et ‘status omnium bonorum in aggregatione 
perfectus’, ut dicunt theologi. Ad haec autem nihil est magis necessarium quam 
immortalitas, sicut nihil magis contrarium quam mortalitas. Ergo, necesse est animam ad 
hoc ordinatam esse ut felicitatem intellectualem obtineat et possideat sine fine. Et est 
ratio Anselmi, ut dictum est, Monologion [cap.] 79, et in principio II libri Cur Deus homo 
inquit: ‘Ideo homo rationalis est, ut discernat inter iustum et iniustum. In vanum autem 
discerneret vel discernendi potestatem haberet, si secundum discretionem non vitaret et 
amaret. Ad hoc igitur facta est, ut summum bonum diligeret super omnia, quod sit [ita] 
dilectum ut [nec] Deum deceret ei auferre, nec ipsa posset sponte diserere’; ergo 
etc.” (bracketed items in orig.); cf. ibid.,403, 415. On this view, the truth that man 
considers is ultimately referred to the divine light of God (see Tractatus, chapter 13).
 Quaestiones, 445: “Item, Augustinus, XIV De Trinitate: ‘Imago, quae renovatur in 163
spiritu mentis, perficietur in visione quae erit post iudicium’. Ergo usque ad iudicium 
semper sibi deest aliquid perfectionis; et hoc non videtur nisi ex defectu sui corporis; ergo 
etc.” 
 Quaestiones, 386. It is interesting that Aquinas also says that there are various levels 164
of perfection in matter, such as existing, living, sensing, and thinking, but maintains that 
the presence of the various perfections does not constitute the presence of various forms 
(Treatise, 35). 
providing the five intellectual perfections as he draws on Aristotle, Avicenna, and 
Augustine.  Each of Pecham’s five intellectual powers has its own perfection.  165
Third, the plurality of form view allows the the body to retain its corporeal form after 
death. Even the dust of the fully decayed individual’s body would retain the forma 
corporeitatis and thus remain a part of the individual human being. On the other hand, 
Aquinas’s position is that the intellect is the only substantial form for the body; thus when 
the intellect departs at death, it leaves the body with no principle of unity or identity.  166
Pecham elaborates on the implications of the plurality view for the identification of the 
dead body: 
So therefore in a certain way it remains the undivided of the kind, undivided in 
diverse species, even if they are changed to ashes: When a man dies and the body 
is corrupted, the species of the body and of the individual of the species changes 
to ashes, but remains the individual of the kind; although the ashes are changed to 
air or in the body of whatever animals, it is true to say, “This matter, this 
substance was in the body of some man. . . .”  167
Kilwardby’s pluralism was also motivated by this point: 
Later in 1277, responding to the criticisms of the Dominican archbishop of 
Corinth, Peter Conflans, Kilwardby maintained that a form cannot be corrupted 
into pure nothingness, since such annihilation would make it impossible for a 
body at the Last Judgment to rise with the same form it had in life. . . .  168
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 See Aquinas, Treatise on Human Nature, 34-35; cf. Wilson, “The Critique of Thomas 166
Aquinas’s Unicity Theory,” 423-425. 
 Delorme, “La Summa,” 66-67: “Sic ergo manet idem quodammodo individuum 167
generis in diversis individuis specierum, etsi in cineres transmutantur: quando homo 
moritur et corpus corrupitur, in cineres transit species corporis et individuum speciei, sed 
remanet individuum generis; etsi cineres mutantur in auras vel in corpora quorumcumque 
animalium semper verum est dicere ‘haec materia, haec substantia fuit in corpore alicuius 
hominis.’”
 Lewry, “Robert Kilwardby,” 260. 168
A clear implication of the plurality view is that the dead body of Christ in the tomb 
retained its identity as the body of Christ for the three days until the resurrection, not 
taking on any lower substantial form.  (The plurality view provides similar answers to 169
questions about dead bodies of saints, the Incarnation, and the Eucharist; the theological 
issues surrounding the debate over plural forms made the controversy intense. ) Douie 170
writes on this issue: 
Serious theological implications arose. . . . The question over which Pecham 
and Aquinas came into conflict—the nature of the body of Christ during the three 
days between His death and resurrection—was one which had been long debated 
in the schools. It is not surprising that the pluralists found the explanation, that in 
this case the union of the divine and human natures enabled it to preserve its 
identity, unconvincing. In a later quodlibet Pecham maintained that in this case it 
could only be described equivocally or metaphorically as the body of Christ, since 
after the departure of the soul the introduction of a new substantial form, that of 
the inanimate body, into a matter which had no tendency towards any particular 
form, but was pure potency without any actuality, involved a complete change of 
nature. According to the pluralist theory, on the other hand, it would retain its 
identity owing to the survival of the bodily form. . . .   171
!472
 See Artur Landgraf, “Das Problem ‘Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo mortis’ in 169
der Frühscholastik,” Mélanges Pelzer (Louvain: Bibliothéque de L'Universite, 1947), 
109-158. 
 See Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 22.170
 Ibid., 21-22; cf. Pecham, Quodlibeta, 175-176. 171
Aquinas admitted that the body of Christ in the tomb was only equivocally identical to 
the living body, and Pecham confronted him on the issue.  In Pecham’s 1286 172
condemnation, the following three articles were condemned:   173
• Article 1: “The dead body of Christ has no substantial form that is the same as 
that which the living body had.” 
• Article 2: “That in the death [of Christ] a new substantial form and a new 
species or nature was introduced, although not joined to the Word by a new 
species or assumption or union. From this it follows that the Son of God was not 
only man but of another unnamed species.” 
• Article 5: “There was numerical identity of the dead body of Christ with the 
living body only because of the identity of matter and of undetermined 
dimensions and the relation of these to the intellective soul, which is immortal. 
In addition there is identity of the living and the dead body by reason of the 
existence of both in the same hypostasis of the Word.” 
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 See Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 15; cf. Aquinas, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 2.1.1: 172
“In morte autem separata fuit anima a corpore: alioquin non fuisset vera mors Christi, de 
cuius ratione est quod separetur anima a corpore, quod per animam vivificatur; sed 
divinitas non fuit separata nec ab anima nec a corpore: quod patet ex symbolo fidei, in 
quo de Filio Dei dicitur, quod sepultus est, et descendit ad inferos. Corpore autem iacente 
in sepulcro, et anima ad inferos descendente, non attribuerentur ista Filio Dei, nisi haec 
duo essent ei copulata in unitate hypostasis vel personae. Et ideo de Christo in triduo 
mortis dupliciter loqui possumus: uno modo quantum ad hypostasim vel personam, et sic 
est idem numero simpliciter qui fuit; aut quantum ad naturam humanam; et hoc 
dupliciter.” 
 Registrum, 3:922. I am using Wippel’s translation (“Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 173
140) of the following articles: “quod corpus Christi mortuum nullam habuit formam 
substantialem eandem, quam habuit vivum. . . . quod in morte fuit introducta nova forma 
substantialis, et nova species, vel natura, quamvis non nova assumptione vel unione 
Verbo copulata; ex quo sequitur, quod Filius Dei non fuerit tantum homo, sed alterius 
speciei innominatae. . . . identitatem fuisse numeralem corporis Christi mortui cum ejus 
corpore vivo, tantummodo propter identitatem materiae et dimensionum interminatarum, 
et habitudinis ipsarum ad animam intellectivam, quae immortales est. Esse insuper 
identitatem numeralem corporis vivi et mortui, ratione existentiae utriusque in eadem 
hypostasi Verbi” (emp .added).
There is uncertainty about how Aquinas assessed the substantiality of Christ’s body. If 
Aquinas took the position that Christ’s divine nature preserved his body’s identity, then 
this account would not explain the continuity of the average dead person’s bodily identity 
from death until the general resurrection.  Or, Aquinas might have said that the identity 174
of the body in the tomb is accounted for by the identity of the supposit,  a position that 175
Pecham calls frivola et inanis.  Pecham’s account, relying on the forma corporeitatis to 176
preserve identity, is certainly more naturalistic than the view that Christ’s divine nature 
accounted for the preservation of his body’s identity. Pecham’s view of the dead body is 
counterintuitive insofar as it implies that the corpse continues to be a person’s body even 
at late stages when it would be difficult (or impossible) to recognize it as such by sight 
(just imagine instances of cremation or burial at sea). However, this difficulty is not a 
logical problem for Pecham, as his view does not imply that the body be visually 
identifiable after death.  
Fourth, the plurality position avoids positing that previous forms are corrupted during 
the development of the embryo, as Aquinas taught.  Since Aquinas holds that the 177
intellect contains whatever belongs to the sensitive soul, he compares the intellect to the 
quadrilateral which “possesses whatever a triangle has and something more. It does not 
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overview of contemporary discussions concerning what position Aquinas took, see 
Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 150-154. 
 Quodlibeta, 198.176
 See Pecham, Quaestiones, 326.177
follow from this that the nutritive and sensitive differ essentially from the intellective, but 
rather that one of them includes the other.”   178
Pecham agrees with “the wise” that there are three aspects of the soul (vegetative, 
sensitive, and intellectual),  but the issue at hand is when these three aspects come 179
together in one unified person, and what becomes of the pre-existing form(s) when new 
forms are introduced. There is a Tractatus passage that deals with embryology, but it is 
more concerned with whether to call the three aspects of the soul substances than it is to 
address when or how the three unite.  In Pecham’s first quaestio, he says that God 180
creates and infuses the rational soul, or the intellectual form, but the corporeal form is 
from the parents:  
[The composite] is generated from the body and the sensitive soul, which is not 
corrupted when the rational soul comes in, but completed. And that generated, 
with the rational soul which is poured in, are not two souls, but one; just as man is 
one substance and the soul composite.   181
Pecham thus attempts to avoid dealing with the problem of what happens to forms that 
are “destroyed” on Aquinas’s view. 
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 Aquinas, Quaestiones, 61. 178
 See Pecham, Tractatus, 30-31. 179
 Ibid., 31. 180
 Quaestiones, 326. “[Compositum] generatur ex corpore et anima sensitiva, quae non 181
corrumpitur adveniente anima rationali, sed completur. Et quod generatum, et anima 
rationalis quae infunditur, non sunt duae animae sed una; sicut homo est una substantia ex 
anima composita” (bracketed item in orig.). This quotation is especially helpful as an 
example of Pecham’s tendency to call the intellect “the soul,” e.g., throughout the first 
quaestio. This becomes especially important for understanding the following contra 
argument that Pecham gives: “Item, si anima est ab anima sicut ab anima patris, et tunc 
Christus non habuit animam; aut ab anima matris, et sic Eva non habuit animam; aut ab 
utroque, et tunc Adam non habuit anima; quorum quodlibet est impossibile etc.” (ibid., 
320, bracketed item in orig.). 
While the present study is not about theories of individuation, it is plausible that 
Pecham’s view of the subject is more explanatory than Aquinas’s view.  Aquinas thinks 182
that individuation begins with the union of soul and body,  whereas Pecham believes 183
that the soul and body are both already individuated. Pecham can therefore still say that 
the individuation of the substance as such (the third thing that results from the 
combination of the soul and the body) begins with the union of soul and body. The 
Aristotelian view of prime matter is the target of Pecham’s first quaestio, in which he 
asks whether the rational soul is ex traduce, i.e., provided by the biological parents, and 
answers in the negative.  184
Revisiting the Controversy with Latin Averroism 
Recall Dales’ suggestion that, in the controversy over Latin Averroism, Pecham  
was not a worthy opponent on the philosophical level for the young artists. He 
holds two positions that seem to be mutually incompatible: first, that the soul is 
the substantial form of the body; and second, that the soul is composed of matter 
and form. He adopted the first position in order to preserve the unity of the 
individual human being and his dignity as a rational substance. He adopted the 
second in order to explain how the soul could be a hoc aliquid and be multiplied 
according to the number of human beings.   185
Dales’ summary cannot be the end of the story concerning Pecham’s view of form and 
matter, for we have already seen that Pecham wants to think of form and matter in 
different senses depending on whether he is considering an existing substance with its 
form and matter (such as a human being) or prime matter, a separated form, etc. Yet to 
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 See Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 192. 183
 Quaestiones, 315-330.184
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judge whether Dales’ assessment of Pecham’s work against the young artists is right, we 
would also have to do an evaluation of many major Averroists in addition to our 
evaluation of Pecham. Such is beyond the scope of the present study, which is not 
designed primarily to assess arguments in favor of monopsychism. However, with the 
main differences between Pecham’s and Aquinas’s approaches to anthropology in view, it 
is possible to show how the two thinkers diverge in their response to Latin Averroism. 
It is clear that, while Pecham agrees with Aquinas that monopsychism should be 
opposed, Pecham sees Aquinas’s response as itself endangering certain centrally 
important revealed theological convictions. First I will say something about this contrast, 
and then I will suggest that Pecham’s purely philosophical arguments against Averroism 
deserve attention independent of their possible value to theology.  
Pecham thinks that Averroes is wrong about issues that Pecham associates with 
Augustine’s authority, especially spiritual matter. It is striking that in the fifth quaestio, 
Pecham is not primarily addressing what Aristotle taught, as Aquinas seems to be doing 
in the first and second quaestiones in his own Questions on the Soul. Pecham sees the 
defense of Augustine as a major goal, whereas Aquinas sees his major task as the defense 
and integration of Aristotle. Aquinas has as his goal to show that Averroism is subject to 
the same criticisms that make Platonism problematic, but this objective is simply not on 
Pecham’s agenda.  Rather, Pecham begins by answering objections that he believes 186
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 See Aquinas, e.g., Treatise, 135-136, 141-145, 150. 186
 Quaestiones, 383ff. 187
involve misinterpretations of Augustine.  Only in the eighth objection does Pecham 187
respond to an argument that deals directly with Aristotle.   188
Pecham’s purely philosophical arguments deserve consideration independent of any 
disagreement with Aquinas. Pecham’s texts contain interesting, non-theological 
arguments against Averroism which Aquinas does not make in the texts I have 
considered, and which are interesting independent of debates with Averroism. I suggest 
that a careful consideration of such philosophical arguments on Pecham’s part would 
further support my claim that his anthropology is worth consideration alongside 
Aquinas’s anthropology. The central point in Pecham’s quaestio five is that Averroes is 
mistaken in claiming that the possible intellect is substantially free from matter.  Yet 189
additional arguments, some of which Pecham only briefly mentions, further distinguish 
his approach from that of Aquinas. I will mention some of them here.   
Pecham’s view of corporeal species serves as a backdrop for a counterargument to the 
Averroists’ claim that, if the intellect can receive intelligible species of one object, then 
the intellect can receive infinite species from an infinity of objects at once.  Pecham 190
responds by citing Aristotle’s principle that two bodies cannot be in the same place.  191
Furthermore, since Pecham believes that the soul relates to the body as mover (in 
addition to being the body's perfection), he can make an argument against monopsychism 
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that Aquinas cannot make.  According to Pecham, Averroes erred when he said that the 192
soul could perfect many, diverse things.  Pecham takes Aristotle to have contradicted 193
Averroes’ argument by saying that a plurality of movables are moved by a plurality of 
movers and not by a single one.  194
Furthermore, since Pecham thinks of reason as the perfection of individual human 
beings (in the sense discussed above), he can make an argument that monopsychism 
conflicts with this role for the intellect.  It would seem that this argument is available to 195
Aquinas as well, yet I have not found him doing so in the anti-Averroist texts that I 
consulted. Aquinas does make an argument about perfection in terms of the activity of a 
capacity,  but this is a more limited sense of perfection than the one that Pecham 196
emphasizes; Aquinas’s sense of perfection refers strictly to the fulfillment of the possible 
intellect’s activity (or to the activity that correlates with any potentiality whatsoever), 
whereas Pecham’s notion of perfection refers to the life of the whole person. Pecham’s 
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view of perfection is also related to his view of individuation, because it is impossible for 
“whatever soul” to perfect “whatever body.”    197
Aquinas’s argument concerning the Averroists’ difficulty with the attribution of 
thought to individual humans has to do with the ways in which an action can be attributed 
to something.  Pecham, on the other hand, deals with the issue by asking how a separate 198
intellect can account for abstract thought on Averroist terms, given that no phantasms are 
involved in purely abstract thought.  This is one consequence of Pecham’s belief that 199
not all thought requires recourse to the phantasms.  Bonaventure had already taken the 200
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 Quaestiones, 377. Pecham does clearly explain his view of individuation in the texts I 197
have studied here. However, it is possible to make some progress toward understanding 
what he thinks. Based on unibility, Bonaventure has a robust notion of individuation that 
results from the divine implanting of the human soul in the body. And, Pecham discusses 
unibility in various ways in the first and 13th of the Quaestiones (327, 449). In the first 
quaestio, Pecham brings up unibility to mark two distinctions: (1) the difference between 
the souls of plants, brutes, and men; and (2) the difference between unifiable spiritual 
substances (human souls) and non-unifiable spiritual substances (angels): “[C]redo quod 
anima sensitiva brutalis et vegetabilis non sunt in genere [substantiae] spiritualis, 
quamvis habeant esse spirituale et incorporeum, quia substantia spiritualis dividitur per 
unibilem et non-unibilem, et non operatur nisi corpore mediante” (327, bracketed item in 
orig.). There are two interesting points to make about Pecham’s usage of the unibility 
concept in the 13th quaestio. First, Pecham brings up unibility for the purpose of showing 
that embodiment does not hinder the separated soul’s activity. Second, Pecham says: 
“Anima appetit uniri corpori ex nobiliori quod est in ipsa, quia eius differentia specifica 
est unibilitas. Nobilius autem quod sit in anima est intellectus” (449). Thus Pecham 
applies the notion of unibility to the soul’s individuation. Evidently, Pecham thinks the 
soul gets the body it does because of its own particular unibility.
 Treatise on Human Nature, 20-21. 198
 Quaestiones, 375-376. 199
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material objects and receive forms intentionally” (The Thought, 214; cf. Pasnau, Thomas 
Aquinas on Human Nature, 343; Aquinas, Treatise, 153).
position that the agent intellect can cognize without recourse to the phantasms,  and 201
Pecham agrees.  Pecham does not deny that phantasms may be involved in cognition, 202
but he does deny that the phantasms are always required.  For example, in the Tractatus 203
Pecham says that “no medium falls between ... the intellect and itself.”  Pecham wishes 204
to give space to divine illumination and innate knowledge (e.g., of first principles and the 
existence of God).  Pecham also thinks that abstraction has to take place knowingly, 205
thus knowledge of universals presupposes knowledge of singulars.  Knowledge of 206
singulars, however, does not always presuppose reference to phantasms. Pecham admits 
that the mind is always moved by intelligible species,  but he also says that intelligible 207
species do not come exclusively through abstraction from phantasms.  208
Whereas Averroes had said that the diversity in the intellect comes from the natures of 
the diverse things that the intellect receives, Pecham says that the diversity goes deeper 
than that: “the intellect in diverse ways must receive diverse and disparate things; 
therefore there is diversity.”  Diversity that pertains to the various intellects themselves 209
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is a partial cause of the diversity in thoughts.  While Aquinas certainly discusses 210
diversity of intellect in the anti-Averroist texts I consulted,  he focuses on the 211
multiplication of the content of knowledge rather than on the human intellect as the 
essential cause for diversity.  212
Aquinas and Pecham both insist that the soul is in every part of the body equally.  213
Yet Pecham adds that the soul senses every bodily lesion no matter in what part of the 
body the lesion occurs, and that in such a situation the sensitive soul is not impeded by 
phantasms that relate to another sense, such as sight.  Pecham thinks that this 214
phenomenological fact presents a problem for monopsychism: The universal mind would 
not have a way cognize an instance of pain as relating to a particular part of the body. 
Presumably, this is because it is not by a phantasm that such pain is cognized, yet our 
experience suggests that we do focus on the particular locale of a given pain. 
Philosophical Motivation for the Plurality of Forms in Pecham 
Pecham’s and Aquinas’s anthropological projects have similar overarching aims. 
Pecham and Aquinas are both synthesizing views of prominent philosophers and 
theologians to develop conceptions of the human person as some combination of intellect 
and corporeal-temporal matter (the body). For both Pecham and Aquinas, the intellect and 
some matter must come together in such a way that a single human being, one human 
substance, is produced. 
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Why, then, do Pecham and Aquinas differ so sharply concerning the plurality of forms 
and the concept of life? One reason is that Pecham is part of a different philosophical 
tradition; he does believe that his Neoplatonic background and commitment to 
Augustinian illumination theory dictate that plurality is the correct position. However, 
lest one suppose that Pecham adopts the plurality view simply because he subscribes to 
different strands of authority from those to which Aquinas subscribes, it must be 
understood that Pecham has philosophical as well as theological reasons for adopting 
these two doctrines. That is, he takes the positions he does not only because of his 
allegiance to a particular tradition but also and primarily because he believes these 
positions are more reasonable than the opposing views taken by Aquinas. Thus, in this 
section, I will draw on the evidence presented above to summarize Pecham’s 
philosophical reasons for thinking that his view of life and of the plurality of forms offers 
greater explanatory power than the unitarian view of Aquinas. 
Pecham’s anthropology diverges sharply from that of Aquinas at the fundamental 
level of the definitions of matter, form, and substance. Pecham believes there are certain 
unacceptable consequences that follow from Aquinas’s metaphysical starting point, but 
which do not follow from his own starting point. The consequences are of significant 
theological and philosophical importance concerning the relationship between the soul 
and the body, including: 
• The identity of the dead body of Christ in the tomb.  
• The Eucharist. 
• The creation of the first man, Adam.  
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• The development of the embryo.  
• The inheritance of sin.  
Pecham and Aquinas are primarily theologians who are using philosophy to help them 
better understand their theological convictions, to better answer theological problems. 
Therefore, given Pecham’s references to convictions on the topics listed, it is safe to 
assume that they served as the major motivation for his central doctrines of the plurality 
of forms and of life. These two doctrines, as I have shown in the present chapter, 
constitute the substantive doctrinal differences between Pecham and Aquinas. Here, I will 
discuss Pecham’s and Aquinas’s metaphysical definitions, and then show how they give 
rise to these significant controversies.  
Matter, Form, and Substance 
To get a clear picture of how Pecham and Aquinas differ in their definitions of matter, 
the idea of matter must be isolated from other ideas. That is, we must first consider 
“prime matter” (what Avicebron calls “universal matter”) before considering “natural 
matter,” or that matter that is specified by form(s) and contributes directly to the 
constitution of objects which we observe sensibly or of which we are aware due to 
philosophical reasoning or revelation. In fact, opposing conceptions of “prime matter” are 
central to the differences between Pecham (and other pluralists, such as Roger Bacon) 
and Aquinas (and those who subscribe to the unity view). Crowley provides a helpful 
explanation of Bacon’s hylomorphism, which applies equally to Pecham:  
The first point of difference between the two theories is that, for Bacon, prime 
matter is co-extensive with finitude or contingency and is its source or principle. 
It is, therefore, a potentia ad esse. For St. Thomas, prime matter is limited to the 
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world of material things and is, together with the form to which it is intrinsically 
and necessarily relative, in potency relatively to the act of existence from which 
the essence constituted of matter and form is really distinct. But in spiritual 
things, in the opinion of St. Thomas, the principle of finitude or limitation is not 
matter but essence conceived as simple form which is in potency relatively to 
existence conceived as act.  215
For Bacon and Pecham, matter considered in itself (as “prime”) is the principle of 
possibility. It is thus the “root of contingency” of finite beings, and has a different essence 
from that of form.  Matter is not purely non-being or the mere absence of something, or 216
just a pure possibility. Nor is it an accident. It is rather a real potency. Aquinas 
understands that Avicebron’s position required this active reality on matter’s part.  217
Matter itself is not mere nothingness, because it is due to matter’s essence of possibility 
that various substances are formed.  (It is impossible that matter’s ability to be formed 218
be due to forms that are as yet not present, and so there must be a real, active potency in 
matter per se.) Although matter in itself has an essence, it is an incomplete essence 
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insofar as it is in potency to all forms.  It should be noted that, for Pecham, prime 219
matter is not merely an abstract concept. Pecham thinks that God does create matter 
without form, but actually uses form to “conserve” created substances in complete 
being.  (So neither Pecham nor Aquinas expects to ever come across any isolated prime 220
matter in the world.)  
The Bacon/Pecham definition of prime matter is distinct from that of Aquinas. For 
Aquinas, prime matter is the principle that is intrinsically relative to a form as the potency 
for the act of existence of the corporeal form/matter compound (substance).  “For if it is 221
of the nature of matter that it be in potency, then prime matter must be completely in 
potency. As a consequence, it is not predicated of any actually existing thing.”  Matter, 222
for Aquinas, is not an essence but is the pure possibility for the actualization of a form’s 
essence, and so the mutability or finitude of the substance comes from the limited 
existence of the form.  This is the perspective from which Aquinas criticizes the 223
doctrine of spiritual matter: 
It is important to notice, however, that if someone were to claim that the soul 
is composed of matter and form, then he could in no way say that the soul is the 
body’s form. For since form is actuality, whereas whereas matter is solely 
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potential being, there is no way in which what is composed of matter and form 
can be the form of something else in respect of its whole. But if it is the form in 
respect of some part of itself, then we will say that the soul is that which is the 
form, and we will say that what it is the form of is what is first ensouled. . . .”   224
Aquinas’s hylomorphism therefore exhibits a primacy of form, minimizing the 
contribution on the part of matter. 
Matter also can be considered in what Crowley calls its various “natural” states, or in 
states that are, for Bacon and Pecham, specified to some degree by form:   225
Matter which is the substratum of coming to be and passing away is not prime 
matter, is not that simple essence distinct from form which is the root of 
contingency, but is prime matter plus certain forms. It is prime mater plus the 
forms of substance, of corporeity, and of the elements. . . . This does not mean to 
say that matter has, of itself, any kind of active spontaneity or vital energy. In 
order to become active, the incomplete form (or active potency) has to receive 
from an external agent a complement or power (virtus) which confers on it a new 
mode of being. . . . The incomplete form or active potency is not to be thought of 
as an accident of matter, nor is it identical with matter. It is a substantial form, 
essentially the same as the complete form. Between this incomplete form or active 
potency and the complete form, there is only a difference of degree of 
actualisation within the same essence.  226
While Bacon has a basic distinction between prime matter and natural matter, it should be 
noted more precisely that the later Bacon has five stages of matter, the last of which is 
natural matter or the subject of generation and corruption. Michela Pereira’s forthcoming 
article on “Materia naturalis” in Bacon shows that he largely reproduces Avicebron’s 
layered structure of stages from prime matter to natural matter, including: 
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1. The genus generalissimum (prime matter and form).  
2. Spiritual incorporeal substance (separate substances and rational souls),  
3. Universal corporeal matter (not a body, but a common root for both heavenly 
and non-heavenly corporeal matter). 
4. Corporeal substance (heavenly matter and non-heavenly matter [non-heaven 
corporeality being the root for natural generation], to include the sphere of the 
elements, which are not subject to generation and corruption).  
5. Natural matter, or the world of generation and corruption (from the simplest 
mixed bodies to man).   227
While Pecham emphasizes the gradation of matter less than Bacon does, most of these 
stages are present in Pecham. But Bacon includes two (rather mysterious) distinctions 
that Pecham, to my knowledge, does not: For Pecham there is no “universal corporeal 
matter” that is a common root for heavenly and non-heavenly matter, and there is no non-
heavenly corporeal substance other than the corporeal matter that is subject to generation 
and corruption.  (Pecham also has no spere elementorum, although he does have both 228
elements and mixed bodies. ) 229
Recall that Bacon and Pecham subscribe to universal hylomorphism, or the view that 
every finite being, whether associated with a corporeal body or not, has matter (not 
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necessarily corporeal matter).  Thus, in fact, every finite, formed thing consists of 230
matter that has been specified by form to various degrees.  For Pecham and Bacon, 231
those form/matter compositions include not only the corporeal things of our sense-
experience, but non-corporeal things such as angels and intellects. In his discussion of 
natural matter, Bacon says: 
Et planum est quod non incipit in genere generalissimo nec in materia et forma 
ejus, quia illa in omnibus habentur per creacionem, quoniam conveniunt 
spiritualibus et corporabilibus et celestibus et aliis. Similter nec in prima specie 
que sequitur hoc genus, que est substancia spiritualis et incorporea, quia illa 
quantum ad angelos et quantum ad animas racionales creatur totaliter. Nec incipit 
in specie alia ei coequeva, scilicet, in substancia corporea, quoniam illud est 
commune celo et non celo, et ideo antecedit generacionem.  232
For Aquinas, on the other hand, natural matter can refer only to corporeal matter. This is 
necessitated by his view that prime matter is the potency to the actualization of a 
corporeal being’s form.  
For the pluralists, matter and form are essentially different from one another.  233
Matter is gradually specified by a series of forms—or grades of the single form—which 
are not expelled as new forms are educed from the active potency of matter by external 
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forces.  Pecham, like Bonaventure, refers to these forms which are in matter as the 234
seminal reasons, taken from the philosophy of Stoicism and Augustine.  Substance 235
itself is the result of the union of universal matter and universal form, and is analogous to 
the “most general genus,”  which contains in potency its various species, each of which 236
is determined gradually by more and more specific formation.  In the case of Bacon it is 237
more correct to refer to the individual being’s single substantial form which has various 
grades, admitting of degrees, whereas for Pecham the situation is not entirely clear, but as 
I have noted above, it is entirely possible that he advocates the grades theory, as would be 
perfectly consistent with his philosophy.  
For Aristotle and Aquinas substantial form does not admit of degrees; each being can 
have only one substantial form, else it would not be one thing.  For Pecham, who does 238
not share Aquinas’s definitions of form and matter, it is not logically necessary that a 
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substance have but one form in order to be a unified substance. In fact, Pecham uses 
substantia in a wide variety of contexts,  and so the reader cannot assume that the word 239
refers to what is traditionally called “substance” in Aquinas’s language.  
Whether Pecham subscribes to the grades view or not, he certainly sees a progressive 
unfolding of the actualization of substantial form. In the case of the human being, 
Pecham views substantial forms (or grades of form) as being non-static, accounting 
jointly for all human function and thereby fulfilling one another. For example, the 
nutritive and sensitive forms are taken up and transformed in the activity of the 
intellective form, because human thinking presupposes the support of the nutritive and 
sensitive souls. Nonetheless the nutritive and sensitive forms have their own subservient 
perfections. Pecham insists that the forma corporeitatis is included in the very definition 
of the soul of the human being, because the definition of the soul makes reference to the 
organic body that potentially has life.  Pecham cites both Avicenna and Boethius to 240
make the point that form can refer whole of the thing with its parts, as well as the esse of 
the thing.  241
I have already said that for Aquinas, matter (prime or natural) does not contain in 
itself any forms in any sense, but is rather is pure possibility for the actualization of form 
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which is ontologically external to it.  Matter is therefore a purely receptive potency and 242
forms cannot be educed from natural matter at all:  
Now it is proper for matter to be in potency. This distinction of matter must 
therefore not be understood as matter contains its diverse forms or dispositions, 
for this is outside the essence of matter, but according to the distinctions of 
potency with respect to the diversity of forms. For, since potency is called that 
which is said relatively to act, it is necessary that potency be distinguished with 
respect to that of which potency is primarily predicated.  243
For Aquinas, the single substantial form for a being is static, so while it is possible for the 
form to be corrupted and for the matter to receive a different substantial form, it is 
impossible for a single being to have more than one substantial form (or more than one 
grade of a form) at a time.   244
Life as Emanative Force 
Pecham thinks that life is an emanative, immanent, “top-down” force (sometimes 
called a form ) which, in its farthest reaching emanation from God, animates all living 245
corporeal matter.  In living things, the actualization of forms (e.g., the nutritive and 246
sensitive) is driven by this force as it reaches the soul and then “overflows” to the 
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body.  Life is more fundamental than the activity of the nutritive soul; nutrition involves 247
the passing on of material from part to part, but some principle must explain why this 
happens. Life, as this emanative principle, does not emerge out of matter. But it is 
omnipresent in living, corporeal beings. 
Aquinas does not have a principle to explain why nutrition happens, because he 
thinks that there is nothing more fundamental in the living thing than the nutritive soul 
itself. While Aquinas also associates form with life, his concept of life is not the same as 
that of Pecham. For Aquinas, the soul is actuality of a physical body that potentially has 
life.  Life results from the ensoulment of matter, but there is not the same Neoplatonic 248
emanation of life.  249
As one reads Pecham, it is easier to understand the effects of life than to understand 
life itself. He characterizes the effects of this vital form in terms of various emanated 
forms. The plants, having only the “farthest resonance of life” have only enough of the 
vital force to attain the nutritive form/soul. Animals have more of the vital form, and so 
they are able to attain not only the nutritive form, but also the sensitive form. Humans, 
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while still far removed from the source of life, are close enough to be subject to a greater 
measure of the vital force and thus also suited to receive the intellective form.  
Substantial Unity 
Aquinas thinks that the unity produced by Pecham’s combination of the substance of 
universal matter and the substantiality provided by the various forms is purely accidental: 
“For if to some being existing in act, another act is added, the whole will not be one 
essentially but only accidentally because two acts or forms are essentially diverse.”  250
Surely Pecham’s combination of the various forms in a being would result in an 
accidental unity if he were operating with the same definitions of form and matter that 
function in Aquinas’s thought. But Pecham’s definition of natural matter includes the 
seminal reasons, which guide the formation of the substance. It is anything but accidental, 
therefore, that a being takes on the forms that it does. Pecham’s extended treatment of the 
seminal reasons is found in his Summa De Ente et Essentia.  There, Pecham says that a 251
seminal reason is the “power of the genus of the individual, through which it is to find the 
species ramificalem.”  Pecham illustrates this point by contrasting a man and a donkey. 252
While the man and the donkey are both in the genus of animal, the seminal reason that 
contributes to the production of the donkey is not in the matter that produces the man, 
and vice versa. The result is that man does not naturally produce a donkey (although God 
could miraculously use the matter of a man to make an donkey, if he willed to do so). 
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In this discussion, Pecham also explains the gradual development of the various kinds 
of creatures throughout the world due to the seminal reasons in matter.  All animals 253
may be said to be closely related in that they are all part of a genus that has evolved 
according to the seminal reasons, as universal matter has been progressively specified by 
form. This gradual evolution of substantial form must occur, for “generation embraces a 
multiplicity of partial generations.”  The devolution must come to an end, however, and 254
Pecham is evidently thinking of this when he mentions the mule: In the far reaches of this 
specification the mule, for example, is made from the mating of the horse and donkey 
because the horse and donkey are closely related in the genus.  
Pecham explains further in his Summa De Ente et Essentia how a substance that 
includes various active, formative principles, which are educed from the active potency 
of matter, may constitute a single “being.” The being (esse) of a thing can be explained in 
four ways, and in each of these explanations there is a perspective from which form can 
be considered as an accident of matter (every attribute of universal matter is accidental in 
a sense). 
1. Being can refer to a thing not as it is composed of principles, but to the nature 
of the thing as it is in relation to others. For example, “to read” makes 
reference to a book, and “to write” makes reference to a script. What one 
reads is the book, not the principles that compose it. In this sense, esse is in a 
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sense an accident of being (ens), although it remains an ens in itself (i.e., the 
book is really a being in virtue of the principles that compose it).  255
2. Being can refer to the whole nature of the thing, that is, whatever is in the 
being other than its accidents. This includes the Boethian distinction between 
quod est and quo est. We refer to the being of a thing when we say that 
someone is capable of taking on the accident of becoming wise. 
3. Being can signify the form or quiddity of the the thing. For example, 
humanity is the form a whole human being (not just a part). This form may 
also be called accidental in the sense that the thing’s coming together as one 
thing is contingent.  
4. Being can refer to anything that is in the genus of ens. Accidents are not 
beings in this sense, because they have essence not from their own principles, 
but from principles of the beings that are the subjects of change.   256
For Pecham, natural substances are unified beings, but this in no way rules out their 
composition “from subsisting principles.”   257
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 Pecham goes into some detail here about the sense in which esse may be considered as 255
accidental and the sense in which it may not be: “Vocat autem Avicenna accidens rei quod 
non est in re sicut esse vel pars eius, ut quia non est genus vel differentia, materia vel 
forma. Boethius autem [et] alii, utentes nomine accidentis, dicunt ipsum esse non esse 
accidens. Nec sequitur quod est accidens entis: non enim est accidens mediante potentia, 
sed ipsius rei accidentalitas immediata, non elicita a potentia, sed concomitans 
principiorum confluentiam et causata ab ipsa” (Delorme, “La Summa,” 62, bracketed 
item in orig.).
 Delorme, “La Summa,” 62-64; Aquinas understands that the Avicebronian position 256
holds that every particular substance is in some sense an accident of being (Treatise on 
Separate Substances, 63). Aquinas rejects the Avicebronian view, instead choosing a 
definition of accidental being that is clearly more limited: “[C]onsider that a substantial 
form differs from an accidental form as follows: an accidental form does not give being 
unconditionally, but being such. (So heat does not make its subject be unconditionally, 
but be hot.) And so when an accidental form is added, we do not say that something is 
made or is generated unconditionally, but that it is made such or that it stands in some 
way. Likewise, when an accidental form departs, we do not say that something is 
corrupted unconditionally, but in a certain respect (secundum quid)” (Treatise on Human 
Nature, 34, parenthetical items in orig.). 
 “[E]x principiis subsistentes” (Delorme, “La Summa,” 63). 257
Substance and Individuation 
Yet, to say how particular beings are unified is not to explain how they are 
individuated from one another. Pecham’s account of individuation is presented in his 
Summa De Ente et Essentia,  and it relies on the discussion of the active potency of 258
natural matter described above. Pecham argues that individuals are totally distinct from 
one another, even if they share membership in some genus.  Individuation is not 259
something that is superadded onto the most specified species of being; rather, 
individuation is already present in the species by virtue of its active potencies. Pecham’s 
illustration for this has to do with fire and the surrounding air.  When a fire is corrupted 260
into air, it is not the case that the fire is totally corrupted into absolute nothingness, nor is 
the source of the air nothing. Rather, there is something of the fire that remains after the 
change and there was already something of the ignited air (as yet not fully actualized) in 
the fire. Pecham uses this example to show that the individuation of the product of 
change (a third thing after the form and matter are counted) results from both matter and 
form, according to the following procedure: Matter contributes to the individuation of the 
third thing, because the subject of the change, the fire, is matter that becomes the ignited 
air. However, form is also involved, because the form of the air already resided in the fire 
as an active potency. The form of the fire is corrupted and resolved into a new substance. 
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 A companion passage in Pecham is Quaestiones, 381. 260
The new substance shares the same “root” as that of the fire.  No individuation is purely 261
accidental, but rather occurs “according to the order of nature.”  262
As would be expected, the individuation of the human being adheres generally to the 
foregoing pattern. The various forms and the corporeal matter both contribute to the 
individuation of the person. The difference is that in the case of the human being, there is 
not only the forma corporeitatis and the seminal reasons which lead to the actualization 
of the potency of the already-formed matter, but there is also the intellectual form, which 
God inserts from outside the human being. The rational soul cannot be united to just any 
kind of body, but must be united specifically to a corporeal structure capable of yielding a 
human body.  Therefore, the rational soul requires a bodily disposition which “ministers 263
to its operation” . The organization of the full body is required to make possible the 264
uniquely human activity, intellection. However, the organization and life of the body 
alone is insufficient to account for intellection. The intellective soul has an operation that 
is not carried out by the matter of the corporeal body, and so it cannot be educed from the 
potency of matter. It is not that the intellection cannot occur apart from the human body, 
but rather that the human body must operate in a certain way if there is to be intellectual 
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 Delorme, “La Summa,” 65: “[I]dem ergo radicaliter G, verumtamen esse rei est 261
alterum et alterum.” “G” denotes the common subject which was before the individual 
fire and became the air.
 Ibid., 68: “Sed ex via Avicennae sequitur error, ut individuatio sit per accidentia, quod 262
falsum est; cum individua sint diversae substantiae, non est individuatio per accidentia, 
sed per ipsa principia essentialia, quae sunt alia et alia. Si ergo omnia accidentia sint a 
principiis substantiae, necesse est priorem esse individuationem substantiae quam 
accidentium ordine naturae.”
 Quaestiones, 377; Tractatus, 27.263
 Tractatus, 27: “ ... suae operationi subministret.”264
functionality on the part of this human being. Thus the intellect plays a decisive formal 
role for the unity and plurality of the human being. 
For Aquinas, the individuation of a substance comes primarily from matter, although 
there is a contribution from form in the sense that multiple instantiation must be suitable 
to a form’s nature.  This is not the place for a full study of Aquinas’s theory of 265
individuation, but the relevant point here is that his rejection of the Avicebronian position 
about the unity of matter pre-empts any Pechamian explanation of species individuation. 
In fact, Aquinas likens those who share Pecham’s view with the Pre-Socratics substance 
monists.  Every case of individuation on the Avicebronian view is taken as a merely 266
accidental difference, and so any further remaining Pechamian explanation concerning 
substantial individuation (as discussed above) is of no use.  As I said earlier in the 267
present chapter, however, it is not clear that Aquinas’s account of individuation is as 
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 See Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, 9; cf. Joseph Owens, “Thomas Aquinas (b. ca. 265
1225; d. 1274),” Individuation in Scholasticism, 180. 
 “Now in this way alone is a species one without qualification, namely, insofar as that 266
which is man is truly animal, not because animal is the subject of the form man but 
because the very form animal is the form man, differing only as indeterminate from the 
determinate. For, if animal be one thing and biped something else, the biped animal that 
is man will not be essentially one and consequently will not be essentially a being. As a 
consequence, it follows that whatever things agree in the genus, will differ only by an 
accidental difference and all things will be one in substance which is the genus and the 
subject of all substances; just as the one part of a surface is white and the other part black, 
yet the whole is one surface. For this reason, the ancients themselves who posited one 
matter which was the substance of all things and predicated of all them, asserted that all 
things were one. These difficulties likewise beset those who posit an order of diverse 
substantial forms in one and the same being” (Treatise on Separate Substances, 65). 
 Aquinas’s argument against any accidental determination of substantial form-matter 267
combination is in Treatise, 40-41.
explanatory as Pecham’s account. This becomes clearer in the case of the individuation of 
the embryo, which I will discuss below. 
Now, consider how Pecham’s views on form, matter, and substance support his 
various central convictions. 
The Separation of the Soul and Bodily Identity 
Pecham wants an anthropology that guarantees not only the unity and individuality of 
the human being, but also the persistence of the body’s ontological identification after 
death. This identification is critical not only for addressing the concerns of those who 
expect to be reunited with their bodies in the eschatological resurrection described in 
Christianity, but also for explaining how the dead body of Christ maintained its 
identification during its three days in the tomb. (Furthermore, a philosophical account of 
diachronic bodily identification was necessary to explain how the dead body of Christ 
could be involved in the Eucharist. ) Pecham believes that only his account of the 268
human person—and not that of Aquinas—can explain the ontological persistence of the 
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 Pecham says on this point: “Unde elegantissime deserviunt vocabula fidei christianae, 268
ut non dicatur panem transmutari in corpus Christi, sed transubstantiari: ubi enim est 
commutatio, et subiectum commune et materia eadem manet; corpori autem Christi non 
ei isto modo advenit nova materia, quia individua ipsa materia panis, immo ipsum 
individuum substantiae quod est in pane, transit in individuum substantiae quod est 
corpus Christi; ideo propriissime dicitur transubstantiatio” (Delorme, “La Summa,” 67). 
human body, and so I suspect that this is one of the major issues motivating Pecham to 
take his anthropological claims so seriously. (In fact, his own writing suggests this. ) 269
According to Pecham, at death: (1) The intellect leaves the body; (2) The body is no 
longer animated by the vital form; (3) The nutritive and sensitive forms, which are no 
longer needed to maintain the body’s corporeal life and provide phantasms for cognition, 
are corrupted;  (4) However, the forma corporeitatis remains with the decaying body, 270
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 Callus, The Condemnation of St Thomas at Oxford, 16: “Archbishop John Pecham at 269
the metropolitan visitation of the University on October 29th, 1284, in order to short-
circuit all evasion, renewed the prohibition issued seven years previously by his 
predecessor [Kilwardby]; but, for the sake of peace, he added that as a concession he 
would consider whether any of the thirty theses might be tolerated in the schools. Until 
then, the prohibitions should be maintained under the same penalties as before. 
Nevertheless, one particular thesis should be most strictly proscribed, namely, the 
execrable error of those who posited one single form in man, ‘unum vero illorum 
expresse notavimus articulum, quorundam dicentium, in homine esse tantummodo 
formam unam.’ Without significant emphasis he roundly asserted that, in addition to 
countless other absurdities, it follows from this theory that Christ’s body was not one and 
the same before and after death; that the relics of the saints venerated in Rome and all 
over Christendom did not in reality appertain to their own bodies born of their mothers, 
but would be new entities born of the imagination, for it is in fact impossible to preserve 
the identity of the body without the permanence of a general or special form” (bracketed 
item added); cf. Pecham, Registrum, 3:841.
 Pecham, Quodlibeta, 237: “Si enim dicere vellet quis animam sensitivam hominis 270
generari et solum intellectum creari et extrinsecus advenire—ut videtur sentire 
Philosophus—tunc dicere oportet sensus aut vires sensitivas nullatenus separari. Sed quia 
‘quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest superior’ et non e converso, intellectus separatus 
potest cognoscere sensibilia sicut omne genus sensitivum unica vi intellectiva.” I do not 
know of a passage where Pecham describes precisely the corruptive process through 
which the nutritive and sensitive forms go, but he implies that they are corrupted when he 
says that the intellect is not corrupted precisely because it has a potency that works 
without an organ: “Potentia autem, quae sine organo operatur, sine organo habet esse, 
cum operatio habeat esse a forma, quae dat esse. Ergo potentia intellectiva nullo modo 
dependet a corpore, et ita nec corrumpitur, corpore corrupto” (Tractatus, 49). And, 
Pecham says that whatever is generated is corrupted (Quodlibeta, 227); the nutritive and 
sensitive souls are generated, therefore they are at some stage (death) corrupted.
preserving its identification as this particular body.  Corporeity was present before the 271
infusion of the rational soul, and so it will remain there when the rational soul departs.  272
Pecham says that it is by virtue of the seminal reasons in matter that the identity of the 
dead body is maintained: 
Haec ergo ratio seminalis est vis individui generis propinqui, quae vis non est 
solius formae generis, sed continens aptitudinem materiae et esse alio modo 
praedicto. Sic ergo manet idem quodammodo individuum generis in diversis 
individuis specierum, etsi in cineres transmutantur: quando homo moritur et 
corpus corrumpitur, in cineres transit species corporis et individuum speciei, sed 
remanet individuum generis; etsi cineres mutantur in auras vel in corpora 
quorumcumque animalium, semper verum est dicere: “haec materia, haec 
substantia fuit in corpore alicuius hominis”. . . .   273
Pecham thinks that the body’s reduction to ashes, or even to prime matter, is not a 
problem for the identification of the body, because the matter has been permanently 
identified as being the matter of a individual by virtue of the matter having been specified 
by the seminal reasons, which produced the forma corporeitatis.   274
On the other hand, the separation of the intellect from the body is problematic for 
Aquinas, given his definition of matter. If matter is a totally uninformed potency, it 
cannot be disposed to any particular form. Having lost its only form, the matter is now 
free from any disposition and therefore totally unspecified. There is no hope to account 
philosophically for its future identification, nor is there any principled reason for it to 
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 In the Tractatus, Pecham bases an argument for the immortality of the soul on the 271
incorruptibility of a bodily form: “Item, si aliqua forma corporalis, perficiens materiam 
corcorporalem (sic), est incorruptibilis, ergo multo fortius aliqua forma spiritualis corpus 
perficiens. Sed omnium formarum nobilissima est anima rationalis” (50); cf. Delorme, 
“La Summa,” 66-67. 
 Pecham, Quodlibeta, 230. 272
 Delorme, “La Summa,” 66-67. 273
 Tractatus, 48-49; Quodlibeta, 227-228, 230. 274
taking up the form of a corpse after death. This is precisely the point Pecham makes in 
his Summa De Ente et Essentia and in his ecclesiastical condemnation of 1286.  275
Aquinas is forced to rely on God’s miraculous intervention to re-introduce the bodily 
identification at the resurrection. For Pecham, Aquinas is making two mistakes by 
introducing the miraculous to solve the philosophical difficulty: He is introducing a 
strictly theological explanation that arbitrarily infringes on his own Aristotelian account 
of natural processes, and he is opposing the only philosophical explanation that supports 
what both thinkers understand to be orthodoxy. 
When we turn to Pecham’s fourth Quodlibet (Romanum), we find further problems 
with the unity view relative to the intellect’s isolation from the corporeal body. Pecham 
says that God infused a rational soul into the already-formed body of Adam, that is, the 
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 Delorme, “La Summa,” 66-67: “Sic ergo manet idem quodammodo individuum 275
generis in diversis individuis specierum, etsi in cineres transmutantur: quando homo 
moritur et corpus corrumpitur, in cineres transit species corporis et individuum speciei, 
sed remanet individuum generis; etsi cineres mutantur in auras vel in corpora 
quorumcumque animalium, semper verum est dicere: ‘haec materia, haec substantia fuit 
in corpore alicuius hominis.’” For the 1286 condemnation, see Registrum, 3:922: “quod 
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natura, quamvis non nova assumptione vel unione Verbo copulata; ex quo sequitur, quod 
Filius Dei non fuerit tantum homo, sed alterius speciei innominatae. . . . identitatem 
fuisse numeralem corporis Christi mortui cum ejus corpore vivo, tantummodo propter 
identitatem materiae et dimensionum interminatarum, et habitudinis ipsarum ad animam 
intellectivam, quae immortales est. Esse insuper identitatem numeralem corporis vivi et 
mortui, ratione existentiae utriusque in eadem hypostasi Verbi” (emp .added). For further 
information concerning this condemnation, see Wilson, “Henry of Ghent and John 
Peckham’s Condemnation”; Alain Boureau, Théologie, Science et Censure au XIIIe 
Siècle: Le Cas de Jean Peckham (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2008). 
body had a form prior to the introduction of the rational soul.  If Adam’s body were not 276
already specified by form, then there would be no reason for God to introduce the soul 
into that body rather than into, say, a stone. Pecham adds that there is no sense in which 
the forms already present in the body are corrupted when the rational soul comes in, as 
Aquinas taught. Thus it is clear that the discussion is directed against Aquinas and others 
who espouse the unity of form position.  
In the very next quaestio of the fourth Quodlibet, Pecham argues that it is not due to 
the intellective soul’s creation that it is made impure by sin, but rather because the 
intellective soul is infused into a corporeal body.  This requires, however, that the body 277
already have certain properties. The corporeal body considered in the state of being 
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Scripturam Gen. 2, 7, dicit: Formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae et inspiravit in 
faciem eius spiraculum vitae. ‘Formavit’, Glossa: ‘quantum ad corpus.’; et Haymo addit: 
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forma corporalis. Item, Philosophus, XVI De animalibus: ‘Sermo dicentis quod illud 
quod operatur corrumpitur postquam fecerit omnia membra, est falsus.’ Dicendum igitur 
quod anima rationalis non est forma corporis, secundum quod corpus est, immo 
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animae, quae est ‘actus corporis organici physici potentia vitam habentis.’ Ergo nullo 
modo repugnat animae ut corrumpatur per adventum eius”; cf. Aristotle, Generation of 
Animals, 742a.10-13; ibid., De Anima, 412a.20.
 Quodlibeta, 233: “Dico quod anima creatur munda et ex carne infecta inficitur et 277
efficitur immunda. Quod patet sic: quia anima creatur ex nihilo, et hoc non potest esse 
nisi ab illo cuius potentia est infinita, qui solus potest aliquid facere de nihilo. Ipse autem, 
cum sit optimus, nihil potest facere nisi bonum in genere suo. Impossibile est igitur 
animam esse malam ex creatione, sed in corpore inquinatur”; cf. Quaestiones, 359.
prepared for the introduction of the rational soul, is not a nothing or a pure potency, but 
rather is an already informed something.  
Notice the implication of these discussions in the fourth Quodlibet: Pecham sees his 
own understanding of matter as required for a consistent understanding of how the 
theological doctrines could be true. It is not just that Pecham thinks he has a more 
explanatory account of the human person than that of Aquinas. Rather, he thinks that the 
Scriptures and Augustine’s philosophy require the pluralist account. 
Embryology 
The same pluralist vision that accounts for the separation of the intellect from the 
body also implicates an account of embryology. For Pecham, every part of the embryo is 
the product of natural generation with the exception of the rational soul, which is created 
and infused, and the form of life itself.  The parents pass on material from which the 278
embryo’s various forms (including the nutritive and sensitive souls) are educed by 
external forces associated with the parents.  Life as the universal teleological drive for 279
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 Quaestiones, 315-330; see the discussion in the present chapter (above) concerning 278
life as the animate form.
 Pecham, Quaestiones, 324: “Ergo, animatum et inanimatum sunt in eadem potentia 279
formae substantialis”; ibid., 326: “[S]perma habet animam potentia, actu autem non, sed 
est virtus paterna in semine transfusa, quae quidem operatur ad productionem animae 
species. . . . Et quia non distincte [agit] ad operationem membrorum, quasi per modum 
artis incipiens a corde, ideo dicitur intellectus, [quia] quasi similis intellectui in operando. 
. . . Ideo generat agregatum essentialiter ordinatum ad animam rationalem. Quod autem 
ad animam rationalem non potest attingere, non est ex impotentia et indignitate, sed 
summa hominis dignitate qua [secundum] supernaturalem modum est ad imaginem 
Dei. . . . [H]omo generat hominem et aggregatum, quia generat quidquid est in homine 
generabile. Tamen, quia illud quod per se generat est ordinatum essentialiter ad animam 
rationabilem, unde credo quod si per impossibile Deus non infunderet animam 
rationalem, necessario deficeret” (bracketed items in orig.).
animate beings participates with the matter to cause the embryo’s organization and vital 
development. At some point during the natural, gradual, bodily developmental process, 
the created rational soul is infused.  The forms that were in place prior to the 280
introduction of the rational soul are completed.  281
Aquinas’s position concerning the animation of the embryo is as follows: The embryo 
initially has its own nutritive soul/form, which is corrupted upon the development of the 
sensitive soul. The sensitive soul contains virtually the powers of the nutritive soul. Then, 
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 See Crowley, Roger Bacon, 132-135, especially: “It is interesting to note that the roles 280
of Aristotle and St. Augustine in the present debate are the reverse of what one would 
expect: Aristotle is the great authority in the camp of the ‘pluralists,’ Augustine, in the 
opposite camp. In the De Generatione Animalium, the Stagirite traces the various stages 
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protagonists of plurality of forms” (134-135). Amerini says that the pluralist position 
about the development of the embryo’s soul is: “[T]he sensitive soul and the rational soul 
are added to the vegetative soul, which is present in the semen, in such a way that there 
are in humans three substantially different souls.” This phrasing would most readily be 
interpreted to mean that the sensitive soul is infused just as the rational soul is. However, 
Pecham’s view is that both the sensitive and nutritive souls are educed from matter, 
whereas only the rational soul is infused from outside (Quaestiones, 315-330): 
“[D]icendum quod [compositum] generatur ex corpore et anima sensitiva, quae non 
corrumpitur adveniente anima rationali, sed completur. Et quod generatum, et anima 
rationalis quae infunditur, non sunt duae animae sed una; sicut homo est una substantia ex 
anima composita” (ibid., 326, bracketed item in orig.). 
 Quaestiones, 326:  “[D]icendum quod [compositum] generatur ex corpore et anima 281
sensitiva, quae non corrumpitur adveniente anima rationali, sed completur. Et quod 
generatum, et anima rationalis quae infunditur, non sunt duae animae sed una; sicut homo 
est una substantia ex anima composita” (bracketed item in orig.).
when the rational soul is created, the sensitive form is likewise corrupted, because the 
rational soul contains virtually all of the powers of the sensitive and nutritive forms. 
For Thomas the formative power, passed on by the father’s semen, is a corporeal 
power whose only task is to manage the material formation and organization of 
the body. It remains throughout the whole process, at least until the coming of the 
rational soul. But since for Thomas the species of what is formed changes during 
the process (in fact the embryo performs vital operations—vegetative, sensitive, 
and intellective functions—that are of different species), it follows that, once it is 
conceded that one and the same form cannot perdure and be gradually perfected, 
the only possibility is to assume that in the process of generation there is a 
succession of species, and this requires an alternation of generation and corruption 
because … “every process of generation involves a process of corruption, and 
vice versa.” And so, before the coming of the rational soul, embryos are formed to 
last a short period of time. As soon as they are conceived, embryos possess a 
vegetative ensoulment. Once they reach a more perfect form of organization, 
these embryos corrupt and embryos specifically more complex take their place. in 
this way, embryos in their first phases are entities that are transitory and almost 
instrumental, produced to give life to more articulated and functionally 
sophisticated embryonic forms and, finally, to a human being.   282
The issue here is not just that Pecham prefers to say that developmental forms are 
perfected whereas Aquinas chooses to say they are corrupted. It is that Aquinas’s account 
of the organization and vital activity of the embryo has a problem that Pecham’s account 
does not. Given Aquinas’s positions (1) that natural matter is the principle of a form’s 
potency, but has no active principle in itself; and (2) that the rational soul is not infused 
until the body is organically prepared to receive its ultimate form, the rational soul,  he 283
is left with no principle to explain the development of the various transitory forms from 
the matter provided by the parents.  
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Aquinas thinks the contribution from the father, the semen, contains a remote potency 
for either the production of the soul or for the organization required for vital function.  284
Yet this does not account for how the lower forms facilitate functions associated with the 
higher forms, as Stephen J. Heaney writes: 
Could it be that each successive soul, in some way, manages to transcend 
itself—that is, to produce by its own power a body capable of receiving a higher 
form? In this scenario, the original vegetative soul produces a body with the 
organs necessary for the sensitive soul, which in turn produces a body capable of 
receiving an intellectual soul. No; such a production is impossible. . . . There is a 
lack of due proportion of producer to what is produced; a cause cannot be the 
cause of what is greater than itself. Thus a lower soul, which itself is incapable of 
higher operations, could not be responsible for the production of organs of higher 
operations. Nor could it be the case that a lower soul upon further perfection 
becomes the higher soul, for this would mean: a) that substantial form is 
susceptible of degrees, and b) that a rational soul is corruptible, since it would 
thus be founded in a vegetative and sentient substance.   285
The matter from the parents can produce only organic parts, but not the activities 
associated with ensoulment.  Aquinas could have accounted for embryonic 286
development by arguing—as others did—that there is a “double soul,” i.e., that in 
addition to the ensouled body that is developing in the womb, there exists an additional 
tripartite soul created by God to facilitate the development of the ensouled embryo as it 
develops its own animate function.  On this view, both of the following are in one 287
embryo: 
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• A nutritive and sensitive soul educed according to the laws of nature. 
• A nutritive, sensitive, and intellective soul, concreated by God and infused.  288
But this explanation would have conflicted with Aquinas’s convictions regarding biology, 
as Heaney points out, and so he does not use it.  Heaney’s own solution is to argue for a 289
reading of Aquinas texts that adapts to contemporary scientific embryology and shows 
how Aquinas can accommodate the immediate presence of the rational soul in the early 
embryo.  This reading makes the rational soul the causation of the embryo’s natural, 290
biological development. Heaney admits that Aquinas did not overtly teach the immediate 
presence of the intellective soul. After all, if Aquinas had espoused this view, his teaching 
would have been entirely original in his day (as far as I know).   291
Whether Heaney’s suggested reading of Aquinas is correct or not, the problem of 
accounting for fetal development is not problematic (at least not in the same way) for 
Pecham. For the pluralists hold that the substantial form is susceptible of degrees, and 
matter has already within itself the seminal reasons from which subsequent forms may be 
naturally educed. And, it is clear that Pecham’s position does not necessitate that the 
previous forms in the embryo be destroyed. 
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 Bacon argues against this view in his Communia Naturalium, 1.pars 4.d.3.ch.1, p. 288
283-284.
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Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 736b.1-3.
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Conclusion 
Insofar as Pecham and Aquinas operate with different definitions of matter, form, and 
substance, they have two distinct projects. Pecham’s metaphysical definitions rule out the 
possibility that his anthropology results from a failed attempt to do what Aquinas also 
attempted to do, i.e., to give an an account of the human person that was not only 
consistent with Christianity but also true to a particular reading of Aristotelian 
anthropology. Unfortunately, Aquinas judges the consistency of the Avicebronian 
background of Pecham’s position by its failure to remain consistent in his application of 
metaphysical definitions from Aristotle that Aquinas has himself specified.  But 292
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one Avicebronian argument is “unacceptable because Avicebron proceeds upward from 
the lower beings to the highest ones by resolving them into material principles, which is 
an argument absolutely contrary to reason. For matter is compared to form as potency to 
act” (Treatise on Separate Substances, 61). Also, Aquinas says that Avicebron’s position 
“destroys the true nature of prime matter. For if it is of the nature of matter that it be in 
potency, then prime matter must be completely in potency. . . . This position likewise 
destroys the principles of logic by doing away with the true nature of genus, species, and 
substantial difference, inasmuch as it reduces them all to the mode of accidental 
predication” (ibid., 63). And Aquinas does not acknowledge that the pluralists may be 
said to view the form/matter combination as being purely accidental only if “accidental” 
has the meaning given to it by Aquinas’s own context of predication (ibid., 64-65). In 
Aquinas’s critique of the plurality of forms, he relies on his reading of Aristotelian 
predication: “Therefore if something were said to be an animal because of one form, and 
said to be a human being because of another, then it would follow that either (i) one of 
the forms could be predicated of the other only per accidens, if the two forms did not 
have any order to one another; or (ii) there would there be predication in the second mode 
of speaking per se, if one of the souls were a prerequisite for the other. But each of theses 
is clearly false. For (i) animal is predicated of human being per se, not per accidens, and 
(ii) it is not the case that human being is contained in the definition of anima, but vice 
versa. Therefore, it must be the same form through which something is an animal, and 
through which something is a human being. Otherwise the human being would not truly 
be that which the animal is, in such a way that animal would be predicated per se of 
human being” (Treatise, 31-32).
Avicebron, Bacon, and Pecham should not be judged in this way, because they radically 
alter the meaning of the Aristotelian language to function in their own project. It is 
impossible, therefore, to judge the success of Pecham’s project on the basis of his 
consistency in applying Aquinas’s definitions of central concepts (especially matter).  
In chapters two and three, I gave an exposé of the content of Pecham’s relevant texts 
for the purposes of supporting my thesis and enhancing future Pecham scholarship. Then, 
in the fifth chapter, I placed Pecham’s texts in their intellectual context in order to show 
that Pecham exhibits a nuanced, original interpretation of a particular metaphysical 
tradition. Therefore the fifth chapter proved correct the first part of my thesis, i.e., that 
Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of 
Neoplatonic metaphysics. 
In analyzing the relevant texts of Thomas Aquinas in the fourth chapter, and in 
comparing them with Pecham’s views in this concluding chapter, I also showed (1) that 
Pecham’s position is not subject to some objections that are problematic for Aquinas; that 
(2) Pecham and Aquinas cannot be conveniently separated along dualist/non-dualist lines; 
and that (3) Pecham makes interesting philosophical arguments that Aquinas does not 
make in his own anti-Averroist texts. Since Pecham’s work on the soul has these 
qualities, I have proved correct the second part of my thesis, i.e., that Pecham’s 
anthropology is a significant alternative to that of Aquinas. Only with this more complete 
background in place can the medieval debate about the nature of the soul and the 
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